000337160 001__ 337160
000337160 005__ 20230719054311.0
000337160 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.337160
000337160 037__ $$a913-2023-924
000337160 041__ $$aeng
000337160 084__ $$aC25
000337160 084__ $$aQ15
000337160 084__ $$aQ18
000337160 084__ $$aQ25
000337160 084__ $$aQ28
000337160 084__ $$aQ53
000337160 245__ $$aPayments for environmental services with ecological thresholds: farmers’ preferences for a sponsorship bonus
000337160 260__ $$c2023-07-18
000337160 269__ $$a2023-07-18
000337160 300__ $$a28 p.
000337160 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000337160 490__ $$aWorking Paper SMART N°23-02
000337160 520__ $$aDesigning incentives for agri-environmental public good provision with threshold effects calls for payment mechanisms favouring critical mass participation and continuity of commitments at the landscape scale. Studies show farmers are reluctant to collective requirements but favourable to a bonus rewarding collective action. We conducted a choice experiment to test the acceptability of a bonus in a hypothetical scheme for improving rivers’ water quality in France. We introduce a sponsorship bonus each time the farmer convinces a peer into entering the scheme that can be combined with a collective result bonus per hectare if the river reaches a higher step of the water quality scale. We consider the involvement of local financers could increase the willingness to pay beyond opportunity costs and income foregone, and propose higher levels of payment than agri-environmental schemes. Results suggests a sponsorship bonus on its own is cost-effective, and that preferences for the bonus levels are heterogeneous..
000337160 546__ $$aEnglish
000337160 650__ $$aAgricultural and Food Policy
000337160 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000337160 6531_ $$awater quality
000337160 6531_ $$achoice experiment
000337160 6531_ $$acollective action
000337160 6531_ $$amixed logit model
000337160 6531_ $$alatent class model
000337160 700__ $$aLe Gloux, Fanny
000337160 700__ $$aRopars-Collet, Carole
000337160 700__ $$aIssanchou, Alice
000337160 700__ $$aDupraz, Pierre
000337160 8560_ $$fsmart-wp@inrae.fr
000337160 8564_ $$9d42ab80b-43d2-4a12-b61c-d34b4ec4b0ba$$s1170084$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/337160/files/WP23_02.pdf
000337160 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:337160$$pGLOBAL_SET
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000337160 980__ $$a913