@article{Carbone:331061,
      recid = {331061},
      author = {Carbone, Jared and Rutherford, Thomas F. and Helm,  Carsten},
      title = {Carbon Abatement, Coalition Formation, and International  Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emissions},
      address = {2002},
      pages = {14},
      year = {2002},
      note = {Presented at the 5th Annual Conference on Global Economic  Analysis, Taipei, Taiwan},
      abstract = {The success of any international climate change agreement  depends on the strategic incentives of countries to  participate. We use a calibrated non-cooperative game to  consider how the terms on which countries are allowed to  trade in emissions permits affect equilibrium cost and  emissions predictions. Wealthy, high abatement demand  countries will participate only in agreements which promise  significant reductions in global emissions, the while  developing countries entering such agreements must be  allowed to sell sufficient emissions rights to make an  their participation worthwhile. We find that stringent caps  on the level of emissions rights that any individual  country may allocate itself, combined with relatively weak  restrictions on the volume of trade in which countries may  engage are an effective way of aligning regional  incentives. This result runs contrary to received wisdom  from the non-strategic literature on emissions trading.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/331061},
}