@article{Balistreri:332681,
      recid = {332681},
      author = {Balistreri, Edward J. and Maliszewska, Maryla and  Osorio-Rodarte, Israel and Tarr, David G. and Yonezawa,  Hidemichi},
      title = {Poverty and Shared Prosperity Implications of Deep  Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa},
      address = {2016},
      year = {2016},
      note = {Presented at the 19th Annual Conference on Global Economic  Analysis, Washington DC, USA},
      abstract = {Evidence indicates that trade costs are a much more  substantial barrier to trade than tariffs, especially in  sub-Saharan Africa. We decompose trade costs into: (i)  trade facilitation; (ii) non-tariff barriers; and (iii) the  costs of business services. We assess the poverty and  shared prosperity impacts of deep integration to reduce  these three types of trade costs in: (i) the East African  Customs Union (EACU)-COMESA-SADC “Tripartite” FTA; (ii)  within the EACU alone; and (iii) unilaterally by the EACU.  We employ an innovative multi-region computable general  equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the changes in the  macroeconomic variables that impact poverty and shared  prosperity. We utilize the CGE model estimates in the  Global Income Distribution Dynamics (GIDD) microsimulation  model to obtain assessments of the changes in the poverty  headcount and shared prosperity for each of our simulations  for each of our six African regions or countries. We find  that these reforms are pro-poor. There are significant  reductions in the poverty headcount and the percentage of  the population living in poverty for all six of our African  regions from deep integration in the Tripartite FTA or  comparable unilateral reforms by the EACU. Further, the  incomes of the bottom forty percent of the populations  noticeably increase in all countries or regions of our  model that are engaged in the trade reforms. The reason the  poor share in the prosperity is due importantly to the fact  that the reforms increase unskilled wages faster than  rewards of other factors of production, as the reforms tend  to favor agriculture. Despite the uniform increases in  income for the poorest 40 percent, we find some cases where  the share of income captured by the poorest 40 percent of  the population decreases. We find that the estimated gains  vary considerably across countries and reforms. Thus,  countries would have an interest in negotiating for  different reforms in different agreements.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/332681},
}