

The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library

This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.

Help ensure our sustainability.

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu
aesearch@umn.edu

Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.



A blessing or a curse? Causal link between primary exports and institutional quality

VICTOR LANA, LORENA COSTA, LEONARDO BORNACKI

Department of Agricultural Economics – University of Vicosa, Brazil

Introduction

Many researches have long investigated how institutions could affect long-term growth;

But we wanted to take one step back and try and understand what could determine institutions

Colonial heritage

Climate

Trade openness

Resource endowment

Introduction

We also know that (based on the HO model) resource-rich countries tend to export primary product goods;

Then we argued whether the relationship between **resource endowments** and **institutions** also holds for the association between **primary exports** and **institutions**;

We know that such a connection might differ between developing and more advanced economies.

Introduction

To evaluate the impact of primary product exports on institutional quality for a set of countries from 1997 to 2019.

Identification strategy

Since countries' commodity exports might, at the same time, cause and be affected by institutional quality, it is crucial to search for exogenous natural variations in primary product exports in combination with econometric modeling techniques.

Identification strategy

The identification strategy in this paper uses China's accession to the WTO in 2001 as a natural experiment to study the relationship between primary trade and the quality of a country's institutions.

Identification strategy

Chen (2009) stresses that the accession of China to the WTO means that the country's imports would all face the same tariffs and barriers to trade, thus making each country's commerce with China a reflex of its comparative advantages, not its political power.

Empirical strategy

Our baseline model is:

$$Inst_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ln X_{it} + \sum \beta V + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Empirical strategy

Our baseline model is:

$$Inst_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ln X_{it} + \sum \beta V + \varepsilon_{it}$$

IV approach through the 2SLS. The first- and second-stage econometric models follow:

$$lnX_{it} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 lnchinaM_t + \sum \eta V + v_{it}$$

$$Inst_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ln \hat{X}_{it} + \sum \beta V + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Exclusion restriction

Data

Institutional quality (i.e. voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption) – **World Bank WGI**

Trade flows – WITS

GDP and resource rent – World Bank

Latitude and landlocked dummy – CEPII

Results

	Log of primary exports	Second stage							
Dependent variable		Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Average institutional index	Average institutional index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Log of Chinese imports	0.1532***					<i>y</i> , **		11 - 100	
	(0.0279)								
Log of primary exports		-0.5797***	-0.6958***	-0.9239***	-0.7408***	-0.8879***	-1.0847***	-0.8188***	-0.0725***
		(0.1428)	(0.1395)	(0.1926)	(0.1614)	(0.1857)	(0.2220)	(0.1666)	(0.0153)
Obs	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-sq	0.5634								0.4450
Adjusted R-sq	0.5615								0.4426
Partial R-sq	0.0262								1 1 1
F-stat	30.1444								179.80
p-value	0.0000								0.0000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression results. According to the Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic) we observe no serious estimated bias induced by weak IV. Columns (2)_(8) report the second stage regression results. Control variables are natural resources rents; log of per capita GDP; latitude, and the landlocked dummy. Column (9) shows OLS estimation results with no correction for endogeneity bias. Figures rounded to four decimal places.

Results

Table 5. IV regression results: developing economies

Dependent variable	First stage Log of primary exports	Second stage							
		Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Average institutional index	Average institutional index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Log of Chinese imports	0.1735***								
	(0.0416)	1							
Log of primary exports	1 1 1 1	-0.5124***	-0.5950***	-0.9308***	-0.9002***	-0.9461***	-0.9678***	-0.8087***	-0.1648***
		(0.1576)	(0.1651)	(0.2335)	(0.2219)	(0.2230)	(0.2264)	(0.1890)	(0.0192)
Obs	529	529	529	529	529	529	529	529	529
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-sq	0.6114	i 1 1							0.4237
Adjusted R-sq	0.6077								0.4182
Partial R-sq	0.0321	1 1 1							
F-stat	17.3631	1 1 1							76.91
p-value	0.0000								0.0000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression results. According to the Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic) we observe no serious estimated bias induced by weak IV. Columns (2)_(8) report the second stage regression results. Control variables are natural resources rents; log of per capita GDP; latitude, and the landlocked dummy. Column (9) shows OLS estimation results with no correction for endogeneity bias. Figures rounded to four decimal places.

Concluding remarks

Our results indicate that as countries focus upon commodity based exporting goods, they cause a reduction in the effectiveness of their institutions.

We expand the aforementioned association to the 'foreign trade of primary goods – institutional framework' nexus

We use a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of primary trade on institutional quality

We measure the quality of institutions from multiple dimensions

Concluding remarks

This paper is helpful to policymakers aiming to improve a country's level of institutional quality through trade specialization.

A trade policy focused on a more diverse exporting agenda requires investment in technology, human capital, etc. We know this comes at a price, but our results show that these investments could enjoy the benefits of stronger, more effective institutions.

What we are working on

Expanding the timespan;

Considering a larger number of economies;

Disaggregating exports into different product categories

. . .

Acknowledgements





victor.h.lana@ufv.br