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EFFECTS OF JATROPHA INVESTMENTS ON LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN GHANA

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explore implications of large-scale land investment for local citizenship, with a particular focus on customs and mobility. The concept of local citizenship is a neglected aspect of land investment debates. We argue that the use of the concept helps us to identify how large-scale land investments work to invoke the hegemonic and customary power of indigenes and undermine local citizenship identity of migrants. The paper explores why and how this power invoking happened through a critical examination of experiences of five communities that experienced large-scale jatropha investments. Using survey data derived from 350 informants, this paper confirms the *existence* of deep-rooted land insecurity of migrants. Indigenes invoked the concept of local citizenship identity in land claim, as large scale agri-investments influenced local citizen status through changing value of rural lands, and exposed the use of hegemonic power of indigenes over migrants' rights to land access.

Keywords: Local citizenship, Investment, Land, Migrant, Indigenes, Rights, Power, Mobility

1. INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted that access and use of land by rural members have implications on their livelihoods and empowerment (see Matondi, 2011; Richardson, 2010). This indication is premised on the fact that land serves as the main economic asset for rural members (Thondhlana, 2014). The use of land is underpinned by accessibility and rights security of rural members (Acheampong and Campion, 2014). However, little is understood how this accessibility and rights security are achieved in the first place. In this paper, we argue that the concept of local citizenship influences land rights and tenure security, such that the accessibility of indigenes to land is unobstructed compared to migrants who are not fully considered as the privileged citizens. While the indigenes are able to re-connect to other land resources even if large scale investments capture their lands (Boamah, 2015), migrants in the rural areas have less of this privilege. The persistent increase in land claims has led to internal struggles over land resources (Berry, 2009) and the intense competitions favor the indigenes compare to the migrants.

This situation has been widely observed in West Africa, where the indigenes have clearer historical underpinnings which define their entitlements as the owners of lands (refer to; Berry, 2001, p.152). Before the haste in land investments, indigenes including their chiefs saw the new-comers (migrants) as cheap labor source for their farming activities, and as such, opened their '*communal gates*' to welcome them into their communities (Berry, 2009). Over some period of time, the persistent trooping in of migrants led to fierce competition, in some cases, worked in their favor. For example, in Cote D'Ivoire, Chauveau (2006) identified that in some cocoa growing communities, migrants became powerful due to their higher economic gains and number, and as such, gained social objectivity to operate in their settled communities without any coercive influences from the first-settlers (indigenes). In Ghana, however, indigenes remain more

powerful than migrants and have access to lands through inheritance (Awanyo, 1998). Migrants obtain their rights to use lands through economic means (Boni, 2006, p.177) and these lands are used purposively for small scale farming. Chiefs remain the first point of engagement for land acquisition either by individual or an entity (Yaro and Tsikatai, 2014) and as such, it will be very difficult for migrants to have dominance over lands. Notwithstanding, the fear of land-takeovers by migrants and the pre-emption of local citizenship identity are potential factors that induce indigenes to restrict migrants' accessibility and controllability over lands. It is presumed that migrants can become more economically empowered than indigenes when granted similar privileges, and this can impede the long terms coercive power held by the indigenes over the migrants, as witnessed in the neighbouring Cote D'Ivoire. The emergent large scale investment has provided a platform for land owning clans to invoke the concept of local citizenship on migrants to make way for land deals, and changing migrants' mobility and connectivity to social and geographical position.

This paper looks at the critical perspective of the *existence* of deep-rooted land insecurity of migrants, and examines how indigenes and their leaders have invoked the concept of rural citizenship identity in land claim making and connectivity to alternative lands. In addition, it also critically examines the cases of migrants withdrawn from lands they depended on and the manner in which *local citizenship concept* has been used to stigmatize migrants in accessing lands and benefiting from jobs generated through investments. The outcomes of migrants' alienation on fragmentation and coherence have also been considered

2. LOCAL CITIZENSHIP

In order to appreciate the concept of local citizenship, it is worth-noting that the term 'citizenship' itself is first understood.

Bellamy (2008) defines citizenship as an aggregate of political practices which consider explicit public rights and responsibilities with respect granted to a politically defined locality. Thus, most often, citizenship is regarded as a relationship that exist between an individual and a public body. Jacob and Le Meur (2010) made an in-depth analysis of citizenship which has helped in understanding the term 'Local citizenship'. They revealed that citizenship is layered on set of rules and multiplicity of institutions which compete to exercise claims over resources/properties. People could have national citizenship identity, but autochthony (earliest arrival to a political community) has often been used as an approach to either include or exclude certain group of people to a communal resource (Geschiere, 2009; Chauveau, 2006; Bayart et al., 2001). The manifestation of autochthony has been found in Cameroon by Geschiere (2009) where first-settlers of a community have ownership claims over land available in the communities they first arrived. In most cases, they are able to deny the late-arrivals from land resources, but allow the late-arrivals to connect to these resources through negotiations.

This means that Local citizenship has featured prominently in defining land-use rights amongst rural dwellers (Sikor and Lund, 2009). Berry (2009) accentuate the concept of local citizenship as identity status underpinned by one's lineage or origin which defines socio-economic access to land and related resources. There is no contestation between local and national citizens, just that the concept of local citizenship tends to contextualize one's status in a particular community based on meeting locally-made conditions/criteria (Boamah, 2014). One significant condition is one's ability to trace his/her ancestors as the first to settle and establish the community. In this regard, citizens could be tagged as indigenes or migrants in the context of a particular community. The indigenes are normally referred to as '*local citizens*' whilst the migrants can either be '*foreign citizens*' or '*local foreigners*'. Berry (1989) identified that the status as '*migrant*' is not permanent, but could be changed to '*local citizens*' through marriage; and, possibly, through satisfaction of other

social criteria recognized as legitimate by the community (Lund, 2011a). This dynamics are articulated by land rights, societal cultural and identity.

2.1 Local citizenship and the dynamics of land rights

In the context of Ghana, the term '*local citizens*' is commonly used to differentiate the '*we were here first*' individuals in a particular community from other locals. Berry (2001) contended that this group of people has a solid understanding that their fore-fathers were the first to settle in a particular community, as no one was there to witness the arrival. Alternative names used to describe this group of people in the context of a particular community are '*first arrivals*', '*first settlers*', and '*land owners*'. '*Foreign citizens*' and '*local foreigners*' are collectively tagged with any of the following names as '*strangers*', '*new arrivals*', '*outsiders*' or '*aliens*'. Berry (1989) admits that '*foreign citizens*' are individuals from different country, who have moved to settle in a particular political community (also supported by Lund, 2011). '*Local foreigners*' on the other hand are national citizens, who have moved from their communities within a country to other communities in the same country.

Local citizenship serves as the right for easy access to land; and this, as opined by Neumann (2005) has been defined by the social construction of identity providing emblematic connotations to supremacy over and utilization of land resources. The common terms used by the local citizens to separate themselves from their so-called regarded '*strangers*' are "*the things they possess*" and "*what they think define them*", making them to have perceived uniqueness (see Lund, 2011a, pp.71) over migrants. Unlike the indigenes, migrants' access to land is governed by set of rules and regulations which need to be followed to the latter; failure to comply, is likely to lead to alienation. As Boni (2006) confirmed, the chiefs have, in several cases, exploited migrants by taking large amount of money as rent for their use of lands. These migrants are farmers, who, due to the low fertility of their lands in northern

Ghana, are forced to move to southern centres, where lands are very fertile for viable agricultural production. Apart from exploitations from chiefs, migrants are, in most cases, maltreated by the indigenes in land use, and since migrants' protests will end up in chief's palace, they dare not to retaliate but to conform to the maltreatments (see Boni, 2006). The difficulties faced by migrants became intense in the phase of large scale investments which involve the acquisition of large tracts of lands by investors. Boamah (2014) revealed that in such instances, the entitlements to resources, irrespective of citizenship status could be lost.

Citizenship identity plays prominent role in defining the land rights of the local dwellers. The land rights dynamics is influenced by time of mobility to a community, as either 'first-arrivals' or 'late-comers' This has served as important basis to differentiate rural members as indigenes and migrants (Lund, 2011), defining the type of rights to land. The indigenes made up of traditional leaders, family/clan heads, and individuals from a land owning family/clan, first settlers based on historical antecedence or common ethnic status and marriage have rights in terms of ownership, exclusion, transfer and user rights to customary/family/clan lands. Migrants, at the other hand, are made up of foreign citizens and/or local foreigners who are either new arrivals irrespective of their ethnic status, non-members of the land owning family/clan or actors with different ethnic status as indigenes. Usually, they have user and transfer rights based on certain agreed conditions they have with indigenes (Figure 1). Juul and Lund (2002) have confirmed that the influences of mobility on land rights were at first, hidden, and as such, did not affect local cooperation. However, the increase in mobility patterns in the phase of land scarcity spearheaded the definition of local identity and its connection to land rights dynamics. This, as inveterate by Kuba et al. (2003) has produced a cumbersome local rules and regulations, guiding the lease of and use of lands whether through informal renting arrangements or borrowing.

The complexities of land rights, especially in the third world countries, have

been heightened due to the absence of clear legal underpinnings to define and protect local rights to land (Cotula et al., 2008). The complexities are further exacerbated when foreign investments are introduced in these countries and communities. Failure of the state to define and protect local rights to land has led to complications of who has/have specific rights to land. The migrants mostly establish rights to land through agreements and conditions defined by some indigenes, who dismayingly are not able to secure their rights during the intrusion of large scale land investors (Lund, 2011). These investors are very powerful as they are supported by the state that sees their investments to advance economic growth and development. As a result, state land-institutions provide supportive role to investors by guiding them to pass through the right channel recognized by the state. Whether the presumed '*right channel*' infringes on local rights and livelihood issues is treated out of scope by the state, mostly, not through deliberate means but failure to take the pain to consider and investigate the investment operations on the affected local members. Resultantly, the large tracts of land acquired by investors become land-enclosures (see Tilley, 2003; Basset and Crummy, 2003).

Lund (2011) defines land-enclosures as the legal or/and physical fencing of an acquired land, which restricts the previous users of the land. Lands enclosures are often put into new use by the new owner(s), usually, an investor. The acquisition of land excluding previous local-users often result in reconnection/redistribution of land to affected individuals. Ubink and Amanor (2008) have confirmed to the influences of customary leaders in land allocation and redistribution amongst local actors. In such instances, local leaders have displayed their ownership and exclusion rights in a manner to favor the indigenes at the expense of the non-indigenes in land reconnection and use (Ubink and Amanor, 2008). As revealed by Lund (2011), questions on the extent to which local citizenship status and right dynamics have spearheaded or impeded land access need thorough investigation and analysis to inform future policy measures. Studies such as Ubink

et al.(2009) and Toulmin and Quan (2000) have commented on the need for countries to define rules and regulations which reveal ownership to, right to transact, expropriate and redistribute land and other resources. According to these proponents, rights to land and even land reforms should be influenced by policies. That is '*getting policies right*' should set the agenda in the establishment of rules and regulations governing the differing land rights. On the other hand, Moyo and Yeros (2005) have resonated that politics play important role and influences land rights at the local level. These politics need to be well-examined and understood as '*getting the politics right*' will ensure local cooperation and reduce contested land rights exercised by local communities.

In sum, studies have shown that, land investments tend to marginalize migrants by attaching local citizenship with the indigenous populations who have the right types of rights for safeguarding their access and ownership of land. How the rights are justified, however, is determined by the manifestation of large scale investments serving as the prerogative to determine identity status drawing a clear distinction between indigenes and migrants, and defining who benefits from investment opportunities.




Figure 1: The influence of local citizenship status on land rights: Indigenes vs. migrants
Source: Authors' own work

2.2 Large scale investments and manifestations of identity status and cultural protection

The manifestation of large scale investments has served as the basis for host members to reveal who they are and where they belong to through identity status and the need to protect their cultural identity; a platform used by indigenes to draw a clear distinction between themselves and other members. Land has served as both economic and cultural asset, especially for indigenous members to advance their livelihood and to protect their cultural identity, hence, making land struggles and competition a common phenomenon in communities affected by commercial investments (Boamah, 2015). Land-claim making has somewhat been influenced by social identity (Sikor and Lund, 2010; Lund, 2006) creating and defining rules and regulations, cultural norms as well as social values in connection to local resources and properties (MacPherson, 1978). The struggles over properties including land for instance, have serious complications vis-à-vis the scope and constitution of authority that define their access (Lund, 2011). Obviously, the expressions of social identity and the safeguarding of local properties including land as cultural commodities have thereby been accompanied with a wide range of processes which are engaged by people so as to pursue their divergent interests. There has therefore been dynamics of how people construct their access to land and other local properties (see Colin and Woodhouse, 2010; Derman et al, 2007; Toulmin et al., 2002), which has often become very intense when local communities are exposed to external pressures such as large scale investments which take away their lands through powerful structures above them (Boamah, 2014). In such instances, national identity status is submerged and unrecognized in affected communities, as local citizenship identity become the significant yardstick to include and exclude people in access to these local resources (Geschiere, 2009; Bayart et al., 2001), which have cultural significance to indigenous members (see Awanyo, 1998).

2.3 Large scale investments and employment

The economic implications of large scale investments have been well acknowledged in the literature. Whilst such investments have been identified to consume the local livelihoods of their host communities through take-over of local resources and economic assets such as lands (Matondi, 2011; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009); it has also been purported that they can create employment opportunities to advance local wellbeing (Richardson, 2010). The potential negative economic implications can be tied to the exacerbation of conditions to which local small-holder farmers operate through deprivation of their access to land or alteration of ecological resources causing poverty, food insecurity and social marginalization (Bues, 2011; Guillozet and Bliss, 2011; Smaller and Mann, 2009). The negative economic implications can usually be offset through implementation of sustainable business models that tend to create room for large scale employments with commensurate income generations for local members (Baumgartner et al., 2015). The employment benefits have also been echoed by Otsuka and Yamano (2006) who indicated that large scale investments can contribute to poverty ramification by creating favorable economic conditions for their host communities and even beyond. Through employment generations, large scale investments have multiplicities of economic benefits in several means such as: stimulating rural economic growth depending on the approach to labor participations in the investment process, helping to enhance labor productivity, and improvement in local food supplies and nutritional status (von Braun and Kennedy, 1994).

Recent studies conducted by Vath (2013) and Hermann et al. (2013) have showed the diversities of employment impacts of large scale investments. Vath's study for instance, was conducted in Ghana, which identified that local citizenship identity (indigenes vs migrants) was one factor which defined employment gains reaped by local members depending on who were considered to be employed by large scale investors depending

on prevailing local social conditions and dynamics. Traditional leaders have also appeared to play influential role in the land negotiation process and its outcomes (Nolte and Vath, 2013; Nolte and Voget-Kleschin, 2013) which tend to create development opportunities usually for the benefits of indigenous members. This revelation moves in line with Brüntrup et al.'s (2016) perspective that some local members who are socially vulnerable tend to be excluded in benefit-sharing between investors and the local members. Thus, large scale investments do not always affect local members in the same way.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Study areas

The study was conducted in five previously large scale Jatropha investment destinations in Ghana across the Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Northern and Volta regions. The study communities have been indicated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Study settings (Jatropha investment sites in Ghana)

Source: Authors' own work

3.2 Study Design and Sampling

The study adopts a multi-case study design made up of five interesting. The respondents numbered 350 in total, with 70 from Bredi, 72 from Agogo, 45 from Kobre, 108 from Lolito, and 55 from Kpachaa. They were enrolled through purposive and snowballing

sampling techniques. The respondents were made up of local leaders; state officials; indigenes and migrants, including farmers and individuals who once worked or are working for existing investors; drawn through both purposive and snowballing sampling techniques.

Table 1: Categories of study respondents

Community	Respondents (N=350)			
	Farmers	Workers	Others	Total
Bredi	18	42	10	70
Agogo	26	23	23	72
Kobre	10	27	8	45
Lolito	27	51	30	108
Kpachaa	16	24	15	55

Source: Field data

3.3 Data sources and gathering

The research utilizes data from both secondary and primary sources. The secondary data were obtained from published materials and other literary works that are related to the subject area. The collection of secondary data was guided by the thematic areas of the study, which ensured that only data of relevance to the study were solicited. The primary sources for data were through field surveys in which interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were held. This was done using interview guides and FGDs formats. Secondary data were solicited first, and this helped to know the data gaps, which guided the preparation of the data collection instruments. The primary data were made up of data which could not be obtained through secondary means.

3.4 Data analysis

Data were analysed descriptively and quantitatively. The data were discussed case-by-case for the five previously Jatropha investment destinations. Findings of the study

involved critical analysis of comprehensive statements obtained from the wide range of respondents. Data from the primary sources were triangulated with the literature to enhance validity of the findings and to establish novel contributions of the study to existing literature.

4. LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN FIVE COMMUNITIES

4.1 Before the investment

Before the exposure of the five communities (Bredi, Kobre, Agogo, Lolito and Kpachaa) to large scale investment, both indigenes and migrants' access to land was guided by agreed customs (see Table 2). The easy access to land ensured positive livelihood outcomes as unveiled by Matondi (2011) and Richardson (2010). Passing through the legitimate process laid down through customs was a guarantee for access and use of rural lands, irrespective of citizenship status. For instance, in Bredi, lands are owned by the people of Nkoranza (the indigenes), with the Nkoranza Traditional Council responsible for land management in the interest of the indigenes. As customs demand, the indigenes have automatic access to any land space subject to the consent of the traditional council. Migrants' legitimate access to a land space is guided by the payment of 'drink money'¹ and subsequent payments of ground rent on yearly basis. Migrants interested in alternative lands, need to legitimize their user-rights by meeting the economic conditions. Migrants, upon having legitimate access to a particular land, can transfer the land to another migrant based on the consent of the traditional council (see Figure 2). These legitimate process was respected, and migrant farmers had access to rural land spaces upon meeting the economic conditions set-forth. This revelation was also identified in Agogo, Kobre, Lolito and Kpachaa.

Particularly in Agogo, lands are owned by families locally known as 'abusua' who trace their ownership from matrilineal inheritance as Akans (Awanyo, 1998). Each family has a head

¹ Drink Money-This entails drinks and/or money which are presented to chiefs during land negotiations. It shows a sign of respect and recognition to the chiefs' concerned.

The drink is poured out to ancestors in the form of libation to invoke the blessings of God for the transaction and the use of the land.

known as 'odikro' serving as the allodial title holder for family lands. Indigenes have automatic rights to their family lands, and can enter into an economic agreement with migrants for the use of the family lands upon the consent of the family head 'odikro'. The families 'abusua' are eight (8) in number. Amongst the eight family groups, there is a royal family. An indigene from the royal family heads the entire family groups; and serves as the paramount chief of the Agogo traditional area. Any lease agreement on lands is treated legitimate upon the endorsement by the paramount chief. Migrants can approach the 'odikro' or the paramount chief for legitimate land access provided they are able to fulfil the economic conditions laid down. When migrants passed through this laid down process, their access to rural land was goofproof, without any competition with indigenes.

Emphasizing on Kobre, it was observed that Kobre is a neighbouring community to two major towns-Konkoma and Kojobofour. These towns have their respective paramount chief, who should manage traditional lands in the interest of the people. Kobre is a small community with less than 500 people, with the major share of the population made up of migrants. Farming lands in Kobre were occupied by migrants, whose access to the lands was granted by the paramount chief of Kojobofuor, through a payment of '*drink money*' and annual ground rent. Once migrants fulfilled this condition, their land access was assured.

In the case of Lolito, lands are owned by the people of Tsiala clan in the Eweland. These lands are managed by the head of the Tsiala clan, who has the traditionally-recognized responsibility of taking care of lands for the benefit of the indigenes. Indigenes have automatic access to any portion of land upon

the approval of the clan head, but cannot transfer land to migrants. Migrants' legitimate access to land was through negotiation with the clan head. This took the form of presenting a bottle of gin and promising to pay or making payment of a yearly rent suggested by the head. Once this was done, migrants were able to secure land for their economic activities without any contestation.

In Kpachaa, lands are owned by the 'Yaa-naa', who is the paramount chief of the entire 'Dagbon' communities in Northern region of Ghana. Due to the large land area of the paramount chief, lands in Kpachaa have been assigned to a sub-chief of the 'Yaa-naa' known as 'Tijo-naa', who is also the chief of a Tijo, a peri-urban community. Kpachaa is a remote community predominantly made up of indigenes, and has a traditional leader known as 'Kpachaa-naa'. As customarily required, the indigenes can access any portion of land upon the permission of the 'Kpachaa-naa' whilst migrants had to contact the 'Kpachaa-naa' to get legitimate access to land. Once this was done, migrants' access to land was secured. Prior to the large scale investment, access and use of lands in the five communities were legitimized through the recognized customs, and once these customs were respected, both indigenes and migrants had access to rural lands. With this, indigenes and migrants' wellbeing was assured as majority depend on land resources for their survival (Thondhlana, 2014).

Table 2: Prior to large scale investment: legitimate process for land access and use

Selected cases	Field findings (prior to jatropha investment)		
	Ownership structure of land	Legitimate process for land access	
		Indigenes	Migrants
Bredi	Owned by Nkoranza traditional group with management responsibility on the	Automatic access to land subject to the consent of the traditional council	Access can be legitimized by i) paying drink money on the land; ii) payment of annual ground rent.

Nkoranza Traditional Council (NTC)			
Agogo	Family land ownership structure, with Agogo paramount chief required to manage the land in the interest of all families.	Automatic access to land subject to the consent of the family head	Access can be legitimized through: i) Negotiating with indigene on his/her family land through sharecropping or monthly rent payment; ii) Negotiating with family head through rent payment and/or sharecropping iii) Negotiating with paramountcy through payment of drink money and monthly/annual ground rent Access granted by payment of drink money and annual ground rent
Kobre	Vague ownership structure, but migrants' access granted by Kojobofour paramountcy	-	
Lolito	Lands owned by Tsiala clan, with clan head having management responsibility.	Automatic access to land upon the consent of clan head	Access through presenting drink money and paying or promising to pay an agreed yearly rent
Kpachaa	Lands owned by Dagbon people, with management responsibility at different levels.	Automatic access to land upon the consent of Kpachaa-naa/Tijo-naa	Access can be established based on negotiations with Kpachaa-naa

Source: Field survey

4.2 During investment

Intrusion of investments evoked the hegemonic power of indigenous local citizens. This was exhibited through actions of indigenous local citizens by (i) open display identity status and protection of indigenous culture and resource, and (ii) the protection of employment opportunities generated through the investments for just the indigenes.

4.2.1 Identity status and resource protection

Jatropha investment started in 2007/2008, when foreign investors trooped into Ghana to acquire large stretch of land of about 1,075,000 hectares through negotiations with traditional leaders (Schoneveld et al., 2011). These lands were occupied by both indigenous and migrant farmers, but were alienated without proper livelihood arrangements (Acheampong and Campion, 2013). As a result, competition for land became intense as the rural members had to strive for available lands. At this stage, indigenes and their leaders invoked the concept of rural citizenship identity in land claim making and connectivity to alternative lands. The extreme competition over land resources favored the indigenes in relation to migrants (Berry, 2009). As the indigenes used their hegemonic representations of their rural culture as an exclusionary device, to marginalize the migrants in getting access to land.

Using Bredi for emphasis, the traditional council as enthused by large sums of money, used its hegemonic power to alienate migrant farmers from their lands, without proper consultation and compensation. These lands totaling 13,000 hectares were sold to the Canadian Kimminic Company Limited through a profit sharing agreement in the ratio 3:1 between the investor and the traditional council accordingly for a period of 40 years. Suffering from startling alienation, migrants moved from Bredi to look for alternative lands elsewhere. During discussions with the traditional council, the Chief confirmed to the

fragile identity status of the migrants, when he stated that:

"These farmers don't come from this community.....I was not even interested in taking annual agricultural tributes from them since they were small holder farmers"

The traditional council has used citizenship identity status of the farmers as migrants to deny them access and use of the land (supported by Geschiere, 2009; and Bayart et al., 2001). The migrants were pictured as 'aliens' in the influx of large scale jatropha investment which was seen to have substantial financial benefits than the rent paid by migrants.

The Agogo case was quite complicated due to the ownership structure. The land lease and community land rights was completely distorted when the paramount chief gave out 19,000 hectares of land to the Norwegian Scanfarm Company Limited for a period of 50 years, subject to 25-year renewal. As some portions of the 19,000 hectares were owned and used by some indigenes, their alienation became difficult, but was possible through compensations. This concurs with Boamah's indication that indigenes can be alienated from their lands through large scale land investments (Boamah, 2014). On the other hand, the migrants were denied access of their legitimate farming lands affected by the investment, but were not compensated. This was so since the Akan custom hammers on the power of local citizenship status, as it establishes that ownership right and user-right to land are different; and that only individuals with ownership right to land (i.e. indigenes) qualify to receive compensation for the take-over of their lands (supported by Knudsen and Fold, 2011). With this discursive power held by indigenes, migrants became the real sufferers. Many could not find suitable alternative lands as lands became scarce, making them to move from Agogo. The migrants' lack of support for land reconnection coincides with Ubink and Amanor (2008) findings. They admitted that local leaders display their ownership and exclusion rights against migrants in land reconnection and use.

The complications in the land lease and community land rights continued to unfold in Ghana, as in Kobre, farming lands of migrants (about 13,000 hectares) were leased out to the Canadian Kimminic Company Limited. This acquisition was made possible by Konkoma paramountcy instead of the Kojobofour paramountcy who gave migrants, access to the land. The large scale investment made the entitlement to such land a contested issue, as the two paramountcies claimed ownership. The investor through government's support was able to start operations on the land. Migrants secured compensation for their alienation through the support of the Kojobofour paramountcy. The paramountcy, however, used its hegemonic power to set higher economic conditions for migrants' legitimate access to alternative lands. The conditions set forth were the payment of higher drink money, higher annual ground rent and inclusion of crop-sharing agreement. According to the elders, these arrangements were made to guarantee migrants' access to the alternative lands, and to give them the assurance that their rights to the lands will always be protected by the paramountcy. The setting of higher economic condition is in accordance with Boni's perspective that some chiefs exploit migrants through unfavorable negotiations and exorbitant rents to establish the migrants' legitimate user-rights to rural land spaces (Boni, 2006). With the hegemonic economic conditions set forth, many migrants moved to neighbouring communities where access to land is comparatively easier.

The Lolito case saw the Tsiala clan head leasing land of about 2,300 hectares to the Norwegian Biofuel Africa Company Limited through an indigenous broker. The lands were legitimately used by both indigenes and migrants for economic activities encompassing farming, cattle grazing, raffia mat making and firewood gathering. The clan head is traditionally mandated to manage lands in the interest of the indigenes (Tsiala clan members), as the lease of large scale of lands should go through consultation process. However, the lands were leased out without the consultation of Tsiala clan members. This generated internal conflicts, as the clan head was seen to have

acted irresponsibly. On the other side, as an attempt to express its good intention, the investor started Jatropha plantation on 400 hectares leaving 1,900 hectares to be utilized by local members for their economic activities. During discussions with the clan members, it became adequately obvious that the clan head authorized that indigenes should have the first-user right to the unused lands by the investor. According to the migrant-farmers interviewed, despite the investor granting them the permission to use their farming lands, the clan head indicated that they should vacate their farming lands for the indigenous farmers, whose lands formed part of the 400 hectares of land to be used by the investor. Similar unfair treatment was identified in Kpachaa (another centre for Biofuel Africa Company Limited), as the indigenous farmers were granted the first user-rights to the unused lands by their traditional authorities. User-right was thus, politicized, as Moyo and Yeros (2005) have echoed; and the politics favored the indigenes at the disadvantage of migrants.

The maltreatment of migrants in the phase of investment has a link with protection of indigenes' culture. Land is a socio-cultural asset for the indigenous members as it defines their geographical positions and coverage. As such, indigenes and their leaders had the quest to protect their customary lands. This was very necessary as experiences in relation to land boundaries, demarcations and who should give lands out to who have led indigenes to lose some portions of their lands to other nearby indigenous communities. There are scarcity of formal records to attest to the size and the boundaries of lands in relation to neighbouring indigenes (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001), hence, indigenes have to ensure that their lands are safe. A discussion with the Nkoranza traditional council confirmed that large tracts of the council's lands have been taken over by their neighboring indigenes from the Ejura traditional council. The Nkoranza traditional council accused the Ejura traditional council for granting migrants access to and use of such lands. The chief revealed that:

"We had vast land areas in our traditional area. However, most of our lands closer to Ejura have been

taken away by the Ejura traditional council. The paramount chief gave migrants the permission to use such lands which were subsequently claimed by the traditional council as theirs. Greater parts of these lands have been given out for residential and commercial purposes by the Ejura traditional council"

With this past experience of land-takeover, both the chief and indigenes have opted to protect the remaining land spaces, which are significant cultural commodity for them. The protection mechanisms have sometimes led to the prescription of land to non-indigenes based on exorbitant principles such as payment of exorbitant rents and unjust crop-sharing arrangements. The Nkoranza traditional council further attested that the indistinct demarcations of land boundaries and the incremental arrival of migrant farmers pose threat to authority over and security on their lands. According to the chief, before the large scale Jatropha investment, some migrant farmers claimed they owned the lands given to them for farming. According to the chief, these migrants felt that the payment of ground rent was commensurate to land ownership and that the lands cannot be taken away from them. In extreme cases, some migrants instituted chiefs to serve as their heads and claimed allegiance to lands given out to them for farming purposes. The influx of large scale investment was, thus, seen an opportune time to show migrants that their right to use their 'claimed' lands received protection based on the benevolence of the chief. The uncertainty of possible land-takeover by migrants implied that outrageous rents and exorbitant economic conditions were prescribed for migrants to get legitimate access to alternative lands during the Jatropha boom. This was done to forcibly push migrants from Bredi in order to protect the remaining lands for future generations of indigenes. Migrants on the other hand argued that they had no intention of taking over lands which did not belong to them. The migrants' installation of a 'chief' was informed by their interest to have a leader, who will channel their issues to the paramount chief for immediate attention. However, whether or not the actions

and inactions of migrants were guided by positive intention, a vacuum was created for indigenes to take the stance to stigmatize them in land claims and compensation during the large scale agri-investment. Even after the large scale agri-investment, migrants' connectivity to rural land spaces has become very difficult.

4.2.2 Identity status and Employment protection

One benefit of large scale investment is the creation of employment for the rural members (Bosch and Zeller, 2013; FAO, 2013). This indication was manifested when as part of the lease contract, the Nkoranza Traditional Council expected the Jatropha investor to provide jobs for his people. In Agogo and Kpachaa, a community meeting was organised where the investors informed the locals that they will provide jobs for them. With this revelation, the rural folks were in expectation for jobs once the investors start operations. During the Jatropha period, particularly in Kobre and Bredi, traditional leaders became influential members to support the locals to get jobs. This was so, as they were given such a platform by investors in order to have their support and operational peace. As part of the lease agreement, the paramount chief of Nkoranza pressured the investor to recruit indigenous community members from Bredi and other traditional communities. On the other hand, majority of the migrants were denied jobs as they were easily identified by their 'Northern' names. Those who were granted jobs, were considered as temporal and low grade workers. With the case of Kobre, the investor allowed the Kojobofour paramount chief to recommend his people for job offerings as an attempt to appease them to resolve the land acquisition conflict. The paramount chief used local citizenship status as a criterion to recommend workers for the investor. The indigenes were interested in certain specific jobs such as field supervisors. On the other hand, the limited number of migrants recruited were considered as casual laborers.

The use of authoritative power to secure indigenes jobs was also identified in Lolito and Kpachaa. In relation to Lolito, this became very evident when Brazilian Agro-Business Group

took over from Biofuel Africa Limited, and then evicted the locals for using portions of the investment land. With both indigenes and migrants denied access to any portion of the acquired land, the quest for employment became very intense. The clan head and members invoked the concept of local citizenship as a mechanism to ensure that the indigenes were favored and employed by the company before migrants were granted the opportunity. This was established during a discussion with some workers of the Brazilian Agro-Business Group, with majority being indigenes. Table 3 shows the ratio of migrants (M) to indigenes (I) in relation to individuals who worked or are working for investors.

Invest- ment site	Investor	Ratio (M:I)	Workers
Bredi	Kimminic Company	1:10	42
Agogo	Scanfarm Company	1:5	23
Kobre	Kimminic Company	1:8	27
Lolito	Biofuel Africa/Agro- Business Group	1:5	51
Kpachaa	Biofuel Africa Company	1:3	24
		AR:1: 5	N=167

***Note:** AR=Average ratio; N=Total number of workers interviewed

Source: Field data

In relation to salaries of the local members during investment, it was identified that all the migrants enrolled on to the study were given salaries below GH¢100.00 [USD 22.69], confirming that they were low grade workers (casual laborers). On the other hand, majority of indigenes (76.3%) received a monthly pay of GH¢100.00- GH¢500 [USD 22.69 to USD113.44], followed by 19.4% who received GH¢100 [USD 22.69]; and 4.3% who received above GH¢500 [USD 113.44]. See Figure 3.



Figure 3: Salaries received by indigenous and migrant workers

Source: Authors' construct

The authors have revealed the type of land rights of both indigenes and migrants, the display of hegemonic power by indigenes and their heads in terms of land access and job offerings during and after the Jatropha boom in Table 4.

Table 4: Local citizenship status, land rights and display of hegemonic power in land and job access before and after Jatropha

Case	Types of land rights: indigenes vs. migrants	During Jatropha boom: The hegemonic influences on land and job access		After the burst of Jatropha (current situation): The hegemonic influences on land
		Land	Jobs	Mobility and connectivity to land resources
Bredi	Indigenes: ownership right; exclusion right; transfer right; user-right Migrants: user-right; transfer right but with consent from chief	Migrants alienated from their lands without prior notification and compensation.	Indigenes granted jobs through the support of the traditional council; migrants' failure to secure job, and as such moved to adjoining communities	Land re-occupied and in use by new migrants without meeting local conditions which define user-rights of migrants
Agogo	Indigenes: ownership right; exclusion right; transfer right; user-right Migrants: user-right; transfer right but with consent from an indigene/family head/chief	Migrants alienated from their farming lands without formal notification and compensation; indigenes given compensation as owners of the land	Migrants moved to reconnect themselves to other livelihood sources elsewhere; indigenes obtained jobs from the company.	Investor transformed from Jatropha to food crop, hence, land is still occupied by the investor; indigenes and migrants have lost their rights to the land
Kobre	Indigenes: contested ownership right between Kojobofour and Konkoma communities; contested lease-right leading to conflict; user right Migrants: user right leading to meagre compensation	Migrants refused automatic user-right to alternative lands by chief; user-right needed to be validated by meeting hegemonic conditions set thereof.	Indigenes granted jobs through the support by their chiefs; migrants employed directly by company as low grade workers	Both indigenes and migrants are restricted from using the investor's acquired land, as ownership-fight is yet to be resolved between the two paramountcies.
Lolito	Indigenes: ownership right; user right; exclusion right; lease right is held by clan head in consultation with members Migrants: user right	Some indigenes and migrants were alienated; whilst others were allowed to operate on the remaining land unused by investor. However, indigenes were first considered before migrants in operating on unused land by investor.	Both indigenes and migrants were employed but indigenes were the first to be considered.	New investor has come on board and has evicted all locals, irrespective of social identity; indigenes favored in job offerings ahead of migrants
Kpachaa	Indigenes: ownership right; user-right; lease right; exclusion right Migrants: user right; transfer right but with consent from chief	Indigenes and migrants officially notified for land takeover; both indigenes and migrants were allowed to operate of unused lands by the investor.	Preferential treatment given to deep rooted indigenes (blood relation to chiefs) at the expense of others, particularly migrants	Land taken over by indigene and migrant farmers

Source: Field survey

5. DISCUSSIONS

The experiences of the five communities show that before the large scale agri-investment, both indigenes and migrants had control over land access defined by satisfaction of local agreed conditions. Local citizenship status was visibly invoked during and after jatropha investment. The investment led to takeover of large tracts of land leading to scarcity of rural land spaces, particularly for agricultural activities. Scarcity of viable lands led to higher demand over supply creating competition. The intense land competition created through large scale investments led to social identity transformation strongly informed by *'who we are?'*, and *'when we came to settle in the community?'*, a form of exclusion criteria developed amongst indigenes against migrants. With these criteria, indigenes had higher control and a secured access to alternative lands. For example, the Kojobofour group of Kobre contended that the alienated-migrants should pay higher rent to qualify for alternative lands for their farming activities. Also, in Agogo, the indigenous farmers used their social recognition and status to get connected to suitable alternative lands.

It has become obvious from the cases that the rural migrants are visualized as *'outsiders'* by the local citizens, facing several bottlenecks in getting access to and utilizing land for economic sustainability. Despite the constraints, migrants have made attempt to connect to land resources through economic channel; but have somehow been impeded or alienated from their lands in the phase of the investment opportunities in the communities. The findings confirm to the dominating power possessed by local indigenes over migrants in making claims over lands and the social benefit attractions attached to large scale investments. This hegemonic power has been influenced by large scale agri-investments based through identity status and resource protection as well as employment opportunities created through the investments. The indigenes have depended on power possessed by their local traditional leaders to somehow repel the negative attributions, and to gain from the positive

components, associated with agri-investment. The migrants, as *'helpless citizens'*, are the most exposed local actors to the shocks and hits of operational investments. Indigenous residents have used local citizenship criterion to undermine the social identity of the migrants in land claims as well as job offerings generated through investments. Again, the dominant controllability possessed by indigenes made it impossible for migrants to withstand the hegemonic control of indigenes and their leaders. As a result, migrants had to be the most negatively affected actors during the era of Jatropha.

In Kobre, Bredie and Agogo communities, the local-indigenes had quick and easy access to alternative lands for their farming, whilst the local-migrants have to struggle to reconnect themselves to land resources, primarily, through satisfaction of exorbitant economic conditions prescribed by traditional authorities. Particularly in Bredie, whilst the migrants had user-rights to the leased land through payments of annual ground rent; the traditional council never notified them concerning the land-lease and their alienations. The separation of these migrant farmers from their farming lands was impromptu but they were never compensated. In Agogo, compensation for land loss was given to indigenes, who were visualized as the owners of the land based on local customs. Whilst indigenes were formally notified about the project through their family heads; migrants who were the major users of the land did not receive formal notification. They were subsequently evicted from the land without any form of compensation. The Lolito and Kpachaa cases also reveal how local identity concept can create hegemonic power possessed by indigenes, as they were the first to receive gains from the investment-either jobs or land reconnections.

In this process, indigenes largely depersonalised migrants as *'aliens'*, but migrants personalised indigenes as *'supremos'* who could support them to reconnect to alternative lands or other livelihood sources such as investment jobs. With strong hegemonic power possessed by indigenes in terms of access, control and identity, they were

the first to be aligned to job offerings. The manner in which each distinct group (the indigenes and the migrants) perceived each other contributed to the strong hegemonic power possessed by the indigenes over the migrants. Clearly, in all the investment destinations, the behaviour, action and power possessed by one group; the indigenes, over the other; the migrant, are connected to their social identity status. In connection to this, it is very obvious that migrants can, in no means, have equal opportunities as indigenes, but equity should form the basis of efforts geared toward enhancing the access to and utilization of resources by diverse groups.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This study has explored the concept of local citizenship in relation to large-scale land investments by drawing on cases of five communities in Ghana. The study has not in any case, denied the fact that indigenes are also negatively affected by large scale land investments, but make a clear-cut stance by elaborating that the first grade sufferers (the highly affected) of such investments are the migrants. Actions are needed to correct the abnormalities between indigenes and migrants in relation to rights over and control of local resources for livelihood advancements. Moving forward, there is the need for migrants to be granted special recognition in relation to their land-rights with or without investments. This could be done through legal clarification and incorporation of measures which allow individuals with user and transfer rights to land to be duly compensated for take-overs. These rights to lands should legally be intensified, so that their infringements come with commensurate reparation. This will allow chiefs and indigenes to respect the rights of migrants, so that in the phase of large scale investments, they will not be severely affected through land-lost. Whilst the study proposes legal recognition of user-rights to land, it entreats migrants never to pass through the 'back-door' to use the indigenes' lands-that is; without the satisfaction of local criteria for land-use. Migrants are thus, expected to seek

user-rights through legitimate process set forth and recognized by indigenous residents, including their heads. Most importantly, the study proposes that institutional support systems must be envisioned, especially for migrants, who are mostly the sufferers in land deals, through legal incorporation of benefits arrangements. These benefits arrangements could include the provision of physical infrastructure based on number of years of operations by the company and job offerings, which also benefit non-indigenes. Admittedly, it will be cumbersome for migrants to have equal access to investment offerings such as jobs for the locals, particularly, the indigenes; but, equitable access to investment gains by the two groups will ensure fairness. This should be of particular interest of concerned stakeholders, especially, the government who recognises both indigenes and migrants as common citizens of Ghana irrespective their geographical identity as recognized by local communities.

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