@article{Conning:296595,
      recid = {296595},
      author = {Conning, Jonathan and Robinson, James},
      title = {Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture},
      address = {2001-04},
      number = {2276-2019-4733},
      series = {162},
      pages = {42},
      year = {2001},
      abstract = {The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how  the economic environment determines organizational form  under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The  political economy literature has modelled the endogenous  determination of property rights. In this paper we propose  a model in which the economic organization of agriculture  and the political equilibrium determining the distribution  of property rights are jointly determined. In particular,  because the form of organization may affect the probability  and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may  be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model  offers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic  advantages has been so little used in countries where  agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We argue that  this in particular helps to understand the dearth of  tenancy and the relative failure of land reform in Latin  America.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/296595},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.296595},
}