The Distributional Effects of Land Controls in Agriculture

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The paper introduces a framework for analyzing the impacts of land control programs on agricultural production under heterogeneous land qualities, heterogeneous production technologies and imperfect capital markets. It shows that the introduction of diversion programs tends to benefit land owners while harming operators. Moreover, it tends to increase the separation of land ownership and operation and increase concentration among operators. Diversion programs tend to raise land prices less than proportional to the increases in rental rates. They encourage the adoption of yield increasing technologies, and may also encourage adoption of cost reducing technologies when credit is a binding constraint. Participation in voluntary government programs tends to be greater in regions with higher costs, less efficient marginal technology and less efficient marginal land.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the theoretical distributional impacts of two particular policies—acreage setasides or land-retirement programs and associated subsidies or deficiency payments. The evaluation of the effects of these policies on the distribution of agricultural production takes place within a framework sufficiently general to accommodate both mandatory and voluntary governmental programs. Producers are required to divert or setaside some portion of their available land (asset control) and may receive, as an incentive, a subsidy, diversion, or deficiency payment. Such policy variables have been the key elements in governmental programs related to land use in the United States.

A number of recent studies have addressed the distributional impacts of agricultural land control and subsidy programs on small- and medium-size farmers. Unfortunately, little in the way of concrete results—conceptual or empirical—has been advanced. Much of this work is summarized by Gardner who argues that “The current state of affairs, in sum, is that agricultural economists have not been able convincingly to establish a connection one way or another between policy and the structure of agricultural production...” (p. 842). Although much disagreement seems to exist with regard to the distributional effects of general agricultural policies, a conventional wisdom has emerged on aggregate policy effects and the principal characteristics of U. S. agriculture. This conventional wisdom stems from the classic piece of Schultz (1945). In Schultz’s work, the emphasis was on labor; but, in subsequent work by Schultz (1953), differences in rates of return to resources for different producers were attributed to differences in land quality, endowments of inputs, human capital, and wealth controlled by individual producers—the key resource constraints in programming models. In addition, following the work of Schultz (1953), both Johnson and Cochrane have suggest-
ed asset fixity, competitiveness, and rapid technological change as other characteristics of principal importance. The limitations of credit availability for producers of different size classes should also be recognized explicitly. As empirical evidence reported by Baker, Quinn, and Riboud has shown, rural credit markets must be treated as imperfect. Any attempt to analyze the distributional effects of policy requires a specification of all these structural characteristics.

The above studies have been undertaken over the post-World War II period. The empirical evidence over this same period shows that redistribution within the agricultural production sector has, indeed, been dramatic. The average size of production units increased from 216 acres in 1950 to 390 acres in 1976, while the average value per acre moved over the same period from $43 to $244 in 1967 dollars. The major demand for farmland still emanates from farmers expanding their operations (Carter and Johnston).

In addition to recognizing credit markets in assessing the distributional impact of agricultural policy, the land and rental markets for land must be given special attention. The rapid appreciation in land values during the 1970s is much of the basis for another emerging phenomenon, namely, the disruption of the traditional unity between ownership and operation of farm units (Carter and Johnston). Hence, the rental market for land cannot be ignored in any serious investigation of the distributional impacts of U.S. agricultural policy.

In this setting, the evaluation of governmental intervention in terms of output markets only, is grossly inadequate. Governmental policies impinge directly on asset as well as flow markets for both inputs and outputs. In general, the distributional consequences depend on the ownership, utilization, quality, and technology associated with the assets. For the formulation developed in this paper, the distributional implications of acreage setasides and diversion payments are drawn through output markets and land and rental markets, noting the limitations of rural credit markets and the importance of technological change. The heterogeneous nature of agricultural production is admitted by allowing variations in land quality across producers as well as for a particular producer. A major benefit of the formulation advanced in this paper is that it provides a theoretical justification and analytical framework for qualitatively evaluating the implications of mathematical programming models that have been used widely by agricultural economists (Heady and Srivistava; McCarl and Spreen).

We begin our analysis with a specification of the basic model of agricultural production in section 1. Section 2 contains the basic model formulation with diversion and acreage-control policies. A useful simplification of the criterion function is presented in section 3 which shows that the overall gains for a particular farm can be decomposed into gains from operation or land utilization and gains from wealth in landholdings. In section 4, we move from the microeconomic foundations of the mathematical programming sector model to the embodied theoretical aggregation process. Based on the aggregation of individual farm behavior to market-level relationships under fixed technology, we investigate the aggregative effects of changes in diversion policies, the special case of cost-reducing technologies, and the distributional effects on landowners. The assumption of fixed technology is relaxed in section 5 where the trade-off between land transactions and capital-good investments is introduced. In section 6, some

1 As we shall see later, land qualities vary not only across different areas of the nation but also on land controlled by a particular producer, especially larger scale producers. This observation is particularly relevant in assessing the distributional effects of the national farm policy program.
concluding remarks summarize the principal results of the paper.

1. Putty-Clay Agricultural Production

In general, the distributional implications of agricultural policy depend on farm size, land quality, equity, capital, and existing technology. Assume an agricultural sector consisting of I farms denoted by indexes \( i = i, \ldots, I \). To reflect the distribution of farm size and land quality, let \( L_i = (L_{i1}, \ldots, L_{ij})' \) represent acreage endowments of qualities \( j = 1, \ldots, J \) owned by farm \( i \) at the beginning of a production period.\(^2\)

Before implementing production decisions, a producer may choose either to buy additional land or sell existing land. Thus, let \( \Delta L_i = (\Delta L_{i1}, \ldots, \Delta L_{ij})' \) be a vector representing the change in ownership of various land qualities (\( \Delta L_{ij} > 0 \) represents net purchases and \( \Delta L_{ij} < 0 \) represents net sales). In addition, the farmer may choose to augment his land-holdings for the duration of the production period by renting additional land from external sources represented by \( Z_i = (Z_{i1}, \ldots, Z_{ij}) \) where \( Z_{ij} < 0 \) corresponds to leasing some of his own land to another farmer.

In this context the vector, \( A_i \), of acreages of various qualities utilized by farm \( i \) in crop production must satisfy the Land Utilization Constraint

\[
0 \leq A_i \leq L_i + \Delta L_i + Z_i
\]  

(1)

and, of course, the farmer can neither sell nor lease to another farmer more land than is actually owned—the Land Sale Constraint and the Land Rental Constraint,

\[
\Delta L_i \geq -L_i
\]  

(2)

and

\[
Z_i \geq -L_i - \Delta L_i.
\]  

(3)

To consider the distribution of capital stock and technology in the industry, suppose there are \( S_0 \) types of existing technologies in the industry, and every farm's existing technology, \( S_0 \), may be classified into one of these types denoted by \( s = 1, \ldots, S_0 \). The technology type thus specifies the complete machinery complement, structures, etc. In addition, with the new production period, \( S_1 - S_0 \), new technologies become available. Following the putty-clay approach, a farm may continue operating with its existing technology or incur costs of investment \( k_s \) in adopting a new technology \( s, s = S_0 + 1, \ldots, S_1 \) (for simplicity, assume \( k_s = 0 \) for \( s = 1, \ldots, S_0 \)).\(^3\) The cost of new technological investments attributable to the present production period is thus \( \gamma k_s \), where \( \gamma \) reflects the cost of capital and depreciation and, thus, appropriately “annualizes” the relevant investment value.

Moreover, following the putty-clay assumption, each technology is associated with fixed input-output coefficients which may be arrayed in an \( L \times J \) matrix, \( H_i \), where elements, \( H_{ij} \), denote the amount of variable input \( \ell \) required per acre of type \( j \) land using technology \( s \). In addition, each technology is associated with a \( 1 \times J \) vector of productivities, \( y_\sigma \), where elements \( y_{\sigma j} \) define the yield per acre on land of type \( j \) for farm \( i \) under technology \( s \). And, finally, each technology is associated with a linear Capacity Constraint, \( \ell A_i \leq \ldots \)

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\(^2\) As we shall show, this feature allows an examination of the impact associated with diverting only the most unproductive lands. As numerous authors have noted, average yields tend to increase when acreage restrictions are imposed (Weisgerber). As a result of acreage setaside or control programs within U.S. agriculture, Weisgerber estimates that the combined effects of land selection within farms and the differential impact among areas cause land withdrawn from production to be, on the average, 80–90 percent as productive as the land utilized. This has been referred to in the literature as "slippage"; it is often computed on the basis of past data and is assumed in policy impact analysis. In our model such slippage rates are treated endogenously.

\(^3\) The assumption here is that a farm will only incur investment costs to adopt new technologies because of obsolescence expectations of existing technologies.
b_i which may be rewritten without loss of
generality as
\[ c_i A_i \leq 1 \]  
(4)
where \( c_i = (c_{i1}, \ldots, c_{ij}) \) is a \( 1 \times J \) vector
of constraint coefficients, and \( 1/c_i \) reflects
the maximum of type \( j \) land that can be
farmed with technology \( s \).

These capacity constraints assume that
different land qualities require different
degrees of effort per acre from a given
configuration of capital goods. Thus, the
maximum amount of land that can be uti-
лизed with given machinery may vary
across land qualities. In addition, the con-
straint implies that capacity utilization
may be substituted proportionally be-
tween land types.

Assuming a competitive industry, each
farm regards its output price \( P \) and the
vector of input prices \( V = (V_1, \ldots, V_L) \) as
given.\(^4\) Thus, with technology \( s \), total rev-
enue from the sale of production is \( P Y_i A_i \),
and variable costs of production (exclud-
ing rental expense) are \( \mu_i A_i \), where \( \mu_i = V H_i \),
is a vector of average costs per acre. Sup-
pose, also, that the land and rental mar-
ket are competitive with respect to \( 1 \times J \)
price vectors, \( W = (W_1, \ldots, W_J) \) and \( R =
(R_1, \ldots, R_J) \) corresponding to the various
land types. Thus, the net investment in
new land is \( W A L_i \), and net rental expense
is \( R Z_i \).

Now further suppose each farmer ex-
pects land to appreciate and has a subjec-
tive expectation of land prices \( W_i^* \) at the
end of the production period. Expected
capital gains on landholdings are thus given by
\[ [W_i^* - (1 + \theta)W(L_i + \Delta L_i)] \]
where \( \theta \) is the effective interest rate on the farmer's
land investment (including opportunity
cost on land held free of debt). In this
context, suppose the farmer has a myopic
objective for the present production pe-
riod of maximizing his total gains, \( \pi_i \), de-
finned by the sum of short-run profits less
the annualized cost of new capital invest-
ments plus capital gains from land apprecia-
tion,\(^5\)
\[ \pi_i = (P Y_i - \mu_i) A_i - R Z_i - \gamma k_i 
+ [W_i^* - (1 + \theta)W(L_i + \Delta L_i)]. \]  
(5)

Finally, to reflect the role of equity in
allowing farms to capitalize on opportu-
nities offered or encouraged by new pol-
licies to expand landholdings or upgrade
technologies, assume that the industry does
not have access to a perfect capital mar-
ket. Suppose that farms have different
credit lines available to them, possibly de-
dpending on their equity, management, etc.
Let \( m_i \) represent the total funds available
to farm \( i \) at the beginning of the produc-
tion period including both internal liquid-
ity and external credit. Fixed credit, \( m_i \),
is a function of the initial net worth of the
farmer and the composition of his port-
folio. It reflects his ability to finance new
investments, above and beyond what can
be secured utilizing newly purchased as-
sets as collateral.\(^6\) Then the new invest-
ment in land and alternative technologies
must satisfy the Credit Constraint
\[ k_i + W A L_i \leq m_i. \]  
(6)

The farmer's myopic decision problem
thus becomes maximization of \( \pi_i \) in (5)
subject to the constraints in (1), (2), (3),
(4), (5), and (6).\(^7\)

\(^4\) Note that this decision problem can be interpreted
as a maximization problem under uncertainty with
risk-neutral behavior. Thus, \( \pi_i \) is the expected gain
at the end of the period. It is the sum of expected
short-term profits less the annualized costs of new
capital investment plus expected capital gains from
land appreciation. Output-price expectations are
assumed rational and common across producers, re-
flecting readily available future market quotes for
harvest period prices. Land-price expectations,
however, due to the lack of direct information on
inflation, interest rates, and the like, are presumed
to vary across producers.

\(^5\) Explicit consideration of asset composition, debt
structure, and the collateral coefficients of different
assets complicates the analysis without altering the
results significantly. (For further details, see Just et
al., 1982.)
The farmer's decision involves choice of a production technology, the quantities of output and inputs including land rental, and land portfolio adjustment. For conceptual purposes, the decision problem may be broken into two stages. First, optimal production plans and land transactions can be determined by linear programming for a given technology, i.e.,

$$\max_{\pi_i} \pi_i(\gamma)$$

subject to constraints (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6). Suppose the resulting decisions, which are functions of P, R, V, and W, are denoted by $A^*_i$, $Z^*_i$, and $AL^*_i$, and let the resulting maximum under technology $s$ be denoted by $\pi_i(s)$. The optimal technology is then found by maximizing over $s$,

$$\max_{\pi_i(s)} \pi_i(s)$$

where $\mathcal{S}_i = (s_0, S_0 + 1, S_0 + 2, \ldots, S_i)$ is the set of potential technology choices for farm $i$. Let the optimal technology choice from the problem in (8), which is also a function of prices $P$, $R$, $V$, and $W$, be denoted by $\eta^*_i$.

Given the above framework for each individual farm, the farm responses can be simply aggregated into market relationships. Each farm's output supply curve for given input, rental, and land prices is $y^*_iA^*_i$; hence, market supply is $X^s(P) = \sum_{i=1}^{S} y^*_iA^*_i$. Letting $X^d(P)$ represent market demand for agricultural output ($X^d < 0$), the market equilibrium condition is thus

$$X^s(P) = \sum_{i=1}^{S} y^*_iA^*_i.$$  

Similar equilibrium conditions can also be developed for input markets, but they are not given here explicitly, since the results in the remainder of this paper are derived assuming fixed input prices (elastic input supply).

While input and output prices are determined by the interaction of the agricultural sector with external forces from the rest of the economy, the prices and rental rates of land are determined internally. For example, for given input and output prices and given rental rates, an individual farm's demand for land of various types (supply if negative) is $AL^*_i(W)$, which is a function of land prices according to the above optimization problem. Supply is equal to demand for each type of land, and equilibrium prevails in the industry only if

$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} AL^*_i(W) = 0.$$  

Similarly, the demand for rental land of various types (supply, if negative) is given by $Z^*_i(R)$ for given prices of land, other inputs, and output. The rental markets are thus in equilibrium only if

$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} Z^*_i(R) = 0.$$  

### 2. Subsidy and Acreage-Control Instruments

Consider now the role of agricultural policy instruments corresponding to diversion policies. Specifically, consider the introduction of voluntary acreage controls and subsidy payments. Suppose a farmer has the option of either diverting or not diverting a fraction, $1 - \omega$, of the land he farms (including rented land). If he diverts $1 - \omega$ of his land, he receives a payment for normal production on the non-diverted land. Since the payment is based on regional average yields, he receives a payment of $P$ per acre of nondiverted land where $P$ is based on a payment rate per acre and normal average yields for the region. If the farmer does not comply and

The subsidy, $\tilde{P}$, under the 1977 and 1981 Food and Agriculture Acts, can be measured as the sum of deficiency payments and diversion payments. The diversion payment is predetermined, while the deficiency payment is computed as the minimum of either the difference between the target price and the average farm price or as the difference between...
diverts $1 - \omega$ of his land, then he receives only the market price. Let $\lambda_i$ be a dichotomous decision variable where $\lambda_i = 1$ corresponds to compliance with the diversion program and $\lambda_i = 0$ corresponds to noncompliance. The farmer's decision problem for a given technology choice in (7) thus becomes

$$\max_{\lambda_i, X, A_i, Z_i} \pi_i(s) = \left[ P_{y_i} + \tilde{P}_{\lambda_i} - \mu_i - Z_i - \gamma_k - \omega \right] X_i + [W - (1 + \theta)W(L_i + \Delta L_i)] \quad (12)$$

subject to the Acreage Setaside Constraint

$$\lambda_i e(L_i + \Delta L_i + Z_i) - A_i \geq 0 \quad (13)$$

and the constraints in (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) where $e = (1, 1, \ldots, 1)$ is a $1 \times J$ row vector.$^9$

3. Individual Firm Behavior Under Diversion Policy

In the context of the above problem, the effects of agricultural policy on individual farm behavior can be examined by comparing the results of compliance with noncompliance using the formal mathematical derivations contained in Just et al. (1983).$^{10}$ Shadow values are defined for each group of constraints, $\Phi_1$ for the Land Utilization Constraint, $\Phi_2$ for the Land Sale Constraint, $\Phi_4$ for the Credit Constraint, and $\Phi_6$ for the Acreage Setaside Constraint. To facilitate the discussion, definitions of three quantities of land are important: owned land $(L_i + \Delta L_i)$, controlled land $(L_i + \Delta L_i + Z_i)$, and utilized land $(A_i)$. In the case of utilized land, or constraint (1), the relevant shadow value is

$$\phi_i = \begin{cases} 
P_{y_i} + \tilde{P}_{\lambda_i} - \mu_i - \phi_{d_i} c_{d_i} - \phi_{d_i} \lambda_i > 0 & \text{if } A_i = L_i + \Delta L_i + Z_i \\
0 & \text{if } A_i \leq L_i + \Delta L_i + Z_i. 
\end{cases} \quad (14)$$

Thus, if type $j$ land is utilized, its rental rate is

$$R_j = P_{y_j} + \tilde{P}_{\lambda_j} - \mu_j - \phi_{d_j} c_{d_j} - \phi_{d_j} \lambda_j (1 - \omega) \quad (15)$$

while, if it is not utilized,

$$R_j = \phi_{d_j} \lambda_j \omega. \quad (16)$$

Solving (15) for $\phi_{d_j}$, the quasi rent to technology, and noting that this rent measure will exceed program net returns $[P_{y_j} + \tilde{P}_{\lambda_j} - \mu_j - \phi_{d_j} \lambda_j (1 - \omega)]$ less the rental rate adjusted for the capacity measure $1/c_{d_j}$ for

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$^9$ A more realistic specification would treat target and price supports as the control variables and solve for the deficiency payment endogenously. This specification, however, complicates the conceptual analysis without significantly changing the derived results.

$^{10}$ This paper is available upon request.
all types of land which are not utilized obtains
\[ \phi_u = \max \left\{ \max_i \left[ \frac{P_{y_i} + P_{x_i} - \mu_i}{c_i} \right] \right\} > 0 \] (17)

If the first term on the right-hand side of (17) is negative for all land types, then \( \phi_u = 0 \) and no land is utilized. In the case of noncompliance (\( \lambda_i = 0 \)), \( \phi_u \) is simply the maximum profit (returns to land minus rental payments) per unit of capacity over all types of land controlled by the farm.\(^{11}\)

To further interpret \( \phi_u \) for the case of compliance (\( \lambda_i = 1 \)), note that \( \phi_{u_j} \leq (R_i - \phi_{u_j}/\omega) \) for all \( j \) where \( \phi_{u_j} \geq 0 \). Thus, \( \phi_{u_i} \leq R_i/\omega \) for all \( j \). But the diversion requirement cannot be satisfied unless some land is controlled but not utilized (\( A_{ij} < L_{ij} + Z_i \)); clearly, from (16), \( \phi_{u_i} = R_i/\omega \) for some land type \( j \) and, hence,
\[ \phi_u = \min_i \left[ \frac{R_i}{\omega} \right]. \] (18)

Thus, the farm will divert only land with the lowest rental rate. The shadow price of diversion is the rental rate on diversion quality land,\(^{12}\) adjusted upward by a factor reflecting the proportional amount of land for which the marginal diversion acre satisfies the diversion requirement.

Turning to land transactions, the gain from either controlling or leasing out land of type \( j \) is equal to the market rental fee. This result reveals that land of type \( j \) will be held if the expected capital gains from

ownership plus the gains from controlling the land (represented by \( R_i \)) are equal to the opportunity cost of the credit constraint, i.e.,
\[ \Delta L_i = \begin{cases} \lambda_i & \text{if } W_i^e - (1 + \theta)W_i + R_i = \phi_u W_i, \\ \lambda_i & \text{if } W_i^e - (1 + \theta)W_i + R_i < \phi_u W_i. \end{cases} \] (19)

The opportunity cost or shadow price of credit may be determined from
\[ \phi_u = \max_i \left[ \frac{W_i^e - W_i + R_i}{W_i} - \theta \right] > 0 \] (20)

i.e., if any land is held, \( \phi_{u_i} \) is the expected rate of return on land minus the rate of interest.

The above results on rental rates, (15)–(18), and land transactions, viz., \( W_i^e - (1 + \theta)W_i = \phi_u W_i - R_i \) for held land, allow a useful simplification of the criterion function (12). That is, substituting these results into (12) for land types where not all land is rented out and not all land is sold and using (18) with \( R = \min_i R_i \) leads to
\[ \pi(s) = \phi_u + \lambda_i \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} eA_i - \frac{R}{\omega} (L_i + A_i) + \phi_u W_i (L_i + A_i - A_i) - \gamma_k \] (21)

Note that, since \( L_i + A_i + Z_i - A_i \) is a vector of diverted acreages and \( \bar{R} \) applies to all types of land which are diverted, the third term on the right-hand side of (21) is \( \bar{R} \) times total diverted acreage if \( \bar{R} > 0 \). However, since \( [(1 - \omega)/\omega]eA_i \) is also total diverted acreage, the sum of the second and third terms of (21) vanishes. Hence,
\[ \pi(s) = \phi_u - \gamma_k + \phi_u W_i (L_i + A_i) \] (22a)
or, since either \( \phi_{u_i} = 0 \) or the credit constraint in equation (6) holds in strict equality, (22a) can be rewritten as
\[ \pi(s) = \phi_u - (\gamma + \phi_u) k_i + \phi_u(WL_i + m_i). \] (22b)

\(^{11}\) While this result suggests specialization by each farm in the type of land which gives the farmer the greatest profit per unit of capacity (leasing out all other types of owned land and renting from others enough of the one type to fill his capacity), the equilibrium rental market conditions discussed below lead to adjustment in rental rates which, on average, tend to equate profits per unit of capacity on all types of land.

\(^{12}\) A land quality \( j \) is defined as diversion quality land if it is at least partially diverted.
Equation (22a) implies that the overall gains for the farm are made up of two components, viz., \( \phi_{qi} - \gamma k \), represents the gains from operation and \( \phi_{qi} W (L_i + \Delta L_i) \) represents the gains from wealth (in landholdings).


To examine the distributional implications of diversion policy and the performance of markets, assume initially that firms do not have the opportunity of adopting new technology. Hence, every farm operates with its existing technology \( s_i \). Moreover, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, assume the capacity of each technology is independent of the land quality utilized, i.e., \( c_s = c_s \) for all \( s_i \). Finally, the total amount of land available of quality \( j \) is presumed fixed at \( L_j \).

The assumption of fixed technology implies that, along with a fixed amount of available land of quality \( j \) [as equation (22a) suggests], land utilization and associated gains from operations can be treated separately from landownership and its associated gains. The component, \( k_s \), is zero, and thus the link between landownership and land utilization is eliminated. In other words, the trade-off between land transactions and capital good investment does not exist. Given a perfect rental market, the optimal land utilization will involve the maximization of industry gains from operation. This can be shown by comparing the equilibrium conditions derived from individual firm behavior and conditions obtained from industry maximization of gains from operation.

Firm Land-Use Equilibrium Conditions

The key determinant of the equilibrium is the degree of compliance. The conditions for compliance are summarized in the following proposition:

**PROPOSITION 1:** The key determinants of compliance are the diversion payment per diverted acre, \( [\omega /(1 - \omega)] P \), and the minimum rental rate, \( R \). Specifically, for full compliance, \( [\omega /(1 - \omega)] P > R \); for partial compliance, \( [\omega /(1 - \omega)] P = R \); and for no compliance, \( [\omega /(1 - \omega)] P < R \).

**PROOF:** Introducing (18) into (17) obtains

\[
\phi_{qi} = \max_{\nu_i} \max_{c_i} \left\{ \frac{P_y - \mu_i - R_i}{\lambda_i (\hat{P} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} R)} \right\} > 0. \tag{23}
\]

Since \( \lambda_i \) is a choice variable, \( \lambda_i = 1 \) for all \( i \) if \( P > [\omega/(1 - \omega)] R \), while \( \lambda_i = 0 \) for all \( i \) if \( \hat{P} < [\omega/(1 - \omega)] R \). Hence, \( \lambda_i \) will be selected in accordance with the largest value of \( \phi_{qi} \). The participation decision is given by

\[
\lambda_i(s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \hat{P} \geq \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} R \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \tag{24}
\]

For \( \hat{P} = [\omega/(1 - \omega)] R \), each farmer will be indifferent between compliance and non-compliance, a result that will lead to partial compliance.

The case of no compliance is, of course, of little relevance to our analysis. Hence, we shall investigate the cases of partial and full compliance for a given \( P \). To examine the equilibrium conditions for these two cases, note first that firms with the same technology for land quality \( j \) are indistinguishable. Thus, they can be treated as a single aggregate, viz., the total land of quality \( j \) employing technology \( s \) is defined by

\[
\hat{A}_j = \sum_i A_{ij} \tag{25}
\]

where \( A_{ij} \) refers to land of type \( j \) utilized by firm \( i \) with technology \( s \). Since the capacity of each technology is independent of land quality, the aggregate defined in (25) is constrained by

\[
\sum_j \hat{A}_j \leq N_s \frac{1}{C_s}, \quad s = 1, \ldots, S \tag{26}
\]
where $N_s$ is the number of firms employing technology $s$. Similarly, $\phi_s = \phi_{s0}$, and since $\phi_s$ is the dual value for the capacity constraint for each firm employing technology $s$,

$$\phi_s \left( \frac{N_s}{c_s} - \sum \hat{A}_s \right) = 0. \quad (27)$$

To admit the effects of diversion policy, define the amount of land-type $j$ diverted as $A_{o}$. Since all the land is either utilized or diverted,

$$\sum_{s=0}^{N} \hat{A}_s = L_j; \quad (28)$$

and similar to (13) for individual farms, the aggregate limit on diversion is

$$\sum_{s=0}^{N} \hat{A}_s \leq (1 - \omega) \sum_{s=0}^{N} L_s; \quad (29)$$

Thus, using Proposition 1 in the cases of partial and full compliance we have

$$P_y - \mu + \hat{P} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} \hat{R} - R_i - \phi_0 c_i \leq 0 \quad (30)$$

To complete the statement of farm land-use equilibrium conditions, introduce (18) into (14) and (15) and use the assumption of at least partial compliance, $\hat{P} - (1 - \omega)/\omega \hat{R} \geq 0$, to obtain

$$P_y - \mu + \hat{P} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} \hat{R} - R_i - \phi_0 c_i \leq 0 \quad (31)$$

$$\hat{A}_s \left[ P_y - \mu + \left( \hat{P} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} \hat{R} \right) - R_i - \phi_0 c_i \right] = 0. \quad (32)$$

Conditions (26) and (27)–(32) determine the farm land-use equilibrium values of $R_i$, $\hat{R}$, $\phi_0$, and $\hat{A}_s$ ($s = 0, \ldots, S_0; j = 1, \ldots, J$) for a given $P$. This equilibrium can be easily determined from the following proposition.

**PROPOSITION 2:** The farm land-use equilibrium (26) and (27)–(32) for a given output price maximizes industry total gain from utilization and diversion, where diversion is treated as an additional technology, i.e., the land-use equilibrium satisfies

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^{S} \left[ \sum_{s=0}^{N} (P_{y,s} - \mu_s)\hat{A}_s + \hat{P} \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} \hat{A}_s \right] \quad (33)$$

subject to the constraints:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} \hat{A}_s \leq (1 - \omega) \sum_{i=1}^{S} L_i; \quad (34)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} \hat{A}_s \leq N_i c_s, \quad s = 1, \ldots, S_0 \quad (35)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} \hat{A}_s = L_j, \quad j = 1, \ldots, J. \quad (36)$$

The proof of this proposition is available in Just et al. (1983). The proposition shows that, while the decision problem of each farm is a discrete programming problem, the general equilibrium problem for a fixed technology is a simple standard linear programming problem.

**Changes in Diversion Policies**

Proposition 2 allows analysis of the impacts of changes in diversion payments and requirements on total diversion, output, rental rates, and gains from operation in the context of the simplified linear programming framework. In this analysis an explicit representation of the dual to (33)–(36) will prove useful. The dual problem is:

$$\min \sum_{i=1}^{S} L_i \hat{P} + \sum_{i=1}^{S} \left( \frac{N_i}{c_i} \right) \delta_i$$

subject to

$$\delta_i \geq P_{y,i} - \mu_i \quad (38)$$

$$\delta_i \geq \hat{P} \frac{1 - \omega}{1 - \omega} \hat{R}_i \quad (39)$$

where $\delta_i$, $\mu_i$, and $\alpha_0$ are corresponding shadow prices. First consider the impact of changes in $\hat{P}$ on total diversion measured by $T = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \hat{A}_j$ for a given $\hat{P}$. An increase in $\hat{P}$ will augment the value of $A_{o}$ in the pri-
mal. Under partial compliance, this increase will result in larger diversion while under full compliance, of course, no effect will be registered on diversion.

The impact of increased diversion payments under a state of partial participation can be captured by the use of the dual representation, (37)–(39). For partial participation prior to the increase in diversion payments, the initial level of the shadow price $\alpha_0$ is 0. Hence, from (38) and (39), it follows that all land-technology combinations for which the return, $P_y - \mu_q$, is smaller than the payment for diverted land, $\tilde{P}/(1 - \omega)$, will not be utilized (i.e., $\Lambda_q = 0$). Given a nonbinding aggregate diversion limit, as $\tilde{P}$ increases at some point, the effective diversion payment, $\tilde{P}/(1 - \omega)$, surpasses the net gain measure, $P_y - \mu_q$; and the associated $(s, j)$ land-technology combinations will be diverted. Such lands receive a higher return when allocated to diversion than when utilized with initial technologies. Note that utilization of these lands with more efficient technologies is unprofitable since, if the new higher level of diversion payments were feasible and profitable, it would have been feasible and profitable as well as for the initial level of $\tilde{P}$. Finally, if $\tilde{P}$ increases but does not surpass any $(s, j)$ land-technology combinations for which the net gain measure is larger than the initial $\tilde{P}/(1 - \omega)$, the land-use pattern will not change.

An increase in diversion requirements on total diversion, $T$, has two impacts which may be captured in terms of the primal (33)–(36). First, it makes the diversion constraint in (34) less binding; second, it diminishes the gain from diversions, $\tilde{P}/(1 - \omega)$, the price of $\Lambda_q$'s. The second impact has the same effect as a reduction in diversion payments. Hence, if the initial participation is partial, an increase in $1 - \omega$ will affect $T$ only through the reduction in $\tilde{P}/(1 - \omega)$. In this event, total participation and the amount of diverted land will decline. On the other hand, for the case of full participation, both before and after the increase in $1 - \omega$, total diverted land $(1 - \omega) \sum L_j$ will rise. Clearly, if participation is complete prior to the rise in $1 - \omega$, partial participation may result after the increase. In this case, the effect of an increase in the diversion requirement on total diversion is unclear.

As with total diversion, the impact of changing diversion payments and requirements on the aggregate supply depends upon the degree of participation. Under full participation, given output price, an increase in $\tilde{P}$ will not change land-use patterns or total output. However, under partial participation, an increase in $\tilde{P}$ may result in the diversion of some previously utilized land, with the nondiverted land continuing to employ its initial technology. Hence, an increase in $\tilde{P}$ tends to reduce aggregate output. Moreover, under partial participation, a rise in diversion requirements has the same qualitative impact on aggregate supply as a decrease in $\tilde{P}$; namely, output is increased. On the other hand, if participation is complete both before and after a change in diversion requirements, an increase in $1 - \omega$ will reduce total utilized land, forcing a reduction in the utilization of some of the technologies without increasing the utilization of others. Under these circumstances, total output will fall.

Some of the more interesting qualitative effects relate to changes in $\tilde{P}$ and $1 - \omega$ on land rental rates and farm operators' quasi rents. For full participation, equations (34)–(36) indicate that the new optimal solution to the primal for higher $\tilde{P}$ will be identical to the original solution. However, the solution for the dual for alternative levels of $\tilde{P}$ will differ. That is, to insure that equation (39) will not be violated, $\alpha_q$ must increase sufficiently to compensate for the increase in diversion payments, i.e.,

$$\Delta \alpha_q = \frac{\omega}{1 - \omega} \Delta \tilde{P}. \quad (40)$$
Hence, from Proposition 2 we find that, under full participation, an increase in \( \tilde{P} \) will not alter the industry production pattern or the gains or quasi rents from operation \( (\phi_s) \). The additional income from diversion payments will increase the rents for land. From (40), these changes are given by

\[
\Delta R_j = \frac{1}{1 - \omega} \Delta \tilde{P}. \tag{41}
\]

In the case of partial participation before and after the change in \( \tilde{P} \), the fact that the shadow value of the diversion constraint \( (\alpha_0) \) must be zero implies that \( R_j = \delta_j \). Thus, changes in rental rates \( R_j \) are equal to changes in \( \delta_j \) in the linear programming formulation. Recalling that an increase in \( \tilde{P} \) results in the diversion of all land operated with those technologies for which \( P \gamma_{ij} - \mu_j \) is smaller than the new effective diversion payment, \( \tilde{P} \omega/(1 - \omega) \), the change in rental fees will be equal to the change in the effective diversion payment. The quasi rents after this increase to the operators of those technologies that were employed on diverted land falls to zero. For land-technology combinations that continue to operate with the new diversion payment, if the land is of diversion quality, (38) and (39) indicate that the quasi rent to the operator must decline to compensate for the increase in \( \tilde{P} \omega/(1 - \omega) \). Constraint (39) implies that \( \delta_j \) must increase since \( \alpha_0 = 0 \); thus for constant \( P \gamma_{ij} - \mu_j \), some elements of \( \alpha_i \) must tend to decrease. These changes will spread to other land qualities and technologies; therefore, land rental rates will tend to increase to absorb the gains from increases in the diversion payments, while quasi rents will decline to absorb the loss from reduced production. In the case of partial participation, where the rise in \( \tilde{P} \omega/(1 - \omega) \) is not large enough to increase diversion, as (39) indicates, the resulting increase will be reflected in increased rental fees for diversion-quality land with the result that, for other types of land, the quasi rent will decline accordingly by (38).

The above results can be summarized by:

**PROPOSITION 3:** Given output price, an increase in diversion payments will be reflected by rental rate adjustments such that all increased benefits will accrue to landowners rather than operators. In the case of full participation, the increased diversion payment will increase rental rates leaving quasi rents unchanged. In the case of partial participation, the increase in the diversion payment tends to increase land rental rates and reduce quasi rents.

Proposition 3 implies that, for the case of partial participation, increases in diversion requirements tend to decrease rental rates and increase quasi rents. To examine the impact of more stringent diversion requirements in the case of full-participation, the rental rate for this case is

\[
R_j = \delta_j + \frac{\alpha_0}{\omega}. \tag{42}
\]

Under full participation, an increase in \( 1 - \omega \) will reduce the amount of utilized land; thus, some \((s, j)\) combinations will no longer be operated. In these cases, those elements of \( \alpha_i \) associated with the discarded technology are reduced to zero; and since \( P \gamma_{ij} - \mu_j \) is given, associated elements of \( \delta_j \) may result in the reduction of other elements of \( \alpha_i \) associated with technologies combined with land type \( j \); and this reduction may, in turn, increase still other elements of \( \delta_j \). Thus, the reduction in utilized land due to higher diversion requirements will reduce quasi rents while simultaneously increasing the rental rates for land through increases in some \( \delta_j \)'s. By (42), the increase in \( 1 - \omega \) also tends to increase \( R_j \) through the reduction in \( \omega \) which contributes to increases in \( \alpha_0/\omega \). However, by (40), the reduction in the effective diversion payment will reduce \( \delta + \alpha_0/\omega \) and since \( \delta \) may increase, \( \alpha_0 \) will fall leading to reduced \( R_j \). In other words, the reduction in the gain from diverted acres, \([\omega/(1 - \omega)]P\), tends to reduce the rental
rate. The net result of these opposing effects is unclear.

The implications of diversion requirements may be summarized as:

**PROPOSITION 4:** For given output price under partial participation, an increase in diversion requirements tends to reduce rental rates and increase quasi rents. Under full participation, more stringent diversion requirements will result in lower quasi rents, but their effect on rental rates is unclear. Reduction in utilized land tends to increase rental rates, but the reduction in payments per diverted acre tends to reduce rental rates.

A corollary of some importance follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 4—namely, an increase in \( P \) and/or \( 1 - \omega \) under partial participation reduces \( a_i \) and thus forces some technologies and associated farms to cease operation. Hence, some operating farms included in \( N_i \) before the increase will exit from the industry and, thus, concentration will increase. That is,

**COROLLARY 1:** An increase in diversion payments or a reduction in diversion requirements under partial participation leads to increased concentration measured by the average land size of active farms.

The above results presume infinitely elastic demand. However, since demand for the final good is not completely elastic, it follows that changes in \( P \) and \( 1 - \omega \) tend to change output prices. To be sure, the second-order effects resulting from price changes must be taken into account when the overall influence of changes in \( P \) and \( 1 - \omega \) is evaluated. These second-round effects modify somewhat the results in Propositions 3 and 4, but the qualitative directions implied by these propositions remain unaltered.

Under full participation, an increase in \( \tilde{P} \) will not affect output prices; and the results of Proposition 3 remain unchanged when demand is negatively sloped. Under partial participation, an increase in \( \tilde{P} \) will increase output price; and that increase will offset the initial increase in diversion. Nevertheless, the overall impact of an increase in \( P \) will be to increase diversion and reduce output. This is the case since, by negation, if the second-order effect led to reduced diversion and increased output, ultimately the price would decline; and the second-order effect would be reversed. Similarly, the increase in output price resulting from an increase in \( \tilde{P} \) will strengthen the increase in rental rates by Proposition 3 and will tend to offset reductions in quasi rents.

Under partial participation, when demand is negatively sloped, an increase in diversion requirements will reduce output prices. This will partially offset the reduction in total diversion, the increase in quasi rents, and the reduction in rental rates. However, the overall results implied by Proposition 4 still hold for this case. Under full participation, an increase in diversion requirements will increase output prices. The second-order effects will be increases in quasi rents and rental rates.

**Cost-Reducing Technologies**

The equilibrium level of diversion, rental rates, and quasi rents can be determined graphically for the special case where land productivity is independent of technology \( (y_j = \hat{y}_j) \) and the cost of each technology is independent of land quality \( (\mu_j = \bar{\mu}_j) \). The dual, \((37)-(39)\), indicates that in this case there will be a critical \( j^* \) such that all types of land with higher productivity \( (\hat{y}_j > \hat{y}_r) \) will be utilized, while lower productivity lands \( (\hat{y}_j < \hat{y}_r) \) will not. There also will be a marginal technology, \( s^* \), such that all the lower cost technologies \( (\bar{\mu}_j < \bar{\mu}_r) \) will be fully utilized (hereafter referred to as efficient technologies) and all the less-efficient technologies will not be utilized. Moreover, by the independence of land productivity and technology, a unique correspondence between land quality types and technologies will not exist. For the optimal solution, diverted lands may be utilized with any efficient tech-
nology. Only the optimal level of total diversion is captured; this total diversion determines the marginal land quality, \( \bar{y}_{j^*} \), and the marginal technology, \( \bar{\mu}_s \), along with their utilization levels. In Figure 1(a), qualities of land are arrayed by declining quality along the land axis with total revenues per acre shown in the upper bar graph. Existing technology capacities are also arrayed along the land axis by declining efficiency with operating costs per acre shown in the lower bar graph. Subtracting operating costs from revenues allows gains from operation, \( P_{\bar{y}_j} - \bar{\mu}_s \), to be determined as shown in Figure 1(b). The aggregate diversion requirement, if all farms comply, is \( (1 - \omega)L \). Thus, if \( \omega/(1 - \omega)\hat{P} > a \), all farms will comply since the diversion payment per diverted acre exceeds the gain possible on all land to the right of \( (1 - \omega)L \). If \( a > \omega/(1 - \omega)\hat{P} > b \), then gains from operation exceed the diversion payment per diverted acre on the land \([(1 - \omega)L, L]\) so that utilization increases to \( L_\omega \). Thus, from Figure 1(a), all of land qualities 3 through 6 are utilized, while some of the marginal technology, \( \bar{\mu}_s - 3 \), continues to stand idle. Now suppose the diversion payment is lowered so that \( b > \omega/(1 - \omega)\hat{P} > c \). Then, following the above reasoning, utilization increases from \( L_\omega \) to \( L_\omega \), so that all of technology, \( \bar{\mu}_s - 3 \), is utilized but land quality 2 is only partially utilized. Finally, if the diversion payment is lowered such that \( d > \omega/(1 - \omega)\hat{P} \), then the gains from operation on all land exceed the diversion payment per diverted acre. Hence, no compliance will result.

Since any land utilization pattern consistent with Figure 1 is optimal, the equality in (38) will hold for \( j \geq j^* \) and \( s \geq s^* \). This equality implies that rental rate differences between two types of utilized land will be equal to the difference in the values of their output, i.e.,

\[
R_k - R_j = P_{\bar{y}_k} - P_{\bar{y}_j}, \quad k, j \geq j^*.
\] (43)

Similarly, quasi rents per acre among utilized technologies will differ by the amount of the differences in their respective costs per acre, i.e.,

\[
\alpha_n - \alpha_s = \mu_n - \mu_s, \quad s_n, s_1, s_2 \geq s^*.
\] (44)

As Figure 1 illustrates, two types of equilibrium are likely under partial participation. In one case, for example, when \( b < P\omega/(1 - \omega) < a \), the marginal land is fully utilized and the marginal technology is partially utilized. In this case the quasi rent for the marginal technology is zero; and by (38) and (39), the rental rate for the marginal land is

\[
R_n = P_{\bar{y}_n} - \bar{\mu}_n > \hat{P} \frac{\omega}{1 - \omega}.
\] (45)

In the second case the marginal land is partially diverted, while the marginal technology is fully utilized [for example, when \( c < P\omega/(1 - \omega) < b \)]. In this case,
the rent for the marginal land is equal to \( \frac{\bar{P}\omega}{1 - \omega} \); and the quasi rent for the marginal technology is determined by
\[
\phi_{\omega} = \frac{\bar{P}_t^* - \omega(1 - \omega)\bar{P} - \bar{\mu}_t}{c_t}.
\] (46)

In the case of full participation, the optimal solution likely results in both marginal technology and marginal land being partially utilized. In this case the quasi rent of the marginal technology is zero, and the rental fee for the marginal land is equal to the rental fee of diverted land. Introducing these results into the rental rate equation for diversion quality land, we obtain
\[
R = R_p = \omega(\bar{P}_t^* - \bar{\mu}_t + \bar{P}).
\] (47)

Note that the rental fees for any utilized land quality can be derived by introducing the rental fee for marginal land in (44). The quasi rents for each technology can be determined similarly. These results and Figure 1 illustrate the use of Propositions 3 and 4. Under partial participation, a reduction in the diversion payment per acre, \( \bar{P}\omega/(1 - \omega) \), may reduce total diversion, the productivity of the marginal land [if \( \bar{P}\omega/(1 - \omega) \) moves from segment ab to bc], and the efficiency of the marginal technology (if it moves from bc to cd), while production may increase.

The effects of changes in effective diversion payment on rental rates and quasi rents depend on the segments over which such changes occur. If effective diversion payment is increasing over segment ab, only the rental fee for diversion quality land will increase; while, by (43) and (44), other rental rates and all quasi rents will not change. If, however, effective diversion payment is rising within a segment such as bc, (43)–(46) indicate that all rental rates will increase and all quasi rents will decrease. An increase in effective diversion payment, which involves a shift from one segment to another (from bc to ab), will increase all rents and reduce all quasi rents. If demand is negatively sloped, the change will increase output price; and this, in turn, will, by (43) and (45), increase the rental rates for utilized land and the rental rate differentials.

**Landowner Distributional Effects**

The above results related to distributional effects on operators can be extended to landowners. To simplify this extension, a specific assumption on the form of land-price expectations will prove expedient. Suppose each individual merely holds a subjective expectation on the rate of appreciation which applies to all types of land; hence, \( W_i^* = (1 + \psi_i)W_i \), where \( \psi_i \) is the subjective rate of appreciation for farmer i. Thus, from (20), the shadow price of credit for individual i is
\[
\phi_i = \psi_i - \theta + \frac{R_i}{W_i}
\] (48)

where j is any type of land owned by individual i in the new production period. If individual i owns no land in the new production period, then \( \phi_i = 0 \). Using (48) and (19) thus implies that each individual will own only land types for which \( R_i/W_i = \max_k R_k/W_k \); hence, ownership of all land implies
\[
\frac{R_1}{W_1} = \frac{R_2}{W_2} = \ldots = \frac{R_i}{W_i} = \frac{\bar{R}}{W} (49)
\]
via the equilibrating market mechanism where \( W \) is the price of diversion-quality land. Thus, (48) becomes
\[
\phi_i = \begin{cases} 
\psi_i - \theta + \frac{\bar{R}}{W} & \text{if } \psi_i - \theta + \frac{\bar{R}}{W} \geq 0 \\
0 & \text{if } \psi_i - \theta + \frac{\bar{R}}{W} \leq 0.
\end{cases} (50)
\]

Using (48) in (19) implies that all farmers with \( \psi_i > \theta - \bar{R}/W \) will buy land until their credit is exhausted, while all farmers with \( \psi_i < \theta - \bar{R}/W \) will sell all their landholdings; farmers with \( \psi_i = \theta - \bar{R}/W \) will be indifferent to owning land, i.e.,
Effects of Land Controls

\[ W \Delta L_i = m_i \quad \text{if} \quad \psi_i > \theta - \frac{\bar{R}}{W} \]
\[-WL_i \leq W \Delta L_i \leq m_i \quad \text{if} \quad \psi_i = \theta - \frac{\bar{R}}{W} \]
\[ W \Delta L_i = -WL_i \quad \text{if} \quad \psi_i < \theta - \frac{\bar{R}}{W}. \]

Thus, a critical \( \tilde{\psi} \) will exist, viz.,

\[ \tilde{\psi} = \theta - \frac{\bar{R}}{W}, \]

such that all farmers with \( \psi_i > \tilde{\psi} \) buy land; all farmers with \( \psi_i < \tilde{\psi} \) will sell land. The critical \( \tilde{\psi} \) will be determined by the land market equilibrium equation in (10) which, when premultiplied by \( W \), becomes

\[ \sum_{i \in \chi} W \Delta L_i + \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} W L_i = 0. \]  

Substituting equation (51) in (53) and using (50) obtains

\[ \sum_{i \in \chi} W L_i - \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} W \Delta L_i = \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i. \]  

Hence, land transactions in the marginal group with \( \psi_i = \psi \) must adjust so that the total new purchase of land by farms with \( \psi_i > \psi \) is equal to their credit availability.

Introducing (52) into (54) yields

\[ \sum_{i \in \chi} \tilde{R} L_i \leq (\theta - \tilde{\psi}) \sum_{i \in \chi} m_i \]  

\[ \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} R L_i > (\theta - \tilde{\psi}) \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i. \]

Thus, \( \tilde{\psi} \) can be determined by ranking \( \psi_i \) and then performing tests with \( \tilde{\psi} = \psi_i \), \( i = 1, 2, \ldots \), using \( \bar{R} \) as determined in the previous section until a \( \psi_i \) is found where (54) holds. Note that equilibrium is obtained only if \( \theta - \psi_i > 0 \) for some \( i \); otherwise, the equilibrium condition in (52) cannot hold for positive prices.

PROPOSITION 5: An increase in the diversion payment and a reduction in the diversion requirement under partial participation tend to increase land prices but at a lower rate than rental fee increases resulting from such changes.

PROOF: First, prove by negation that \( \bar{R}/\bar{W} = \theta - \tilde{\psi} \) may rise with \( \bar{p}/w/(1 - w) \) under partial participation. Suppose an increase in \( \bar{p}/(1 - w) \) raises \( \psi \) from \( \psi \) to \( \tilde{\psi} \). From (55a),

\[ \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} R L_i \leq (\theta - \tilde{\psi}) \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i \]

at the new equilibrium where \( R_0 \) and \( R_1 \) are vectors of the initial and new rental rates. By (55b),

\[ \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} R L_i \geq (\theta - \psi) \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i. \]

At the initial equilibrium. By Propositions 3 and 4, \( R_1 \geq R_0 \); and, assuming \( \psi_1 > \psi_0 \),

\[ \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} R L_i \geq \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} R_0 L_i. \]

Also,

\[ (\theta - \psi) \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i \leq (\theta - \psi_0) \sum_{i \in \check{\chi}} m_i. \]

Combining (59), (58), and (57) contradicts (56); thus, an increase in \( \bar{p}/(1 - w) \) may reduce \( \psi \) and raise \( \bar{R} \). To show that an increase in \( \bar{p}/(1 - w) \) may increase but never reduce land prices, note that the possible reduction in \( \tilde{\psi} \) due to the increase in \( \bar{p}/(1 - w) \) will cause the equality in (54) to be violated; and the only way for restoration is for land prices to increase.

5. Technological Adoption

In the context of the above framework, what are the major effects of diversion policies on the adoption of new technologies? To investigate this issue, the introduction of new technologies must be allowed. In this event the tradeoff between land transactions and capital good investments can no longer be neglected. Specifically, the link between landownership and land utilization, the component \( k \) [see (22a)], is now positive. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the adoption of a new technology, \( s_i \), instead of \( s_0 \) are that technology, \( s_i \), yields higher gains, i.e., [by (22b)],

\[ \pi_i(s_i) - \pi_i(s_0) = \phi_m - \phi_w - \phi_k k_i \geq 0 \]

and that the new technology can be financed, i.e.,
As implied by (60), policy changes will augment the tendency to adopt technology \( s_i \) if the new technology is feasible before and after the policy changes and \( \pi_i(s_i) - \pi_i(s_0) \) becomes positive after the policy changes. Under these conditions, the policy changes operate through two distinct effects: (a) a quasi-rent effect (an increase in the difference, \( \phi_{s_i} - \phi_{s_0} \)) and (b) a credit price effect (a reduction in the shadow price of credit, i.e., a reduction in \( \phi_{s_i} = \psi_i - \theta + R/W \)).

Condition (61) implies that policy changes may increase the tendency to adopt the new technology through a third effect, viz., the credit availability effect. This effect is realized if the new technology, which was previously infeasible due to credit limitations, becomes more profitable and feasible after the policy changes.

The overall effect of diversion policies cannot be determined unequivocally. Nevertheless, under partial participation, Proposition 5 implies that an increase in \( P \) and a reduction in \( 1 - \omega \) will not only increase credit availability (through increased land prices) but also increase the cost of credit (through an increase in \( R/W \)). Moreover, the increases in output price and rental rates resulting from an increase in \( P\omega/(1 - \omega) \) allows determination of the effects of diversion policy changes on the quasi-rent differential, \( \phi_{s_i} - \phi_{s_0} \), since, by (23),

\[
\phi_u = \frac{P_y s_i - \mu_{s_i} - R_i}{c_i}
\]

for partial participation where \( j \) denotes land utilized with technology \( s \).

The above results imply:

**PROPOSITION 6:** Under partial participation, an increase in diversion payment and a reduction in diversion requirement will affect the tendency to adopt the new technology through (a) a positive credit effect, (b) a negative capital cost effect, and (c) a negative quasi-rent effect for a given output price assuming that the new technology has larger capacity.

Since output price may rise when \( P\omega/(1 - \omega) \) increases, (23) indicates that the quasi-rent effect of Proposition 6 may be reversed when the modern technology is yield increasing. Thus, the direction of the quasi-rent effect depends on the nature of the modern technology. Therefore,

**COROLLARY 2:** If the modern technologies are not smaller in scale than the older ones, an increase in diversion payment and a reduction of diversion requirement under partial participation will affect the quasi-rent differential between the new and the old technologies such that (a) the tendency to adopt new cost-reducing technologies will decline and (b) the tendency to adopt new output-increasing technologies may increase. This effect is stronger when the demand elasticity is lower.

The second part of Corollary 2 indicates that diversion policies, which intend to reduce production and increase prices, may have the opposite effect in the long run since they may accelerate the adoption of output-increasing technologies. The magnitude of the quasi-rent effect depends also on the characteristics of the initial farm technology. Equations (60) and (23) imply that farms operating older technologies with lower quasi rents will have more incentive to adopt than those operating newer technologies. Hence, an increase in effective diversion payment which encourages adoption will generally accelerate the scrapping of the oldest technologies.

**6. Concluding Remarks**

As shown, the distributional effects of agricultural policy can be distinguished in

\( ^{13} \) The quasi-rent effects of changes in \( P\omega/(1 - \omega) \) are perhaps the most important since they apply to all firms and do not depend on their credit situation.
Effects of Land Controls

Terms of three behavioral units: operators (active farms), landowners, and investors in new technology. Introduction of a policy in which the effective diversion payment on diverted land, \( P_w/(1 - \omega) \), exceeds the existing minimal rental rate will influence operators by decreasing their number (Corollary 1), increasing the minimal rental rate (Propositions 3 and 4), and decreasing the quasi rent to technology (Propositions 3 and 4). These are the initial effects. The second-round effects result from increasing output prices as a result of reduced supply. The minimal rental rate increases further in the second round, while the quasi rent to technology and the number of active farmers increase. These results suggest that the compliance percentage would decrease after second-round effects.

The initial effect of the above policy on owners is an increase in land prices with a further increase in such prices after the second-round effect on output prices. These effects, in conjunction with the effects on active farms, suggest that the number of absentee owners will initially increase; but this increase will be tempered by the second-round effects on output prices. In other words, for the short run (with fixed technology), the net result of increased diversion payments and/or reduced diversion requirements is to motivate a separation between operation of farm units and ownership, i.e., an increase in absentee ownership.

For technology adoption, a distinction may be made between operators and owners as investors. In the case of operators, the effect of increased diversion payments and reduced diversion requirements is to increase rental rates and reduce quasi rents to technology for both output-increasing and cost-reducing investments. The second-round effects through the output markets simply augment the change in rental rates while partially reversing the change in quasi rents to technology. For the owner-operator, land prices initially increase and are followed by a further increase once the reduced supply generates a higher output price. This change augments the wealth position of owners; it improves their collateral and expands the availability of credit. The expanded availability of credit, along with perhaps better credit terms, provides further incentives for large landowners to adopt modern technologies; hence, a high correlation is expected between large landowners and large-scale technologies.

The short-run effects of policy on distribution and equity must be distinguished from the long-run effects. The usual conclusions of static analysis, which suggest that producers are able to capture the gains from technological progress under diversion policies, must be modified once dynamic effects are explicitly recognized. As Corollary 2 clearly illustrates, under certain circumstances, increases in diversion payments and reductions in the diversion requirements (under partial participation) can possibly increase the tendency to adopt new output-increasing technologies. Ultimately, such technologies, given the inelastic nature of output demand, will lead to augmentations of consumer surplus as a direct result of such diversion policies. Moreover, the short-run effects of such policies enhance credit availability and thus motivate further technology adoption. This latter effect sheds light on the importance of agricultural credit policies in capturing the effects of diversion policies. In any dynamic empirical analysis of agricultural policy on the distribution and structure of landownership in U.S. agriculture, both credit and diversion policy must be examined simultaneously.

Some of the more interesting results of this paper pertain to program compliance across various agricultural regions. In particular, land and rental markets are separated by geographical boundaries beyond which transportation and coordination costs make farm expansion
unprofitable. Hence, the results of this analysis can be applied to agricultural regions individually or by groups. In particular, diversion program compliance tends to be greater in agricultural regions with higher costs, less efficient marginal technology, and lower quality marginal land.

References


