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
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*Collective
bargaining*



COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AGRICULTURE: THREE UNION MODELS

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This research was funded by a U.S. Department of Labor grant to the Industrial Relations Research Association for a survey of contemporary collective bargaining.

*Presented to Western Economic
Association, Jan, 1978.*

INTRODUCTION

The four interrelated factors described by Dunlop as influencing trade union development are technology, market structure and competition, community institutions of control, and ideas and beliefs held by society at large (Dunlop, 1948, p. 168). However, little attention has been paid to the impact of unions on their environment, and the effect on union development and collective bargaining.

This paper compares three unions operating in essentially the same environment. It shows how they respond to that environment differently in terms of philosophy, structure, and tactics. The unions compared are the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO(UFW), the Western Conference of Teamsters (WCT), and Local 142 of the International Longshormen's & Warehouseman's union (ILWU). All three represent field agricultural workers.

This paper begins with a discussion of the agricultural industry and labor market. This is followed by a brief discussion of union development in agriculture, and a description of structure, philosophy, and tactics of these unions. Finally, preliminary suggestions are made about how unions not only react to their surrounding environment, but direct efforts at changing that environment in order to organize and negotiate more successfully.

THE INDUSTRY

Agriculture is a major United States industry in terms of employment, number of producing units, and essentiality of output. About 5.5 million people worked on 2.75 million operating farms during 1977. Collective bargaining has been rare in agriculture, and some of this rarity is related to basic industry characteristics.

Agriculture is closer to pure competition than any other industry. Most agricultural products have many producers, and no one producer affects market price. This is because of both large numbers, and because agricultural products of a given grade are usually indistinguishable.

Second, agricultural prices and incomes fluctuate considerably between time periods. Product supply depends on many factors, such as growing conditions. Growing conditions cause variations in quantities supplied, but demand for agricultural produce is relatively constant and not particularly responsive to price changes. As a result, agricultural products, unlike manufactured products which are usually priced before production, are priced after production. Thus, prices and incomes fluctuate due to changes in supply quantities, and prediction of price and income movements is difficult. Bad growing conditions can result in high prices for some growers and low incomes for adversely affected growers, while good conditions may mean large crops, low prices, and low incomes for all growers. (Suits, 1977, pp. 1-39).

Much agricultural production, particularly in labor intensive crops, such as fruits and vegetables, is seasonal. The result is fluctuating

labor demand, and the need for adequate labor supplies during seasonal highs to avoid crop spoilage.

Given agriculture's competitive nature, seasonal labor demands, and unpredictable income streams, it is hardly surprising that producers have historically been resistant to collective bargaining. Competition means that any grower raising wages because of a collective bargaining will be at a competitive disadvantage. Seasonal labor demands make growers vulnerable to economic action during seasonally critical periods, and collectively bargained wage rates increase production cost stability without stabilizing prices.

Another factor slowing collective bargaining is large numbers of small farms. This results from many small farms using few, if any, hired workers, and because of general difficulties in organizing workers in small bargaining units.

However, the inhibiting impact on unionization of small farms is mitigated by production concentration on large farms, and there is a trend, encouraged by mechanization, toward more production concentration. Between 1940 and 1970 average farm acreage doubled, and from 1966 to 1976 there was a 15 percent drop in farm numbers with farm acreage declines of 4 percent (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1976).

Because of large numbers of producers and the relatively small size of many of them, there are far more producer associations than in any other industry. Generally, these associations were formed to provide

growers collectively services difficult for them to afford individually.

Some associations engage in worker recruitment either regularly or intermittently, and a few grower associations are involved in labor relations.

Competition, price and income instability, production concentration, and seasonality all have implications for agricultural labor relations. Price and income instability make growers reluctant to bargain collectively, and seasonality results in problems for collective bargaining and public policy. Finally, some grower associations are important in farm labor relations.

THE LABOR FORCE

The nature of the agricultural labor force has also affected unionization. Unlike in most industries, 70 percent of the farm labor force is made up of family workers. Thus, less than one third of the labor force is potentially organizable.

There are about 2.6 million hired farm workers. Because of agriculture's seasonal nature, year-round workers who work 250 days or more a year, and regular farm workers, who work from 150 to 249 days a year, account for 70 percent of farm work in terms of days worked. However, these two groups are 22 percent of the labor force. Seasonal workers, who work from 25 to 149 days, compose 33 percent of the labor force and do 25 percent of the work. Casual workers, who work less than 25 days, make up 45 percent of the labor force, although they do only 5 percent of the work (Rowe & Smith, 1976). Many seasonal and casual workers are people wanting temporary work. Because of their limited labor force commitment,

they are often poor subjects for unionization.

Migratory workers who leave home at least overnight to do farm work, or who do hired farm work and have no permanent residence, are about 7 percent of hired farm workers (Rowe & Smith, 1976). Historically, their mobility has made them difficult to find and organize, and, if organized, to keep within a union.

There are also large numbers of illegal aliens in the hired farm labor force. For obvious reasons, they have also been difficult to organize.

The nature of the farm labor force makes unionization difficult. Workers are scattered geographically and, even when not migratory, operate in a casual and seasonal labor market. Many farm workers have only a temporary involvement in farm labor, and thus little interest in joining unions. Another factor inhibiting unionization are large numbers of illegal aliens in the labor force.

Another major factor inhibiting unionization is exclusion of agricultural workers from protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A few states have passed labor relations laws covering agricultural workers. Hawaii and Wisconsin have general labor relations statutes which do not exclude farm workers. Arizona, Kansas, Idaho, and California have laws specifically regulating agricultural labor relations. Of these four, however, only California's is designed to promote collective bargaining in agriculture.

THE NONUNION LABOR MARKET

The agricultural market operates differently than most labor markets.

Because of seasonal production, employment relationships are predominately casual. Thus, growers have a recurring need to recruit seasonal workers. Most growers use labor contractors to supply seasonal workers. Labor contractors assemble both migratory crews and crews recruited in local labor markets.

Besides recruitment, labor contractors may provide transportation, keep production and payroll records, pay wages and, sometimes, supervise workers. Because contractors can perform important employer functions, many crew members regard them as employers.

Nonunion wages are usually based on informal agreements among area growers about appropriate piece rates. Wage determination depends on labor supplies, crop condition, comparable area wages, and the industry's economic state. Resulting piece rates are understood to be "going wages" by both growers and workers.

Agricultural workers on farms using 500 or more days of hired labor in any calendar quarter of the previous year are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage provisions. Hourly minimums in 1978 are \$2.65 an hour, with scheduled increases to \$3.35 in 1981.

In the nonunion segments of the labor market, employment relationships in agriculture remain relatively unstructured in comparison to other industries. Barriers to labor market entry are few, and employment relationships are usually temporary. Although a trend exists toward increasing government regulation, there is still less government regulation in agricultural employment than in most industries.

UNION HISTORY

Efforts to organize farm workers up until the early 1960s share elements related to their lack of success. As indicated earlier, industry characteristics and farm labor force composition slowed unionization. Additionally, agricultural workers have little contact with the labor force's mainstream and concepts of unionization. Finally, general oversupplies of farm workers resulted in strikebreaker use which undercut strike efforts.

The societal complex surrounding agricultural labor relations further complicates unionization. Growers have opposed collective bargaining. Politically important nationally and locally, they have not hesitated to use political power. Grower organizations have opposed covering farm workers under most protective labor legislation, and historically they have been a major force preventing the National Labor Relations Act protections from being extended to agricultural workers, another factor making organizing difficult. Locally, their political power has resulted in the cooperation of police and other government officials in combatting strikes and labor unrest.

ORGANIZING IN HAWAII

Efforts to organize Hawaiian agricultural workers were equally unsuccessful prior to the 1940's. As on the mainland, growers used political power to slow organizing efforts, and Hawaiian farm workers were often foreign workers who were physically and culturally remote from the labor force's mainstream. Sporadic organizing efforts and strikes had little permanent impact on wages and working conditions.

Much of the credit for successful organization of Hawaiian agricultural workers is given to ILWU's Jack Hall. His organizing efforts began in the late 1930's, and were suspended during World War II. He became ILWU's regional director in Hawaii in 1944, and organized a voter registration drive which produced enough new voters to change the political composition of the territorial legislature. In 1945 that legislature passed the Hawaii Employment Relations Act (Meister and Loftis, 1977, p. 63).

The Hawaii Employment Relations Act is tailored after the NLRA. However, it does not contain NLRA's exemption of agricultural workers. Thus, Hawaii farm workers have the same collective bargaining protections as industrial workers, substantially easing the difficulty of organizing them. ILWU had organized the bulk of Hawaii's agricultural workers by the end of the 1940's.

CONTEMPORARY UNIONISM

The lessons of the repeated failures to organize farm workers were not lost on Cesar Chavez and the other early organizers of the National Farm Workers' Association (NFWA). The strategies developed by NFWA, which evolved into the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UFW), were tailored to overcome barriers to organizing agricultural workers and went far beyond traditional union organizing tactics.

NFWA first got public attention in a 1965 strike against wine-grape growers in Delano, California. The strike lasted slightly more than two years, and it showed characteristics of agricultural labor relations that were to be repeated many times during the next decade. First, growers

were unwilling to bargain collectively and responded to this strike as they had to past ones. Strikebreakers and assistance of government policy and officials were used to offset its effects.

Second, the strike revealed NFWA's philosophy and tactics. NFWA committed itself to nonviolence, and during this strike the boycott weapon developed. The initial contracts signed during 1967 and 1968 with ten wine-grape growers resulted from boycott pressure. During the decade between 1965 and 1975, UFW followed up its wine-grape success by getting contracts with the bulk of California's table-grape growers. These contracts, like earlier ones in wine-grapes, resulted from UFW's use of boycotts and boycott threats. Because agricultural workers are excluded from the NLRA, there was no statutory authority for representation elections, and recognition was generally extended to UFW only after the application of economic force.

Shortly after the table-grape contracts were signed, the Western Conference of Teamsters (WCT), which had long had contracts covering cannery and processing workers, signed contracts covering a large proportion of the California lettuce industry's field workers. The resulting jurisdictional dispute between UFW and WCT was long, bitter, and often violent.

Subsequently, the table-grape growers, and some wine-grape growers, signed contracts with WCT rather than renegotiate their UFW contracts. By early 1975 UFW had lost most of its members and contracts, and its survival looked doubtful. However, in 1975 the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (CALRA) became law. Tailored after the NLRA, but with some special

provisions designed to facilitate organizing seasonal workers, it provided for representation elections to determine whether or not agricultural workers wished to have union representation.

Elections held under CALRA showed the great majority of voting workers wanted union representation, and most of those wanting a union to represent them wanted UFW representation. (See Table 1). These election results helped pave the way for a 1977 agreement which ended, hopefully permanently, the UFW-WCT jurisdictional dispute.

Another NFWA tactic, involvement of sympathetic third parties became apparent. The union used volunteers on picket lines, and sympathizers provided financial assistance.

EXTENT OF ORGANIZATION

The election results also encouraged UFW organizing, and by the end of 1977 it had about 30,000 members. Members were concentrated in fruits and vegetables, such as lettuce, grapes and tomatoes. UFW also has between 1,000 and 2,000 members under contract in Florida citrus groves owned by the Coca Cola Company, producer of Minute Maid products.

Because of election losses and the UFW jurisdictional agreement, the number of field workers represented by the Teamsters is declining. However, WCT still represent many workers in row crops and dairies in California, as well as a few agricultural workers in Arizona.

In Hawaii, Local 142 of the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's union, represents over 90 percent of that state's agricultural workers. Its membership includes about 7,500 sugar workers, 4,500

Table 1. ELECTIONS AND RESULTS: CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: July 1, 1975 to October 31, 1977

Election Category	Number
Total Elections	683
Total Certifications	462
United Farm Workers of America	212
Western Conference of Teamsters	53
Other*	179
No Union	18

Source: Telephone conversations with ALRB administrator Karen Clayton, November 1977.

* Most of the "other" category elections were won by the Christian Labor Alliance in dairy operations.

pineapple workers, and several hundred workers each in papaya and macadamia nut operations.

UNIONS IN AGRICULTURE

THE UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

Philosophy and Objectives

UFW's objective is bringing farm workers dignity, justice, and better living and working conditions. Collective bargaining is a major vehicle for achievement of these goals, but for collective bargaining to become feasible, it was necessary to build a strong organization capable of economic action.¹

UFW's original organizing units were built from small house meetings. They defined farm worker needs and concerns, and provided UFW with direction as well as rudiments of an organization. These meetings provided impetus for the union's first self-help projects, such as a credit union and a gas and oil cooperative.

These projects, and the requirement that members pay dues to stay in good standing, were designed to build rank and file involvement and commitment, and to develop a sense of communality of interests. It is usually difficult for unskilled workers employed by different employers to perceive mutual interests and needs, but this recognition is often of

¹This analysis is based on interviews with growers, grower representatives, union officials, government officials, representatives of other involved organizations, and arbitrators, in 1976, 1977, and 1978.

fundamental importance to successful unionization, particularly in an industry as hard to organize as is agriculture.

Belief in nonviolence underlies UFW philosophy. This stems both from the philosophy that organizations dedicated to advancing human rights cannot legitimately abridge rights of other human beings by using violence, and from recognition that violent actions would provoke even more violent and destructive reactions, as well as alienate sympathizers.

Organizational Structure

The National Level

UFW has two major organizational levels: national headquarters and local ranch committees. National responsibilities include planning and directing negotiations, organizing, boycotts, legal support, finances, publications, lobbying, and fringe benefit program administration. General union policy comes from biennial conventions, and it is implemented on a daily basis by the Executive Board and the President.

Collective bargaining is handled by the Administration and Negotiations Department. It is also responsible for the link between workers at each ranch committee and communicate policy between ranch committees and the national.

Ranch Committees

UFW puts high priority on encouraging worker involvement in all phases of union operations. Democracy is seen as a value in and of itself, and

active worker participation is also viewed as a way to ensure commitment to the union, and, in turn, union responsiveness to worker needs. Ranch committees were developed as a mechanism to insure this worker input.

There is at least one ranch committee at each ranch under contract. On large grower operations there may be more than one committee. Each committee is made up of five or more elected people.

UFW does not have local unions, and ranch committees perform many functions that local union officers and shop stewards are responsible for in other unions. They handle the first two steps of the grievance procedure, provide advice and information for union negotiators, supervise elections of representatives to negotiating committees and union conventions, and administer hiring halls. They are responsible for implementing contracts on a daily basis, communicating union policy to workers, and communicating worker needs and concerns back to the national union. Committees also have a responsibility for developing among rank and file members an understanding and appreciation for the concept of collective bargaining, the meaning and application of collectively bargained contracts, and UFW's philosophy.

Boycott Committees

No other labor organization relies as extensively on the boycott weapon as does UFW, and its boycott committees are unique in the history of the American labor movement. Boycott committees are responsible for developing boycott support at the local level. They are also supposed to

generate financial contributions sufficient to operate their own offices and to add to the union's general treasury.

Although boycott committees vary in size and number depending on staff availability, there are committees in all major metropolitan areas. UFW plans to make local boycott committees a permanent part of its organizational structure. A comprehensive training program for boycott members was developed in 1977. Efforts are being made to develop the original boycott committees into broadly based community organizations staffed primarily by part-time volunteers capable of independent planning and action. Local recruits take part in training programs which last from six to twelve weeks.

Union Personnel

UFW is staffed from Cesar Chavez on down to the boycott committees by volunteers who work for \$7.00 a week and union-provided subsistence. Some of these volunteers are Chicanos who have worked as farm workers. There are also a large number of nonfarm worker volunteers, generally Anglo, engaged in all phases of union operations. These volunteers became important to UFW during early struggles in wine grapes when they joined picket lines. From there, they became active as organizers, boycott staff, and field office administrators. Some early nonfarm worker volunteers have important staff positions in the union hierarchy.

UFW appears committed to ongoing use of volunteers as union administrators. There are, however, critics of this policy who suggest that a paid

professional staff would make union administration more efficient. (Taylor, 1975, p. 322). As the union grows, UFW may turn to supplementing volunteers with professionals.

Relationships with Other Organizations

One factor explaining UFW's survival is its ability to attract support and assistance from a potpourri of organizations. Some of these are labor organizations. Others include church, civil rights, neighborhood, and ad hoc donor, and, on one memorable occasion early in UFW's history, Chavez went to Berkeley's Sproul Plaza at noon, explained the farm workers' plight, and asked students who gathered for their lunch money. He returned to Delano with several thousand dollars.

These groups have been of fundamental importance to UFW. They have enabled it to survive financially; they have been a major element in the success of boycott and letter writing campaigns; and they have provided UFW with political power vastly greater than its membership alone would muster. It is also a curiosity in the history of American labor. No other union has built a similar student-liberal-labor coalition, nor been able to use outside help to the same degree and with the same effectiveness.

LOCAL 142 of THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSE-MEN'S UNION

Objectives and Strategy

Like UFW, Hawaiian agricultural workers were organized with external support. This support came from Local 142 of the International

Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. Although the union did not have to face problems created by large numbers of migratory workers, grower interests, and particularly those of the five major sugar families, were dominant Hawaiian political forces. It is doubtful organization would have been possible without the protections of Hawaii's labor relations law.

To establish collective bargaining, an organizational strategy to create union loyalty and worker solidarity was needed. To build solidarity, heavy emphasis was placed on the concept that the union's function was to serve workers, and that this could best be accomplished through democratic decision making. The union attempted to serve worker needs both at work and away from work. Ever since these early organizing efforts, shop stewards handle work-related problems, while a membership service system provides assistance with nonwork problems. Workers go to the membership service system for help with questions involving pensions, health matters, community affairs, legal problems and eligibility for government programs.

There is an obvious similarity between Local 142's service system and UFW's service centers in terms of objectives and problems handled. In both instances, they have been important organizing devices.

Both unions also put a heavy premium on democracy. Local 142's union conventions, held every two years, are an important governing instrument. Delegates to conventions are selected from and by each bargaining unit. Convention resolutions must be approved by a referendum, in which every rank and file member can vote, before becoming official union policy.

Organizational Structure

Local 142 is a major force in Hawaii's labor movement, and it has organized workers in a number of different industries. In addition to agricultural workers, it has organized about 200 different types of workers in hundreds of bargaining units, including auto mechanics, hospital workers, cemetery workers, hotel and restaurant workers, and retail clerks. Because of its size and diversity, the local functions more like a regional body or district council than a traditional local union. Each bargaining unit has its own chairperson and shop stewards, and performs functions normally associated with a local union. Local 142 runs regular training programs for new union officers, shop stewards and service system representatives.

WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS

Organizational Structure

The Western Conference of Teamsters is the oldest of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' five area conferences. Area conferences serve as intermediary bodies between locals and the International. Area conferences have sometimes been likened to internationals within an international, for they perform many functions normally associated with an international, such as collective bargaining, organizing and research. Area conferences have large amount of autonomy in decision making, vis-a-vis both local unions and the International.

The Western Conference covers 13 Western states, but most of its membership is in California. It includes a number of locals representing

processing workers, as well as locals set up to represent and organize field workers.

Philosophy and Tactics

Prior to UFW organizing among field workers, the Teamsters had established bargaining relationships with a number of growers covering truck drivers and packing shed workers. Some of these agreements were negotiated on a multiemployer basis, while others involved single growers. In addition, the Teamsters had a few contracts covering farm laborers. However, their interest in organizing field workers was extremely limited prior to UFW's initial strike against wine-grape growers.

In 1966, the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, a wine-grape producer, agreed as a result of boycott activity to hold elections to determine if UFW (then NFWA) represented their workers. When election conditions were discussed, DiGiorgio announced that the Teamsters would be on the ballot. UFW felt that Teamster inclusion on the ballot was uncalled for, and it refused to take part in the subsequent election, which the Teamsters won. Public pressure made it necessary for DiGiorgio to negotiate terms for a new election, which UFW won. Although the Teamsters lost the election, they had indicated their interest in representing field workers.

This interest was expressed sporadically to a number of lettuce growers in the Santa Maria Valley between 1967 and 1970, although the Teamsters did not actively try to organize lettuce workers. During 1970, negotiations with Salinas Valley lettuce growers over contracts covering truck drivers

and shed workers, WCT officials indicated their willingness to represent field workers as well. With the conclusion of negotiations, the growers met and agreed to recognize the Teamsters as the bargaining agent for their field workers, and contracts were signed covering field workers. Shortly thereafter, Santa Maria growers agreed to a Teamster demand presented in negotiations over driver, stitcher, and loader contracts that the Teamsters be designated as bargaining representative for their field workers as well.

UFW reacted to the lettuce agreements with strikes and boycotts. Efforts were made by the Teamsters and UFW to frame a jurisdictional agreement, but the results were somewhat inconclusive, and most of the growers continued to honor their Teamster contracts. As a result, UFW, believing that workers preferred it to the Teamsters, continued the strikes and boycotts.

To stop these activities, growers brought suit against UFW under California's Jurisdictional Strike Act. At that time, California had no general labor relations statute, but its Jurisdictional Strike Act provided for injunctions against concerted activities of competing unions in jurisdictional disputes unless one of the involved unions was financed, in whole or part, dominated, controlled, or interfered with by the employer seeking injunctive relief. In deciding the case, the California State Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no state-provided mechanism for determining wishes of employees in representation cases. However, it pointed out that the Teamsters made no claim of being the choice of a majority, or even any, of involved workers, and the growers had made no effort to determine their

employees' wishes. Available evidence indicated that many, and perhaps a majority, of concerned workers would have chosen UFW as their bargaining agent if given an opportunity. It concluded that UFW's activities were not enjoined because the growers had interfered with the Teamsters by giving it exclusive bargaining rights when they knew that the Teamsters did not have support of a majority of their workers (*Englund v. Chavez*). The result of the decision was that UFW could continue its actions directed at the growers and Teamsters, but existing contracts remained in effect.

The case is interesting for several reasons. It makes clear that Teamster efforts to gain recognition in lettuce were directed at growers, rather than involving field workers. Second, its description of events indicate little grower resistance to the Teamsters. The lettuce contracts marked the beginning of a mutually acceptable alliance between growers and the Teamsters.

The forces at work when grape growers decided to sign Teamster contracts rather than renegotiate UFW contracts in 1973 are somewhat less clear. It appears, however, the negotiations between growers and UFW had become stalled prior to grower recognition of the Teamsters.

There are several different versions of the cause of negotiation breakdowns. Issues causing impasses were the hiring hall, seniority arrangements, and union security provisions. The first two subjects, hiring halls and extent of seniority units, are controversial because they are related to control of the work force. As such, they have implications for the union's

security as an institution and management's ability to control and direct the labor force.

Thus, bargaining impasses may have resulted in outright differences over new contract terms. They may also have been fostered by grower expectations of a Teamster accord if UFW negotiations were unsuccessful. It has also been suggested that the inability of UFW negotiators to make decisions and union administrative inefficiency inhibited bargaining. Growers described UFW's attempts at negotiating, "half-hearted at best, sullen, obstinate, uncooperative and completely irresponsible at worst" (South Central Farmers League, undated). Finally, delays in reaching agreement caused some frustration among workers, particularly since the disagreements concerned noneconomic issues, and at least some of them were tempted to consider the Teamsters as an alternative representative.

Resulting contracts between grape growers and the Teamsters, like the lettuce contracts, were roughly equivalent to UFW contracts in terms of economic benefits. The major differences between the contracts was that Teamster contracts contained no hiring halls. The absence of hiring hall provisions permitted continued use of labor contractors and made seniority issues unimportant because seniority was not a factor in the hiring process.

There are several possible explanations for grower willingness to bargain with the Teamsters. One explanation advanced by growers in Englund v. Chavez credits the Teamsters' strategic position and resulting

effectiveness of strikes. However, in many instances, other factors were at work in addition to grower concern about Teamster strikes. A problem some growers foresaw was having different organizations represent field workers, and truck drivers and processing workers. This would increase the likelihood of disruptive strikes, with a strike involving either bargaining unit shutting down operations.

In addition, many growers, when presented with the choice of bargaining with either Teamsters or UFW, preferred the Teamsters as an organization. In contrast to UFW, the Teamsters seemed business-like and efficient. Finally, the Teamsters did not raise issues about control of the work force and social reform, while UFW did. UFW's philosophy is an anathema to some growers who see it as being radical and irresponsible at best, and Communist-dominated at worst. Behind this view of UFW may lie an uneasiness about its potential for changing existing Anglo-Chicano power relationships in local communities where political power has long been concentrated in Anglo hands.

In recognizing the Teamsters, growers were acknowledging that collective bargaining involving field workers could no longer be avoided altogether. Given the reality of collective bargaining, they preferred to deal with an internally efficient organization which confined itself to economic issues, while accepting the status quo with respect to labor market operations and community power relationships. Only a few growers continued to deal with UFW. They did so either because of boycott pressure or due to the belief that allowing field workers to choose their own

representatives would make for more cooperative employment relationships.

There are several interrelated reasons for Teamster interest in representing field workers. One explanation is that organizing field workers did little to increase the bargaining power of truck drivers and processing workers already represented by Teamsters. Given the difficulties of organizing field workers, it became important to organize field workers only when another union began organizing them, thus making already organized workers vulnerable to strikes called by another union. It has also been suggested that WCT was interested in exercising jurisdiction to higher paid equipment operators as mechanization of farm work advanced.

There are also political explanations, both internal and external. One theory is that Teamster interest in field workers resulted from a power struggle within the Western Conference, with field worker units potentially important as a power base. The external political explanation credits Teamster interest to the close relationship between former President Nixon and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the equally close relationship between Nixon and California growers.

The best explanation of Teamster motivation in representing field workers probably is some combination of these theories. Whatever the reasons, growers and the Teamsters found that their alliance served each other's needs very well until CALRA provided for representation elections.

Negotiating Teams

Although general makeup of employer negotiating teams is similar

to that found in many industries, the composition of UFW's bargaining teams is unusual. These teams are usually headed by UFW's negotiations director, and include necessary legal and research support staff. Sometimes the director is not available, and other staff members direct negotiations. However, because of UFW's emphasis on democratic procedures, negotiations committees also contain either the involved grower's ranch committee members, or other elected rank and file members to take part in negotiations. This means that when UFW is bargaining with large growers or multiemployer bargaining units, its bargaining teams can consist of 100 or more members! Many growers found UFW's negotiating committee size to be distracting initially, even though most union committee members take little part in actual bargaining.

In contrast, the Teamsters make little use of rank and file members during negotiations. Negotiations were conducted by representatives of the Western Conference and officers from individual locals.

ILWU's Local 142 uses a subcommittee of a larger committee to conduct sugar negotiations. The full committee has representatives from each sugar plantation, and its size makes it unwieldy for negotiations. It chooses a subcommittee, with the stipulation that of the nine members, three must come from Hawaii and two each from the other three involved islands. The spokesperson for negotiations is an ILWU vice president. Pineapple negotiators are also chosen to provide broad representation. The spokesperson, however, is from Hawaii, rather than from the ILWU headquarters.

BARGAINING STRATEGY

Union Negotiating Tactics

Because of difficulties involved in mounting effective strikes, particularly during nonpeak periods of labor demand, UFW supplements strike threats with other forms of pressure. Particular tactics chosen from UFW's arsenal depend on the situation and the union's perception of grower vulnerability. Boycott threats are used frequently, as are letter-writing and phone-call campaigns. These campaigns are most commonly used when grower operations are controlled by a conglomerate enterprise. Boycotts are instituted when necessary. Because of CALRA, UFW has found it less necessary to rely on economic pressure than previously, and the entire process of getting settlements has been easier.

In contrast to UFW, the Teamsters and ILWU's Local 142 rely almost entirely on strikes and strike threats to gain bargaining concessions. Both unions are in a position to institute strikes more effectively than UFW.

The Teamsters' vertical integration provides them with a strategic position which UFW does not have. Although the Teamsters have bargained new contracts with little recourse to the strike weapon, strikes were used during the 1975-1977 period of rivalry with UFW to get wage concessions matching those gotten in UFW negotiations while Teamster contracts were still in effect. Theoretically, these strikes were spontaneous indications of worker displeasure at being paid inferior wages, but their widespread nature and failure of Teamster leadership to condemn them led many growers to believe they were part of an overall strategy. UFW engaged in

similar stoppages to match Teamster wage gains, and the resulting wage spiral dismayed growers.

ILWU's Local 142 is able to use the strike weapon because of the Hawaiian agricultural labor force's relative stability. There are few seasonal workers in sugar production, and even in pineapple operations only about one-fifth of the labor force is seasonal during peak demand periods.

Strikes have frequently resulted from bargaining impasses. They have been more common in sugar than in pineapples. Since 1946, there have been about a dozen sugar and four pineapple strikes. Interestingly enough, given fears of many mainland growers of harvest strikes, ILWU contracts terminate between seasonal peaks. This is because the initial pineapple strike was timed for a critical seasonal period. The strike was marked with strikebreaking, violence, and ILWU's eventual capitulation. Seasonal workers were the major strikebreakers, and now Local 142 times strikes for winter periods when seasonal workers are not a problem.

This timing increases strike effectiveness, but it also increases strike length. Strikes tend to last a month or more before operations are affected, but they are run in a business-like fashion. Growing operations are readied prior to strikes so that work can be resumed in an orderly fashion when impasses are resolved. Even during strikes, growers will call the union to ask for help in tending plants. The union cooperates, for future wages depend on what happens to crops during strikes.

CONCLUSION

There is an interesting contrast in bargaining tactics used by these three unions. In each instance, tactics are designed to capitalize on natural advantages and minimize inherent weaknesses in bargaining position. Because of Teamster vertical integration, processing workers buttressed the relatively weak bargaining position of field workers. The strike was a more effective weapon for them than for UFW, which represents only field workers.

Both UFW and Local 142 have to be cognizant of potential strike-breakers. Local 142 avoids their impact by not striking during seasonal highs in labor demand. Because California agriculture is much more seasonal than Hawaiian agriculture, strikes directed at growers during low periods of labor demand would have little effectiveness for UFW. As a result, it supplements strike threats with a variety of other weapons.

In order to organize, however, all three unions used similar tactics in that they needed parties not involved in the immediate dispute for leverage. The Teamsters did this most easily, due to their existing contracts covering processing and packing workers. Both UFW and ILWU had to create changes in the external environment before organization could be effective.

The differences in how these unions are organized and function are clearly related to their relationship to Dunlop's community institutions of control. They point out, particularly UFW and ILWU, that the relationship between labor organizations and the environment is a dynamic

feedback one. Not only were these unions affected by the external environment, but they recognized how that environment could be changed, and changed it.

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