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New EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement: Quantitative Impact Assessment of the liberalization through Tariff Rate Quotas

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DRAFT - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

1. INTRODUCTION

On 15 July 2021, the European Commission made publicly available the tariff elimination schedules of the Association Agreement between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur countries, a mega-regional trade agreement that were concluded on 28 June 2019.

On the one side, Mercosur or the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur in Spanish or Mercado Comum do Sol in Portuguese) is a regional economic community (REC) that groups four¹ Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay since 1991. Although the region applies a common nomenclature and a common external tariff², Mercosur has not yet achieved the status of a customs union. Indeed, intra-Mercosur trade is also governed by a set of partial trade agreements. On the other side, the European single market (EU) is composed of 27 countries and forms one territory where goods and services can be traded freely without any tariffs or regulatory barriers.

Together, the EU-Mercosur region accounts for 23% of the world GDP and opens a market of 9% of the world population or 714 million of people with GDP per capita ranging between 9,742 USD and 37,100 USD in 2019 according to statistics from the World Development Indicators. Exchanges between them are significant and bear immense potential. In the trade in goods alone for example and based on trade data extracted from Trade Map, Mercosur countries imports 247 billion USD and exports 304.6 billion USD worth of goods in 2019, whereas the EU's imports and exports of commodities amounted respectively to 5,370 billion USD and 5,640 billion USD the same year. Accordingly, the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement will bring about the second biggest trade-bloc ever created³.

Tariffs barriers between Mercosur and EU countries are in average high with peaks in some sectors. EU27 applies an average tariff of 4.2%, while Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay apply 11.6%, 10.1%, 7.2% and 9.7%, respectively. In fact, trade between the two regions mostly happens under the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) regime.

The current EU-Mercosur Association Agreement (EU-Mercosur AA) has three components: trade, political dialogue, and economic cooperation. Our study focuses on the trade pillar of the agreement, which draws our interest because of the systemic implications it may have on global trade of goods and services, particularly on the agricultural market.

Tariff reductions under the EU-Mercosur AA often take the form of linear cuts where both Parties will eliminate or reduce base rates in equal stages from the date of entry into force until the final years of implementation. Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ), either reciprocal or transitional, and specific treatments for some sensitive agri-food products are exceptions to these staging. Although they concern relatively smaller number of national tariff line, liberalization through TRQ is a key element of the EU-Mercosur AA.

On one hand, Mercosur countries do not grant market access to EU27 through TRQ under any regime. However, they will open two categories of TRQ, transitional and reciprocal TRQs, on sensitive and strategic commodities to their European counterpart once the agreement comes into effect. On the other hand, the EU currently grants TRQ to Mercosur countries under the World Trade Organization

¹ Venezuela's memberships and rights are suspended.

² The common external tariff does not apply to certain industries: cars, sugar, textiles, etc.

³ The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) accounts for 30% of world GDP and 30% of world population.

(WTO) regime, with country-specific reserved quantity. When the EU-Mercosur AA will apply, the EU will concede preferential TRQ, both transitional and reciprocal, to its American counterparts.

Our paper consists of a comprehensive study of the liberalization mechanism undertaken through TRQ under the EU-Mercosur AA. It also describes in detail the methodology used to estimate the ad valorem equivalent tariffs of TRQ used by Ngavozafy and Latorre (2021)⁴ in their quantitative assessment the impact of EU-Mercosur AA on global trade in agricultural commodities. Finally, our paper also zooms in the results of the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulations by Ngavozafy and Latorre (2021) for the impacted sectors.

To evaluate the impacts of the EU-Mercosur AA, we use a standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with 8 regions, including Mercosur4, EU27, the United States and China, and 36 sectors aggregated from the GTAP10 sectoral and regional classifications, which incorporate NTMs and TRQ.

We experiment the CGE model for a baseline scenario (a world without EU-Mercosur) and for FTA scenarios where the treaty is implemented at different points in time: on the date of entry into force, five, ten, and 15 years later. The quantitative impacts of the agreement are obtained by comparing the projections under the baseline and the FTA scenarios.

Our results show that [WILL BE ADDED].

The remainder of this paper is organized as the following. Section 2 sets the background. Section 3 presents a review of the most relevant literature related to the modelling TRQ in CGE models and describes our model and simulation strategies. In section 4, we present and discuss our results. Finally, section 6 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Economics of Tariff Quota

Tariff Quota (TQ) is a trade policy instrument introduced for the first time at the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). TQ is designed to enhance market access of traded goods, mostly agricultural commodities, which were subject to stringent measures such as highly prohibitive tariffs or quantitative restrictions (absolute quotas).

David W. Skully (2001) defines Tariff Quotas (TQ) as a “two-tiered tariff”, where “in a given period, a lower in-quota tariff (t) is applied to the first Q units of imports and a higher over-quota (T) is applied to all subsequent imports.” In this sense, TQ differs from absolute quota, also known as quantitative restriction, because the former does not limit the entry of the commodities when the quota volume is filled. Therefore, TQ generates a rent stemming from the opportunity to import inside the TQ at a lower cost.

Tariff Quotas have both tariff and non-tariff components. The tariff part can be ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound or technical (Figure 1), hence the term “Tariff Quota” is technically more accurate than “Tariff-rate Quota” although we use both phrases interchangeably in this paper. The non-tariff components consist of the volume/quantity limit also called contingent, the administration method as well as the product and partner-country coverage. Table 1 summarizes the main components of a TQ.

⁴ New EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement: Quantitative assessment of its Impacts on Global Trade in Agricultural Commodities. Antonia Ngavozafy and Maria C. Latorre (2021).

Figure 1: Tariff Quota applied by the European Union on high quality beef and veal carcasses from Argentina⁵

Customs tariffs ^①

For product 0201100029 – Carcasses or half-carcasses of bovine animals, fresh or chilled : High quality beef and veal Other
 Exported from **Argentina** to **Spain**
 Tariff year: **2022 (HS Rev.2022)**
 Source : ITC (Market Access Map)

| Tariff regime ^① | Applied Tariff ^① | AVE ^① | Note |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------|---|
| MFN duties (Applied) ^② | 12.8% + 176.8 EUR/100 kg | 39.53% | Duty applicable over the TRQ [▲] |
| Preferential duty for Argentina under the WTO Tariff Rate Quota | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ^③ Inside-quota Tariff ^① : 0% [▲] TRQ Quantity limit ^① : 48200 tonnes [🛒] Product coverage ^① : 0201100029; 0201202029; 0201203029; 0201205029; 0201209015; 0201300039; 0202100015; 0202201015; 0202203015; 0202205015; 0202209015; 0202301015; 0202305015; 0202309015; 0206109515; 0206299115; 0206299129 [-] [🌐] Country coverage ^① : All countries ^{🏛️} Administration method ^① : Non-specified | | | |

Moreover, TQ impacts the willingness to imports and its effects on trade depends on the excess demand for imports. Decreux and Ramos (2007) named three regimes:

- The in-quota regime, when imports (M) < Q and IR applies, then quota is not binding;
- The at-quota regime, when $M = Q$ and IR applies, then quota is binding and the equilibrium price includes a prime over the IR;
- The out-of-quota regime, when $M > Q$ and OR applies, then quota is no longer binding.

Finally, the TQ administration methods (MA) affect the volume of trade and the distribution of the TQ rent (David W. Skully (2001)). In fact, MA should not create a barrier to imports other than the cost related to the in-quota tariff. On this basis, market methods, such as auctioning are the most efficient while historical allocation are the least desirable.

Table 1: Components of a Tariff Quota

| TQ component | Definition | Example ⁶ |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| In-quota Tariff (IQTR) | The in-quota tariff, aka inside-quota tariff, is the customs duty applicable to any products imported before the quantity limit is filled. | 0% |
| Over-quota Tariff (OQTR) | The over-quota tariff, aka outside-quota tariff, is the customs duty applicable to any products imported after the quantity limit is filled. | 12.8% + 171.3 EUR/100 kg equivalent to 44.33% AVE |
| Quantity limit (Q) | The quota quantity limit, aka quota volume or contingent. Until this specific quantity of goods is reached, the in-quota tariff applies. Once the contingent is filled, the product can continue to be imported | 23,000,000 kilogrammes |

⁵ Source: ITC Market Access Map (May 2022), <https://www.macmap.org/en//query/results?reporter=724&partner=032&product=0201100029&level=8>

⁶ Source: ITC Market Access Map (May 2022), <https://macmap.org/en//query/results?reporter=724&partner=032&product=0204100090&level=8>

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| | without limitation, but at a higher tariff which is the outside-quota tariff rate. | |
| Opening period (OP) | The period during which imports are allowed under the TQ mechanism. | Not specified |
| Country coverage (CC) | The list of countries that can claim an allocation or a portion of the TQ. | All countries |
| Product coverage (PC) | The list of products eligible for the TQ. | 34 NTLC |
| Administration method (MA) | The method used to manage the TQ allocation. The WTO identifies seven principal methods of TQ administration ⁷ . | First-come, First-served (FC) |

2.2. Tariff Rate Quota in the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement

Under the EU-Mercosur AA, tariff reductions often take the form of linear cuts where both Parties will eliminate or reduce base rates in equal stages from the date of entry into force until the final years of implementation. Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ), either reciprocal or transitional, and specific treatments for some sensitive agri-food products are exceptions to these staging. Transitional TRQs are in place pending liberalization while reciprocal TRQs remain in application as long as the agreement is active. Specific treatments for agri-food commodities, especially for the EU27, include the non-elimination of the entry price system and the non-ad valorem and agricultural components of the customs duty.

To date, no Mercosur country grants market access to EU27 through TRQ under any regime. Once the agreement will enter into force, Mercosur will open two categories of TRQ to their European counterpart: transitional and reciprocal TRQs. Transitional TRQs concern motor vehicles, sugar confectionery and chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa, and tomatoes prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid (whole or in pieces). Contingents under this category of TRQ are phased out while both the inside- and outside-quota duties are eliminated gradually over the implementation periods. Additionally, Mercosur countries will operate the liberalization of products such as powdered milk, cheese, infant formula and garlic through reciprocal system of preferential TRQ. Access quantities are gradually increased over the implementation period then stay in application as long as the agreement is active or unless being renegotiated. Inside-quota tariffs are phased in 11 stages while the outside-quota tariffs stay at the base rates. [Table 2](#) summarizes the liberalization scheme through TRQ in Mercosur's concession list.

⁷ See also Annex 1. Table 1.

Table 2: Mercosur's TRQ concession schedule

| Mercosur's TRQ concession under the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement | Number of HS8 code affected (NCM 2012) | Category of TRQ |
|--|--|------------------|
| A quota of 30 000 t for cheeses , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 8 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 30 000 t for cheeses , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period /E | 8 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 5 000 t for infant formula , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 3 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 10 000 t for milk powder , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 1 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| An quota of 50 000 units distributed across Mercosur countries for motor vehicles , with in-quota duties and out-quota duties phased out over a 9 year period. | 10 | Transitional TRQ |
| Quotas of 4760 tons and 17640 tons for chocolates , with in-quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 9 year period. | 2 | Transitional TRQ |
| Quotas of 2030 tons, 150 tons and 4380 tons for white chocolates, chocolate powder and preparations , with in-quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 14 year period. | 6 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 15000 tons for garlic , with in-quota duties phased out in 7-year period and increasing contingent | 1 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 7500 tons for preserved tomatoes , with in-quota duties phased out in 9-year period. | 1 | Transitional TRQ |

Source: New EU-Mercosur trade agreement, The agreement in principle, published on 1 July 2019

As of 2021, the EU grants TRQ to Mercosur countries under the WTO regime and bilaterally. The WTO TRQ cover products such as lamb and goat meat, high quality beef and veal, high quality bovine meat, poultry and preparation of poultry, garlic, or raw cane sugar⁸. Data from the EU tariff quota consultation database⁹ in 2020 show that TRQ balance did not exceed the initial allocation in most TRQ. When the EU-Mercosur agreement will begin to apply, the EU will concede preferential TRQ, both transitional and reciprocal, to its American counterparts. Reciprocal TRQ concern comparable products as in Mercosur's concession, while transitional TRQ cover a wider range of sensitive agricultural products such as meat products, cereals, honey, sugar or ethanol¹⁰. In the case of the EU concession, contingent of transitional TRQ are phased out over the transitory period, then stay in application as long as the agreement is active. Additionally, the inside-quota duties are phase-in while the outside-quota tariffs remain at the base rate or reduced by some preferential margin. As a result, products subject to TRQ in the EU concession list (317 hs8 code) will not be fully liberalized at the end of the

⁸ The EU TRQ allocation by product group and Mercosur country are listed in [Annex 4](#)

⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp?Lang=en

¹⁰ An exhaustive list of EU TRQ concession is summarized in the [Annex 5](#)

implementation period. Current EU's TRQ opened for Mercosur is summarized in Table 3 and EU's concession through TRQ is summarized in Table 4.

Table 3: Current TRQ access to the EU for Mercosur countries

| Product group | Beneficiary | Quota Volume (Tonne) |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Lamb and goat meat (bone in) | Argentina | 17006 |
| Lamb and goat meat (bone in) | Uruguay | 4759 |
| Lamb and goat meat (boneless) | Argentina | 33949 |
| Lamb and goat meat (boneless) | Uruguay | 9518 |
| High quality beef and veal (bone-in) | Argentina and Uruguay | 48200 |
| Buffalo meat (Boneless) | Argentina | 200 |
| Poultry ("70% chickens and "65%" chickens) | Argentina and Brazil | 6249 |
| Poultry (Boneless, Frozen) | Argentina and Brazil | 2305 |
| Garlic | Argentina | 13700 |
| Poultrymeat (salted or in brine) | Brazil | 170807 |
| Preparation of poultry, turkey and other fowls meat or offal | Brazil | 579192 |
| Raw cane sugar | Brazil | 412054 |
| Dried birds' eggs | Argentina | 7000 |
| Frozen cuts and breasts of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus | Brazil | 9432 |
| Frozen cuts and breasts of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus | Argentina | 3300 |
| Frozen cuts, halves and quarters of turkey (bone-in and boneless) | Brazil | 4285 |
| Fresh,chilled, frozen bovine meat, thick and thin skirt (High quality) | Argentina | 30700 |
| Fresh,chilled, frozen bovine meat, thick and thin skirt (High quality) | Uruguay | 6300 |
| Fresh,chilled, frozen bovine meat, thick and thin skirt (High quality) | Brazil | 10000 |
| Fresh,chilled, frozen bovine meat (High quality) | Paraguay | 1000 |

Source: Aggregated data from ITC Market Access Map (<https://macmap.org>) and EU Tariff Quota Consultation Database (https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/quota_consultation.jsp?Lang=en), accessed april 2021

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Table 4: EU's TRQ concession schedule

| EU's TRQ concession under the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement | Number of HS8 code affected (CN2013) | Category of TRQ |
|--|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| A quota of 54 450 t (cwe – carcass weight equivalent) for fresh beef , phased in in six equal stages, with in-quota duty of 7.5%. | 7 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 44 550 t (cwe) for frozen beef, including for processing , phased in in six equal stages, with in-quota duty of 7.5%. | 15 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 30 000 t for cheeses , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 43 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 30 000 t for cheeses , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period /E | 1 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 3 000 t (egg equivalent) for egg products , phased in over six equal stages, duty-free | 5 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 3 000 t (egg equivalent) for egg albumins , phased in over six equal stages, duty-free | 2 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 650 000 t for ethanol , phased in in six equal stages. 450 000 t of this quantity are reserved for the chemical industry, duty-free. For the remaining 200,000 t, the in-quota duty for the undenatured ethyl alcohol imported under sub-heading 2207.10 and tariff items 2208.90.91 and 2208.90.99 is 6.4 €/hl. The in-quota duty for the denatured ethyl alcohol imported under sub-heading 2207.20 is 3.4 €/hl. | 4 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 15 000 t for garlic , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 7 year period | 1 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 45 000 t for honey phased in over six equal stages, duty free | 1 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 5 000 t for infant formula , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 1 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 1 000 000 t for maize phased in in six equal stages, duty free | 4 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 10 000 t for milk powder , with in quota duties and volumes phased out/in over a 10 year period | 13 | Reciprocal TRQ |
| A quota of 2 000 t for other sugars (Headings 1702 and 1806) with a 50% MFN tariff preference | 16 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 25 000 t (cwe) for fresh and chilled, frozen and prepared pigmeat phased in in six equal stages. The in-quota duty shall be 83 €/t | 42 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 90 000 t (cwe) for boneless poultry meat, including poultry preparations , phased in in six equal stages, duty free | 25 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 90 000 t (cwe) for bone-in poultry meat phased in in six equal stages, duty free | 85 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 60 000 t for rice phased in in six equal stages, duty free | 32 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 2 400 t (pure alcohol equivalent) for rum in bulk, phased in over six equal stages, duty free, | 2 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 1 000 t for sweetcorn , duty free | 3 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 1 500 t for maize starch and manioc starch with a 50% MFN tariff preference (83 €/t) | 2 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 600 t for starch derivatives , phased in in six equal stages, duty free | 11 | Transitional TRQ |
| A quota of 10 000 t for sugar for refining for Paraguay, duty free + lowering the in-quota of the EU WTO quota for Brazil from 98 €/t to zero for 180 000 t | 2 | Transitional TRQ |

Source: New EU-Mercosur trade agreement, The agreement in principle, published on 1 July 2019

3. Model and Assessment strategy

3.1. Literature review

David Skully (2001) gave an easy-to-read introduction to the concept of TQ. The study is a cornerstone literature in the matter.

On the question of how to include TQ in a model, several studies have developed more and less elaborate strategies. Guyomard et al (2005) are the first to categorize methods to calculate ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of TQ, which are the market model estimations and the empirical price gap method. They also calculated ad valorem equivalent estimates (AVEs) of TQ through market model estimations using a single-commodity, multi-country partial equilibrium model to assess the effects of TQ on the EU banana market, assuming perfect competition. They assumed that the “unexplained” price gap¹¹ correspond to either the quota rent, or other “unexplained” margin not linked to TQ.

Replicating actual market behaviour when TQ apply remains limited in Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models although many have tried. Döbeling and Pelikan (2019) addressed how AVEs of TQ calculation was done in Market Access Map (MAcMap) Database¹² which provides pre-calculated AVEs of TQ that can be directly incorporated in models. They also explained other correct and incorrect ways to estimate AVEs of TQ. Decreux and Ramos (2007) include bilateral TQs in a MIRAGE CGE model when running a scenario of bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur. They model TQ as bilateral TQs at the HS6 level to address some shortcomings of TQ modelling in CGE such as the possibility to capture policy changes and the allocation of TQ rents among exporters and importers. TQ are also modelled at an aggregate level in some GTAP (Elbehri and Pearson, 2000; Berrettoni and Cicowiez, 2002) and LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe, 2001; Van der Mensbrugghe et al., 2003) models. This strategy has the advantage of allowing a distribution of quota-rents among importers and exporters.

Our study opts for a market model estimation of the AVEs of TQ. Moreover, we conducted the estimation at the detailed tariff line level. We also make the assumption that all TQ rents accrue to exporters.

3.2. Model

To evaluate the impacts of the EU-Mercosur AA, we use a standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with 8 regions (Table 5) and 36 sectors (Table 6) aggregated from the GTAP10 sectoral and regional classifications, which incorporate TRQ. A standard CGE model consist of a before-after comparison of an economy when a shock, in this case the decrease of trade protection measures induced by the trade agreement, causes it to reallocate its productive resources in more or less efficient ways. Thanks to this model, we can tell which countries will be the ultimate winners and losers from the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA and how the volume of trade will vary.

¹¹ “unexplained price gap = CIF price – FOB price – Tariff – (estimated insurance, freight and other insurance)

¹² The methodology is detailed here <https://macmap.org/en/about/methodology>

Table 5: Regional Aggregation

| No. | GTAP_code | Description |
|-----|-----------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | EU_27 | European Union without the UK |
| 2 | BRAZIL | Brazil |
| 3 | ARGENTINA | Argentina |
| 4 | URUGUAY | Uruguay |
| 5 | PARAGUAY | Paraguay |
| 6 | USA | United States |
| 7 | CHINA | China |
| 8 | ROW | Rest of the World |

Table 6: Sectoral Aggregation

| No. | String | Code | Description | Group | Aggregated from GTAP sectors |
|-----|--------|------|---|---|------------------------------|
| 1 | c_cer | CER | Cereals | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 1, 2, 3, 5, 23 |
| 2 | c_v_f | V_F | Vegetables, fruits, nuts | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 4 |
| 3 | c_sgr | SGR | Sugar | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 6, 24 |
| 4 | c_ocr | OCR | Plant & animal fiber, others | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 7, 8, 12, 14 |
| 5 | c_cmt | CMT | Bovine and other ruminant meats | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 9, 19 |
| 6 | c_oap | OAP | Other animal products | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 10 |
| 7 | c_mil | MIL | Dairy products | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 22 |
| 8 | c_frs | FRS | Forestry | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 13 |
| 9 | c_gas | GAS | Gas, coal, oil extraction or distribution | Manufacturing | 15, 16, 17, 18, 47 |
| 10 | c_omt | OMT | Live animals, meat and animal products | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 20 |
| 11 | c_vol | VOL | Vegetable oils and fats | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 21 |
| 12 | c_ofd | OFD | Food products nec | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 25 |
| 13 | c_b_t | B_T | Beverages and tobacco products | Agricultural and agro-industry products | 26 |
| 14 | c_tex | TEX | Textiles | Manufacturing | 27 |
| 15 | c_wap | WAP | Wearing apparel | Manufacturing | 28 |
| 16 | c_lea | LEA | Leather products | Manufacturing | 29 |
| 17 | c_l_p | L_P | Wood products | Manufacturing | 30, 31 |
| 18 | c_pch | PCH | Petroleum, coal and other chemical products | Manufacturing | 32, 33 |
| 19 | c_bph | BPH | Pharmaceutical products | Manufacturing | 34 |
| 20 | c_rpp | RPP | Rubber and plastic products | Manufacturing | 35 |
| 21 | c_omf | OMF | Other manufactures | Manufacturing | 36, 45 |
| 22 | c_mmp | MMP | Metals and metal products | Manufacturing | 37, 38, 39 |
| 23 | c_elq | ELQ | Electronic products | Manufacturing | 40 |
| 24 | c_oma | OMA | Other machinery | Manufacturing | 41, 42 |
| 25 | c_mvh | MVH | Motor vehicles and parts | Manufacturing | 43 |
| 26 | c_otn | OTN | Transport equipment | Manufacturing | 44 |
| 27 | c_ose | OSE | Other services | Services | 48,50,52,55,62,63,64,65 |
| 28 | c_cns | CNS | Construction | Services | 49 |
| 29 | c_afs | AFS | Hotels and Restaurants | Services | 51 |
| 30 | c_wtp | WTP | Maritime Transport | Services | 53 |
| 31 | c_atp | ATP | Air Transport | Services | 54 |
| 32 | c_cmn | CMN | Communication | Services | 56 |
| 33 | c_ofi | OFI | Banking | Services | 57 |
| 34 | c_ins | INS | Insurance | Services | 58 |
| 35 | c_obr | OBR | Business Services | Services | 59, 60 |
| 36 | c_ros | ROS | Personal Services | Services | 61 |

3.3. Experiment design and simulations

We experiment the CGE model for a baseline scenario (a world without EU-Mercosur) and for FTA scenarios where the treaty is implemented at different points in time: on the date of entry into force (assumed to be in 2022), five, ten, and 15 years later. Shocks stem from the tariff reduction. The quantitative impacts of the agreement are obtained by comparing the projections under the baseline and the FTA scenarios.

3.3.1. Construction of the tariff reduction schedules

We construct the tariff reduction schedules of both parties under the EU-Mercosur AA by combining information extracted from the “EU-Mercosur trade agreement: The Agreement in Principle and its texts”¹³ published by the European Commission on 1 July 2019 and the detailed tariff offers made publicly available by Argentina¹⁴. For each NTLC, preferential tariffs applicable each year result from the dismantling of the base duties according to the corresponding staging categories. Both ad valorem (AV) and non-ad valorem (NAV) duties are phase-in accordingly. When NAV duties apply, we compute the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of the staged tariffs following the World Tariff Profile Methodology¹⁵ i.e., using unit values, taking 2014 as a reference year.

To evaluate the extent of TRQ, we opt for an estimation of their AVE for each of the NTLC impacted and consider three possible equilibria situation:

- Regime-1: Demand with supply below the quota;
- Regime-2: Demand with supply at the quota;
- Regime-3: Demand with supply over the quota.


In regime-1, the AVE is equal to the IQTR, in regime-3 it is equal to the OQTR, and in regime-2 it is equal to the IQTR plus a quota premium that depends on the quota administration method. The AVE of the staged rates at the NTLC are first aggregated at the HS6 level by simple average, then aggregated at the model sectoral level using GTAP-10 methodology using three-year (2012,2013,2014) bilateral imports average as weight.

¹³ <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2048>

¹⁴ <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/node/101016>

¹⁵ World Tariff Profile 2006, Technical Annexes A-C, pp. 179-204. (https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world_tariff_profiles06_e.htm)

Figure 2: Construction of tariff reduction schedules



Source: Antonia Ngavozafy and Maria C. Latorre (2021)

4. RESULTS

4.1. TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of EU-Mercosur AA

From the three possible equilibria situation, regime-1 and regime-3 appear throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA in the schedules of both parties.

In Mercosur's schedule tariff-quotas on most products fall in the regime-1, below the quota. The quota opened for cheese, milk powder and chocolates and preparations containing cocoa exceed the demand of those products in 2019 from the first two years of implementation of the agreement. Therefore, the quota is not binding. As a result, the AVEs equal the inside-quota tariffs. Since the inside-quota tariffs on these commodities are gradually reduced to become duty-free from year-9 onwards, these products will be fully liberalized.

However, some TQ in Mercosur's schedule fall in the over-quota regime (Regime-3). That is the case for the quotas on garlic (HS 070320), white chocolates (HS 170490), and preserved tomatoes (HS 200210). Demands on these group of products exceeds the opened quota, even at the end of the implementation period. Although the quota volume of garlic is for example increasing from 2 143 tons to 15 000 tons in seven years, the contingents are still below the demand (17314 tons in 2019). Therefore, the AVEs of these products are equal to the outside-quota tariffs (OQTR). Additionally, the OQTR on garlic remain at the base rate of 25% during the implementation period so there is no effective liberalization. Regarding white chocolates and preserved tomatoes, their effective liberalization happens from year-14 and year-9 respectively, when the OQTR become duty-free.

Finally, commodities such as Infant formulas and filled chocolates switch regimes throughout the implementation period. The quota volume on Infant formulas grows from 500 to 5000 tons with an increment of 500 tons in 10 years. Regime-1 applies until the opened quota is below Mercosur's annual demand of 3168 tons. The quota is not binding, AVE is the OQTR at 16%. As soon as the quota volume

becomes higher than Mercosur's annual demand of infant formulas, the quota regime switches to regime-3, over the quota, and the AVE is the IQTR, which gradually decreases to become free by year-10. Filled chocolates show a similar pattern with an effective liberalization starting from year-9.

In the European Union' schedule, the quota regimes vary depending on the type of commodities and their sensitivities for the EU market. The Tariff quotas on bovine meat (HS 0201), meat offal (HS 0210), maize (HS 1005), rice (HS 1006), maize and potato starch (HS 110812 and HS 110814), meat preparations such as ham (HS 16024*, 160250, 160290), cane sugar (HS 170113 and HS 170114), and rum and spirits (HS 220840) fall under the over-quota regime (regime-3). The demands on these commodities exceed the opened tariff quota. As a result, the AVEs are equal to the OQTR. Additionally, because the OQTR remain at the base rates for all of the cited commodities, there is no effective liberalization on those products which are already subject to very high tariffs.

The liberalization is effective from the day the agreement enters into force (year-0) for swine meat (HS 0203), fresh or chilled bovine offal (HS 020610), other frozen bovine offal (HS 020629) and fat (HS 020990). The demands on those products are lower than the opened quota so that the IQTR apply as the AVE and the TQs are not binding. The resulting preferential margins are significant: between 0.24 pp and 1.32 pp.

The TQ are not also binding for powdered milk (HS 040210 and 040221), cheese (HS 0406*) and eggs (HS 0408*). The AVEs are the IQTR. In fact, the quota regime is regime-3 below the quota as the demands are far lower than the opened contingents. For example, the EU commits to open a quota of 30000 tons on cheese while its current demand from Mercosur is merely 17.2 tons. Additionally, the IQTR on powdered milk, cheese and eggs will be gradually reduced to zero in nine instalments from the day the agreement enters into force. Liberalization could be effective.

Tariff quotas on the remaining products i.e., poultry meat and offal, natural honey (HS 040900) and garlic (070320) go through regime-1 then regime-3 during the implementation period. For instance, EU's annual demands of poultry meat and offal (HS 0207) from Mercosur of 65 286 tons exceed the opened quota for the first four years, during which the AVEs are equal to the OQTR (= base tariffs) and the quota volume accrues from 15 000 tons to 60 000 tons. From year-4 onwards, the contingent keeps on growing from 75 000 tons up to 90 000 tons. Therefore, the AVE is equal to the IQTR of 0% from year-4 onwards, making the liberalization effective. The AVEs for natural honey (HS 040900) equal to the OQTR (17.3%) in year-0 and year-1 and the contingents are 7 500 tons and 15 000 tons.

The evolution of TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA in the schedules of the EU and Mercosur is summarized in [figure 1 to 9 in the Annex 1](#).

4.2. CGE results

Welfare and GDP impact

Table 7 reports the relative changes in the real GDP compared to the baseline on the day the agreement enters into force (EIF) assumed in 2022 and 15 years later (EIF +15).

As soon as the agreement enters into force, their GDP relatively increases for Mercosur countries but remain constant for the European Union. The agreement has no significative effects on the GDP of third countries.

As the liberalization goes deeper 15 years later (EIF +15) and tariffs reduced further, the impacts on real GDP are stronger. Among the parties to the treaty, Uruguay appears to be greatest beneficiary with 0.88% increase of its real GDP. In the opposite, the EU27 does gain much from the EU-Mercosur

AA in relative terms. However, EU27's gain is still sizeable in monetary values. In fact, the EU is expected to gain 3.8 billion USD in real GDP when the agreement is implemented.

Table 7: Percentage change in real GDP due EU-Mercosur AA

Changes in real GDP (in percent) due to EU-Mercosur AA

| Country | At EIF (2022) | At EIF +15 years (2037) |
|-------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| EU_27 | 0 | 0.02 |
| Brazil | 0.05 | 0.34 |
| Argentina | 0.04 | 0.36 |
| Uruguay | 0.07 | 0.88 |
| Paraguay | 0.04 | 0.18 |
| United States | 0 | 0 |
| China | 0 | 0 |
| Rest of the World | 0 | 0.01 |

Note: Results report GTAP qgdp

Source: Authors' CGE modelling results using GTAP10 database

Table 8: Changes in real GDP due to the EU-Mercosur AA



Changes in real GDP (in USD millions) due to EU-Mercosur AA



| Country | At EIF (2022) | At EIF +15 years (2037) |
|-------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| EU_27 | 247 | 3790 |
| Brazil | 1339.25 | 8858 |
| Argentina | 247.38 | 2117.5 |
| Uruguay | 44.23 | 524.74 |
| Paraguay | 12.76 | 56 |
| United States | -4 | -74 |
| China | 12 | 178 |
| Rest of the World | 110 | 1716 |

Note: Results report GTAP qgdp



Source: Authors' CGE modelling results using GTAP10 database

Trade Impact





DRY



5. CONCLUSION

[...].

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
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

ANNEX 1 TRQ regimes during the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA.

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TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of Mercosur countries (Assuming EIF in 2022)




TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of Mercosur countries (Assuming EIF in 2022)



TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)

H56




Regime
 ● 1 - Below Quota
 ◆ 3 - Over Quota

Regime
 ● 1 - Below Quota
 ◆ 3 - Over Quota

Contingent
 • 0
 ○ 20000
 ○ 40000
 ○ 60000
 ○ 80000
 ○ 90000

TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)




Regime
 ● 1 - Below Quota
 ◆ 3 - Over Quota


Regime
 ■ 1 - Below Quota
 ■ 3 - Over Quota

Contingent
 • 0
 ○ 10000
 ○ 20000
 ○ 30000
 ○ 40000
 ○ 45000

TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)



TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)




TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)

Regime
 ● 1 - Below Quota
 ◆ 3 - Over Quota


Regime
 ■ 1 - Below Quota
 ■ 3 - Over Quota

Contingent
 • 0
 ○ 50000
 ○ 100000
 ○ 150000
 ○ 180000



TRQ regimes throughout the implementation of the EU-Mercosur AA, Schedule of the EU towards Brazil (Assuming EIF in 2022)

HS6



Regime

- 1 - Below Quota
- ◆ 3 - Over Quota

Regime

- 1 - Below Quota
- 3 - Over Quota

Contingent

- 0
- 200000
- 400000
- 650000

ANNEX 2 Trade Impacts of the EU-Mercosur AA (Agricultural products subject to TRQ only)

Table 9: Percent Changes in Bilateral Traded Quantities, EIF

| Commo.. | Exporter | Importer | | | | |
|---------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|----------|---------|
| | | Argentina | Brazil | EU27 | Paraguay | Uruguay |
| c_b_t | Argentina | 0.02 | -0.12 | 2.21 | 0.18 | 0.10 |
| | Brazil | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.21 |
| | EU27 | 11.17 | 7.96 | 0.01 | 31.75 | 6.82 |
| | Paraguay | -0.12 | -0.26 | 1.92 | 0.05 | -0.03 |
| | Uruguay | 0.02 | -0.12 | 3.19 | 0.20 | 0.13 |
| c_cer | Argentina | 0.08 | -0.09 | 1.14 | 0.19 | 0.11 |
| | Brazil | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.23 |
| | EU27 | 4.22 | 26.47 | 0.01 | 16.52 | 1.87 |
| | Paraguay | -0.06 | -0.21 | 0.09 | 0.07 | -0.03 |
| | Uruguay | -0.01 | -0.17 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.04 |
| c_cmt | Argentina | 0.04 | -0.10 | 0.28 | 0.12 | 0.09 |
| | Brazil | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.38 | 0.28 | 0.20 |
| | EU27 | -0.02 | -0.26 | 0.01 | 16.04 | -0.01 |
| | Paraguay | -0.14 | -0.27 | 0.11 | 0.02 | -0.06 |
| | Uruguay | -0.04 | -0.18 | 0.21 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| c_mil | Argentina | 0.01 | -0.14 | 2.00 | 0.17 | 0.09 |
| | Brazil | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.91 | 0.28 | 0.21 |
| | EU27 | -0.26 | 0.55 | 0.01 | 0.66 | -0.16 |
| | Paraguay | -0.16 | -0.30 | 0.10 | 0.01 | -0.07 |
| | Uruguay | -0.05 | -0.19 | 0.22 | 0.12 | 0.05 |
| c_oap | Argentina | 0.08 | -0.08 | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.54 |
| | Brazil | 0.05 | 0.02 | 1.34 | 0.24 | 0.59 |
| | EU27 | -0.14 | -0.37 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.30 |
| | Paraguay | -0.15 | -0.28 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.39 |
| | Uruguay | 0.00 | -0.14 | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.55 |
| c_ofd | Argentina | 0.03 | -0.14 | 3.15 | 0.17 | 0.10 |
| | Brazil | 0.12 | -0.01 | 2.79 | 0.27 | 0.20 |
| | EU27 | 3.65 | 0.47 | 0.01 | 1.63 | 2.34 |
| | Paraguay | -0.12 | -0.27 | 1.89 | 0.05 | -0.04 |
| | Uruguay | -0.06 | -0.21 | 3.03 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| c_omt | Argentina | 0.03 | -0.12 | 1.03 | 0.18 | 0.15 |
| | Brazil | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.25 |
| | EU27 | 0.07 | -0.13 | 0.01 | 0.87 | 0.88 |
| | Paraguay | -0.15 | -0.29 | 0.11 | 0.01 | -0.02 |
| | Uruguay | -0.05 | -0.19 | 1.83 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| c_sgr | Argentina | 0.03 | -0.13 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.09 |
| | Brazil | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.20 |
| | EU27 | 0.60 | 0.44 | 0.01 | 0.64 | 1.28 |
| | Paraguay | -0.11 | -0.25 | 0.11 | 0.02 | -0.04 |
| | Uruguay | 0.01 | -0.13 | 0.23 | 0.12 | 0.08 |
| c_v_f | Argentina | 0.01 | -0.12 | 2.12 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| | Brazil | 0.08 | 0.01 | 1.26 | 0.20 | 0.15 |
| | EU27 | 14.75 | 10.63 | 0.00 | 2.84 | 1.60 |
| | Paraguay | -0.15 | -0.25 | 0.09 | 0.00 | -0.06 |
| | Uruguay | -0.10 | -0.21 | 1.09 | 0.05 | -0.01 |

Table 10: Percent Changes in Bilateral Traded quantities, EIF + 15

| Commo.. | Exporter | Importer | | | | |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------|------|----------|---------|
| | | Argentina | Brazil | EU27 | Paraguay | Uruguay |
| c_b_t | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 12 | 3 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 1 | -1 | 15 | 4 | 2 |
| | EU27 | 61 | 39 | 0 | 448 | 39 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 18 | 0 | -1 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -3 | 11 | 2 | 0 |
| c_cer | Argentina | 1 | -1 | 16 | 2 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 2 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| | EU27 | 11 | 1894 | 0 | 127 | 21 |
| | Paraguay | -1 | -3 | 2 | 0 | -1 |
| | Uruguay | 0 | -3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| c_cmt | Argentina | 0 | -1 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 1 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| | EU27 | -4 | -6 | 0 | 14 | -3 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 2 | 0 | -2 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -3 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| c_mil | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 24 | 3 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 1 | -1 | 13 | 4 | 2 |
| | EU27 | -1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 10 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 2 | 0 | -2 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -3 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| c_oap | Argentina | 1 | -1 | 20 | 3 | 4 |
| | Brazil | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3 | 4 |
| | EU27 | -4 | -6 | 0 | -2 | 0 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -2 | 16 | 2 | 3 |
| c_ofd | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 12 | 3 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 1 | 0 | 25 | 4 | 2 |
| | EU27 | 14 | -2 | 0 | 25 | 13 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 16 | 0 | -1 |
| | Uruguay | -2 | -3 | 12 | 1 | 0 |
| c_omt | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 28 | 3 | 2 |
| | Brazil | 1 | 0 | 36 | 4 | 3 |
| | EU27 | -2 | -4 | 0 | 14 | 7 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 2 | 0 | -1 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -3 | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| c_sgr | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| | Brazil | 1 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 2 |
| | EU27 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 2 | 7 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 2 | 0 | -1 |
| | Uruguay | -1 | -2 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| c_v_f | Argentina | 0 | -2 | 11 | 2 | 0 |
| | Brazil | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 1 |
| | EU27 | 9 | 6 | 0 | 27 | -2 |
| | Paraguay | -3 | -4 | 3 | 0 | -2 |
| | Uruguay | -2 | -3 | 8 | 1 | 0 |

