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INSTITUTIONALISING PARTICIPATORY, CLIENT-DRIVEN RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE

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CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	1
Introduction	2
Key features of the participatory R&D approach	3
Issues for institutionalising participatory client-driven research and development	5
Creating client-driven agenda	5
Decentralising technology development: reorientations in research	8
Decentralising technology development: developing farmer capacity to lead adaptive research testing	10
Identifying organisational principles for accountability sharing	12
Issues for the future	15
References	19

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ABSTRACT*

This paper identifies key characteristics of participatory research and development (R&D): it is client-driven, requires decentralised technology development, devolves to farmers the major responsibility for adaptive testing, and requires institutions and individuals to become accountable for the relevance and quality of technology on offer. The paper then reviews ways by which institutions can respond to these characteristics. For creating ***client-driven agenda*** *options commonly include: representation by clients on their governing boards, joint research planning and the establishment of research-extension liaison units. However, more effective than this "representation" strategy might be to place a significant proportion of the available research resources directly under client control: client groups would then contract as they deem appropriate.* ***Decentralising technology development*** *requires scientists to shift away from a "pipeline" model which defines a limited number of products towards the development of menus of options, and prototypes, which are then adapted to "niche" conditions by others. Such localised testing, requiring a* ***community-based adaptive research*** *capacity, can be achieved through working with groups of farmers (rather than individuals) and with producer organisations. The devolution of trial testing is discussed in reference to experimental methods, statistical validity and cost. Institutionalising* ***accountability sharing*** *is probably the most challenging issue. While scientists' rewards might be tied to the success or failure of technologies, clients' contracts with research or third party evaluations probably serve as more binding options.*

Three issues are signalled for future attention. First, clarification is needed of the respective roles of farmers and scientists in prototype screening: e.g. what features should scientists be screening for and at what stage?; how early in the

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process can farmers be involved and to what degree can they control decisions on trial design and measurement? Second, decentralised technology development requires corresponding reorientation in service provision (e.g. credit, extension and seed multiplication). Third, steps need to be taken to safeguard equity, both between the more and less vocal groups of farmers,and between the requirements of present and future generations (the latter referring particularly to environmental concerns).

Finally, participatory R&D alone is insufficient to deliver innovations relevant to diverse client groups: explicit procedures are required to define which clients are to participate, whose agenda are to drive the process, and what organisational innovations are needed to move agricultural R&D in these directions.

INTRODUCTION

Involving users or clients in research and development (participatory R&D) is a principle of successful innovation. Within industry, the client orientation of America's most-respected and productive companies has been well-publicized (Peters and Waterman, 1984), with the most avant-garde flexibly pouring out new products to meet varied customer needs (Stewart, 1992). Within agriculture, senior research managers, responsible for innovation, have highlighted "learning from and serving the users" as a basic tenet for achieving technical change in developing countries (Nickel, 1988), with the emphasis on research collaboration as well as end-product consultation. Farmer participation in agricultural R&D is now perceived as an essential feature of sustainable agricultural innovation by environmentalists, socio-economists, and politicians – as well as agriculturalists (National Research Council, 1989; Bhatnagar and Williams, 1992). A recent position paper on soil, water and nutrient management research prepared by the CGIAR states that "we have identified the critical issue as the failure to start the research process at the user level, and to establish a continuing mechanism for interchange of knowledge between the farmers and other practitioners and the researchers" (Greenland *et al.*, 1994:vi). Yet in practice the capacity of formal research to incorporate client-driven agenda and active client participation remains remarkably limited. A study of nine national agricultural research systems found that the most difficult function to institutionalize in on-farm research had been feedback from clients to orient research priorities (Merrill-Sands *et al.* 1991).

The purpose of this paper is to briefly outline the main issues which need to be addressed if small farmers in low-income countries are to participate on a

regular basis in the design and development of technical innovations in agriculture. The first section of the paper outlines some key characteristics of participatory R&D which represent significant requirements for its institutionalisation in the agricultural sector. The issues these raise are then discussed and illustrated in terms of creating client-driven research agenda, decentralising technology development and organising accountability sharing. In conclusion, the paper identifies several issues related to the strengths and weaknesses of client-driven research which need to be addressed if this approach is to be successfully institutionalized.

KEY FEATURES OF THE PARTICIPATORY R&D APPROACH

Participatory R&D has some unique characteristics which will affect its institutionalisation in the agricultural sector.

First, it is **client-driven.** This means that farmers' (i.e. the principal clients) knowledge, needs, criteria, and preferences have weight in decisions about technical innovation. It also, more fundamentally, implies that farmers are actively involved in decision-making about innovation, not just at the very late point in time when adoption (or rejection) occurs, but early in the process when the agenda for research is set, when specific themes are proposed, and when design features are determined.

Client-driven agendas are likely to differ markedly from those geared toward basic, long-term research. Clients have differing needs, specific to their own agronomic and socio-economic situation. Farmers, when themselves innovating, have always done so in a given locality with particular constraints and opportunities in mind. Addressing client needs means that the technology development process itself must be sufficiently decentralized to meet diverse farmers' goals and to allow for site-specific, local adaptation. Such **decentralized technology development**, the second major feature of participatory R&D, needs to be organized to promote and reinforce multiple sources of "horizontal" innovation (Biggs, 1986). The decentralized model contrasts starkly with the conventions of applied agricultural science which is organised around the general principle of a "pipeline" or centralised research capacity generating technology which is broadly adapted to a wide range of circumstances.

Decentralized client-driven technology development requires both applied researchers and farmers to perform new functions. First, decentralisation suggests that the "pipeline" or transfer of technology model must give way to

a client relationship which is highly interactive, evolving through time, and in which farmers participate early on in R&D. Such client involvement generates important feedback for the design of prototype-technology, which is tested, and adapted to fit local circumstances, and may stimulate further applied research in response to client specifications. Decentralising towards an interactive model means that applied research must have a sharpened capacity to integrate feedback and modify research schedules in response to client critique.

A second change required by a decentralised model is for applied research itself to take a proactive role in anticipating diverse clients needs in the form of assuring many options, not only "on the shelves", but actually in the fields. National research programmes and regional experiment stations no longer need to produce "finished" technologies or final recommendations. Instead, to facilitate decentralized technology development, researchers should think in terms of prototypes: these may encompass: (1) technological components which can be combined and managed flexibly to meet a given situation and (2) a "menu" of potentially useful options to be screened, and perhaps modified. The notion of "prototype" in this sense implies exposing farmers both to *early technological designs* as well as a *diversity of technological designs*. To prescreen prototype designs, farmers can be brought directly onto experimental stations (Sperling, 1992), onto farm sites set up for the purpose (Scherr 1991), or simply exposed to a general technological model, outlined theoretically, rather than physically (Sumberg and Okali, 1989). By screening prototypes, farmers can select technological alternatives to be tested and adapted locally or they can project new ideas for further development.

Effective decentralisation of testing is a task beyond most public sector research services and it is in this realm that farmer partners become key research partners. Testing of many different "menus" tailored to different preferences and localities sets the third major feature of participatory R&D: **the devolution to farmers of major responsibility for adaptive testing**. Farmers take the lead in organising experimentation, evaluating results, and transmitting local recommendations. Such devolution potentially allows for increased scale of testing, better targeting of technology, and more realistic technology evaluation.

The fourth important feature of client-driven R&D in agriculture centres on **accountability sharing.** Those involved in research (state research/extension programmes; NGO's; producer organisations; local communities; informal farmer groups) become liable for the relevance and quality of technology on offer. One of the biggest obstacles to institutionalising participatory client-driven R&D in the public sector is that, presently, most agricultural research systems and their staff are neither penalized for producing technologies which

farmers cannot use, nor are they rewarded for client-oriented research. A necessary feature of client-driven or demand-led R&D is that clients must have the right to "buy into" (or "sell out of") a research programme via their control over a significant proportion of resources needed for that program. Were the level of applied research resources tied to the impact obtained by adaptive research; and were that same adaptive research financed to a significant degree by farmer-controlled resources, then the necessary receptivity to client-demand in the research system could develop.

In brief, client-driven R&D requires that clients have a vote in setting research priorities as well as in the design of the final technological products. Further, clients should play key roles in allocating resources, and in evaluating the performance of research programmes to ensure accountability. With rights go responsibilities, and responsibility in this context implies that farmers share the implementation of some of the adaptive research load as well as bear some of its costs. Only then is decentralisation possible.

The next section of the paper discusses the issues involved in institutionalising this approach.

ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONALIsiNG PARTICIPATORY CLIENT-DRIVEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Creating client-driven agenda

In setting a client-driven agenda, one of the most commonly raised issues is how to reconcile the diverse, and often competing priorities and preferences of different client participants. Cattle ranchers will have different demands from nomadic pastoralists; women farmers have different priorities from men; commercial farmers differ from semi-subsistence producers. A nightmarish vision could be painted of literally thousands of different demands for localized research "menus" being articulated by participating farmers; and the question is posed "how can research systems respond to this?".

One way to reconcile the often competing interests of the various groups might be to give them representation in the research arenas where decisions are continually being made: e.g. on the boards of national and international research institutes. Several options have been proposed: farmers could participate directly in planning exercises; on-farm researchers could act as proxies for farmers; or pre-planning meetings could be held in farming communities (Merrill-Sands and Collion 1993). Research agendas would thus be negotiated

within a centrally-administered research system. However, the issue of taking the client seriously still hinges to a large degree on researcher "good will", with a substantial dose of interpretation as to clients' real wants/needs.

An example of the shortcomings of joint planning for creating a client-driven research agenda is the experience of OXFAM'S "Project Agro Foresterie (PAF)" in Burkina Faso. PAF initiated an annual process of government agency/peasant organisation/NGO joint planning. Although this gives farmers an opportunity to provide feedback, joint planning has not changed the basic power relations which determine the research-extension agenda. The priorities in technology development are still set by agencies, and although there are farmer experiments, these do not reflect a client-led agenda (Gubbels, 1993). Another example of the weakness of interinstitutional planning and coordination as a mechanism for creating client-driven research agendas, is the experience with Research-Extension Liaison Units (RELUs) in Ecuador. Typically, RELUs have brought together a government research agency, the ministry of agriculture's extension program, development projects, local universities and farmer organisations in a committee. The mandate of a RELU includes research planning (identification of problems and potential solutions), coordination of research, training and extension. RELUs are intended to be a forum for feedback on farmers' problems. In practice, an evaluation found RELUs' joint planning did not address farmers' problems. The RELUs were sometimes able to address this function when an individual or institution, who asserted farmers' interests, took control of the committee or dominated it. The constitution of a joint planning process including farmer representation did not in itself lead to client-agendas being recognised in research plans or acted upon by the participating institutions (Uquillas and Navas, 1993; Bebbington, 1993a:19-23).

A different mechanism for determining whose research priorities are given weight is one which places a significant proportion of the available resources for financing research under client control. This approach removes the need for centralised research planning by creating the means for client groups to contract applied research and so exert demand-pull on the research system. Instead of centralised planning, however, clear policy guidelines for priority setting and for monitoring the quality of research are needed because the contract scenario poses a series of challenges: (1) how to identify which user groups should get a chunk of the financial pie (those most important to economic growth? Those most needy? Those with the highest political profile?); (2) how to develop the capacity for client groups to express demand as aggregates rather than as individuals? and (3) how to improve the effectiveness of existing organisations to represent the range of client needs. We already know cases where wealthier, or particularly export-oriented farmers in both developed and developing areas

have been able to influence research budgets and effectively lobby for specific technologies (for the Netherlands, see Roling 1989a, for Zimbabwe,see Biggs 1989). Poor farmers, however, and particularly those less market-oriented, organize less easily, and "their real ability to say 'no' to a technology makes itself felt but erratically (Röling 1989b), i.e. who cares if they don't adopt?

Organisations representing poor farmers are typically pressed to address issues of income generation, and input supply (including credit) to meet the short-run needs of their members. The research agenda generated by such organisations' immediate needs is not necessarily formulated to represent the interests of diverse socio-economic strata among their members. An example is the experience of the federations of Indian farmers in the province of Chimborazo in Ecuador, which in the late 1980's organized simple adaptive research services linked to their own farmer-to-farmer extension and input distribution programmes. In the 1990's the ability of some communities and families to influence the concentration of these services in favored communities, the dramatic rise in costs of agrochemical inputs, and the absence of viable alternative technologies weakened the credibility of the federations with their member organisations which began to break away. Correspondingly, the ability of the federations to represent and negotiate a coherent client-driven agenda with research institutions was eroded (Bebbington, 1993a:10-12).

One way for poor, unorganized farmers to exert influence on a national or regional research agenda might be for NGO's to act as "brokers" or intermediaries which represent farmers interests in joint planning as well as by their active role in adaptive research and technology development. A huge volume of action programmes are in place, mostly NGO-sponsored, which have the intent of speaking for smaller farmers. Such organisations are scattered across regions, of variable composition and intent, often short-lived. Little systematic evaluation is available on their effectiveness in articulating their clients' demands for research (c.f. Bebbington and Thiele, 1993.)

While lauding their considerable strengths, several pioneering reviews suggest important limitations in relying on NGO's to voice poor farmers' research needs. Overview studies encompassing some forty NGO's in Latin America, Africa and Asia (Carroll 1992; Riddell and Robinson 1993) show NGO's limited capacity to work with the poorest groups who tend to select themselves out of activities which demand time, risk, or other commitments. Further, NGOs' agenda for technology development may be as susceptible to being ideology-driven as client-driven (Bebbington *et al.*, 1992; Bebbington, 1993b). Promotion of organic or environmental issues and validation of ethnic origins and ideals.have been prime areas of NGO advocacy, sometimes in spite of clients' priorities

(Farrington *et al.*, 1993). Kohl (1991) provides a telling example in the development of protected horticultural systems (PHS) in the Bolivian altiplano which started in the 1980's and was disseminated by over 50 NGO's by the end of 1990. These intensive cultivation systems were designed and promoted by NGO's. PHS projects suffered persistent technical difficulties; often the production was insufficient to pay off the producers' debts. Kohl attributes the technical problems to faulty design based on trial and error methods of technology development, and a failure by NGO's to test the technology adequately before launching demonstration and implementation (Kohl 1991:6-11). Moreover, producers were rarely involved in the design or planning of PHS; the technicians who promoted them were never accountable for the technical success of PHS; and there was no compensation for participants who were engaged in a technically-flawed enterprise. The PHS experience illustrates that grass-roots, NGO-based initiatives may be just as vulnerable to disarticulation from client interests as are public sector research entities.

Decentralising technology development: reorientations in research

For applied researchers, decentralising technology development implies a basic change in the way technologies are developed. Rather than focussing on fine-tuning a limited number of products and then verifying them on selected farms, the scientist develops a larger range of prototypes which will be tested and may be modified to suit specific needs and circumstances. Such a re-orientation suggests that scientists working on experiment stations should have a relatively good idea of the broad range of client needs and constraints at the beginning of the technology development process. It also suggests that scientists have to be prepared to part with their technologies at a relatively earlier stage in their product development – before they have "the" answer. Client-driven R&D will demand considerable behavioural changes and perhaps even role reversals on the part of the various participants (Chambers, *et al.* 1989). Increased involvement of farmers in the initial screening of prototypes, however, should mean that relatively more of the technological shortcomings, as well as promising opportunities, are identified early. Several examples illustrate the approach.

Rwandan farmers have considerable experience in managing local bean diversity: some 550 varieties exist countrywide and farmers themselves adjust mixtures of some 20 varieties for specific soil types and crop associations (Scheidegger, 1993). Despite such dynamic diversity on-farm, the selection sequence of the Rwandan Agricultural Institute (ISAR), paralleling western models, sharply narrows the diversity of cultivars on offer: while some 200-300 entries are initially screened, only 2-5 enter on-farm trials – the sole entry point

for client feedback. From 1988-1993, an experimental programme sought to draw on farmer' experience early in the breeding process, when varietal options were still extensive. During Phase I, farmer varietal experts evaluated 15 bush bean cultivars in on-station trials 2-4 seasons before normal on-farm testing; they then chose cultivars for home experiments. On-station evaluations showed that women experts select along two sets of criteria, preference and performance variables, with many of the desired attributes not easily integrated in a formal breeding framework. On-farm trials showed that farmers were well able to select cultivars from station fields suitable for their home plots. Farmer selections outperformed their checks with average production increases of up to 38%; breeder selections in the same region showed, on average, negative or insignificant production gains.

The range of cultivars desired by farmers was revealing: the number adopted from the two-year phase, 21, matched the total number of varieties released by ISAR in the 25 years previous (Sperling, Loevinsohn and Ntabomvura, 1993). During Phase II of the program, participants screened a broader range of cultivars even earlier in the selection process: 80-100 entries in on-station trials 5-7 seasons before conventional on-farm testing. In subsequent on-farm trials, laid in community plots, farmers selected 26 different varieties for home testing during the first two seasons alone. The experiment highlights farmers' ability and eagerness to screen large numbers of varieties relatively early in the R&D process. It also suggests important benefits of prototype screening: enhanced and diversified production on-farm; significant savings from reducing on-station research.

Another example suggests the advantages of prototype screening with more complex technologies. Rwandan farmers sought to intensify production in crowded highland valleys, where they were cultivating dryland crops on raised beds. Scientists most readily conjured up the model of the "sorjan" system, practiced by Indonesian farmers, whereby rice is grown in the drains between beds. Yet rather than pursue a "logical" idea wholesale, they discussed with farmers a range of technical and managerial options, which to that point had been only cursorily examined by formal research. For example, rice could be grown in paddies in any of the three principal seasons as well as in drains; or green manures and aquaculture might be integrated in various ways; farmers also were encouraged to propose alternatives. Self-organized groups of farmers ultimately decided which options they would try, when, and on what scale. Innovation was stimulated by several methods, including regular visits among groups in nearby valleys. The results, after three years of researcher-farmer interaction, were surprising; all groups rapidly appropriated rice, achieving mean yields of 3-4 t/ha with few external inputs. Equally striking was the diversity of

ways in which the groups integrated the crop. Some grew uniform crops of rice in paddies, others rotated rice with maize and sorghum, still others combined rice with sweet potato production and fish ponds. By collabourating with farmers early on, scientists avoided costly investments in ultimately unacceptable technologies, the "sorjan" being a case in point. Farmers felt that the limited space between their raised beds did not justify digging a canal, building a dam and sowing a seedbed. However, they were prepared to take a much larger step: many, including the poorest, turned all their valley land into paddies to accommodate a crop they had never before grown. Researchers elaborate:

> *"...had we attempted to design the technology in isolation before taking it on-farm, it is unlikely we would have considered the method employed in several groups .... Building and then destroying raised beds is prodigiously demanding of labour when considered on a hectare basis, but appears acceptable to farmers who manage only a few hundred square meters."* (Loevinsohn *et al.*, in press).

Decentralising technology development: Developing farmer capacity to lead adaptive research testing

Participatory, client-driven R&D also demands considerable changes in research at the farm level, among the clients themselves. Institutionalising farmer participation involves developing a community-based adaptive research capacity, achieved by working with groups of farmers (rather than individuals) and with producer organisations. While the participation of farmer groups in localized R & D facilitates farmer-to-farmer training, and rapid transfer of information about innovations, it also presents a series of challenges. Above, we noted that firm contractual arrangements would help determine an agenda for action with specific client groups. But researchers do not always have the skills to work directly with groups. In devolving adaptive testing to farmers, formal research systems may be dependent on intermediary organisations, e.g. NGOs, which as discussed early, are subject to their own biases and can be a very imperfect filter for client-driven agenda.

A fundamental question hinges on the quality of on-farm testing achievable with farmer participation. An argument against devolution of adaptive research to farmers is that as farmer participation in managing in on-farm experimentation goes up, so the reliability of data from such experiments goes down (Baker, 1991). This question needs to be resolved empirically by comparing the reliability, cost and pay-off to farmers of experiments with varying degrees of

farmer participation (Ashby 1986). It has important implications for cost-effectiveness. If farmer participation in on-farm testing must be closely supervised to ensure reliable recommendations, then it becomes a very expensive luxury.

The issue of the quality of on-farm testing and data interpretation needs to be addressed from two different perspectives. First, how can scientists get more rigorous or scientifically interpretable data out of participatory trials? When farmers are involved in trial design and management, resulting data sets tend to be heterogenous within and among locations. Such trials, while realistic of actual farming practices, can be difficult for researchers to analyze and interpret. Statistical procedures are currently being refined to address such heterogeneity (e.g. Heinrich and Masikara 1992, Pinney 1991) and scientists have an important role in furthering the range of methods for handling "non-conventional" data, that is, data which does not emerge from "conventional", fully-controlled, identically replicated experiments. Evidence exists that farmer-designed and managed trials can be highly predictive of future farmer assessment and adoption (Sperling, Loevinsohn and Ntabomvura, 1993). The more technical flexibility scientists have in handling heterogenous data, the more they may be willing to acknowledge farmers as major partners in managing on-farm research.

This concern with the reliability and scientific rigour of participatory methodology can also be turned on its head. Instead of asking, "how can researchers better interpret farmer-conceived trials", we might ask: "how can farmers be taught to internalize and manage western scientific methods (that is, researcher-guided trials) so these clients can generate truly robust data." Following this logic, farmers, independently, could generate locally reliable and adoptable recommendations to be promoted by the formal research system. Several experiences show that suitably trained farmers are well able to manage simple replicated on-farm trials, with researcher input required mainly for research design and statistical analysis. Farmers, can interpret comparisons among treatments and make plans for new comparisons based on previous trials (Ashby, 1990). A proliferation of such trials would involve considerable changes in the role of village level extensionists. Instead of teaching farmers about finished recommendations, village-level workers would train farmers in the essential principles of experimental methods (see Bunch 1982).

A criticism of teaching farmers methods of controlled experimentation is that this may stifle creativity and innovativeness, and risks discrediting farmer experimentation which is "less rigorous". As a third option, researchers might reorient their definition of the objectives of farmer participation in adaptive testing. On-farm trials might be conceived as a means of stimulating farmer

innovation, with varied elements, in diverse combinations (Loevinsohn *et al.*, in press). Because of expected variability in farmer testing strategies, collection of statistically reliable data may not be possible. Giving farmers free experimental rein, however, may result in the completion of more realistic, hence more predictive, experiments. Farmer qualitative assessment of promising options may be sufficient if sample sizes are sufficiently large and if researchers can help differentiate among various farmer clientele (Scherr, 1991).

Under all scenarios, the key question remains as to the costs and benefits of devolving adaptive testing to farmers. To what extent can the costs of adaptive research be "externalized" by the formal research system (via devolution to farmers) and at what return in terms of technical innovation? An experimental project designed to train Colombian peasant farmers in on-farm experimentation procedures and to assess their capacity to take over major responsibility for trial management and data collection found that the time input into on-farm trials by technical personnel could be reduced by up to 50 percent, once farmers' were fully trained. On average sixty percent of trials for which farmers were responsible were statistically analyzable in the first year of this project; by the end of the second year, as the input of technical personnel decreased, 100 percent of farmers' trials were statistically analyzable. The change was due to the greater autonomy given to farmers in handling the purchase of inputs which facilitated timely planting, and reduced loss of experimental plots due to tardy financial management by extensionists. The project's findings suggest that the volume of on-farm testing, conducted by public sector research systems could be significantly increased, increasing the number of technical personnel, or even in spite of reductions in technical field staff, if farmers were given more responsibility for managing on-farm trials (Ashby, 1993).

Identifying organisational principles for accountability sharing

Probably the most challenging issue is how to institutionalize sharing of accountability for research. Contractual relationships which set priorities among client groups and research programmes can also serve as a mechanism for performance evaluation and accountability. Several different ways of using contract relationships to ensure accountability are being tried.

One option is direct accountability. A Chinese example is a harsh one. Eighty per cent of Chinese are smallholders farming less than a half hectare and most use traditional farming practices. In 1985, the State Science and Technology Commission was launched to manage China's agricultural research, with the goal of obtaining 70 to 80 percent of all research put to use by farmers. By

1987 the Jiangsu Province (one of China's wealthiest) had established more than 50 contracts between its Academy of Agricultural Sciences and its farming and trading organisations. These contracts accounted for 10 percent of the Academy's income; payment is based strictly on results with a refund to the client if a research project fails. As a result the academy has speeded up the release of new varieties and the production of seed which it sells to farmers, thus providing income for research (Forestier-Walker, 1987). There are also cases where strong client control has shaped programmes with impressive research results. For example, in the Ivory Coast, the cotton development agency, CIDT, and the research institute, IDESSA, jointly plan the annual research program, including the budget. All funds available to IDESSA for cotton-related research, operating costs for technology development and linkages, are directly tied to a cess on cotton revenues. Simply: "the more effective IDESSA is in meeting CIDT's technological needs, the greater financial resources its gets for research on cotton" (Eponou 1993:41). Over the last thirty years, cotton yields have more than tripled in the savannah zones. During the same period, gains in coffee and cocoa, subsectors with no client contract, have been insignificant (Eponou 1993, pp. 41 & 58).

Another option for creating accountability is for farmers' organisations to finance and administer adaptive research activities, thus "pulling in" the relevant research and expertise required by their members. Examples of farmer organisations which have had high levels of control over adaptive research and extension are those in Chimborazo, Ecuador referred to earlier in the paper. Farmer organisations carry out simple field trials with agronomists hired by the organisation, and technologies are adapted in members' fields. Results are extended to members through the organisations' meetings, training courses and sometimes by extension agents financed by the organisation. Members' demand for public sector research is communicated in a variety of ways, varying from formal petition by the national organisations to informal client-patron relationships between farm-organisation officials and state agency employees. While farmer organisations that control some adaptive research can act as a constituency which channels demand to research, their capacity to influence the independent allocation of resources to different items on the research agenda is weak (Bebbington 1991:9). Capacity to implement adaptive research does not automatically ensure that farmers' organisations can materially alter the accountability of research organisations for delivering useful results to farmers.

A third option for creating accountability is to institutionalize evaluation of the usefulness of research to clients through a third party. For example project evaluations by the NGO FUNDAGRO, Ecuador, recently have included farmer-beneficiaries in evaluating both the project and the implementing agencies. This

role in evaluation has stimulated farmer organisations to demand increasing control over projects, and to actively work on articulating research and extension to meet their needs: One farmer organisation (UCIG) established a strong input into the national agricultural research institute, INIAP, with respect to orienting on-farm research and seed production (Bebbington, 1993a).

As a national system, Chile has made some of the greatest advances towards institutionalising accountability through contractual relationships. In 1986, the Agricultural Research Institute (INIA) was transformed into a private corporation which after 1990 began to establish contractual relationships with NGO's and small farmers' organisations to close the gap between research, extension and particularly small farmers. In one case, a major NGO, the Agrarian Research Group (GIA) implemented the contractual relationship to involve local farmers in joint planning. Farmers were organized into Village-level Agricultural Committees of 15-40 members, which in turn belong to an umbrella organisation. These committees define a technical programme including on-farm experimentation, and determined the allocation of credit funds. One result has been that farmer-led experimentation is recognized in budgeting: in 1990 a credit line was being tested to support farmers' experimentation with new crops or technologies (Berdegue 1990:20). Committees established in each agroecological area are responsible for setting up a Centre for Adaptation and Transfer of Technology (CATT), directed by a joint committee which includes representatives from local farmers' organisations. The CATT committee has the responsibility of defining on-farm research priorities and issuing recommendations. Each CATT has a budget to pay for research requested by the committee from INIA. The contractual relationship obliges INIA to involve farmers' representatives in the selection of sites for local CATT committees, and in the definition of the annual research program. As of 1990, over a dozen organisations of small farmers had set up their own technical programmes, operating as private extension firms contracted to implement extension programmes drawing on CATT-sponsored research (Berdegue 1990:13-16).

Although it is still too soon to evaluate the impact of Chile's contract system on rates of adoption by farmers, the evolution of the approach to include farmers' representatives not only in planning, but in the budgetary decisions, illustrates what is likely to be an important organisational principle for institutionalising accountability sharing in the future.

One of the most important shortcomings of contract-based demand as a mechanism for institutionalising accountability to clients, is its susceptibility to being captured by special interest groups. This is likely to occur when the contracting organisation, whether it is a GO, NGO or a farmer organisation, does

not have broad-based client representation in internal decision-making bodies, that determine what research is to be contracted.

This argues yet again, for decentralising technology development. An example of a decentralized contract approach is the "Programa CIAL" run by an NGO in Colombia which has established a fund for research by local agricultural research committees (CIALs), elected by each community which the programme serves. Each community has an equal portion of the common fund reserved for carrying out an experiment, on a topic determined by meetings for participatory group analysis with the whole community. This permits a fair sharing of resources for research among communities. However, experience shows that the group analysis is susceptible to bias among different members within a community: not everyone in the community has time to attend the meetings; topics for research supported by the more vociferous get onto the agenda while topics favored by less outspoken members of the community, in particular women, can be overlooked. The skills of the group moderator who may have a "hidden" agenda can significantly determine the degree of consensus around a topic. The extent to which local committees are accountable to their community seems to depend on the strength of social norms of sharing and group responsibility versus individualism in the local culture (P. Guerrero, personal communication, 1994). This example underlines the importance of allocating funds on the basis of a careful targeting of intended beneficiary groups. Devolving responsibility for research to community-based or farmer organisations, can not ensure that research delivers results to a particular client group.

ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

There are significant gains to be made by institutionalising participatory, client-driven R&D in agriculture but there are also risks from serious distortions of the approach. The benefits are for the most part, associated with greater efficiency in R&D: better-designed technologies with higher probabilities of adoption due to client-involvement in their development; fewer technologies long in the pipeline before testing by clients, which can result in considerable savings. Devolution of adaptive testing to farmers could reduce the burden on public sector agencies and when managed in a way that catalyses innovativeness by farmers, increase the rate of innovation in agriculture. There remain, however, key areas of research yet to be explored to ensure that the risks of Participatory R&D are minimized and its benefits expanded. Three of special note are signalled below.

First, there is the risk that client involvement might compromise the quality of scientific research. This can occur if scientists delegate some control over adaptive research and if farmers orient research to searching for simplistic, quick "fixes" for immediate problems. Clarifying for farmers and scientists, their respective roles in prototype screening will be important. Scientists, in particular, may be challenged to offer a diversity of options, models and components, rather than of fine-tuned products. Scientists will have a comparative advantage in screening exotic options and anticipating "dangers" that farmers cannot "see". For example in selecting germplasm, scientists might screen for disease-susceptible or anti-nutritional genetic traits which may be "invisible" to farmers. Institutionalising participatory R&D will require guidelines to help determine the stage in R&D at which farmers can be usefully exposed to exotic prototypes to avoid risk of their dissemination without adequate testing, but to maximize the input of farmers' criteria to screening.

Farmers have a comparative advantage in analyzing the "fit" between alternative design features of a prototype innovation (eg. varietal characteristics; small machinery; management practices) and the whole farm enterprise, from the users point of view. Channelling farmer experimentation into controlled experimental methods may stifle creative innovation which draws on different cultural traditions. On the other hand, without formal experimentation, the rigour of research and the reliability of results (especially for extrapolation) will be dubious. To address this issue, it is necessary to return to some of the premises of participatory research, which differentiates between nominal participation and farmer participation in decision-making (Ashby, 1986).

One danger is that institutionalising participatory R&D for agriculture will dilute participation, so that <u>any</u> involvement of farmers in implementing adaptive research (as labourers in farm trials, or respondents to questionnaires, or presence in meetings) is termed "participatory research". Then the risk is high that innovative farmers might be siphoned into trials measuring phenomena that have little intrinsic meaning to them, and over which they have little discretion or control. Such nominal participation is likely to reduce farmers' commitment to achieving rigorous measurement or interpretable results, since it produces no responsibility or ownership of the research on the part of farmers. Institutionalising participatory R&D places the onus on practitioners to internalize the values of "new professionalism" (Pretty and Chambers, 1993) which emphasize farmers' partnership in decision-making over issues of measurement and control in agricultural research. A key challenge in reorienting the value system is how to implement change in the structure of incentives and rewards given to scientists for working with farmers.

A second issue is related to the decentralisation of technology development and its implications for the structure of related delivery systems, such as credit, extension and seed multiplication services for example (see Sperling, Scheidegger and Buruchara, 1993). Decentralized, client-driven programmes centreed on prototype screening will demand a reorientation of these services. Research is needed to identify the organisational structures and the type of human resources required to accommodate participatory R&D. Many questions remain unresolved of how to systematize partnerships between farmer organisations and intermediaries, such as NGO's, and their interface with public sector agencies, so that technologies developed with client-involvement by decentralized, demand-driven research can speedily and efficiently reach the intended beneficiaries.

A third issue entailed in institutionalising participatory R&D, identified in preceding sections of this paper, is related to equity. Distortions that can occur include the bias towards better-organized, more vocal client groups with political leverage when setting client-driven agenda, whether by contract-based demand or by including farmers in group decision-making processes. Involvement of farmers in prototype screening and devolution of adaptive research to farmers is also susceptible to unintended bias, if the interests these participants represent are not well understood. Institutionalising shared accountability, when control over contracting, implementation or evaluation of research is subject to bias or even corruption in favor of powerful client groups, is equally liable to orient research in favor of well-organized, well-to-do farmers, to the detriment of large numbers of poorly organized ones.

Strengthening the political and financial power of farmer organisations, improving their representativity to include resource-poor farmers, and investment in their managerial and negotiating skills are necessary but not sufficient conditions for realising the potential of participatory R&D for making agricultural research more effective in delivering appropriate innovations to any given client group.

There are dimensions of the equity issue which go beyond the scope of farmers' organisations. Intergenerational equity may be an issue if farmers' short-term research priorities divert research from longer-term, less immediately tangible benefits such as environmental conservation. Social interest groups other than small farmers in low income countries may have valid needs: for example, consumers concerned about pesticide residues, or conservationists worried about biodiversity.

The expectation that agricultural research can be reoriented to deliver innovations appropriate to the needs of diverse client groups by participatory R&D alone is unrealistic. A serious weakness of agricultural research, and one which is likely to dilute the benefits to be realized from institutionalising participatory R&D, is its lack of attention to policy-oriented "market research" in the sense of client identification. An axiom of successful innovation in the private sector is that R&D is best directed at niche products for well-identified potential markets (or client groups). Public sector agricultural research neglects the (implicit) policy decisions made when technologies are designed without careful attention to "market" or client segmentation and target marketing, although there are recognized methodologies for this used in other public sector areas such as health (see for example Kotler and Andreasen, 1987). Participatory R&D requires significant investment in ex-ante analysis of the impact of allocating resources in different ways, differentiating among beneficiary groups (including future generations), to address questions such as: What amount of resources should go to long-term research vs. that with immediate pay-off to farmers? What is the socially desirable allocation of funds for research among different client groups?

The risk is that the impact of participatory R&D, like that of farming systems research before it, will be limited and disappointing unless it is institutionalized in tandem with a significant injection of explicit procedures to define which clients are to participate, whose agenda are to drive the process, and what organisational innovations are needed to put these policy decisions at the heart of R&D for agriculture.

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