Training and Changing Gender Norms: Evidence from randomized evaluation in rural Nepal

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Abstract

Skill development training programs are widely practiced policy instrument to improve female labor force participation and her agency. However, such training intervention can also liberalize gender norms and attitudes around women working outside the household. While previous studies link progressive change in gender attitudes and increased female labor force participation, they do not explicitly look at the shift in these norms around women's work and her mobility through training intervention. We use a panel dataset from a training in Nepal to empirically capture the effects of improved labor market opportunities on both a woman and her families' (husband and mother-in-law) gender attitudes . Using two-stage randomization, 150 of 300 women were randomly invited to be trained as community animal health workers (CAHW). We estimate both local average treatment effects (LATE) and intent to treat (ITT) effects of being a CAHW (or being invited to CAHW training). We find that training intervention made gender attitudes more regressive for candidates, especially those who completed the training and became a CAHW. There are significant differential effects of treatment by education and income control. Thus, more empowered women are more likely to become conscious of existing gender biased attitudes when they experience increased labor market opportunities. Husband/father's gender attitude only shift through experiencing personal behavioural change when the candidate attends the training. For MIL/mothers, the invitation to training is not sufficient enough intervention to shift their highly conservative gender attitudes.

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1   Introduction

After decades of development and technological progress, women are still socially suppressed and financially deprived individuals of our society. Women in general have lower educational opportunities, less decision making power over marriage and fertility decision, and limited labour force opportunities (Duflo, 2012). This trend is more prevalent in rural communities of developing countries. Often in patriarchal societies, social and cultural norms further perpetuate these gender disparities by restricting their mobility and disproportionately burdening women with household chores and childcare (Jayachandran, 2015).

One way to improve labour market opportunities for women is through vocational training. Previous literature on vocational training for youths in developing countries suggests a very modest increase in earning and employment likelihood (Hirshleifer et al. 2015; Card et al. 2011). Studies focused on women welfare effects from vocational training found sustained improvement in earning and employment opportunities after 6 and 18 months of training (Maitra and Mani 2017; Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir 2011). However, when these results are compared to men, the effects are smaller with no improvements in labor market outcome in the short term (Cho et al. 2013). The literature agrees that a woman makes decisions regarding the labor market in a more constrained environment, and their participation is affected by family and social norms. Hence, participation in training is more expensive for women, resulting in a worse training experience and lower long term benefits (Cho et al. 2013).

While such improvements in economic well-being through training interventions are pertinent, research increasingly suggests that behavioral change, internal to the individual, is a more important and sustained benefit that can be derived from development interventions (Datta and Mullainathan 2014). Recently, few studies in economics literature have looked at the effects of vocational training and access to labor market opportunities on changing behaviour and attitudes. Jensen (2012) study reported large shifts in participants behavior toward work and fertility decision as a result of a small shift in the expected lifetime earnings after being part of a recruitment agency for three years. Other studies have reported an increase in women decision making (Majlesi 2016), delay in marriage and child birth (Bandiera et al. 2020; Heath and Mobarak 2015), and an increase in self-employment (Bandiera et al. 2020) through training intervention.

Regressive gender attitudes relating to work roles is another interesting aspect relating to female labor force participation. The norm that women are primarily responsible for housework and child care and that men are the main provider of food and security is prevalent in essentially all societies. This social representation of women as homemaker and men as

breadwinner is associated with a low labor force participation and a large gender gap in income (Fortin 2005; Jayachandran 2020; Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015). There are strong social stigmas attached to the idea of a woman working outside of the home (Boudet, Petesch, and Turk 2013; Bernhardt et al. 2018). A training intervention like ours can take away the stigma around women working outside by making it commonplace. By liberalizing these restrictive gender roles, the intervention can tremendously benefit women's equity in the long run (Jayachandran 2020).

Recent work provides evidence that even centuries-old norms are amenable to change. For example, regular classroom discussions about gender equality increase young women support for progressive gender norms (Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran 2020), and reserved seats for female politicians reduce gender-biased attitudes in India (Beaman et al. 2009). Mothers with jobs have also shown to make attitudes more gender-progressive (Chen and Ge 2018; Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004). Additionally, the presence of daughters or sisters in one's life improves gender attitudes (Washington 2008; Healy and Malhotra 2013). Access to television programming can also change fertility preferences (Jensen and Oster 2009; La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea 2012). While previous studies link progressive change in gender attitudes and increased female labor force participation (Chen and Ge 2018; Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Kawaguchi and Miyazaki 2009; Fortin 2015), they do not explicitly look at the shift in these norms around women's work, her mobility, decision making power, and sharing household chores through training interventions. Field et al. (2019) is the only study that looks at the direct impact of financial training on social norms around women work and finds more acceptance and fewer social costs attached to women employment outside the home. Thus, I used a panel data set from a training intervention in Nepal to empirically capture the effects of improved labor market opportunities on both a woman and her families' gender attitudes that affects their future-oriented behavior.

When women experience improved labor market opportunities, it's not just her who experiences the change, but also her family- especially the husband and mother-in-law (MIL). Husbands bear a significant social cost of violating the prescribed gender roles when his wife works outside the household (Bernhardt et al. 2018). Furthermore, recent studies have shown that parents influence their children's gender attitudes and perception about social norms, and that the mother's influence is much stronger than the father's (Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran 2020; Farré and Vella 2013).Thus, it is important to empirically test whether women's improved labor market opportunities can also shift the gender attitudes of their husbands.

In South Asia, MIL supervises the tasks and responsibilities allotted to women in the household. Her role in providing childcare support and its effect on a mother's labor force

participation is well documented in economics literature (Khanna and Pandey 2020; Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez 2013). However, MIL is also responsible for following social norms that restricts both the daughter-in-law's mobility and social connections outside of the household (Anukriti et al. 2020). Mothers feel more accepted by their in-laws if they follow social norms that have been already followed by their family peers (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Thus, it is interesting to ask whether access to vocational training erodes the restrictive gender attitudes of the mother-in-laws of these women. To our knowledge, this paper will be the first to explore the effects of vocational training intervention on the gender attitudes of women, their husbands, and their mother-in-laws that may not align with current social norms.

This paper evaluates a training intervention that provided free Community Animal Health Worker (CAHW) training to women in rural Nepal. A CAHW person is a government certified agent that provides basic veterinary services like vaccinations, examinations, and medicine. The training is relatively intense, traditionally requiring 35 consecutive days away from home at a training center. This makes it potentially very difficult for women to participate given their responsibilities at home, particularly women with small children (Cho et al. 2013), or due to family concerns about women's safety or behavior away from home (Dean and Jayachandran 2019). The intervention was a randomized control trial where 300 women across 105 cooperatives were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The type of training was also randomized, so that half of selected trainees undergo a traditional training (TT) course and half undergo a novel distance learning (DL) course with a tablet-based curriculum that requires less time away from home.[1] Those assigned to the treatment group were invited to attend the CAHW training free of cost. The data was collected at a baseline (December 2018-Janurary 2019) and then in December 2020 (18-months after the training). The baseline data included a battery of questions on individual and household characteristics along with information about household income sources and livestock management.

The second round of data collection (midline) was done through phone survey due to the COVID pandemic that started in early 2020. In the midline survey, questions that measured the difference in gender attitudes of women candidates, husbands, and mother-in-laws were included. The gender attitude module attempted to unearth individual's views about a woman's role in both the household and in society. It was measured on the following seven categories: women working outside the household, mobility, decision making, sharing household chores, preference for son, inter partner violence, and acceptance of female CAHW

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[1]In this paper, we don't consider the type of training that was offered in the analysis. The training format is very unlikely to have differential effect on gender attitudes. Preliminary analysis also show no differential effect by the training type.

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worker.

Using the panel data of 300 rural women, we explored the shifts in gender attitudes of the women who were randomly invited to participate in CAHW training. Since the training intervention was randomly assigned, we regress midline outcomes on an indicator for being in the treatment group along with startum fixed effects. This specification estimated intention to treat (ITT) analysis. ITT captures the impact of invitation to training on candidate who was nominated by her cooperative to become a CAHW, regardless of whether she enrolled in or completed the training. I anticipate these changes to be largest for women who participate and complete the training. To do so, we also estimate local average treatment effects (LATE). LATE measures the impact of becoming a CAHW on women who only became a CAHW when invited. To estimate LATE effect, we regress outcomes on an indicator for participating or completing the training given the candidate was invited to attend. We also estimate an enhanced specification in which controls for additional baseline women and household characteristics are chosen using the post-double selection (PDS) Lasso (Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen 2014).

We find that training intervention made gender attitudes more regressive for candidates, especially those who completed the training and became a CAHW. The gender attitude for decision making power became more biased by 0.17 standard deviations, statistically significant at 10 %. The preference for son index also moves by 0.21 standard deviation towards gender regressive attitude. Further exploration of data provide evidence that more empowered women reported more regressive attitudes. The heterogeneous treatment effects for higher education and sole control over income provide evidence of more regressive attitude in invited empowered women. We find significant differential effects of the treatment by candidate's higher education for female mobility, decision making,acceptance of IPV and acceptance of female CAHWs. Similarly, having sole control over non-zero for candidates who were invited to attend the training. However, we only find significant differential effects of the treatment by candidate's sole control over some income for acceptance of IPV and acceptance of female CAHWs. We thus have some evidence to conclude that more empowered women are more likely to become conscious of gender biased attitudes in the society and family when they experience increase in labor opportunities.

Among male relatives, the invitation to training decreases the female mobility index by 0.27 standard deviations which is statistically significant at 5%. The coefficients for women working outside and chore sharing index are in more progressive direction as compared to women candidates gender attitudes. The LATE estimates of becoming a CAHW on male relative's gender attitudes around female mobility are of larger magnitude and moves in the same conservative direction. These results reflect the increased concern for women safety

after increase in labor market opportunity for her. The chore sharing index for male relative's where the candidate became a CAHW increases by 0.44 standard deviations for male relative and statistically significant at 10%. Similarly for acceptance of female CAHW index, the point estimates increased by 0.6 standard deviation among male relative's of candidates who became a CAHW through training intervention. This implies that men's gender attitude could only shift through experiencing personal behavioural change when candidates attends the training, and not just through the candidate who experiences increased access to labor opportunities through invitation to training. In case of MIL/mother's gender attitude, the point estimates are smaller in magnitude and never statistically significant. This implies that an invitation to training is not a strong enough to shift the gender attitude of female elders in the household. Female relatives reflect much stronger conservative gender attitudes. The coefficient for female mobility and chore sharing index are much larger in magnitude and statistically significant at 10%. Further, preference for son index shifts in gender regressive direction when the candidates become a CAHW.

2 Gender norms literature

For centuries, our society has been shaped by century old traditions, values, and beliefs. Human beings are inherently trying to belong to such societies by following the norms and attitude. As a result, individuals do not behave in a manner that is optimal in many situations. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) models this aspect of human behavior identity. They define identity as one's sense of belonging to a social category, along with a view about how people who belong to the category should behave. Their model proposes that such norms influences economic behavior by incurring social cost on individuals when they deviate from the socially prescribed behavior.

The relation between social norms and gender roles is one of the most explored topics in economic literature. These century old social norms and beliefs shape the perception of the appropriate division of roles in the home and family (Inglehart et al. 2003). Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) traced back the current differences in gender attitudes and female economic behavior to traditional agricultural practices of countries. They found evidence that countries whose ancestors engaged in plough agriculture have cultural beliefs that are more gender regressive and have less female participation in non-domestic activities. Hansen, Jensen, and Skovsgaard (2015) also presents a negative relationship between years of agriculture and female labor force participation rates. He argues that societies with longer agricultural histories had a higher level of technological advancement which translated into higher fertility and a diminished role for women outside the home.

The "feminization U" hypothesis (Boserup 1970; Goldin 1995) further lends support to the argument that norms played central role in limiting female labor participation in early developmental phases. The hypothesis argues that social stigmas attached to female factory work contributed to reduced female labor force participation. Fernandez and Fogli (2009) found cultural proxies that reflect beliefs and preferences have a significantly positive explanatory power over female labor participation decisions and fertility. In a study in Saudi Arabia, Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott 2018 found that men systematically overestimate the stigma attached to female working outside of the home . They also show that once this bias is corrected, they become more supportive of their wives working outside of the home. Grewenig, Lergetporer, and Werner (2020) study provides further empirical support by establishing the role of gender norms in shaping gender gaps in labor-market outcomes around child birth. Another study in Saudi Arabia found that female university students underestimate their peers' aspirations to work, and providing them accurate information about peers' views raises their own intention to work (Aloud et al. 2020).

In presence of restrictive norms around woman work, there are very low opportunity costs for women to get married and have children at an early age (Willis 1973; Vella 1994). These norms lead to further lower investment on girl child education. Carlana (2019) shows that teachers bias toward boys reduces girl enrollment and performance in mathematics. Similarly, girls growing up in a "boy-biased" family score on average three percentage points lower on math exams than girls raised in other types of families (Dossi et al. 2021). This suggests that both teacher and parent regressive gender attitudes have a long-running impact on occupational choices and earnings, because math and science in high school is a prerequisite for many remunerative careers such as engineering, becoming a doctor or scientist, etc.

A society with gender biased beliefs perpetuates those belief by institutionalizing unequal customs and rights. For example, in South Asia the custom of dowry is still relevant because of which girl child is considered a social and economic liability for a family . This leads to under investment in her development and further perpetuates the restrictive social norms and gender roles. Women who pursue a career outside their home to become financially self-reliant and break away from such norms are penalized in the marriage market as they are deemed unfit to be a good and docile wife (Fisman et al. 2006; Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais 2017; Folke and Rickne 2020). In a case of unequal rights that perpetuates these regressive gender attitudes, as recent as 2017, under the instant divorce law in India, Muslim men maintained all the contractual power for divorce leaving women with a total absence of control over her matrimonial situation [2]. These regressive gender attitudes affect the marriage market in developed countries like the United States as well. In a study based in

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[2]On August 22, 2017 the Supreme Court of India declared the practice of instant divorce illegal and unconstitutional. The judgement meant that such divorce could not end marriage.

US, Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) found decline in marriage rates when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man. In cases where the wife's potential income is likely to exceed the husband's, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work. Interestingly, when the wife earns more than the husband, the wife spends more time on household chores and moreover, those couples are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce. Literature from both developed and developing countries establishes how biased gender attitudes around working women are negatively affecting women around the world.

Since these gender norms are shaped through century old belief and values, they show remarkable persistence to change. In the case of cultural beliefs, they are inherently sticky. Several studies in economic literature have been devoted to empirically document social norm persistence. Fortin (2005) found that the perception of a woman's role as homemaker is linked to religious ideology, which is increasingly persistent over time and difficult to change. Further, recent pro-girl policies that provide financial incentives to have daughters and also cover their education cost show that these traditional beliefs about gender inequality are difficult to change (Anukriti et al. 2020)

However, recent work provides evidence that even centuries-old norms are amenable to change. Several studies explore the gender-progressive change in social attitudes through information. For example, McKelway (2019) found that showing family members a promotional video about job opportunities for women led to a large increase in the women's employment through reduced family opposition. In a similar approach, Dean and Jayachandran (2019) attempted to shift attitudes about female employment among family members, though unfortunately they didn't have any significant change. Beaman et al. (2009) found that reserved seats for female politicians reduce gender-biased attitudes in India. In a study involving middle school children from the Indian state of Haryana, which is also the state with the most unbalanced ratio of males to females, Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran (2020) found that regular classroom discussions about gender equality increase young women support for progressive gender norms. Cooper, Green, and Wilke (2020) showed that video dramatization that discourages domestic violence and encourages reporting increased willingness to report such incidents to authorities, especially among women, and an overall decline in the number of women who experience violence.

To date, the majority of literature on training interventions has been devoted to looking at its impact on earning and employment opportunities. There are few exceptions that look at the effects of vocational training and access to labor market opportunities on behavioural change, especially among women. Jensen (2012) study reported large shifts in the participants behavior toward work and fertility decisions as a result of a small shift in

the expected lifetime earnings after being part of recruitment agency for three years. Field et al. (2019) is the most recent study that looks at the direct impact of financial training on gender attitudes. The intervention aims to strengthen a woman's control over her earnings by directly depositing their earned income into her own bank account and providing her with training so that she can manage her account independently. They found that women who received both direct deposit and financial training became more accepting of female work, and their husbands perceived fewer social costs to having a wife who works. These studies provide evidence that access to labor market opportunities and an increase in woman's agency through a training intervention can in turn liberalise the restrictive gender norms in our society, to an certain extend. In our context, the access to CAHW training will bring an exogenous increase in the number of women engaged in non-domestic activity that could reduce the stigma of female employment just by making it more commonplace. For example, presence of a working mother has improved the son's gender attitudes towards female labor force participation (Chen and Ge 2018; Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Kawaguchi and Miyazaki 2009; Fortin 2015). However, female attitudes towards working outside the home are developed in youth by parental education, religious affiliation, societal norms and institutional barriers (Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn 1983; Vella 1994). Hence, shifting these attitudes in a short run would be an herculean task.

The idea that a wife who works outside the home is a source of social stigma or shame for her husband and her family, who is expected to earn enough to support his family (Bernhardt et al. 2018). This regressive gender attitude around work roles affects woman participation in the labor market through two channels. When a woman internalizes this stigma, it directly lowers her utility of working outside the home (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). And, when the husband internalizes this stigma, they are less likely to support their partner's decision to work outside the home (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015; Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott 2018). Hence, its important to explore the impact of access to training on their husband's gender attitudes. How do norms about masculinity and men's role as breadwinner affect men's participation in household chores and in turn his attitude towards women working outside the home.

Moreover, several studies have noted the impact of parent gender attitudes and behaviour on their children's choices and beliefs. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)noted that the differences in the labor supply behavior of men and women originate within the family. The men raised by non-working mothers have more traditional gender role attitudes and are less productive in housework (Chen and Ge 2018) .Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran (2020) finds that parents hold greater sway over students' gender attitudes than their peers do, and that the mother influences children gender attitudes more than the father.

3 Intervention

3.1 Background

Nepal is a small agriculture-based economy. Livestock, especially goats, are an important income source for rural communities. With many villages and communities located in hilly and mountain regions, and with a limited transportation infrastructure, community members face a variety of obstacles in accessing everyday services that are available in city areas. One such service is access to a veterinarian in the village. Local veterinarian assistance is required in these communities for livestock health. To fill this gap in access to service, the government of Nepal provides Community Animal Health Worker (CAHW) vocational training to individuals in such communities. This training is a way for many educated rural individuals to work in a less-labour intensive job within their village and also support their community in managing livestock. Also, many look at it as a stepping stone for other work opportunities such as a path to obtain a government license to open an agriculture/veterinarian shop, seek further training opportunities in Artificial Insemination, or collaborate with other veterinarian or cooperatives.

Since women are usually in charge of taking care of livestock and as this job does not require much physical strength as compared to other labour intensive jobs, one would expect an increased participation by qualified women. On the contrary, a consistently low participation rate was observed, even when the training was offered for free. The key constraint faced by women is the requirement to stay in the training center for 35-40 days, away from home. Women usually do not have the luxury to leave their home for such a long duration as they have their children and everyday household responsibilities. Moreover, staying away from their husband's home for long periods is frowned upon by the society and relatives. This training intervention tackles this constraint through its novel digital training (DL) format which involves online learning at home using a tablet.

It is important to note that this intervention provided access to training and job opportunities to rural women that are of a non-manual nature. This distinction in work is of importance, especially in the case of women workers. Previous studies Costa (2000), Mammen and Paxson (2000), and Jensen (2012) have shown that there are less stigmas associated with women working non-manual and non-labour intensive jobs. A CAHW work profile falls into the category of safe and clean work, compared to other labor jobs available in rural areas. Although, they might require some physical strength in dealing with bigger animals like cows and buffaloes. CAHW workers are professionally trained to handle all livestock animals and know when to request assistance. Finally, this job will be more personally satisfying as a CAHW provides technical services relating to health and management of livestock

to several households in the community, which will improve the overall livestock health and eventually help households earn better returns from their livestock enterprises. In a community, CAHW persons are viewed with respect for their expertise and their contribution in livestock development of the community and in turn economic growth. Further, this training will open doors to other training and learning opportunities that are more suited for women.

3.2 Intervention

With the help of our implementing partner Heifer International, Nepal (HIN) and our technology partner Pathway Technology and Services (a Nepali software firm), we developed a government approved curriculum for both training and a tablet based DL learning app. The intended beneficiaries of this intervention were married women who showed interest in becoming a CAHW person in their community. Candidates were identified eligible if they had more than 8 years of education and were willing to be trained as a CAHW. In both training formats, the candidate had to sit for final examinations.

The intervention began April 28, 2019 and ended June 25, 2019. Five sets of 18-23 students were trained in three training center. Of the three centers, two training centers hosted both TT group and DL group. One training center only hosted a single DL group because there weren't enough participants to hold seperate TT group. The few students closest to that training center who enrolled in TT were assigned to another center nearby.

4 Experiment design

4.1 Sample and baseline survey

The intended beneficiaries of this intervention were married women who showed interest in becoming a CAHW person in their community. Candidates were identified eligible if they had more than 8 years of education and were willing to be trained as a CAHW. As the first step of program implementation, HIN identified 105 producer cooperatives that reported shortage of CAHW persons in their community and were asked how many additional CAHWs they would like trained to operate in their area. We chose cooperatives as an intervention area for this program as they are in close link with communities and their needs for technical assistance. At the start, all 105 coops accessed the current demand for CAHW in their villages and identified women in their community who are qualified for CAHW training. There was 3 selection criteria that were kept in mind while selecting a woman for the program. First, a woman must have completed 8th grade. This is a basic education requirement placed by

the Government of Nepal to participate in the training. Second, women had to be in a working age group between the ages of 20 to 35. The reason behind this criteria was to make sure women who are trained have enough work years remaining in their lifetime to actually internalize the benefits of this training. Finally, we sampled women that are already married so as to lower the risk of attrition. Since married women are less likely to move away, the community will be more benefited with married women being trained for CAHW job. The second and third criteria were not always followed by the cooperatives, but women selected outside of those criteria remained in the study.

A total of 420 candidates were nominated for training from 105 cooperatives. With the list of nominated candidates, the baseline survey was conducted during December 2018-January 2019. The baseline data included a battery of questions on individual and household characteristics along with information about household income sources and livestock management. The candidates were also asked about their interest in both DL and TT training. Those who showed no interest in either of the training were dropped from the sample. In the final sample, the number of candidates from each cooperative was at least twice the number of CAHWs requested by the cooperative. This balanced assignment to treatment and control group within a cooperative was done to make sure the ratio of treatment to control candidates in a cooperative was uncorrelated with the number of candidates given by that cooperative. The final sample was made of 300 candidates across the 104 cooperatives. Table 2 provide the balance table. The sample is well balanced.

4.2   Treatment Assignment

Treatment was assigned using a two-stage randomization method. First, we performed stratified randomization in which each cooperative was placed in a group/strata based on cooperative level variables (geographic zone, median household income, and median dependency ratio), and then within group/strata, coops were randomized into digital or traditional treatment arms. In the second round of randomization, candidates were randomly assigned to receive training of the type assigned to their cooperative, stratifying by cooperative and individual income.The remaining candidates in each cooperative would serve as controls. Overall, 150 candidates were assigned in treatment group and 150 in the control group.

5 Midline survey and outcome variables

5.1 Midline survey

The midline survey was originally planned for March 2020, but due to the COVID pandemic the midline data collection was moved to November-December 2020. Figure 2 provide the detailed timeline of the project. The survey was conducted on phone in several stages, with different modules for different respondent types: candidate, male relative, and female relative. At the first stage, the data collection team was successful in contacting 277 candidates out of 300 sample. During that process, it was pointed that 7 observations were repeated households, reducing the actual sample size to 293 observations. Given the sample size of 294, attrition rate was only 8% (16 observations).

Table 1 illustrates the updated treatment assignment after the midline data collection and completion rates. Of the 140 candidates recruited to participate in the training, over 40% completed the training. In addition, we observed 6 control individuals completed the training (always takers). Two candidates in the control group from DL cooperatives managed to sign up for and complete DL training. Four candidates from TT cooperatives managed to sign up for and complete TT training. Assignment to training increased the probability of becoming a CAHW from 0.04 to 0.4, an increase of about 36 percentage points.

Table 1: Recruitment and completion by training format

	Treatment Group	Control Group
Treatment Group	140	56
Control Group	137	6
Total	277	62

At the end of survey interview with the female candidate, we collected data on eligible male and female relative that would also be interviewed for gender attitude module. The criteria to select is as follows: For a married woman, a male relative will be the husband of the woman listed in the sample. If the husband was unavailable, then her father-in-law was eligible for male relative interview. For unmarried woman, the male relative will be the father of the woman in the sample. If the father was unavailable, then the male relative could be the oldest available male household member. Similar criteria was used to establish the female relative from the household roster. For a married woman, a female relative will be the mother-in-law of the woman listed in the sample. If the mother-in-law was unavailable, the female relative will be the mother of the woman in the sample. If the mother was also unavailable, the female relative will be the oldest available female household member.

The data collection team faced a plethora of obstacles in getting the correct respondent in the household for both male and female relative modules. In the end, we had successfully interviewed a total 229 male relatives and 170 female relatives. Over 75% of male relative respondents were husbands. In case of female relatives, mother-in-laws and mothers made up to 64% and 21% of female relative respondents, respectively.

5.2 Gender attitude: Outcome variables

The key goal of gender attitude module was to unveil individual's views about a woman's role in both the household and in society. The focus group discussions during the training helped inform the gender norm module. The following 7 sub categories were designed around women's roles and her agency: [1.] Women working outside the house, [2.] Mobility, [3.] Household decision making, [4.] Sharing household chores, [5.] Preference for son, [6.] Inter partner violence, and [7.] Acceptance of female CAHW.

The first four sub-categories specifically focuses on norms relating female working outside the house. They include other peripheral norms around it that helps maintain the stigma around female labor force participation. The mobility section questions social norms relating to women's mobility and interaction with strangers. In the household decision making sub-category, Wefocus on decisions relating to personal income and assets, and her children. This sections unearths the norms that dictates decisions making dynamic between the woman and her family. Sharing household chores section delves with norms around men helping with household chores and child care. That is, the support from husband that is necessary for a women to work outside the house without stressing about her children and other household responsibilities. For the 4 sub-categories mentioned above, We anticipate to capture larger change through the of training intervention. These norms are more likely to be directly affected by increased access to labor opportunities to women. Another sub-category that will be directly affected by the training is the acceptance of female CAHW. This sub-category delves with norm around female CAHW's capacity to perform CAHW tasks successfully and efficiently and their acceptance as certified CAHW by the clients.

The preference for son and inter partner violence (IPV) are other two interesting gender norms sub-categories that will be indirectly affected through training intervention. The preference for son sub-category looks at the norms and social cost around raising a son and a daughter and preference for one over the other. In the IPV module, the survey is designed to reveal norms relating to acceptance of domestic violence against women. They both are downstream outcomes that are less likely to move with the increased access to intervention.A detailed survey module is provided in the Appendix B for further reference.

Each category consist of 4 or more statements that have both gender-progressive and gender-regressive statements. All statements use a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The sub-category index is constructed by aggregating each of those statements into inverse-covariance weighted (ICW) standardized indices (Anderson 2008). The ICW is a weighted average value of the statement in each module, with weights constructed by normalising the variables to have the same standard deviation and then recovering the weights given by the inverse co-variance matrix. To reduce the dimensionality of analysis, We further aggregate all 7 sub-indices into ICW standardized aggregate gender attitude index. Except for preference for son and IPV indices, a higher value indicates gender-progressive attitude of the respondent. The preference for son and IPV index was constructed to indicate gender-regressive attitude. That is, a higher index value implies that respondent attitude reflects preference for a male child over a female child. Similarly, for inter partner violence index, a higher value implies more acceptance of violence against women at home.

6   Training and gender norms

Even though assignment to the training was random, a woman who was invited to attend the training may begin to take pride in being selected and may take the invitation as a reflection on her ability to do well. Moreover, as each cooperative nominated the list of eligible candidates for the training, women who were invited might feel that cooperative leaders deems them as potential women who can successfully complete the training.[3] This will lead to increased confidence in one's capabilities and hence alter their gender attitudes relating to women working outside the house. For women who complete the training (in either format), they would need to adopt new behaviors in order to participate in the training. She will update her gender attitudes around female work, mobility and chores sharing in order to align with her new identity. We anticipate biggest shifts in gender attitude of woman who end up working as CAHW after completing the training. She may begin to take pride in bringing in earned income or experience the support from spouse and mother-in-law when she works. She may also realize that her children do not suffer when she away for work. Further, these new attitudes around work, mobility, chore sharing and decision making could spill over onto non-complier women through social learning (Fogli and Veldkamp 2011; Fernández 2013). A theory of change model is discussed in Appendix A that further details the channels through which norms will change from training intervention for female candidates.

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[3]During the focus group discussions, I got the impression that trainees assumed that they were selected for the training based on their schooling and the cooperative leader also pushed for their candidacy for the training.

For husbands/male relative, We do not anticipate large shifts in their gender attitude when the wife is just invited to training. In contrast, invitation to training might shift their gender attitudes in opposite direction (more regressive) as the invitation increases the cost of holding biased gender norms for the husband. For men whose spouses completes the training and start working as a CAHW, they would need to adopt to new behaviour that would include sharing household chores and child care. This behavioural change when internalized by husband would shift gender attitudes in progressive direction, especially in case of household decision making, chores sharing and female mobility.

The role and the influence of mother-in-law (MIL) other than the husband on women's welfare is widely documented in literatur. While an invitation to training for her daughter-in-law (DIL) might increase the family status among social peers, however letting her attend the training will go against the social norm of restrictive mobility for daughter-in-law. Hence, the invitation to training can move the gender attitude in either direction. Moreover, the invitation to training can also increase the cost of holding restrictive norms for the MIL. Thus, moving the attitude in gender-regressive direction. The support of MIL in pertinent in case where DIL completes the training and then works as a CAHW. The MIL support in terms of sharing household chores and child care will be reflected in gender progressive attitude towards women working outside the house and household chore sharing. Further, these progressive attitudes around could also spill over onto non-complier MIL through social learning.

Comparing shift is gender norms among woman, her husband and the MIL can provide interesting information on channels through which training intervention influences gender norms. For example, if women who completes the training reports change in gender attitudes then it is likely that the act of working is an important channel for updating gender norms related to women's work.

7 Econometric Specification

The main aim of the intervention was to increase participation among women in CAHW training and in turn improve work opportunities for young women in rural communities of Nepal. For my primary empirical specification, We will estimate intent to treat (ITT) effects of being invited to CAHW training relative to not being invited to CAHW training on the gender attitude outcomes. ITT captures the impact of invitation to training on candidate who was nominated by her cooperative to become a CAHW, regardless of whether she enrolled in or completed the training. The ITT estimate will include the impact of being effectively recruited and the recruitment rate. We expect the ITT estimates to be low as the

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recruitment rate was low for the program.

7.1 ITT

To estimate the impact of being invited to any CAHW training (ITT effects) on outcome y_ic, We will simply regress midline outcomes on an indicator for being invited to CAHW training. The following equation will estimate the ITT effects:

$$y_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 INV_{ic} + \beta_3 y_{ic}^0 + S_{ic} + [X_{ic}'\Theta] + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

In equation 1, INV_{ic} is a dummy variable for being selected for training among the candidates in the cooperative, irrespective of the type of training offered. y_0 is the de-meaned outcome at baseline, dummied out if missing, S is a stratification bin dummy, X is a vector of control variables selected using post-double- selection (PDS) LASSO ((Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014)), and $\varepsilon_i c$ is an idiosyncratic error term.

7.2 LATE

We will also estimate the local average treatment effects (LATE) of being a CAHW relative to not being a CAHW. LATE estimates the impact of becoming a CAHW on candidates who only become a CAHW when invited as compared to candidates who were not invited and did not become a CAHW (compliers). Since, the completion rate for both training format was low (29% in TT and 31% in DL), and very few candidates who managed to become CAHWs despite not being invited (4 of 66 not invited to TT and 2 of 73 not invited to DL). Thus, LATE will be capturing the treatment effect on the treated (TOT). The LATE estimate will in turn measure the impact of becoming a CAHW on outcomes among those who became CAHWs. Thus, We expect the LATE to be high for a program if it has a large impact on those that take advantage of it.

To estimate the impact of becoming a CAHW on compliers on outcome $y_i c$, We will estimate the following:

$$y_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CA\hat{H}W_{ic} + \beta_2 y_{ic}^0 + S_{ic} + [X_{ic}'\Theta] + \epsilon \tag{2}$$

To estimate $CA\hat{H}W_{ic}$ we regress becoming a CAHW on being invited to attend either training type:

$$CAHW_{ic} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 INV_{ic} + \gamma_2 y_{ic}^0 + S_{ic} + [X_{ic}'\Theta] + \mu \tag{3}$$

In equation 3 INV_{ic} is a variable for being invited to training and μ_{ic} is an idiosyncratic error term.

8   Results

8.1   Women candidate gender attitudes

We measure the actual gender attitudes, defined as average beliefs about what women "should" do and not do. The "women working outside" index aggregates whether woman should be allowed to work outside, and is she a better wife and a better mother. The "female mobility" index aggregates attitudes around woman's ability to move without permission and unaccompanied, and interact with male members at work. The "decision making power" index averages the attitudes around women decisions about her owned earned income, fertility, and children's future. The "chore sharing" index includes the attitudes regarding sharing household chores and child care with spouse and mother-in-law. In all 4 sub-categories, higher values correspond to greater acceptance of female work and her agency. The "preference for son" index explores the attitudes around family and society's preference to have a son in a family. In the "acceptance of IPV" index, We aggregate acceptance of varying level of IPV against wife in the household. The above 2 categories indicate gender regressive attitude around women and her abilities. That is, higher value corresponds to gender biased attitude towards women. The "gender attitude" index aggregates all 7 categories to create a single measure of gender attitude in our sample.

The impact of invitation to training is reported in Table 3. Among woman candidates, the invitation to training had no impact on candidate's gender attitude, except for the decision making index. The gender attitude for decision making power became more biased by 0.17 standard deviations, statistically significant at 10 %. Women who were invited to participate in the training also reported regressive attitude around women working outside (0.12 standard deviations lower then the control group). However, the estimate is not statistically significant. The preference for son index also moves by 0.21 standard deviation towards gender regressive attitude. Except for female mobility and acceptance of CAHW indices (column 2 and 7), all gender attitude indices moves in opposite direction (toward being gender regressive) after being invited to the training. The impact of becoming a CAHW (LATE) are also in the same direction, that is, the gender attitudes around women work and her agency become more regressive when the candidate becomes a CAHW. Table 4 presents the results. The coefficients are of larger magnitude as compared to ITT effects. The decision making power index decreases by 0.47 standard deviations after becoming a CAHW, statis-

tically significant at 5%. Similarly, the preference for son index shifts to conservation gender attitude by 0.5 standard deviations for CAHW women. Candidates who became a CAHW also reported 0.34 standard deviation decrease in attitude around women working outside as compared to control women. Among CAHW women, the "acceptance of female CAHW" index increases by 0.32 standard deviations, indicating increased acceptance in ability of women to successfully and efficiently work a CAHW person in the community. The PDS Lasso ITT and LATE estimates with extended controls are reported in Table 13 and 14 in Appendix C, respectively. Because the results are similar with or without the extended controls using PDS Lasso, subsequent tables only present results without the extended control variables.

The midline survey asked candidates who were invited but did not enroll in the training various reasons for not participating. The most conspicuous reason behind not enrolling in the training was that they were not contacted about the training. That is, they were not recruited or informed about their invitation to attend the CAHW training free of cost.Out of 141 women, 39 women (28%) reported that they weren't contacted about the training by the cooperative members or the village leaders. By training format, 24% in DL treatment group and 32% in the TT treatment group. There are two possible explanation: First, they were actually not recruited. That means that either the cooperative didn't want her to go for training and hence didn't inform her about the free training. Or her family was contacted, who eventually didn't' pass on the information to her. In any case, the negative effect of invitation to training could be mitigated by being not recruited. However, the occurrence of non-recruitment of randomly assigned trainees is more likely to be endogenous to cooperative's members and leader and the demand for CAHW at the time of recruitment. Second, these women were contacted, and they are reporting it differently. Either they don't remember it now or they don't want to look bad and it is easier to put blame for not participating in a free of cost training on the cooperative for mishandling the recruitment process. To investigate whether the simple invitation to CAHW training is making women hold gender regressive attitude, we regressed gender attitude outcomes on not being recruited (not contacted about the free training) despite being assigned to treatment group. Table 5 presents the results for the above regression. Women who reported they were not recruited have positive coefficient for gender attitude around women working outside the house, household decision making, and sharing household chores equally with spouse. The coefficient is very small and statistically not significant. The imprecise coefficients are because of small sample size. These women are also gender progressive in terms of preference for a son over a daughter and acceptance of IPV in the household. These results indicates that just the invitation to the training is making women worse off in terms of gender attitude around women working outside and her agency at home and at work.

The possible mechanism through which invitation to training and becoming a CAHW is making women gender attitudes more regressive could be through actually experiencing those gender biases at home and during work in the community. CAHW is a male dominated occupation, where many high school educated men see as an opportunity to work in a white collar job in their village. This free training for only women might have initiated fiction between female candidate and potential male candidate in the household. Hence, the invitation to training would have made women more conscious of existing gender biased cultural norms around women working outside and faced difficult situations while competing for work opportunities with male members in the society. From such experiences, women who were invited to training became conscious of conservative gender attitude around women's work and eventually internalized those gender regressive norms.

8.2 Complier Characteristics using Abadie's (2003) Kappa Weighting Method

In order to understand the underlying mechanism that are moving the gender attitudes, we characterise the sub-population of compliers. Abadie (2003) demonstrated Kappa weighting method to determine the average characteristics of the complier sub-population.

$$E[x_i|complier] = \frac{E[\kappa_i x_i]}{E[x_i]} \tag{4}$$

In equation 4, $E[x_i|complier]$ represents the average of x_i only for compliers; κ_i are the weights that allow the characterization of the complier sub-population. The kappa weights are obtained as follows:

$$\kappa_i = 1 - \frac{D_i(1 - z_i)}{1 Pr(z_i = 1|x_i)} - \frac{z_i(1 - D_i)}{Pr(z_i = 1|x_i)} \tag{5}$$

In equation 5, z_i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate was invited to attend the training and 0 otherwise; D_i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate attended the training and became a CAHW, 0 otherwise. Table 6 presents the means of some variables for the entire sample and for the sub-population of compliers. The column 3 is ratio of column 1 and 2 that reports the relative likelihood that compliers have that characteristics. The probability of randomly choosing a female headed household from the group of compliers is 32% whereas the probability of randomly choosing a female headed household from the

general population is 27%. Women in compliers group are younger, are more likely to have education above 8th grade, from non-high caste family with a migrant member. The women in complier group have more control solely and jointly and lower empowerment and mobility score.

8.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects

To investigate whether being more empowered at baseline make women more gender regressive, we look at the variation in treatment affects due to predetermined empowerment level of candidates. The two main variables that reflect some level of empowerment that stand out for the compliers group is having more than 8 years of education and having sole control over non-zero income. Women with higher education are more likely to face backlash when they are offered the training. First, they are taking away opportunities for male individuals who are equally or more educated. Further, women with more education are more likely to feel confident about attending and passing this training, making them more vulnerable to existing biased gender norms and any family discord that rises due to that. Panel A in Table 7 and 8 present the heterogeneous treatment effect of higher education on candidate's gender attitudes for ITT and LATE, respectively. After including the interaction term between invited and higher education, the direction of training impact on gender attitude for all subcategories is flipped. The heterogeneous impact of higher education who were invited to the training is negative for all dimensions of gender attitude, except for decision making index. We find significant differential effects of the treatment by candidate's higher education for female mobility, decision making, acceptance of IPV and acceptance of female CAHWs.

Similarly, having sole control over non-zero income at baseline also negatively impact the gender norms for women who were invited to attend the training. Panel B in Table 7 and 8 present those heterogeneous treatment effects for ITT and LATE estimates, respectively However, we only find significant differential effect of treatment by candidate's sole control over some income for acceptance of IPV and acceptance of female CAHWs. We thus have some evidence to conclude that more empowered women are more likely to become conscious of gender biased attitudes in the society and family through this training intervention.

8.4 Male relative's gender attitude

As discussed above, this paper interviewed eligible male relative to explore the effect of training intervention on their gender attitudes. Over 75% of male relative respondents were husbands, along with 10% of fathers and father-in-law. The remaining 5% consisted of elder

brothers and other relations in our sample. Table 9 reports the ITT effects of invitation to training on male relative's gender attitude around woman work and her agency at home and in the society. Among male relatives, the invitation to training decreases the female mobility index by 0.27 standard deviations which is statistically significant at 5%. The coefficients for women working outside and chore sharing index are in more progressive direction as compared to women candidates gender attitudes. However, the magnitude for women working outside is very small. The decision making power and preference for son indices also moves towards regressive gender attitudes for the male relative's of the candidate who were invited to attend the training, but the point estimate is not significantly different from zero.

Table 10 presents the LATE estimates of becoming a CAHW on male relative's gender attitudes. As compared to ITT, the point estimate for female mobility index become larger and moves in the conservative direction. The negative ITT and LATE effect of training on male relative's female mobility index implies that the idea of women going out on her own and interacting with other males at work increases the male relative's conservation social norms about women's mobility. They can also reflect the increased concern for women safety and further need to know about her whereabouts for her protection. The chore sharing index for male relative's where the candidate became a CAHW increases by 0.44 standard deviations for male relative and statistically significant at 10%. This increased attitude to share household chores and child care burden equally among partners reflects male relative's attitude will change only by experiencing personal behavioural change after candidate actually works as a CAHW. Similarly for acceptance of female CAHW index, the point estimates increased by 0.6 standard deviation among male relative's of candidates who became a CAHW through training intervention.

Comparing the ITT and LATE effect for male relatives gender attitudes, We observe that male relative's gender attitude can shift towards more progressive attitude when the candidate completes the training and actually becomes a CAHW. This implies that men's gender attitude could only shift through experiencing personal behavioural change when candidates attends the training, and not just through the candidate who experiences increased access to labor opportunities through invitation to training.

8.5   Female relative's gender attitude

The total sample size for female relative is 169, in which mother-in-laws and mothers make up to 64% and 21% of the sample, respectively. Table 11 reports the impact of invitation to training on female relative's gender attitudes. Columns (1)-(8) show that point estimates

for female relatives are smaller in magnitude and never statistically significant. This implies that an invitation to training is not a strong enough to shift the gender attitude of female elders in the household. Looking at the impact of becoming a CAHW (Table 12), female relatives reflect much stronger conservative gender attitudes. The coefficient for female mobility and chore sharing index are much larger in magnitude and statistically significant at 10%. Further, preference for son index shifts in gender regressive direction when the candidates become a CAHW.

The LATE estimates in Table 12 indicates that regressive gender attitudes around woman working the household and her agency become more prominent among the female elders of the household when the candidate became a CAHW. These conservative gender attitudes help explains the negative impact of invitation to training on women candidate's gender attitudes.

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Table 2: Balance table

Variable	(1) Control Mean/SD	(2) Invited to training Mean/SD	(3) t-test (p-value) (1)-(2)	(4) Normalized difference (1)-(2)
Baseline outcome variables				
Income				
Total household income (NPR)	320265	346677	0.404	-0.0966
	[284030]	[262830]		
Total respondent income (NPR)	10774	16865	0.26	-0.13
	[36775]	[54949]		
Respondent non-farm income (NPR)	3507	5193	0.58	-0.064
	[20186]	[31351]		
Respondent sole control over income (NPR)	26150	25580	0.957	0.0063
	[94800]	[86318]		
Respondent joint control income (NPR)	101950	114414	0.516	-0.0752
	[157159]	[174334]		
Empowerment				
Respondent control some income (0/1)	0.587	0.6	0.815	-0.0271
	[.494]	[.492]		
Mobility Index	12.8	13.2	0.404	-0.0966
	[3.52]	[3.66]		
Number of women that would seek your advice	7.84	8.32	0.624	-0.0568
	[8.5]	[8.44]		
Empowerment Index (ICW)	-0.0442	0.0442	0.445	-0.0883
	[1.02]	[.983]		
Aspirations				
Aspired income (NPR)	229700	280813	0.105	-0.187
	[229793]	[309015]		
Aspired number of women seeking help	41.1	33.9	0.595	0.0614
	[138]	[91.2]		
Livestock knowledge				
Percent of easy correct	0.853	0.84	0.684	0.0471
	[.293]	[.274]		
Percent of intermediate correct	0.22	0.217	0.912	0.0127
	[.268]	[.255]		
Percent of difficult correct	0.84	0.847	0.874	-0.0183
	[.368]	[.362]		
Knowledge Score (percentage)	0.597	0.592	0.831	0.0247
	[.22]	[.212]		
Demographic controls				
Respondent				
Age (years)	26.9	27	0.925	-0.0108
	[6.41]	[5.91]		
Education (years)	10.5	10.1	0.115	0.182
	[1.73]	[2.38]		
Married (0/1)	0.787	0.78	0.889	0.0162
	[.411]	[.416]		
Household				
Household size	5.76	5.9	0.616	-0.0581
	[2.34]	[2.48]		
Number of children under 12 years	0.987	1.1	0.32	-0.115
	[.897]	[1.07]		
Number of respondent's children under 12 yrs	0.827	0.84	0.894	-0.0155
	[.873]	[.852]		
Belongs to high caste (0/1)	0.413	0.407	0.907	0.0135
	[.494]	[.493]		
Age of household head (years)	47.1	48.3	0.44	-0.09
	[13.5]	[13.8]		
Female head (0/1)	0.282	0.259	0.652	0.0525
	[.451]	[.439]		
Has a Migrant (0/1)	0.507	0.513	0.908	-0.0133
	[.502]	[.501]		
Owns livestock (0/1)	0.973	0.96	0.522	0.0742
	[.162]	[.197]		
Interest in CAHW training				
High interest in DL (0/1)	0.807	0.82	0.768	-0.0342
	[.396]	[.385]		
High interest in TT (0/1)	0.74	0.72	0.698	0.045
	[.44]	[.451]		
High interest in DL and TT (0/1)	0.68	0.687	0.902	-0.0143
	[.468]	[.465]		
Access to technology				
Owns a smartphone (0/1)	0.813	0.853	0.354	-0.107
	[.391]	[.355]		
Have social media account (0/1)	0.713	0.74	0.606	-0.0597
	[.454]	[.44]		
Observations	150	150		

The value displayed for t-tests are p-values.

***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 3: ITT (OLS) Candidate's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	-0.12 (0.108)	0.04 (0.123)	-0.17* (0.102)	0.00 (0.112)	0.19 (0.124)	0.03 (0.119)	0.12 (0.098)	-0.07 (0.104)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276
Adjusted R-Squared	0.36	0.17	0.40	0.33	0.18	0.21	0.42	0.40

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: LATE (IV) Candidate's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	-0.34* (0.197)	0.12 (0.227)	-0.47** (0.196)	0.01 (0.209)	0.50** (0.235)	0.08 (0.222)	0.32* (0.182)	-0.18 (0.195)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276
Adjusted R-Squared	0.38	0.18	0.36	0.33	0.15	0.21	0.44	0.39

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: (OLS) Candidates who were not recruited for the training in the treatment sub sample

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Not recruited	0.02 (0.202)	-0.11 (0.184)	0.30 (0.227)	0.19 (0.185)	-0.19 (0.169)	-0.10 (0.191)	0.01 (0.220)	0.15 (0.204)
Control Mean	-0.06	0.06	-0.15	-0.05	0.12	0.04	0.09	-0.05
Obs	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
Adjusted R-Squared	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.09	0.10	0.00	0.04

Robust standard errors in parentheses

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Characteristics of compliers using Abadie's (2003) kappa method.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$E[x\|Complier]$	E[x]	$\frac{E[x\|Complier]}{E[x]}$
Candidate's characteristics			
Candidate's Age (years)	27.91	29.15	0.957
Above 8th grade education (0/1)	1.005	0.953	1.055
Married (0/1)	0.808	0.812	0.996
Has a son (0/1)	0.569	0.598	0.952
Household characteristics			
Female head (0/1)	0.321	0.276	1.165
Has a migrant (0/1)	0.465	0.511	0.911
MIL lives at home (0/1)	0.488	0.449	1.086
FIL lives at home (0/1)	0.363	0.373	0.972
Nuclear family structure (0/1)	0.227	0.264	0.859
No. of married woman (count)	0.808	0.768	1.052
No. of married men (count)	0.652	0.663	0.983
Belongs to high caste (0/1)	0.341	0.431	0.791
Empowerment variables			
Mobility (count)	12.49	13	0.961
No. of women seek her advice	5.844	8.199	0.713
Empowerment Index	-0.0818	0.0291	-2.814
Aspired Income	220159.6	259826.1	0.847
Aspired no. of women seeks her advice	30.67	38.46	0.798
Candidate's earned income (0/1)	0.0813	0.174	0.468
Candidate's NAB income (0/1)	0.0624	0.058	1.076
Sole control over income (0/1)	0.27	0.232	1.164
Joint control over income (0/1)	0.674	0.612	1.101
Observations	272	276	272

The values of $E[x\|complier]$ and E[x] were obtained by following a variation of the method proposed in Abadie (2003). The ratios in columns 3 give the relative likelihood that compliers have the characteristic indicated at left. The values in columns 1 represent Abadie's (2003) kappa-weighted means

Table 7: Heterogenous effect of education and income control on candidate's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Panel A: Candidate's education								
Invited to training	0.28	1.06**	-1.94**	0.42	-0.77	-1.53**	1.56**	0.56
	(1.231)	(0.481)	(0.889)	(0.579)	(0.826)	(0.650)	(0.618)	(0.593)
Invited * Above 8th grade education	-0.42	-1.05**	1.83**	-0.44	0.99	1.62**	-1.49**	-0.65
	(1.243)	(0.527)	(0.905)	(0.610)	(0.855)	(0.684)	(0.642)	(0.620)
Candidate education: Above 8th grade (0/1)	0.57	0.87**	-1.02	0.27	-0.99	-1.77**	1.32***	0.94*
	(1.161)	(0.422)	(0.811)	(0.492)	(0.755)	(0.569)	(0.300)	(0.507)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276
Panel B: Candidate's sole control over non-zero income								
Invited to training	-0.05	0.14	-0.15	-0.07	0.05	-0.18	0.24*	0.08
	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.129)
Invited * Sole control over income	-0.33	-0.42	-0.08	0.31	0.61	0.90**	-0.53	-0.64*
	(0.351)	(0.396)	(0.345)	(0.379)	(0.435)	(0.423)	(0.319)	(0.356)
Respondent sole control over income (0/1)	0.34	0.25	0.16	-0.18	-0.30	-0.50	0.37	0.46*
	(0.277)	(0.295)	(0.251)	(0.305)	(0.318)	(0.329)	(0.233)	(0.239)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Heterogenous treatment effect of education and income control on candidate's gender attitudes for LATE

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Panel A: Candidate's education								
Completed training	1.43	4.64**	-8.38*	1.88	-3.71	-6.88**	6.75**	2.60
	(3.450)	(2.328)	(4.379)	(1.874)	(2.696)	(3.472)	(2.709)	(1.799)
Completed * Above 8th grade education	-1.81	-4.61*	8.08*	-1.91	4.31	7.10**	-6.57**	-2.84
	(3.473)	(2.387)	(4.400)	(1.932)	(2.751)	(3.509)	(2.739)	(1.852)
Candidate education: Above 8th grade (0/1)	0.67	0.84**	-0.88	0.27	-1.15**	-1.80***	1.22***	1.00**
	(0.724)	(0.297)	(0.540)	(0.348)	(0.480)	(0.408)	(0.264)	(0.325)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276
Panel B: Candidate's sole control over non-zero income								
Completed training	-0.12	0.43	-0.44	-0.21	0.11	-0.56*	0.72**	0.27
	(0.247)	(0.304)	(0.272)	(0.287)	(0.313)	(0.297)	(0.263)	(0.266)
Completed * Sole control over income	-0.80	-1.17	-0.08	0.83	1.50*	2.41**	-1.51**	-1.66**
	(0.647)	(0.749)	(0.629)	(0.684)	(0.792)	(0.791)	(0.581)	(0.657)
Respondent sole control over income (0/1)	0.44*	0.34	0.21	-0.25	-0.48*	-0.71**	0.47**	0.62**
	(0.231)	(0.248)	(0.215)	(0.255)	(0.272)	(0.280)	(0.187)	(0.206)
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	276	276	276	276	276	276	276	276

Standard errors in parentheses

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: ITT (OLS) Male relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	0.02	-0.27**	-0.11	0.16	0.19	0.05	0.21	-0.03
	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Control Mean	-0.04	0.08	0.00	-0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.10	-0.04
Obs	227	227	227	227	227	227	227	227
Adjusted R-Squared	0.35	0.39	0.44	0.47	0.36	0.36	0.51	0.47

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: LATE (IV) Male relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	0.06	-0.76**	-0.30	0.44*	0.52**	0.13	0.60**	-0.09
	(0.246)	(0.253)	(0.245)	(0.233)	(0.255)	(0.249)	(0.233)	(0.225)
Control Mean	-0.04	0.08	0.00	-0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.10	-0.04
Obs	227	227	227	227	227	227	227	227
Adjusted R-Squared	0.35	0.29	0.39	0.45	0.28	0.35	0.46	0.46

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: ITT (OLS) Female relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	-0.08	-0.26	-0.00	-0.16	0.37	0.02	0.14	-0.12
	(0.248)	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.228)	(0.236)	(0.208)	(0.236)	(0.249)
Female relative: Mother/MIL	-1.15	-1.05	-1.11	-1.05	0.97	0.90	-0.75	-1.54
	(0.964)	(1.038)	(1.308)	(0.994)	(0.873)	(0.764)	(0.619)	(1.082)
Female relative's age	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Control Mean	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.08	-0.02
Obs	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
Adjusted R-Squared	0.27	0.17	0.10	0.38	0.26	0.40	0.33	0.30

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 12: LATE (IV) Female relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	-0.17	-0.59*	-0.00	-0.37	0.82**	0.04	0.32	-0.27
	(0.277)	(0.314)	(0.304)	(0.251)	(0.297)	(0.232)	(0.263)	(0.277)
Female relative: Mother/MIL	-1.15**	-1.03*	-1.11*	-1.03**	0.94**	0.89**	-0.76**	-1.53**
	(0.472)	(0.544)	(0.657)	(0.488)	(0.442)	(0.384)	(0.308)	(0.532)
Female relative's age	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Control Mean	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.08	-0.02
Obs	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
Adjusted R-Squared	0.28	0.09	0.10	0.40	0.08	0.41	0.35	0.31

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendices

A Theory of Change: Training and Gender Attitude

Figure 1: Theory of Change: How training will affect the gender attitude of eligible woman candidate.

B Gender Attitude Survey

This section provide detailed gender attitude module that was used to collect data at the midline survey. All statements use a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". This module was answered by 3 respondents: eligible woman candidate, male relative (husband) and male relative (mother-in-law).

B.1   Women working outside the home sub-index

GA1.1: A woman should be allowed to work outside the home if she wishes to do so.

GA1.2: A stay at home mother is better than a woman who go out for work to earn.

GA1.3: A woman who work outside the house is as good of a wife as a housewife.

GA1.4: It is the job of a man to provide for the family, not woman.

GA1.5: A man should feel happy that his wife financially supports the household.

GA1.6: A husband should always earn more than his wife to maintain the harmony in the household.

B.2   Mobility sub-index

GA2.1: A woman must have husband or other male kinsman to accompany her when she leaves house.

GA2.2 It is acceptable for a woman to visit nearby city or ward leaving in morning and arriving back late evening for work purpose.

GA2.3: It is okay for a woman to interact with other men who are not related to her during work.

GA2.4: A wife should always asks for permission either from her husband or mother-in-law before stepping out of home.

GA2.5: As the protector of the family, a husband must know the whereabouts of his wife at all times.

B.3   Household decision making

GA3.1 A husband should listen to his wife and respect her opinion.

GA3.2 A woman should decide how to spend her own earned income.

GA3.3 A husband should have full control over the assets that his wife brought with her in marriage, as they are gifts to his family.

GA3.4 A woman should decide the number of children to have in a family.

GA3.5 The father is the one who should have the final say in the decisions regarding daughter or son's marriage.

B.4   Sharing household chores sub-index

GA4.1: If a woman works/study outside the home, a husband should help in household chores like cooking, cleaning utensils, laundry and taking care of young children while she is away.

GA4.2: Doing household chores makes a man less masculine.

GA4.3: A husband and wife are equal partner, hence they should share all household responsibility including child rearing.

GA4.4: A mother-in-law should take extra household work if the daughter-in-law wants to work outside the house to earn.

B.5   Preference for son sub-index

GA5.1: Having a son is essential as they keep the family lineage going and provide care in old age.

GA5.2: Boys are smarter then girls.

GA5.3: Both boys and girls should get equal opportunities and resources for education.

GA5.4: Boys should be fed first and given more food compared to girls as they need more energy to grow.

GA5.5: It is understandable for a husband and wife to keep having children until they have at least one son.

B.6   Inter partner violence sub-index

GA6.1: It is okay for a husband to insult or humiliate his wife in front of others.

GA6.2: A husband is justified in using physical violence over his wife if she disobeys him.

GA6.3: A husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife if she burns the food.

GA6.4: A woman should tolerate violence in order to keep her family together.

GA6.5: Violence between a husband and wife is a private matter and others should not intervene.

B.7 Acceptance of female CAHW sub-index

GA7.1: A woman can manage livestock as well as man.

GA7.2: I would trust a female CAHW to diagnose diseases in my livestock as much as I trust a male CAHW.

GA7.3: A trained female CAHW can perform castration as well as any male CAHW.

GA7.4: A trained female CAHW can administer vaccinations as well as any male CAHW.

GA7.5: A female CAHW requires support from other male CAHW while handling large animals.

C Appendix Tables and Figures

Figure 2: Timeline

C.1 PDS Lasso: Candidate's gender attitudes

Table 13: ITT (PDS Lasso) Candidate's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	-0.11 (0.082)	0.05 (0.093)	-0.17** (0.078)	0.01 (0.083)	0.16* (0.093)	0.01 (0.091)	0.12 (0.074)	-0.05 (0.080)
Aspired number of women seeking help					-0.00*** (0.000)			
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	272	272	272	272	272	272	272	272
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 14: LATE (PDS Lasso) Candidate's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	-0.30 (0.226)	0.15 (0.260)	-0.48** (0.225)	0.01 (0.233)	0.45* (0.260)	0.03 (0.255)	0.34* (0.208)	-0.15 (0.225)
Aspired number of women seeking help					-0.00*** (0.000)			
Control Mean	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.01	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	0.03
Obs	272	272	272	272	272	272	272	272
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.2 PDS Lasso: Male relative's gender attitudes

Table 15: ITT (PDS Lasso) Male relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	0.05	-0.25**	-0.11	0.18*	0.22*	0.03	0.20*	-0.05
	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.097)
Male relative: Father/ Husband	0.18	0.11	0.44	-0.24	-0.43	0.05	0.03	0.19
	(0.301)	(0.325)	(0.272)	(0.288)	(0.316)	(0.348)	(0.344)	(0.332)
Male relative's age	0.01	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female head (0/1)			-0.50***					-0.57***
			(0.138)					(0.159)
Respondent sole control over income (0/1)			-0.31**					
			(0.138)					
Percent of intermediate correct			0.88**					
			(0.289)					
Joint family (more than one married women or men)						-0.43**		
						(0.144)		
Percent of difficult correct								-0.42**
								(0.155)
Control Mean	-0.04	0.08	0.00	-0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.10	-0.04
Obs	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 16: LATE (PDS Lasso) Male relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	0.12	-0.76**	-0.33	0.52	0.64*	0.11	0.62*	-0.15
	(0.330)	(0.346)	(0.318)	(0.317)	(0.361)	(0.336)	(0.317)	(0.297)
Nuclear family (husband, wife and children)	0.23	0.38	0.12	-0.13	-0.19	-0.36	-0.41*	0.00
	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.217)	(0.204)	(0.340)	(0.295)	(0.214)	(0.204)
Male relative: Father/ Husband	0.18	-0.03	0.38	-0.15	-0.33	0.13	0.15	0.16
	(0.309)	(0.320)	(0.285)	(0.300)	(0.346)	(0.338)	(0.340)	(0.322)
Male relative's age	0.01	-0.02**	-0.02*	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female head (0/1)			-0.54***					-0.58***
			(0.162)					(0.169)
Respondent sole control over income (0/1)			-0.25					
			(0.160)					
Percent of intermediate correct			0.91**					
			(0.316)					
Joint family (more than one married women or men)						-0.57**		
						(0.181)		
Percent of difficult correct								-0.43**
								(0.169)
Control Mean	-0.04	0.08	0.00	-0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.10	-0.04
Obs	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.3 PDS Lasso: Female relative's gender attitudes

Table 17: ITT (PDS Lasso) Female relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Invited to training	-0.10 (0.214)	-0.37* (0.211)	-0.05 (0.220)	-0.26 (0.172)	0.24 (0.188)	-0.00 (0.174)	0.10 (0.202)	-0.21 (0.202)
Female relative: Mother/MIL	-1.14 (0.792)	-0.80 (0.835)	-0.94 (1.087)	-0.93 (0.768)	1.05* (0.607)	0.91 (0.619)	-0.68 (0.506)	-1.34 (0.875)
Female relative's age	0.02 (0.025)	-0.01 (0.024)	-0.01 (0.034)	0.01 (0.019)	0.02 (0.021)	0.01 (0.019)	-0.00 (0.022)	-0.00 (0.018)
Woman's education (years)				-0.18** (0.075)				
Belongs to high caste (0/1)					-0.85** (0.364)	-0.88** (0.296)		
Mobility Index					-0.11* (0.056)			
High interest in TT (0/1)					-0.94** (0.322)			
Have social media account (0/1)					-0.50* (0.258)			
Control Mean	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.08	-0.02
Obs	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 18: LATE (PDS Lasso) Female relative's gender attitudes

	(1) Women working outside index	(2) Female mobility index	(3) Decision-making power index	(4) Chore-sharing index	(5) Preference for son index	(6) Acceptance of IPV index	(7) Acceptance of female CAHW	(8) Gender Attitude Index
Completed training	-0.24 (0.503)	-0.88* (0.523)	-0.12 (0.516)	-0.60 (0.382)	0.56 (0.485)	-0.00 (0.414)	0.23 (0.478)	-0.49 (0.465)
Female relative: Mother/MIL	-1.13 (0.753)	-0.74 (0.865)	-0.93 (1.050)	-0.88 (0.708)	1.00 (0.665)	0.91 (0.617)	-0.70 (0.500)	-1.31 (0.816)
Female relative's age	0.02 (0.025)	-0.01 (0.027)	-0.01 (0.033)	0.01 (0.018)	0.02 (0.024)	0.01 (0.020)	-0.00 (0.021)	-0.00 (0.018)
Woman's education (years)				-0.15* (0.081)				
Belongs to high caste (0/1)					-0.83** (0.305)	-0.88** (0.302)		
Mobility Index					-0.11* (0.061)			
High interest in TT (0/1)					-1.03** (0.367)			
Have social media account (0/1)					-0.47 (0.316)			
Control Mean	-0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.08	-0.02
Obs	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Adjusted R-Squared								

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All specifications include stratum fixed effects and de-meaned outcome variable at baseline.

Control variables selected using post-double-selection (PDS) LASSO.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$