KEY ISSUES FOR THE NEXT FARM BILL: IS A FARM PROGRAM BUYOUT POSSIBLE?

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As the Doha Round of WTO negotiations unfolds, achieving substantial liberalization of agricultural trade remains elusive. One reason is that just a few years after the WTO Uruguay Round agreements put a set of multilateral trade and subsidy rules in place for agriculture, the level of U.S. farm subsidies rose sharply. Simultaneously, some developing countries with smaller fiscal resources responded by increasing border protection to shield their domestic farmers from declining agricultural prices. Continuation of high subsidies in developed countries matched by high tariffs in developing countries remains a possible result of domestic and WTO policy decisions. A more desirable outcome would be the globally efficient and welfare-enhancing solution of low subsidies and low protection.

In this presentation I explore a policy option that the United States might use to reduce the long-run cost of subsidies and facilitate the liberalization of agricultural trade, while providing substantial transition support to farmers. The focus is on whether reforms to decouple farm support programs, which are supposed to reduce their production- and trade-distorting effects, can be made more convincing through a long-term buyout that would end farm subsidies. Buyouts have not been feasible in the past but recent reforms for several specialty crops provide evidence of what might be done. Estimates are provided of the potential cost of a buyout of the main U.S. farm support subsidies of fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments. A buyout of this type should be on the agenda in discussions of the next farm bill.

Recent Buyouts: Peanuts and Tobacco

A number of recent policy reforms around the world have provided buyouts. In the United States, contrasting recent policy outcomes among the historically similar peanut, tobacco and sugar support programs provide some evidence about the conditions conducive to a buyout and its consequences. Very briefly, the 2002 restructuring of the peanut program included a buyout of production quota rights together with new direct and counter-cyclical payments, the 2004 tobacco buyout ended quotas and eliminated the loan rate program without implementing new payment mechanisms, and there has been relative lack of reform of the support program for sugar.

One lesson from the two recent reforms is that narrowly defined benefits, specifically production quotas, may be easier to buy out than broader support policies. Binding quota rights were bought out both for peanuts and tobacco, whereas sugar marketing allotments that are only intermittently binding have not been bought out.

The onset of reform aligns closely with shrinkage of the benefits obtained by participants in the old program. The pressure from reduced quotas and revenue was most severe for tobacco and the tobacco buyout most complete. Unique dimensions with respect to tobacco also explain the more complete buyout of tobacco support compared to peanuts. Domestic tobacco producers had been less successful than peanuts or sugar producers in securing restrictions on imports to protect their quota rents. The substantial health-cost-related transfers financed by manufacturers, importers and consumers in the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement are also unique to the tobacco industry. This set the precedent for financing the tobacco buyout with specific assessments instead of general tax revenue. Had this precedent not existed, the higher cost of the tobacco buyout ($9.6 billion) compared to peanuts (about $4 billion over 10 years including ongoing payments) might have blocked its enactment. The health issues associated with tobacco consumption also contributed to the outcome of full elimination of the support programs for producers. In contrast, peanut producers were able to align ongoing support with the cash payment programs for other crops.

Consumers have influenced whether buyouts have occurred to the extent that their demand behavior contributes to declining benefits under the quota program. But the political condition necessary for a buyout appears to be the emergence of substantial support for a reform among producers. Emergence of such opinion is obviously related to the shrinkage of benefits. Producers excluded from having quotas also tend to favor reform. This is especially evident in the case of producers of what were "additional" peanuts, who gained in 2002 by becoming eligible for a stronger support program. The opinion among producers in favor of reform does not have to be unanimous. In both the peanut and tobacco cases, minorities of producers in high-cost production regions opposed elimination of the location-specific quotas.

It is also the case that while a buyout may be conducive to liberalization of trade policy, the peanut and tobacco buyouts benefited domestic not foreign producers. The United States was already a net peanut exporter of additionals—imports were artificially drawn in primarily because of the high domestic price under the quota program. In the case of tobacco, total U.S. output is likely to rise with the buyout, displacing imports.

In terms of compensation, the buyout payments have been quite lucrative in the recent reforms, even given the circumstances of declining benefits to quota owners that have provided the reform triggers. The quota buyout payments for peanuts and the quota and total (quota owner and operator) buyout payments for flue-cured and burley tobacco are compared to a seven-year average (1995-2001) of pre-buyout poundage quota rental rates in Table 1.

For peanuts the lump-sum payment of $0.55/pound made available in the 2002 farm bill is equivalent to an infinite stream of payments of $0.026/pound at a 5 percent discount rate. This is about 70 percent of the average of past quota rental rates. Alternatively, the quota buyout payment is equivalent to the average of annual past rental payments, discounted at 5 percent, made for a period of 24 years. The buyout payments exceed this potential future payment stream to the extent that domestic peanut prices might have fallen had the earlier program continued. Likewise, the buyout payments exceed this future rental revenue stream under the old program if the quantity eligible for sale in the domestic market would have continued to decline under its continuation.

Table 1. Value of the Peanut and Tobacco Buyouts (per pound of quota)

	Peanuts	Flue-cured	Burley
7-Year Simple Average Quota Rent (1995-2001)	$0.037	$0.471	$0.411
		$7.00 Tobacco Buyout	
Quota Buyout Present Value	$0.550	$5.675	$5.675
Equivalent Infinite Annuity	$0.026	$0.270	$0.270
Years for Average Rent	24	16	21
		$10.00 Tobacco Buyout	
Quota Buyout Present Value	--	$8.108	$8.108
Equivalent Infinite Annuity	--	$0.386	$0.386
Years for Average Rent	--	34	56

Source: Womach, Jasper, "Comparing Quota Buyout Payments for Peanuts and Tobacco," Congressional Research Service Report RS 1642, October 2003, and author's calculations. Present values, infinite annuities and years for average rent are based on a 5 percent discount rate.

For tobacco, the ten-year stream of annual buyout payments is first discounted back at a 5 percent rate to an equivalent initial lump sum. This reduces the payment from the nominal $7.00 to $5.68, as shown in Table 1. The lump sum payment is equivalent to an infinite stream of payments of $0.27, about 57 percent of the average of past quota rentals for flue-cured tobacco and about 66 percent for burley tobacco. The lump sum payment is more than double the private market prices that had prevailed for sales of quota rights before the reform. It is equivalent to discounted average rental payments for 16 and 21 years for flue-cured and burley tobacco, respectively. Including the $3 payments to growers (also discounted to an up-front lump sum), raises the equivalent number of years of past rentals covered (to 34 and 56 years for flue-cured and burley, respectively). Again, the buyout is more lucrative for producers to the extent that tobacco prices or quota allocations were likely to have continued to fall under continuation of the old program.

Cost of a Larger Buyout

So far there has not been a convincing buyout proposal for the main farm support programs in the United States. The fixed payments adopted in the 1996 farm bill provided a windfall to farmers in a year of high market prices, but that legislation failed to ensure a buyout in three respects: a budget baseline remained in place for future farm program spending, the permanent farm program legislation from 1949 and related acts was retained, and the 1996 farm bill took no other steps to bind the actions of a future Congress. When farm commodity prices fell, the next Congress quickly stepped in with additional payments.

A buyout of the 2002 U.S. farm programs could focus on the fixed direct payments, the counter-cyclical payments, and/or the loan rate price guarantees. The fixed direct payments are a narrowly-defined benefit which increases the feasibility of a buyout. Bringing their eventual elimination would ease concerns about continued subsidization but would accomplish the least economically or institutionally. This is because either the fixed payments or a buyout replacement are relatively decoupled and are a WTO green box policy.

A buyout of the counter-cyclical payments would accomplish more, since these payments are a particularly contentious form of decoupling likely to have some production stimulating effects. A buyout of counter-cyclical payments would let the United States abandon the WTO blue box, potentially allowing simplification and improved transparency of the WTO rules for agriculture. The value to producers of counter-cyclical payments is not as certain as the fixed payments under the 2002 farm bill, but there is an upper bound because the payments are made on fixed quantities and at per-unit levels no greater than the difference between the target price and the sum of the loan rate and per-unit fixed direct payment rate for each commodity. Farmers who succeeded politically in building the counter-cyclical payments into the 2002 farm bill to address what they viewed as an inadequate safety net in the 1996 legislation are not clamoring to eliminate these new payments. But government fiscal deficits that had eased when the 2002 farm bill was enacted have increased again. So farm program spending will be under scrutiny.

Table 2 provides information on the potential costs of several buyout options. Results are shown separately for a buyout (for all commodities aggregated) of the fixed direct payments, the maximum possible counter-cyclical payments, and the expected counter-cyclical payments as evaluated by USDA. Under the 2002 farm bill, for example, fixed direct payments over six consecutive years (crop years 2002-2007) have an average annual value of $5.292 billion and a discounted present value (at a 5 percent discount rate) of $28.198 billion (row 1).

Buyout payments shown in Table 2 are assumed to be made in equal nominal installments over 10 years, as in the tobacco case. The buyout costs shown in row 2 are those required to compensate for annual payments made for 25 years at the average level of the 2002 farm bill—this is roughly consistent with the buyout compensation provided for peanuts and tobacco. The nominal values of annual payments for which these costs are equivalent as an infinite annuity are shown in row 3.

Table 2. Possible Buyouts of the Main U.S. 2002 Farm Bill Support Payments

	Fixed Direct Payments	Counter-cyclical Payments	
		Maximum Possible	Projected Level
	............billion dollars............		
2002 Farm Bill Payments (crop years 2002-2007)	5.292 (average) 28.198 (lump sum)	7.302 (average) 38.787 (lump sum)	3.505 (average) 18.303 (lump sum)
Buyout Payments Over 10 Years Equivalent to Annual Payments at 2002 Farm Bill Level for 25 Years	9.659 (annual) 78.311 (lump sum)	13.328 (annual) 108.065 (lump sum)	6.398 (annual) 51.870 (lump sum)
Infinite Annuity Equivalent of Buyout Payments	3.729 (annual)	5.146 (annual)	2.470 (annual)

Note: Fixed direct payments and projected counter-cyclical payments are based on the president's 2006 budget. Estimate of maximum counter-cyclical payments is from calculations provided by ERS/USDA. Buyout payments are assumed to be made in equal installments over 10 years. Present values and infinite annuities are based on a 5 percent discount rate.

A buyout of the fixed direct payments along the lines shown nearly doubles the annual expenditure (from $5.292 billion to $9.659 billion) that would have to be made for ten years compared to expenditures each year under the 2002 farm bill. It almost triples the present value of the payments under the 2002 bill (from $28.198 billion to $78.311 billion). This buyout raises short-term costs, but the annual value of equivalent payments in perpetuity ($3.729 billion) is less than the average annual payment the 2002 farm bill will deliver during 2002-2007. A buyout of the maximum possible counter-cyclical payments is more costly, while a buyout of their projected value has a lower cost than for the fixed direct payments.

Overall, buying out farm support payments raises short-term budget costs but reduces expenditures in the long run. Drawing on the recent buyouts for peanut and tobacco quotas, the buyout illustrated in Table 2 provides a long transition period and relatively high level of compensation. Shorter, sharper buyouts could be undertaken. In either case, short-term costs must rise in order for a buyout to provide compensation for the loss of payments further in the future. This can still be considered a good deal by taxpayers (who gain in the long run) and farmers (who receive a short-term boost).

If farm subsidy payments were to be bought out, there is also an issue of whether any buyout could be enforced. The record from the post-1996 increase in support shows new expenditures can arise. But several steps can be envisioned that would improve the prospects for adherence to a buyout. The first would be to eliminate the permanent legislation for farm support programs. A WTO agreement built around a buyout of U.S. counter-cyclical payments might also provide an enforcement mechanism.

Stronger steps could also be taken. Contracts for buyout payments could require that the acreage for which the payments were bought out (and the output from that acreage) be ineligible for future support legislated by Congress. To ensure compliance, such contracts might be structured similarly to those by which some farmers sell their "development rights" to state and local governments for the different purpose of their land remaining in rural condition or agricultural use. The state governments have devised binding legal criteria to ensure compliance from the contract beneficiaries who have sold their development rights.

Can There Be a Buyout in the Next Farm Bill?

Achieving beneficial multilateral liberalization of agricultural trade has remained elusive. This presentation has discussed a long-term buyout that would end farm subsidies as a policy option the United States might use to facilitate progress while providing substantial transition support to farmers.

The differing recent policy outcomes among the historically similar peanut, tobacco and sugar support programs provide some evidence about the conditions conducive to a buyout and its consequences. Narrowly defined benefits, specifically quota rights, may be easier to buy out than broader support policies. The onset of reform aligns closely with a sharp shrinkage of the benefits obtained by participants in the old program. The political condition necessary for a buyout appears to be the emergence of substantial support for reform among producers, which is related to the shrinkage of benefits. While a buyout may be conducive to liberalization of trade policy, the peanuts and tobacco buyouts have benefited domestic not foreign producers.

In terms of compensation, the payments have been quite lucrative for the buyout reforms that have occurred, especially given the circumstances of declining benefits to quota owners that have provided the reform triggers. For peanuts the lump-sum payment of $0.55/pound is equivalent (at a 5 percent discount rate) to previous average quota rental payments for a period of 24 years. For tobacco, the ten-year stream of owner buyout payments is more than double the private market prices that had prevailed for sales of quota rights before the reform. It is equivalent to discounted average rental payments for 16 and 21 years for flue-cured and burley tobacco, respectively.

There has not yet been a convincing buyout proposal for the main supported farm commodities and the political environment may still be far from prompting such a reform. Yet such a reform should be on the agenda in discussions of the next farm bill. Buyouts of the fixed direct and counter-cyclical payments along lines similar to the peanut or tobacco quota buyouts would nearly double the annual expenditures that would have to be made for ten years compared to expenditures each year under the 2002 farm bill, and almost triple the present value of those payments. Thus, a buyout will raise short-term costs, but the equivalent annual payments in perpetuity will be less than the 2002 farm bill has delivered in recent years. Such a buyout is an investment in the future. It provides long-term savings for taxpayers, enhanced transition support to farmers, and a basis on which to pursue more open global agricultural markets.

Endnote

This presentation draws on a research project about a possible “new generation” of farm support policies funded by the Economic Research Service, USDA. A longer project paper is available from the author (d.orden@cgiar.org). Opinions expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to USDA or the International Food Policy Research Institute. I thank Ed Young, Paul Westcott, Erik Dohlman, John Nash, Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and participants in December 2004 conferences of the World Bank and Informa Economics for helpful comments and suggestions.

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The Road to a WTO Doha Agreement…

… has been rocky:

- For developed countries, “dirty decoupling”
- and for developing countries, “defensive” versus “offensive” approaches

have constrained progress in the negotiations

A desirable negotiated outcome would be low subsidies and low protection

A Buyout of Farm Support Programs

This presentation puts forth a domestic policy option that would end farm subsidies by buying out farm support programs. A buyout could:

- **Provide enhanced transition support to farmers**
- **Provide long-term savings to taxpayers**
- **Pave the way for more substantial global agricultural trade liberalization**

Recent Buyouts

Divergent Policies Among Peanuts Tobacco and Sugar

- Peanut quota buyout in the 2002 farm bill
- Tobacco quota and price support buyout (2004)
- Little reform of the sugar program

Value of the Peanut and Tobacco Buyouts

(per pound of quota, at 5% discount rate)

	Peanuts	Flue-cured	Burley
Ave Quota Rent (95-01)	$0.037	$0.47	$0.41
		$7.00 Tobacco Buyout	
Buyout Present Value	$0.550	$5.67	$5.67
Infinite Annuity	$0.026	$0.27	$0.27
Years at Average Rent	24	16	21
		$10.00 Tobacco Buyout	
Buyout Present Value	--	$8.11	$8.11
Infinite Annuity	--	$0.39	$0.39
Years at Average Rent	--	34	56

Insights from Peanuts, Tobacco and Sugar

- Narrowly defined benefits are easiest to buy out
- Onset of reform aligns with sharp contraction of past benefits
- Unique dimensions partly explain the more complete tobacco buyout
- Producers must support the reform
- Buyout compensation has been quite lucrative
- Buyouts may facilitate trade policy reform, but the peanut and tobacco buyouts benefit domestic not foreign producers

Possible Buyouts of Farm Payments

	Fixed Direct Payments	Counter-cyclical Payments	
		Maximum	Projected Level
	billion dollars (annual payments; present value at 5% discount rate)		
2002 Farm Bill (2002-07)	5.29; 28.20	7.30; 38.79	3.50; 18.30
10-Year Buyout of 25 Years Payments	9.66; 78.11	13.33; 108.06	6.40; 51.87
Infinite Annuity	3.73	5.15	2.47

Two Challenges Faced by a Buyout

- **Asking Congress to increase expenditures in the short run to achieve savings in the longer term**
- **Enforcing the buyout when the long term arrives**

If these obstacles can be overcome, a buyout might be a good deal for farmers, taxpayers and an improved world agricultural system