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**FOODSECURE**  
FOR POLICIES THAT MATTER

# Governing Food and Nutrition Security in Food-Importing and Aid-Recipient Countries: Burkina Faso and Ethiopia

Arlène Alpha  
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FOODSECURE Working paper no. 34  
November 2015



# Governing Food and Nutrition Security in Food-Importing and Aid-Recipient Countries: Burkina Faso and Ethiopia

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FOODSECURE working paper no. 34,  
November 2015

**Abstract:** The paper analyses the food and nutrition security (FNS) governance in some net food importing countries by looking at how the multidimensional nature of FNS challenges is addressed in policy-making processes. Two countries are particularly studied, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, where the two authors work and where in-depth interviews have been conducted. Complementary insights are given from Benin and Kenya to support our results. The main argument developed is that FNS policies have a strong inertia around agricultural production issues. Historical actors, mainly trained in agriculture, remain predominant in FNS policy-making and tend to raise sectoral agricultural issues. The FNS institutional framework is increasingly fragmented between agriculture, nutrition and social agendas instead of being conducive to the debate of competing visions of FNS and to intersectoral coordination. To some extent, recent changes in trade policies with the decrease of agricultural taxation and strong producer support since the 2007/08 food crisis are now more coherent with production-oriented FNS policies. Intersectoral initiatives are often the result of high-level commitments and/or individual actors. Aid actors play a key role in those initiatives, especially through innovation in their internal organisation to overcome the tendency to work in silos.

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The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2011 under Grant Agreement n° 290693 FOODSECURE. This report is prepared under FOODSECURE Deliverable D4.5: The Role of Domestic Policies on Food Security: Cases from Importing Countries.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGP - Agricultural Growth Program  
CAADP – Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program  
CCI - Complementary Community Investment Program  
CET – Common External Tariff  
CNCN - National Coordination Council on Nutrition (Conseil National de Coordination en Nutrition)  
CNSA – National Council on Food Security (Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire)  
CRSPC - Committee of Reflection and Follow-up of Cereal Policy (Comité de Réflexion et de Suivi de la Politique Céréalière)  
CSA – Central Statistical Authority  
CSO – Civil Society organisation  
DHS – Demographic and Health Survey  
DPPC – Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission  
DRM – Disaster Risk Management  
DRMFSS - Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector  
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States  
ECX - Commodity Exchange  
EHNRI - Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute  
FMHACA - Food Medicine and Health Care Administration Control Authority  
FMoH – Federal Ministry of Health  
FNS – Food and Nutrition Security  
FSN – Food Security and Nutrition  
FSP - National Food Security Program  
GHI: Global Hunger Index  
GoB – Government of Burkina Faso  
GoE – Government of Ethiopia  
GTP - Growth and Transformation Plan  
HABP - Household Asset Building Program  
M & E - Monitoring and Evaluation  
MDG - Millennium Development Goal  
MFA – Ministry of Federal Affairs  
MoAFS - Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security  
MOARD - Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
MOE - Ministry of Education  
MOFED - Ministry of Finance and Economic Development  
MOI - Ministry of Industry  
MOLSA - Ministry of Legal and Social Affairs  
MoU - Memorandum of understanding  
MOWCYA - Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs  
NNCB - National Nutrition Coordination Body  
NGO – Non Governmental Organisation  
NNP - National Nutrition Program  
NNS - National Nutrition Strategy  
PM - Prime Minister  
PNN - National Nutrition Policy (Politique Nationale de Nutrition)  
PNPS - National Policy on Social Protection (Politique Nationale de Protection Sociale)  
PNSAN - National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (Politique nationale de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle)  
PNSA - National Programmes of Food Security (Programmes Nationaux de Sécurité Alimentaire)  
PNSR - National Program on Rural Sector 2011-2015 (Programme National du Secteur Rural).  
PSNP - Productive Safety Net Programme  
RFM - Risk Financing Mechanism  
ROPPA: Network of Farmers’ and Producers’ Organisations of West Africa (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest)  
SMART: Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition  
SNSA - National Strategy on Food Security (Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire)  
SUN – Scaling up’ Nutrition  
WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union

## 1. Introduction

Food and nutrition security (FNS) policies play a determining role in the state of FNS through the institutional environment setting, the public policy choices and the instruments that are implemented on the ground. Progress in FNS in poor countries will depend on FNS public policies, in particular the way they accurately address FNS challenges. It is now widely recognised that FNS challenges are multidimensional issues (Pieters et al., 2012). Multidimensionality refers to a number of sectors involved in FNS (i.e. agriculture, health, trade, social services, etc.), as well as to the temporal nature of FNS (transitory or chronic food insecurity) associated to the conjunctural and structural drivers of FNS (HLTF, 2010; Candel, 2014). Therefore, it appears critical that FNS policies coherently and comprehensively address the multiple dimensions of FNS challenges (IEH, 2012).

This document analyses FNS governance in some net food importing countries by looking at how the multidimensionality of FNS challenges is addressed in policy-making processes. If FNS is traditionally a public policy domain, a number of actors (donors, NGOs and increasingly private sector) now intervene in policy-making processes. Multi- or intersectoral collaboration is often recommended as a way to consider the multidimensionality of FNS (Garret and Natalicchio, 2011; FAO et al., 2014), hence this issue is carefully studied in the selected countries. The practices and interplay of actors are also analysed, with a particular emphasis on development partners who are supposed to play an important role in FNS policy making processes. In addition, special focus is given to trade policies which have a determining importance in net food importing countries. The way to protect vulnerable consumers from price increases on international markets while protecting vulnerable producers from low prices (dilemma between producers' and consumers' interests) is a key challenge and a highly controversial debate.

Hence, the following three sub-questions are successively explored: (i) How effective is the collaboration across sectors and time horizons? (ii) What is the role of development partners (donor's agencies, NGO's, multilateral organisations) in the definition and the implementation of FNS policies? (iii) How the policy content of trade policies relates to FNS?

The main argument developed is that FNS policies have a strong inertia around agricultural production issues, which contributes to hamper the adoption of a comprehensive approach to address the multidimensionality of FNS. The intersectoral collaboration is made difficult by the weight of actors' sectoral visions and logics in the policy processes (path dependency). Development partners play a key role in the FNS policy processes while they are internally organised by sectors. Paradoxically, while FNS policies tend to be production-oriented, trade policies are traditionally marked by agriculture taxation at the expense of producers.

These arguments are illustrated through two main case studies: Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, where in-depth interviews had been conducted. These case studies are complemented by insights from other countries, i.e. Benin and Kenya to support our results. All countries had been selected based on criteria set by the FoodSecure project: a list of pre-selected countries; guidelines for selecting case study countries; countries facing particular food security stress (i.e. Ethiopia and Burkina Faso); countries presenting specific feature, such as export-oriented agricultural strategy (i.e. Kenya). Networks and contacts on the ground were also key in the selection (e.g. in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia). The focus on Burkina Faso and Ethiopia is justified by the presence of the authors in these countries, which allows to use their experience and understanding of FNS policies and to collect a significant volume of information.



In all case studies, the methodology used to collect information combines literature review and field interviews with various stakeholders intervening in the policy process (i.e. government officers, donors, experts, civil society representatives, etc.). A wide range of documentation had been examined: FNS data, policy documents (strategies, policies, laws, etc.), research and expertise documents, etc. Recent policy documents that explicitly present themselves as FNS policies had been considered, with a focus on the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (Politique nationale de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle, PNSAN) in Burkina Faso. Attention had also been given to trade policies, which include tariff and non-tariff measures and support to domestic agriculture.

Between 10 and 20 semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted at different periods of time. In Ethiopia, an opinion survey of around 10 people<sup>1</sup> was conducted between September and November 2014 (see List of organisations in Annex 1); the limitation of this relatively small number of interviews has been counterbalanced by the deep knowledge of EEA-EEPRI on FNS issues in Ethiopia and the large number of documents that have been used. In Burkina Faso, more than 20 interviews were conducted in March 2014 and a participating observation in some meetings of development partners was also made possible during the last quarter of 2014 (see List of organisations in Annex 3). In Benin, around 20 stakeholders were interviewed on the links between agriculture, food security and nutrition, as well as on the role of donors in FNS policies from March-April 2013. In Kenya, a study commissioned by Action Contre la Faim on nutrition-sensitive interventions in food security and agriculture allowed to conduct 20 interviews in April 2013, which are used for the present document<sup>2</sup>.

After a brief presentation in Section 2 of the analytical framework set for the policy documents analysis and the interviews, Section 3 presents the main FNS challenges in the selected countries. Section 4 gives a rapid overview of the main FNS policies while the subsequent sections present the main findings regarding intersectoral collaboration (Section 5), the role of donors (Section 6) and the content of trade policies (Section 7). Finally, the concluding remarks are proposed in Section 8.

## **2. Analytical framework**

The key elements to examine in policy documents and questions to address to the interviewees were based on an analytical framework drawn upon two literature streams: one specialised in FNS focussing on governance issues or political economy (e.g. Reich and Balarajan, 2012); and one in political science focussing on policy changes or policy inertia, especially the so-called “cognitive” approach to public policy.

### **2.1. A renewed interest for governance in FNS literature**

After some reference works (e.g. Field, 1987; Berg, 1987; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1993), there is a renewed interest for governance issues and the use of political science or political economy frameworks to analyse FNS policies. A systematic literature review on *food security*

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<sup>1</sup>It was not possible to have a large number of interviews in Ethiopia, mainly because FNS issues are highly sensitive and the type of governance makes difficult to interview policy makers. In addition, for practical reasons, priority was put on aid actors and people were interviewed through face-to-face interview or via questionnaire. Given the sensitivity of FNS issues, it was difficult to conduct a larger number of interviews. The extensive literature on these issues in Ethiopia also reduced the demand for large interviews.

<sup>2</sup>ACF, 2013a. Reconciling Agriculture and Nutrition. Case study on agricultural policies and nutrition in Kenya. <http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/publication/2013/10/sowing-seeds-good-nutrition-kenya-case-study-reconciling-agriculture-and>

governance from Candel (2014) reveals the upward trend in the number of documents after the 2007–2008 and 2010 world food price crises and the 2008 World Development Report.

A body of literature also focuses on policy processes and governance aspects that may foster *nutrition* agenda setting, political commitment, and actions for food and nutrition insecurity reduction (Pelletier et al., 2011; Acosta and Fanzo, 2012; IEH, 2012; Gillespie et al. 2013). These authors often use key concepts in political science to support their results.

For example, the role of key individual actors as policy entrepreneurs, which is well known in political science to explain of policy changes (Kingdon, 1984; Mintrom, 2000) is frequently highlighted in the literature on nutrition policies. Pelletier et al. (2011) underline the role of “mid-level policy entrepreneurs” who are “typically responsible for the behind-the-scenes work of advocacy and commitment building”. Gillespie et al. (2013) also use the concept of policy entrepreneurs developed by Mintrom (2000) to stress the role of individual actors in a number of success stories in nutrition (Brasil, Perou, Vietnam, Thailande). Efficient and strong network of national leaders in nutrition (“champions”) have been built, and these actors were able to initiate coalitions between government, civil society and private sector and to undertake decisive actions at the right time. More generally, Gillespie et al. (2013) identified that three factors could be determining to achieve political momentum for nutrition and to convert this momentum into results: i) framing through narratives, knowledge and evidence; ii) political economy of stakeholders, ideas and interests; and iii) capacity (individual, organisational, systemic) and resources.

Reich and Balarajan (2012) propose political economy analysis as analytical framework for FNS. Such a framework requires information collected on a broad range of aspects. First, it is suggested to analyse the “policy content” and the framework of the issue (how the issue is defined, positioned, etc.), the political context (e.g. elections), the external or global influences (e.g. additional resources from donors) and the policy entrepreneurs (who are the “champions”, what are their competences, their political resources, etc.). In addition an actors’ analysis enables to understand how actors are potentially affected by the policy, what is their power, the role of each in the policy-making, the forms of coalition that may exist among actors, etc. Finally, it is important to analyse the institutional framework in relation to the policy, which refers to institutions’ access to financial resources, their capacity to influence actors, etc. This analytical framework places a strong emphasis on the perceptions of different actors on the problem and its’ solutions, including how the media may influence the public opinion and the vision of policy elites.

The challenge of multi- or intersectoral collaboration is specifically addressed in a number of recent works in the field of nutrition<sup>3</sup>. IEH (2012) studied this issue for FNS by focussing on institutional frameworks (policy documents, institutional architecture and legal aspects). The rationale for multi- or intersectoral collaboration clearly refers to the multidimensional nature of malnutrition which has been conceptualised by UNICEF (1990) in particular<sup>4</sup>. The difficulties of an effective multi- or intersectoral collaboration in nutrition have already been pinpointed. For example, analysing the difficulties for undernutrition to be targeted as a development priority, Benson (2008) underlined the weight of routine operations by government through sector-specific actions as one obstacle to a comprehensive vision of undernutrition.

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<sup>3</sup>This might be explained by the experience of multisectoral nutrition planning in the 1970 (Field, 1987; Berg, 1987) and the widely accepted UNICEF’s conceptual framework (1990) illustrating the multisectoral nature of child malnutrition.

<sup>4</sup>For example, the World Bank (2013) indicates: “Nutrition is a multisectoral problem with multisectoral solutions.” FAO et al. (2013) also affirm: “The complexity of malnutrition and its underlying causes means that a multistakeholder and multisectoral approach will be most effective.”



Divergent views exist on the question of how far to go multi- or intersectorality in nutrition and therefore on what does multi- or intersectoral collaboration really mean<sup>5</sup>. For the World Bank (2013), multi- or intersectorality should be limited to the design phases of action, which must remain sectoral in its implementation because of the sectoral nature of budget allocations and issues of accountability. For IFPRI, the challenge is really to work and act multisectorally (Garrett and Natalicchio, 2011). They state with regret that: “The accepted wisdom is that, in nutrition, although we can conceive multisectorally, we must work sectorally.” On the contrary, they argue that working across sectors by involving multiple institutions is possible. This could take many forms from networking to coordination, cooperation and collaboration.

Drawing on the literature of innovation management and political science to examine the behaviour of actors working together, Garret and Natalicchio (2011) develop a conceptual model with three sets of factors that could explain the success of multisectoral collaboration. Internal factors are the characteristics of the organizations and individuals which collaborate and refer to: leadership; vision (common language for discussion, cognitive aspects on the problem and on its solutions, related to training or institutional cultures); technical, managerial, financial capacity; organizational structures, values, culture, experience; incentives. External factors are those corresponding to the cultural, economic and political environment in which organizations and individuals operate. What is key in this regard is that nutrition is viewed as a development priority; the urgency of action; the economic, social, political, legal environment. Finally, factors that facilitate collaboration are all the institutional links between organisations and individuals (formal and informal in the form of interpersonal relations and informal communication channels): shared understanding, genuine participation and ownership among stakeholders; clear roles, responsibility and accountability mechanism; flexibility.

Most of this literature on FNS governance and on multi- or intersectoral collaboration in nutrition has a clear operational focus. Garret and Natalicchio (2011), for example, aim to help guide action by providing “a checklist of factors that will likely inhibit or promote successful multisectoral action in nutrition.” This literature is very useful for building the analytical framework on FNS policies. Nevertheless, another kind of literature with less focus on operational aspects is also used to complement the analytical framework and better understand the sectoral logics constructed over time. The French approach of public policy interested in policy changes and the neo-institutionalist approach raising the issue of path dependency allow a specific emphasis on the temporal perspective of FNS policies.

## **2.2. The cognitive approach to public policy**

The French school of public policy analysis in political science highlights the importance of cognitive dimensions or symbolic constructions that influence actors’ representations and behaviours in policymaking. This approach differs from the pluralist approach which focuses on actors’ interactions, interests and power relations. The French approach of public policy acknowledges the importance of actors and institutions but emphasises the role of “ideas” in explaining public policies. What is at the heart of this approach is how actors perceive a problem and its solutions, what makes sense for them (cognitive dimension) in the understanding of the problem and what should be the relevant solutions.

Under the cognitive approach, public policies are analysed through the particular representations they bring of a problem and of its solution, these representations being called “referential” (Jobert and Muller, 1987). The concept of referential is quite close to Hall’s

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<sup>5</sup>The World Bank’s recommendation is: “Think multisectorally, act sectorally.” (World Bank, 2013).

policy paradigm (1993), it refers to the actors' relationship to the world, their vision of the world. More specifically, sectoral policies have sectoral referentials that can be in compliance or in contradiction with a more general referential, which goes beyond sectoral policies and is named the "global" referential. Changes in sectoral policies are, therefore, generated when sectoral referentials are being adjusted to the global referential. As an example, in their formalisation of the cognitive policy analysis, Jobert and Muller (1987) explain how the global referential of 'modernisation' dominated public action during three decades from 1950 to 1980 and was disseminated in all sectoral policies such as agricultural, health, cultural, economic and social policies. When the global 'modernisation' referential was challenged by the 'neoliberal' referential, sectoral policies had to be consistent with the new referential and this led to a number of reforms in all sectoral policies.

Alternative public policy analyses such as a pluralist approach may put much more emphasis on interactions and competition between social actors who pursue their own interests and motivations. The cognitive approach to public policy is particularly useful for us in studying how the concept of FNS is considered and used by the different actors and how it is consistent with or it questions their own representations. In addition, Muller (2010) gives a definition of intersectorality that we endorse, as the interaction between several sectors public action. Multisectorality refers rather to the mainstreaming of a transversal issue in sectoral public domains. We preferably use the term "intersectorality" in the rest of the document.

The neo-institutionalism framework provides some interesting complementary insights for understanding the difficulties of public policy change (Thelen et al., 1992). Thus, the concept of path dependence – taken up by Pierson (1994, 2000) in his work on the forms of institutionalisation of social policies – emphasises the fact that when once a type of public policy has been adopted and an initial compromise has been made for the policy (i.e. the policy is institutionalised), change becomes difficult because it is too costly. Due to the development of actors' interests around the policy, the initial choice quickly becomes irreversible and the policy remains dependent on this initial choice.

Furthermore, as underlined by Schmidt (2008) in her piece on discursive institutionalism, what happens with interests also happens with ideas. In other words, the sectoral referential of a given sectoral public policy will tend to constrain policy changes within certain boundaries – the boundaries of what is included and considered as legitimate and acceptable under the existing referential. Such constraints last for at least a certain period of time, and big changes can be expected to result from the long-term accumulation of incremental changes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

The configuration of 'spaces for debate' is another decisive factor in creating an enabling environment to ensure intersectorality in public policy. A number of empirical studies falling within the school of cognitive public policy analysis indirectly address this issue through mainstreaming strategies for transversal issues, such as gender or the environment. Ansaloni and Fouilleux (2009) for example, aim at understanding why and how environmental criteria had been integrated in the French policy on Geographical Indications (GIs) for wine. The configuration of spaces for debate heavily dominated by a specific segment of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was radically opposed to such integration in the name of market segmentation, hampered this integration for a long time. However, moving the debate from traditional agricultural decision arenas towards the more intersectoral and also heavily publicised *Grenelle de l'environnement* has resulted in a reversal in the balance of power on the issue of GIs. The change in the structure of the institutional negotiation framework leaving more room for environmental representatives, multidimensional discussions and intersectoral bargaining, helped remove obstacles to policy change.

Other studies emphasise the role of policy entrepreneurs (sometimes called institutional entrepreneurs, depending on the literature references) as an explanatory factor of public policy change (Kingdon, 1995; DiMaggio, 1988; Kohler-Koch, 2002; Fouilleux, 2004; Levy and Scully, 2007; Loconto and Fouilleux, 2013). Policy entrepreneurs are social actors who have vision, demonstrate political intelligence, and have institutional, organisational, discursive, analytical, and/or political resources to promote their vision. Other special features are also needed, such as the capacity to be heard and recognised (e.g., being legitimate representatives of a given social group), the possession of technical skills that legitimise their speaking on behalf of others, as well as skills in speaking itself, and the possession of leadership qualities. Negotiation qualities are also crucial, since the whole process takes place not only in public arenas, but also in the corridors of power.

The analytical framework employed in the case studies is built on the two different literature reviews summarised above (FNS literature on governance issues and public policy literature not specialised in FNS). It highlights the following key elements, some of them being raised in both literatures:

- The **cognitive aspects** (“ideas”) of public policies: these refer to the vision or perception that is explicitly or implicitly supported in policy documents and actors’ discourses about what is the public problem and what solutions should be implemented. “Ideas” promoted by actors are often associated with their training or institutional culture;
- The **institutional framework**, comprising the different spaces for debates (forums, arenas) where the competitive ideas are expressed and confronted;
- The **actors** involved in shaping and implementing public policies (what are their ideas, interests, interactions), especially the role of individual actors (“policy entrepreneurs”, “leaders” or “champions”), or the role of high-level leadership or commitment; and
- The **policy contents** of policies, reflecting the choices of policy orientations and of instruments used, that have been decided over time, especially regarding trade issues.

Based on this analytical framework, four main areas of questions were addressed to the interviewees and guided the documents analysis: i) What are the visions about FNS problems and solutions? What are the main controversial points and divergences of interests? How FNS policies evolved over the past two to three decades? ii) What are the different (in)formal spaces for debates where different ideas and visions of FNS are expressed? iii) Who are the actors contributing to FNS policies (ministries, civil society, private sector, donors, NGOs, etc.)? What are the power games between actors? Who takes the lead in the decision-making? What is the role of development partners? iv) What are policy trade-offs and the instruments (i.e. tariffs, subsidies, quotas, etc.) implemented on the ground regarding trade policies?

### **3. Considerable FNS challenges despite progress**

#### **3.1. Contrasted progress in food insecurity reduction**

Ethiopia has made remarkable progress in reducing food insecurity over the last two decades as a result of poverty reduction while progress seems slower in Burkina Faso. However, food insecurity and malnutrition remain major challenges in both countries.

The Recent Global Hunger Index (GHI) reported by IFPRI put **Ethiopia** among the countries that have recorded significant progress in reducing hunger. Between 1995 and 2014, the GHI has been reduced from the score of 42.6 to the score of 24.4 (IFPRI, 2014). According to FAO et al. (2014), Ethiopia has already achieved the MDG1 (reducing half the proportion of undernourished people) with a drop (-53.3%) from 74.8% of undernourished people in

1990/92 to 35% in 2012/14. Nevertheless, more than 20 million Ethiopians will still go hungry even if the MDG1 is met by 2015.

In **Burkina Faso**, despite a sustained economic growth over the last decade –more than 6% in average per year between 2000 and 2012 – poverty persists and the number of hungry people continues to increase, making the MDG1 far from being achieved (FAO, 2014; FAO et al., 2014). According to FAO et al. (2014), the proportion of undernourished has been reduced from 26% to 20.7% over the period of 1990/92 and 2012/14 period. The Burkina Faso’s GHI score decreased from a score of 27 in 1990 to 19.9 in 2014 (IFPRI, 2014). Another figure is the last national in-depth survey on food security (ENIAM, 2008) which reported that one household out of three (35.4%) was food insecure, especially in rural areas where the proportion was higher (37%) than in urban areas (31%) (Burkina Faso, 2014a).


**3.2. Persistence of high prevalence of malnutrition...**

Despite significant improvements in Ethiopia and Burkina Faso in terms of reducing malnutrition, prevalence rates remain at relatively high levels, especially for chronic malnutrition (measured in stunting).

In **Ethiopia**, stunting prevalence decreased from about 58% in 2000 to around 44% in 2011 as shown in Figure 1 (CSA, 2011). The 2012 UNICEF report shows that children under 5 mortality rate falls from an estimated 139 deaths per 1,000 live births to 77 between 2000 and 2011, which is close to the MDG 4 target of 66 per 1,000. However, more than 5 million (44%) of children under 5 were stunted in 2011, more than 10% were wasted, out of which 3% were severely wasted (CSA, 2011).


In **Burkina Faso**, Figure 2 shows that stunting prevalence for children under 5 decreased from 38.7% to 32.9% over the period of 2003-2012, wasting from 19% to 10.9% and underweight from 38% to 24.4% (Burkina Faso, 2014a). Micronutrient deficiencies (hidden hunger) represent however an important problem. For example, while the rate of anaemia (iron deficiency) has decreased for women from 68% in 2003 to 49% in 2010, it remains stable for children under 5, of which 88% were affected in 2010 (ECOWAS-CAADP Burkina, 2011). In addition, the DHS 2010 underlined the rapid increase of overweight and obesity: 7.7% of the population is overweight, but there are strong regional disparities and this rate reaches 22.3% of women in childbearing age in the Centre region where the capital Ouagadougou is located (ACF, 2013).

**Figure 1. Nutrition Trends from 2000 to 2010 in Ethiopia**



Source: FAO and WFP, 2012

**Figure 2. Nutrition Trends from 2003 to 2012 in Burkina Faso**




Source: Burkina Faso, 2014a

### 3.3. ... Despite significant increase in cereal production


**Ethiopia** has experienced a remarkable increase in cereal production (see Figure 3). Over the past decade alone, cereal production has more than doubled to nearly 20 million tonnes, mainly as the result of the expansion of cultivation land, increased productivity due to favourable rains, increased use of fertilizer, improved seeds, and low impact of pests and diseases (CSA, 2013). However, Ethiopia remains a net food importing country and depends on both commercial imports and food aid. In **Burkina Faso**, cereal production has also significantly increased (see Figure 4). However, the coverage of cereals needs with national production has deteriorated between 2002 and 2010 and is about 115% today. This represents a fragile equilibrium, which leads Burkina Faso to import more than 340 000 tonnes of cereals annually to satisfy its food consumption (Burkina Faso, 2014a).

**Figure 3. Growth in cereal production and population over the past decade in Ethiopia**



Source: Computed based on FAOSTAT.

**Figure 4. Growth in cereal production and importation, and population in Burkina Faso**



Source: Computed based on FAOSTAT.

**Benin** and **Kenya** are ranked at higher levels than Ethiopia and Burkina Faso in terms of the GHI scores – respectively of 11.2 and 16.5 in 2014 (IFPRI, 2014). Benin has already achieved the MDG1 target with a spectacular drop (-65.6%) in the proportion of undernourished over the 1990/92-2012/14 period (FAO et al., 2014). However, stunting for children under 5 remains at critical levels: 37% in Benin (PAM, 2009), 35% in Kenya with little or no improvement since 1998 (KNBS, 2010). The double burden of malnutrition and associated diet-related non communicable diseases are becoming major challenges, in particular in Kenya where one-quarter of women age 15-49 are overweight or obese (Kenya, 2012). Yet, food production has increased at higher rates than population growth in both countries, but with uneven distribution across the territory and strong dependence on climatic conditions (PAM, 2009; ACF, 2013a).

In both Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, it seems that significant progress has been made in reducing hunger and malnutrition, despite the difficulty to consider the multidimensionality of FNS in public policies as we will see below. However, a number of nuances have to be brought in these favourable outcomes:

- The evolution of food security in Burkina Faso is not as favourable as in Ethiopia. The MDG1 is not achieved in Burkina Faso whereas it is already achieved in Ethiopia. We will see below that FNS policies and the way to consider FNS multidimensionality are not exactly the same.

- The remarkable performance of Ethiopia in reducing the proportion of undernourished people can be attributed to both progress in poverty reduction and efforts made in the agricultural sector. Official statistics indicate that the proportion of people living below the poverty line (as measured by the incidence of poverty) has declined from 45.5% in 1995/96 to 27.8% in 2011/12 (MoFED, 2013). The high priority accorded by the Government of Ethiopia to the agricultural and rural development sector over the last two decades has helped the country a lot. Production and marketing interventions in the agriculture sector have contributed to improve production and yields (doubling of the cereal production over the past decade). The overall positive growth rate of the economy has also provided a good foundation for increasing household income and employment opportunities.
- In Burkina Faso, the persistence of poverty and the lower increase of cereal production may explain slower progress in food security reduction.
- The significant outcomes in child malnutrition over the last decade in both countries can be partly attributed to the efficiency of nutrition-specific interventions (e.g. food fortification).
- The level of child malnutrition was very high at the beginning of the decade. Nutrition-specific interventions combined with better food availability, strong economic growth and better access to social services have resulted in a significant drop of child malnutrition. But the efforts to tackle the remaining child malnutrition in the coming years will probably need to be of different nature. High rates of economic growth and cereal production will probably not be sufficient. Inclusiveness (especially regarding women), a more holistic approach of FNS and particular attention to nutrition-sensitive agricultural interventions, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education and cultural factors, will be determining to definitively solve food and nutrition insecurity.

## **4. Overview of FNS policies and institutional framework**

### **4.1. Between change and continuity in FNS policies**

This Section presents the evolution of the main FNS policies in Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. While the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) has introduced a significant shift in Ethiopia towards more long-term and social-oriented FNS policies, changes appear less visible in the Burkina Faso's FNS policies, which remain largely focused on food availability.

#### **4.1.1. Ethiopia: Towards a long-term and a social vision of FNS**

##### ***A long history of FNS policies***

###### **1996: From food aid in-kind to food/ cash for work and local purchases**

The first comprehensive **food security strategy** was developed in 1996, and its updated version was provided in 2002 (Elleni, 2007), when about 14 million inhabitants were faced with severe food shortages during the drought period of 2002/03 (EAS, 2013). Prior to 1996, emergency food aid programs were the primary way to address food shortages (Clay et al, 1998, cited by Elleni, 2007). The food security strategy brought some changes in clarifying entitlement and the way food aid was distributed to beneficiaries. It states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid without working on a community project in return. The new policy also declares that 80% of relief should be in form of food-for-work and cash-for-work



schemes over the next five years, while the other 20% is distributed free for those unable to work (Jayne and Daniel, 2005; PANE and EEA, 2006).

The other change associated with this new policy was the move from imported, in-kind food donation to programs that combine cash aid and imported food aid with local purchases. Successive Ethiopian governments have requested donors to move towards cash contributions and local purchases since the mid-1980s. The major food aid agencies only started changing in 1996<sup>6</sup>, with fears that high levels of food aid imports following the 1995/96 bumper harvest unduly depress local grain prices and discourage farmers from future investments in cereal production (Walker D.J. and Wandschneider T., 2005). Local procurement started with the activities of the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) in 1993, but it became a major activity in other areas of Ethiopia in 1996, the year when the European Union began supporting the activity. Since then, around a quarter of Ethiopia's food aid has been procured locally in the form of maize, wheat and sorghum (abid).

#### 2002/03: More focus on the underlying sources of chronic and transitory food insecurity

The 1996 food security strategy was revised in 2002 when the government launched the new **National Food Security Program (FSP)** to address the underlying sources of chronic and transitory food insecurity, at both national and household level. It aimed to improve food availability through domestic production (focus on three zones, i.e. areas with adequate moisture, moisture deficit and pastoral areas), improved access (via market and infrastructure development) and enhanced emergency response capabilities (MoFED, 2002). Increase investments in health, education and road facilities to rural areas were also identified as supportive mechanisms to the food security.

An in-depth study was undertaken in 2003 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD), and the bilateral and multi-lateral development partners of Ethiopia to develop the "**New Coalition for Food Security in Ethiopia**". The key interventions designed to attain household food security over a five-year period since 2003 included: voluntary resettlement program; safety net program (incl. building community assets); and building household assets through on farm and off farm activities (Haan et al., 2006). The coalition promised to enable five million food insecure inhabitants to become food secure and to improve the food security of an additional ten million people. Inhabitants in drought-prone and degraded areas were also assisted to move to areas that are under-utilized and more suitable for agricultural activities under the voluntary resettlement program (EAS, 2013).

#### 2006: Towards a social perspective of food insecurity

The food security strategy was revised again in 2006, around three main components: **Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)**, **Household Asset Building Program (HABP)** and **Complementary Community Investment Program (CCI)**. The objective was to provide support in cash and in-kind to population living in identified food insecure *Woredas* (i.e. districts) (EAS, 2013). In exchange for the support, majority of the recipients were engaged in public work programs (roads, afforestation, and rehabilitation of degraded lands). The 2006 version also contains nutrition interventions for acutely malnourished children and mothers (EAS, 2013).

Until 2005, there was an appeal for humanitarian assistance every year since the famine of 1984 (World Bank, 2011). This aid was recognised to be often associated with untimely delivery of food and increasingly unsustainable (Raisin 2001, Smith and Subbarao 2003,

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
<sup>6</sup> Some NGOs and donors including Australian Agency for International Development, FARM Africa, GTZ, the Netherlands, Norway, Save the Children and REST have been involved in local and regional procurement of relief food since the early 1980s (Walker D.J. and Wandschneider T., 2005).

World Bank, 2011). In addition, responses to food insecurity were mostly through food-for-work and other ad hoc relief schemes. This food aid confounded households who suffer from seasonal or emergency shocks with those who suffer primarily from chronic problems of poor access to productive resources, such as farmland or livestock. The country moved away from annual emergency appeals to more development-oriented, multi-annual cash-based safety net programs aimed at addressing the needs of chronically food insecure.

The adoption of the PSNP appeared to be a radical shift in both the way the FNS had been perceived, and the policy options and instruments that had been chosen. By incorporating people suffering from old age, disability or any other underlying causes of food insecurity, the PSNP added a social perspective into this predominantly agricultural and economic growth related problem. In addition, food insecurity is no longer considered as short-term food needs, but also through its underlying causes as a chronic problem. Consequently, in designing the instruments, a paradigm shift is made from a predominantly short-term vision to a long-term strategic vision (predictable instruments).

Through annual monitoring and continuous evaluation of the PNSP which generates greater knowledge, a number of improvements have been made to the PSNP- not on program contents but largely to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the program. Nutrition gets increased attention. The multidimensional and multi-sectoral characteristics of the causes of malnutrition get proper attention (at least at policy level).

**Figure 5. A recapitulative mapping of the key changes in Ethiopia’s FNS strategies over the past decade**



***The PSNP at the heart of FNS-related policies***

The Ethiopian government’s commitments to agricultural development and food security are demonstrated in its third five-year development plan (2010-2015) known as the **Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)**. Two main programs are specific to food security:

- The **Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)** provides multi-annual predictable transfers, such as food, cash or a combination of both, to chronically food insecure

households. Food/cash transfers are a means to help survive food deficit periods, meet basic food requirements, prevent asset depletion and build productive assets at the community level (SC-UK, 2009; USAID, 2012). The PSNP is a very large program, with over 7.7 million beneficiaries in close to 60% of the country (318 woredas both from highland and some pastoral areas) (Furtado and Hobson, 2011). Over the last five years (2010-14), the program has cost \$1.8 billion (EAS, 2013; USAID, 2011).

- The **Household Asset Building Program (HABP)** aims to spur graduation from PSNP by helping chronically vulnerable populations build resiliency through improved risk management and building up household assets. The ambition is to graduate 80% of PSNP beneficiaries by 2014 (USAID, 2011). In terms of performance, the progress is, however, very low. Recent presentation by Hoddinott (2014) indicates that since 2005 approximately 500,000 beneficiaries have been graduated from the PSNP. The study indicates also that the PSNP reaches approximately seven million people living in 1.3 million beneficiary households. This, in turn, implies that 38% of beneficiary households or 7% of PSNP beneficiaries graduates from the program since its launch in 2005. All in all, the achievement in terms of graduation is very low, as eight years after its launch only 7% or 38% of its beneficiaries graduated from the program<sup>7</sup>.

#### **Box 1. Selection of PNSP beneficiaries**

Participants of the PSNP are selected based on community knowledge and administrative guidelines. Able-bodied members of PSNP households receive wage payments for their participation in productive activities that will build more resilient livelihoods, such as rehabilitating land and water resources and developing community infrastructure, including rural road rehabilitation and building schools and clinics (WFP, 2012). Those who are unable to provide labor to public works projects receive direct support (USAID, 2012). Food transfers are provided primarily in the lean season between June and August. Vulnerable households receive six months of assistance annually. Vulnerable households outside the safety net (there are around 2-3 million of people – along with the 7.7 million beneficiaries of PSNP – who suffer from transitory food insecurity when bad climatic conditions) continue to be assisted under the annual emergency food aid appeal system.

The successes of PSNP have been widely recognised. Household food security has improved while assets have been protected (mainly from reduced distress sales of livestock). The program has also assisted in transforming rural livelihoods (again via increased growth in livestock holdings) and improving the use of health and education services, potable water, rural feeder roads, and has helped more than 269,000 households to be food self-sufficient (Furtado and Hobson, 2011).

In addition, Ethiopia has launched a number of agricultural development and food security programs over the past decade, including the following:

- **Agricultural Growth Program (AGP)** seeks to increase agricultural productivity and market access for key crop and livestock products, and leveraging the potentiality of productive highland areas. This five-year program launched in 2011 marks the renewed interest for agriculture in the FNS agenda of donors. It is expected to assist small and medium farmers to get better livelihoods, and quality life through provision of enhanced agricultural extension services, infrastructure, market opportunities, and linkages enclosed by agro-enterprises and/or cooperatives (MoARD, 2013).

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
<sup>7</sup> The ambiguity on the proportion of PSNP graduates emanate from the study's blurred description of the 500,000 beneficiaries it reported to graduate from the PSNP. Theoretically, these 500,000 beneficiaries could be either PSNP beneficiaries or PSNP beneficiary households where the former is a subset of the later as a single PSNP beneficiary household could register a number of its members as beneficiary members.

- **The New Social Protection Policy:** based on previous experiences and lessons learned, a new progressive and comprehensive social protection policy had been drafted in 2012, but it still awaits approval.
- **The Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS)** has been established in 2008 for the coordination and leadership of the Disaster Risk Management Policy, whose objective is to reduce risks and minimize the impacts of disasters through a comprehensive and integrated disaster risk management system.
- **The National Nutrition Strategy:** after a long period of limited attention to nutrition issues, a National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) was formulated during 2005/06, and again in February 2008. This first ever NNS is based on the conceptual framework of the causes of child malnutrition presenting the immediate, underlying, and basic causes of malnutrition (SC-UK, 2009). It brings together the various isolated and uncoordinated interventions into one comprehensive sector-wide approach, thereby breaking with the traditional food-biased approach which considered food security as the primary means to achieve nutritional security.

A National Nutrition Program (NNP) has been prepared to implement the NNS, with two components respectively on direct nutrition interventions, and nutrition mainstreaming in other sectors. Some examples of the first ones are the followings:

- The Health Extension Program (HEP) nutrition is being implemented using the health extension workers (HEWs) and community volunteers.
- Community-based nutrition (CBN) involves the community in the diagnosis and treatment of malnutrition with the HEWs and the Enhanced Outreach Strategy.
- School Feeding Program (SFP) aims to improve access, stabilize attendance, reduce dropout from schools and alleviate short-term hunger for better learning.
- Micronutrient interventions focus on vitamin A and iron supplementation for pregnant women to tackle iron deficiency (anaemia).

**Figure 6. Overview of major agricultural and food security programs in Ethiopia**



#### 4.1.2. Burkina Faso: A continuity in FNS policies

By contrast with Ethiopia, the evolution of FNS policies in Burkina Faso shows a less radical shift in the vision of FNS, and rather continuity in the agriculture-oriented vision of FNS.

##### *Recent FNS policy documents*

As reported in the **National Strategy on Food Security** (*Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire, SNSA*), the evolution of FNS policies in Burkina Faso could be divided into three main phases:

##### Prior to 1990: A strong state involvement in agricultural sector

National policies and strategies were conducted with strong state involvement in production, processing and marketing of agricultural products. Regional Development Offices (*Offices Régionaux de Développement, ORD*) were created and state enterprises intervened in all fields of the economy.

##### From 1991 - 2000: Prevention and management of food crises in context of economic reforms

Economic reforms were implemented with the support of multilateral financial institutions, especially in the agriculture sector, i.e., **Programme d'Ajustement Sectoriel Agricole, PASA** (Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme). Food policies have been conducted under the PASA framework. The second PASA started in 1996 led to the liberalisation of input marketing, the liquidation of the National Office of Cereals Marketing (*Office national de la commercialisation des céréales, OFNACER*) which intervened on the cereal market, and the removal of the state price setting scheme (CNSA, 2014).

A **specific scheme to steer cereal policy and food security** was implemented (Burkina Faso, 2003). It comprised a Committee of Reflection and Follow-up of Cereal Policy (*Comité de*

*Réflexion et de Suivi de la Politique Céréalière*, CRSPC) to consult stakeholders of cereal market chains, and a Permanent Secretary for the Coordination of the Cereal Policy (*Secrétariat Permanent de Coordination de la Politique Céréalière*, SP/CPC). It was also in charge of the prevention and management of food crises with the creation of:

- A national food security stock (35 000 tonnes) managed by the National Society of Management of the Food Security Stock (Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité, SONAGESS) and a financial stock (equivalent to 25 000 tonnes) managed by the SP/CPC,
- A National Committee for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (Comité National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation, CONASUR),
- An Early Warning System (Système d'Alerte Précoce, SAP) for risky areas.

From 2000: A food security strategy focused on food production support

As a result of the difficulties faced by the CRSPC (i.e. weak coordination of food crises, feeble collection, analysis and dissemination of food security information, etc.), a **National Strategy on Food Security** (*Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire*, SNSA) was drafted from February 1999 to May 2002 and adopted in 2003 (CSAO-CILSS, 2008 ; CNSA, 2014). This was the first reference policy document on food security, with the global objective to reduce half the number of food insecure people by 2010.

The five-year National Programmes of Food Security (**Programmes Nationaux de Sécurité Alimentaire**, PNSA) through which the strategy was implemented had well balanced objectives in 2008: increase food production, improve household food access and the nutritional status of population. However, the distribution of the costs shows a strong focus on food production. Out of the total amount of FCFA 181 billion (275 million EUR), a preponderant share was dedicated to increase agricultural production (45%), while accessibility and nutrition components were limited at 23% and 11.5% (see **Error! Reference source not found.**).

**Table 1: Distribution of the costs in the PNSA of the SNSA**


Sub-program	Cost (in thousands FCFA)	%
I. Support to food production	83 739 125	45%
II. Support to access to food	42 737 325	23%
III. Support to nutrition	21 025 000	11,5%
IV. Institutional support, monitoring & evaluation	21 120 217	11,5%
Miscellaneous and contingencies	16 192 166	9%
Total	184 813 836	100%

Sources: Programme national pour la sécurité Alimentaire (Rapport provisoire septembre 2007), in CSAO-CILSS, 2008.

In October 2014, the first **Policy on Food and Nutrition Security** (*Politique Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle*, PNSAN) has been adopted. The use of the FNS concept shows the stated intention of the Government to better integrate food security and nutrition. The drafting process of the policy has been steered by the National Council on Food Security (**Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire**, CNSA), which replaced the CRSPC in December 2003 and constitutes today the national framework for managing FNS issues.

**Figure 7. Evolution of FNS strategies and policies in Burkina Faso**





The **National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (PNSAN)** recently adopted in Burkina Faso has the global objective to achieve a sustainable food and nutrition security by 2025 through five strategic axes: (1) Sustainably increase food availability to cover national needs; (2) Reinforce the capacity to prevent shocks and respond to shocks; (3) Improve physical and financial accessibility to food; (4) Improve the nutritional status of population; and (5) Reinforce the governance for food and nutrition security.

A three-year rolling plan of actions, from 2014 to 2016, was finalised in October 2014 to implement the policy. It takes the form of a multitude of actions (69 actions with 313 sub-actions). The distribution of costs of the plan shows that, except the building of hard infrastructures which is costly, an important proportion of costs is dedicated to the subvention of inputs (e.g. cotton inputs being also used for maize). The Table 2 shows the effort is focused on boosting agricultural productivity for food availability under the first strategic axis (50.3%). Costs related to strategic axis No. 3 on food accessibility and strategic axis No.4 on nutrition represent respectively 22.1% and 22.5% of total cost (Burkina Faso, 2014b).

**Table 2. Distribution of the costs in the PNSAN Action Plan (in million FCFA)**

	<b>Guaranteed funding</b>	<b>Additional funding required</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
AXIS No.1 Increasing food availability	250 487	293 670	544 157	<b>50,3</b>
AXIS No.2 Strengthening prevention and management of food crises	-	10 809	10 809	1,00
AXIS No.3 Improving physical and financial accessibility to food	48 720	190 745	239 465	<b>22,1</b>
AXIS No.4 Improving nutritional status of population	10 066	233 455	243 521	<b>22,5</b>
AXIS No. 5 Reinforcing food and nutrition security governance	4 511	38 718	43 229	4,0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>313 783</b>	<b>767 398</b>	<b>1 081 181</b>	<b>100,0</b>

Source: Burkina Faso (2014b).

Compared to their scope in Ethiopia, cash transfers in Burkina Faso are limited in scope and coverage to a few pilot programs that have been recently introduced (FAO, 2014). Costs related to free distribution of food to vulnerable populations and cash transfers represents respectively 1.4% and 3.3% of total cost of the action plan. FAO (2014) also underlined that

most of the existing interventions are heavily dependent on donor funding. The main social safety nets are:

- The **National school feeding program** targeted to primary school children, mainly in rural areas, and supported almost equally by the government and donors,
- **Food security stocks** for emergency purposes: Food Security Stock (35 000 tonnes of cereals) co-managed by the government and development partners; Intervention Stock (10 000 tonnes) implemented by the government in 2005 for market regulation purposes; and a Financial Reserve constituted by development partners with a counter value of approximately 25 000 tonnes of cereals (FAO, 2014).

The PNSAN is part of a number of policies and strategies that are expected to contribute to FNS in Burkina Faso. However, the PNSAN is presented as the unique reference framework to guide all actions in favour of FNS. The vision of FNS supported by this policy document seems to remain largely focused on food production, as shown by the distribution of costs in the 2003 SNSA and 2014 PNSAN. The following FNS-related policies are mentioned in the PNSAN (see Figure 8):


- The **National Program on Rural Sector 2011-2015** (*Programme National du Secteur Rural*, PNSR): it was adopted at the end of 2012 as the program framework of the 2004-2015 Rural Development Strategy (*Stratégie de Développement Rural*, SDR). It is also the national program for the implementation of regional agricultural policies (ECOWAS/CAADP and WAEMU agricultural policies). Its aim of establishing a modern, professional and competitive agriculture in view of food security is translated in its first axis on food security and sovereignty. The five sub-programmes focus on production issues, except the last one on prevention and management of food and nutrition crises.
- The **National Nutrition Policy** (*Politique Nationale de Nutrition*, PNN): adopted in 2007, its objectives include reducing morbidity and mortality due to protein-energy malnutrition and specific deficiencies, and the prevalence of non-communicable diseases. A 2010-2015 Strategic Plan for Nutrition has been drafted when Burkina Faso became a member of the Scaling' Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative. It constitutes the SUN action plan.
- The **National Policy on Social Protection** (*Politique Nationale de Protection Sociale*, PNPS) was created in 2012 with the objective to contribute change livelihoods through the development of risk management mechanisms and the extension of social insurance to all categories of workers and providing access to grants to all social risks.

The analysis of the main FNS policy documents in Ethiopia and Burkina Faso shows different trajectories in considering agricultural, social and nutrition issues, and in bridging short-term and long-term interventions. The PSNP in Ethiopia allowed moving from a predominantly short-term vision to a long-term vision and paved the way towards a social perspective of FNS. However, agricultural production remains the major framework to address FNS. This observation can also be made in other countries.

In **Benin**, the National Programme for Food Security (PNSA) is strongly focused on agricultural production, even if nutrition and social safety nets are mentioned. In line with an “agricultural industry” approach, food security is to be achieved through a green revolution to boost production. Interventions are primarily irrigation schemes, food crop intensification, improved post-harvest systems, etc. In **Kenya**, as in Burkina Faso, a National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (FNPS) has been the subject of a long process of intersectoral construction (2005 to 2011) bringing together representatives from various ministries and civil society actors. This policy document, now largely consensual, presents the government's

commitment to all aspects of food and nutrition security. While waiting for its implementation, the guiding document for governmental programmes on food security is the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy, which hardly addresses dimensions of access to food and nutrition. One interviewee in the Home Economics section – a very small section in charge of nutrition within the Ministry of Agriculture – underlines that the entire Ministry’s main concern is “to have food first,” relegating other aspects of food security to the backburner (ACF, 2013a).

**Figure 8. Overview of major agricultural and food security programs in Burkina Faso**



**4.2. The weight of the Ministry of Agriculture on FNS institutions**

This Section explores the current institutional framework established for FNS. In both Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, formal intersectoral coordination bodies have been created under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). This is the responsibility of the MoA to mobilise the other line ministries to address the multidimensionality of FNS.

**4.2.1. Key role of MoARD in the PSNP institutional framework in Ethiopia**

In **Ethiopia**, the PSNP was made possible by the government’s leadership in creating the National Food Security Council. Its implementation is steered by the Food Security Coordination Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD). The institutional home of FNS programmes and policies is one of the key issues considered in the literature on FNS governance (Acosta and Fanzo, 2012; IEH 2012). This is not necessarily to home FNS programmes under the Prime minister or the Presidency to make sure the multidimensionality of FNS is well addressed, but the challenge is to ensure an effective intersectoral coordination regardless of the institutional anchorage of FNS programmes. Implementation followed the tiers of government in Ethiopia with activities at federal, regional and Woreda (or district) level administrations and involved a broad range of sector institutions across government.

A number of intersectoral coordination bodies chaired at senior level also exist for the coordination of the PSNP. This includes the Federal FSP/PSNP Inter-Ministerial Management Committee, the Joint Strategic Oversight Committee, Regional/Woreda FSP/PSNP Steering Committee, Community Level Food Security Task Forces and other technical task forces. These task forces monitor public works inputs and outputs, confirm completion of public works, and notify the woreda for trigger payments (Berhanu, 2011).

Outside the government, the PSNP is coordinated through a cohesive donor group led by a combination of permanent and rotating co-chairs. Donors work with the government through their Donors Assistance Group (DAG), which forms various joint committees, including the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), the PSNP Donors' Working Group (DWG) and the Donor Coordination Team (DCT). The JCC provides joint oversight program implementation and technical guidance on specific and cross-cutting issues. The DWG harmonizes donors' support<sup>8</sup> and the DCT assists the functioning of the DWG, and manages research and technical assistance commissioned for PSNP (Domelen et al., 2009). These structures help in fostering better harmonization and alignment, and provide analytical work to inform policy dialogue (Furtado and Hobson, 2011).


The existence of regular and joint forum for dialogue and exchange has been reported as invaluable means for building trust and realizing mutual accountability. The clear definition of roles and responsibilities in all these forums, and the formalized coordination between all actors have also been pinpointed as important issues in making PSNP successful (Furtado and Hobson, 2011; Berhanu, 2011). Memorandum of understanding (MoU) and Terms of reference (ToR) have been built to define roles and responsibilities both horizontally and vertically as well as jointly agreed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems (i.e. reviews, studies) have been integrated. In addition to strengthen institutional capacity of government systems delivering the PSNP, these agreements promote coordination, complementarities, and synergy within government systems and other relevant programs.

As shown in Figure 9, the MoARD has a prominent place in the FNS institutional framework as being the umbrella for the whole PSNP coordination. The National Food Security Council created by the government is also under the MoARD, although intersectoral linkages have been promoted. It is MoARD's responsibility to ensure proper consideration of social and nutrition dimensions of FNS.

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<sup>8</sup> It is chaired by each donor on six-month rotating basis (Domelen et al., 2009).

**Figure 9. Institutional Framework for the coordination of the PSNP in Ethiopia**




Source: Sketched based on info from Berhanu (2011) and (Domelen et al., 2009).

#### 4.2.2. Key role of MoAFS for the PNSAN in Burkina Faso

In **Burkina Faso**, the FNS institutional framework is spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS)<sup>9</sup> (see Figure 10). The CNSA adopted in December 2003 is under the umbrella of the MoAFS. It presents itself as an intersectoral body with the mandate to convoke all relevant ministries. The CNSA through the MoAFS is responsible for the definition and the implementation of the PNSAN.

<sup>9</sup> The name of the ministry has recently changed with the transition government and became the ministry of agriculture, hydraulic resources, sanitation and food security. Because the recent FNS policy documents have been established under the MoAFS, we continue to use the name ministry of agriculture and food security.

**Figure 10. Institutional framework of the National Council for Food Security (CNSA) in Burkina Faso**



Source: SE/CNSA. Personal communication.

Finally, both in **Ethiopia** and **Burkina Faso**, the FNS institutional framework is characterised by the leadership of the MoA. We can deduce that although both countries have many FNS-related policies and intersectoral bodies, the MoA appears predominant in the FNS institutional framework, including with the responsibility to ensure a proper inclusion of social and nutritional dimensions of FNS in this framework. This situation is characteristic of many developing countries – having contrasted success in reducing hunger and malnutrition – **Benin** and **Kenya** being not an exception.

**5. Difficulties of policies to address FNS multidimensionality**

The previous sections have shown that FNS policy documents and institutional frameworks are predominantly shaped by the agricultural sector and do not really reflect the multidimensionality of FNS challenges. This Section aims to explain why the multidimensionality of FNS is so hard to be addressed in a well-balanced way in FNS policy documents and institutional frameworks.

**5.1. Limits of intersectoral coordination in FNS institutions**

Despite the creation of several inter-ministerial bodies for food security aimed at ensuring the involvement of all relevant sectors, including health/nutrition, effective intersectoral coordination appears limited. The discussions in these bodies tend to be primarily led by short-term and agricultural concerns. FNS-related sectors are also inclined to develop their own agenda and institutional frameworks, leading to parallel dynamics in agriculture, social and nutrition sectors rather than integrated dynamics as the FNS concept would suggest.




### 5.1.1. Historical predominance of short-term over long-term concerns

#### *PSNP as a bridge between short-term and long-term concerns in Ethiopia*

In **Ethiopia**, the capacity of the PSNP to bridge and correct the imbalance between humanitarian and development assistance is one of the major successes reported for the PSNP. With respect to transitory food insecurity as a result of shocks, extra funding comes from PSNP's Contingency Budget and when that is exhausted, the Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM) is used. The RFM allows the PSNP to scale up in times of crisis and to reduce the timeline for humanitarian response by temporarily extending support to current PSNP clients and new clients with transitory needs (Hobson and Campbell, 2012).

The launch of the PSNP has also led to institutional reform aiming at better articulation of short-term and long-term responses through safety nets and disaster risk management. The MoARD was restructured to bring safety net and disaster response into a single structure along with regular agricultural and food security programs. Responsibilities for disaster risk management moved from an independent agency at the ministry level to the MoARD (see Figure 11). This restructuring has brought significant benefits, as it acknowledges the relationship between improvements in agriculture and disasters, and builds on the capacity of the safety net provided by the PSNP for scaling up during emergency situations.

**Figure 11. Institutional arrangement of Food Security and Disaster Response Programs in Ethiopia (before and after PSNP)**



Source: Adapted from IEH (2012)

#### *Predominance of short-term concerns within the CNSA in Burkina Faso*

In **Burkina Faso**, short-term concerns tend to dominate discussions within the FNS institutional framework. This issue was already mentioned in the 2003 SNSA, which reported that due to food crises during the last agricultural seasons, the consultation and the orientation of the CRSPC were focused on emergency responses at the expense of reflection on long-term concerns and prospective.

Because the CNSA has been primarily designed to prevent food crises related to cereal production deficits, its function is marked today by short-term and agriculture issues<sup>10</sup>. This tendency seems to be particularly pronounced since the 2012 response plan. The food production deficit this year –due to bad climatic conditions–led the government to implement a response plan, which enabled to control the food crisis and avoid movement of the population. Since then, response plans are drafted even during good agricultural seasons (2014, 2015). A Prevision Committee meets twice annually: in October to draft the response plan on the basis of agricultural season estimations and to identify the risk zones; and in February to revise it if required with the definitive agricultural season results and information on nutrition (SMART surveys).

Though this routine functioning is considered to be efficient in preventing food crises, it is also recognised there is limitations with regards to time and space for debate on long-term concerns. The CNSA is able to rapidly decide on free food distribution, mobilisation of food security stocks, etc. in case of natural hazards, but seems less efficient to address chronic food insecurity and structural problems (i.e. demographic trends, alternatives to agriculture, food for cities, over-exploitation of natural resources, etc.).

### **5.1.2. Parallel institutional frameworks for social and nutrition concerns**

Difficulties in ensuring effective intersectoral coordination within inter-ministerial food security bodies have been frequently reported. In parallel, social and nutrition dimensions of FNS tend to be handled through specific agenda and intersectoral bodies. This is particularly true for nutrition where multisectoral and multi-stakeholders' platforms have been identified in line with the SUN initiative in Ethiopia and Burkina, and also in Benin and Kenya. Meanwhile food security institutions claim to integrate nutrition issues. This might create confusion and some kind of overlap.

In **Burkina Faso**, a few actors, generally development partners, argue therefore that FNS, as transversal issues, should rather be managed by the Prime Minister (PM) or the Presidency than being under the portfolio of the MoA. Only this highest authority could give FNS the political priority it deserves and could have the power to convoke high-level representatives from all concerned sectoral ministries. The institutional attachment of food security to the MoAFS may partly explain the limited debate within the CNSA on non-agricultural aspects of FNS. Some interviewees reported that representatives from Social Affairs or Health hardly attend the CNSA meetings because the MoAFS is less familiar with those ministries than with the ministry of animal resources for example. However, other actors stated that the CNSA has no difficulty to convoke representatives of sectoral ministries, is widely opened to all stakeholders and this ensures a well-balanced vision of FNS dimensions.

#### ***Social issues left behind within the FNS institutional framework***

In **Ethiopia**, although the PSNP brought a social perspective of food security through its cash/food-based transfers to all chronically food insecure rural people, this social perspective remains poorly reflected in the FNS institutional framework. The PSNP tried to form joint inter-ministerial committee that consists of representatives from the ministries of finance & development, health, water, trade, and industry, but representatives from the social action bodies are under-represented.

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<sup>10</sup> One interviewee notes that “the food security framework is built to address emergency issues (...) the aim is to know how many people experience food insecurity and will need assistance (...). We are logically in needs quantification” for the management of food security stocks and distribution of food.

In **Burkina Faso**, social issues such as cash transfers and social protection are gaining importance on the political agenda, especially with the support of the World Bank and the agenda on resilience. A National Council on Social Protection (*Conseil National sur la Protection Sociale*, CNPS) has been created under the PM's Department and a Permanent Secretary is in-charge of implementing the PNPS. The Ministry of Social Affairs is, therefore, increasingly considered as a key actor for FNS, this evolution being an implicit recognition that agriculture and economic growth is insufficient to ensure FNS<sup>11</sup>.

### ***Parallel agenda on nutrition***

In **Ethiopia**, nutrition was relatively neglected until recent momentum. The PSNP was nutrition-neutral as it did not integrate nutrition-sensitive livelihoods programs. Today, as for food security, the nutrition institutional framework includes intersectoral bodies aiming at dealing with the multidimensional nature of nutrition. Hence, two similar and parallel institutional architectures were built. In addition, difficulties to mainstream nutrition into sectoral interventions and to coordinate nutrition-sensitive interventions were reported.

The Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) is responsible for direct nutrition interventions (especially in care, feeding, health services, and water, sanitation and hygiene, etc.) as well as multisectoral coordination. It has, therefore, to work with other sectors to mainstream nutrition into sectoral policies and programs. A horizontal inter-ministerial coordination committee named National Nutrition Coordination Body (NNCB) has been created since 2008 in this perspective (EAS, 2013). Eight relevant government ministries<sup>12</sup> signed a MoU to form this national nutrition coordination body, which also includes representatives of donor communities, private sector, and academia and research institutes, such as the Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI) (Figure 13).


The function of the NNCB is to ensure that the activities of any sector that serve to reduce malnutrition are done in a complementary and timely fashion with those activities carried out by other sectors. However, a recent study by the Ethiopian Academy of Sciences indicates that the NNCB has carried out limited tasks as compared to its terms of reference. It only met a few times on an ad hoc basis. There is a lack of incentives for the sectors to integrate nutrition and nutrition is, therefore, still entrenched as a health issue. One major challenge is to advocate nutrition at forums with higher decision-making bodies involved, such as the national parliament, MoFED and Office of the PM (EAS, 2013). It is also recommended to find a permanent home-base for the coordination of nutrition interventions. A National Nutrition Coordination Council (NNCC) could be established under the chairmanship of the Office of the PM with the Minister of Health serving as vice chair with the mandate to implement the NNS and subsequently the NNP. Its officially designated secretariat could be the EHNRI or another designated body (EAS, 2013).

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<sup>11</sup> One interviewee states: “[with the issue of targeting the vulnerable] social protection increasingly enters food security and food security is more and more in social protection”.


<sup>12</sup> Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Education, Water and Energy, Trade and Industry, Labor and Social Affairs, Finance and Economic Development, and Ministry of Women, Youth and Children's Affairs.

**Figure 12. Current Setup of Multisectoral Coordination Mechanism on Nutrition**



Source: Adapted from EAS (2013)

**Figure 13. National Nutrition Coordinating Body (as revised in 2013)**



Source: FDRE 2013.

The opinion survey reveals how the institutional anchorage of nutrition is a controversial issue. For some respondents, the NNP was revised in 2013 in the way that reflected the multi-faceted and multisectoral nature of nutritional problems, making any institutional reform unnecessary. The policy clearly indicated what each sector should do and how sectoral efforts should be coordinated at different level (i.e. federal to kebele<sup>13</sup>) with the aim to strengthen the coordination (both horizontally and vertically) among implicated actors.

The divergences of views on the most appropriate institutional framework for nutrition partly address also those on how best to deal with malnutrition. Some respondents support nutritious food whereas others claim that these interventions reinforce the dependency syndrome. Or some respondents support tablet-based micro-nutrient interventions while others believe that nutrition should be agriculture-led (via production of fruits & vegetables, school gardens, mobilisation of agricultural extension agents in Home Economics Department, etc.). Finally, it has been reported that although the FMoH helps increase awareness of nutrition, interventions tend to be biased towards tablet-based micro-nutrient supplements.

In **Burkina Faso**, a National Coordination Council on Nutrition (*Conseil National de Coordination en Nutrition*, CNCN) has been created in 2008 to better coordinate nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions. With the country's membership to SUN, the CNCN became the SUN's platform, and the 2010-2015 Strategic Plan for Nutrition became the SUN Plan of Action. It is chaired by the Ministry of Health (the Executive Secretariat being ensured by the Direction of Nutrition) and co-chaired by the MoAFS.

The CNCN faces the same weaknesses as the CNSA in mobilising senior representatives from all relevant sectors and organising an intersectoral dialogue. According to some interviewees, it is even much less dynamic than the CNSA, with only a few meetings over the last years and has difficulties to discuss subjects other than direct interventions, which only concern the Ministry of Health. The option of merging the CNSA and the CNCN to build an inter-ministerial body on FNS does not seem to be a realistic option at the moment.

A similar institutional architecture as the one in Ethiopia and Burkina can be observed in **Kenya**. A nutrition coordinating structure is housed under the ministry of Health. One of its committee represents the SUN platform since Kenya's accession to the SUN movement in November 2012. This coordinating structure is not truly intersectoral for the time being because the vast majority of actors it brings together support a "health vision" of nutrition (i.e. a curative or clinical approach) and are involved in emergency responses and direct nutrition interventions. Intersectorality, associated with a more preventive approach of nutrition, is also poorly reflected in the National Nutrition Action Plan (2012-2017) developed by Kenya, despite the references to the multisectoral approach of nutrition (ACF, 2013a).

In **Benin**, the Food and Nutrition Council (CAN) set up in November 2011 represents the SUN platform. Interestingly, this platform is directly attached to the presidency with the mission of defining national policy for food and nutrition, and coordinating action related to food and nutrition. However, while the CAN is supposed to be an intersectoral coordination space, it turns out from our interviews that many key actors positioning themselves on food security issues do not have any knowledge of this organ, nor of the SUN movement. This reflects the strong disconnection between food security actors and those in nutrition.

Therefore, at present there is no single formal institutional framework in Ethiopia and Burkina where all the dimensions of FNS could be coherently and comprehensively debated. We observe rather a multiplication of inter-sectorial bodies dealing with each specific dimension. This is also true in Benin and Kenya. We therefore concur with IEH (2012) which states

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<sup>13</sup>Kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia.

“Although Food Security and Nutrition (FSN) is conceptually understood in its multiple dimensions, and there is a wide consensus that FSN should be addressed intersectorally (i.e. FSN is an area in which different sectors need to work together), in practical terms the institutions that orient and finally execute the actions at the field level tend to be sectorally focused”.

## **5.2. Path dependency around the agricultural sector**

This Section argues that historical actors involved in food security generally support an agriculture-oriented vision of FNS, which corresponds to the initial framing of food security. They are also the predominant actors in the FNS policy-making processes and the steering of FNS institutions. These historical actors comprise officials from the ministry of Agriculture, donors and NGOs responsible for agricultural development interventions. Farmers are also much more represented in FNS policy making than consumers. The reason is not that farmers are more vocal than consumers<sup>14</sup>, but farmers are the most food insecure and they are also more structured, through farmer organisations, whereas consumers associations are rather new and weak. Alternative visions focusing more on urban, social or nutritional issues are, thus, more difficult to be heard in these processes and institutions. This illustrates quite well path dependency around agricultural framings and actors.

### **5.2.1. Predominance of an agricultural vision of FNS**

In **Ethiopia**, the opinion survey with aid actors showed that food insecurity is generally viewed as a rural phenomenon, though food insecurity becoming an urban phenomenon. The government of Ethiopia is certainly sympathetic to the rural and farmer issues because it has had a long experience relationship since their rebel time. This relationship continued in some formal way once they assumed power. Food security programs are generally implemented in rural areas, but many in the aid actors support alternative visions of FNS. They claim that there is a need to go beyond the existing programs focused largely on supply-side constraints, and to address long-term institutional and structural problems.

Some respondents, for instance, claim existing policies overlook the problem of high population growth/pressure and land tenure regime-related problem, with the land fragmentation discouraging rural-urban migration and diversification of rural livelihoods. Other respondents noted the lack of focus on pastoral regions or reported high food insecurity in urban areas, such as Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa. These alternative voices are not adequately heard for the moment, although it has been noted that the government and donors recently agreed to launch food security programs in urban areas, such as Addis Ababa.

In **Burkina Faso**, two main competing visions emerge from the interviews:

- Agriculture-focused vision versus social and health visions: food insecurity is primarily perceived for rural areas, and agricultural issues are the most often raised by interviewees (i.e. land, seeds, equipment, financing, minimum producer prices, food sovereignty, etc.). This is justified by the fact that the vast majority of food insecure people live in rural areas and are engaged in agriculture. The aim of FNS policies should, therefore, be to “reinforce production capacities” or “help people to be more productive”. This vision is often presented as a long-term “economic” vision opposed to an assistance-oriented vision. Economic growth and supports for producers are supposed to improve food security, whereas free (or at low price) food distributions are criticised for their limited

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<sup>14</sup> On the contrary, recent urban riots and the historical urban bias of agricultural and trade policies illustrate the power of urban consumers, see section 7.



efficiency (i.e. quantities too small or remaining too expensive) and perverse effects (i.e. people encouraged to wait and made to beg or tempt to sell the food).

On the contrary, some respondents argue that the economic and agricultural growth would not be sufficient enough to achieve FNS. Addressing direct poverty and vulnerability through cash transfers and implementing a social protection policy, are considered essential. These two different visions are often in conflict about assessment of food insecurity and malnutrition, and decisions regarding emergency measures.

- Short-term vision focused on “bad years” or “deficit areas” versus long-term vision focused on structural problems: despite efforts to link emergency and development, it is widely recognised that the functioning of the CNSA is too focused on emergency interventions and provides limited (if no) opportunities to discuss long-term challenges and sustainable interventions. At the same time, however, many respondents insist on the Sahelian nature of the country, its vulnerability to climate shocks, the predominance of rainfed agriculture, etc. and therefore, tend to focus their attention more on natural hazards rather than a more holistic approach<sup>15</sup>.

The predominance of agricultural production issues in the vision of the vast majority of FNS actors is observed in a number of countries. This is also confirmed by IEH (2012) in its comparative study on four countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Mozambique): « Although most of the countries studied have improved their formal consideration of FSN as holistic and comprehensive comprising four pillars (i.e. production, stability, food access, consumption and nutrition), in practice, the FSN concept is understood in an unbalanced way.” This observation also shows the need to go beyond the definitions of food security from the FAO, which gave the first one in 1976.

### 5.2.2. Predominance of agricultural actors in FNS policies

In **Burkina Faso**, actors involved in FNS are mainly from the agricultural and rural world. Most of the interviewees working in FNS have been trained in agriculture: agronomists, livestock engineer or agricultural economist<sup>16</sup>. Training of FNS actors has only recently been recognised as an important issue to encourage a more holistic approach of FNS. Efforts are currently on-going regarding the curricula of both agricultural and health agents to sensitize them respectively to nutrition and food security. The CNSA has also recently hired young agents with nutrition background.

In addition, despite considerable enlargement of the food security information system, agricultural season remains the reference framework on which most of FNS indicators are built and the CNSA functions upon. FNS information systems are now quite comprehensive by including all crop and livestock products (not only cereals), price data, nutrition, household economy, urban areas, etc. However, the FNS framework tends to be limited to agricultural season monitoring, in view of FNS surveillance, prevention and management of food crises.

The drafting process of the PNSAN is an example where the agricultural sector plays a major role. The process has been led by the SE/CNSA under the MoAFS. A multisectoral working group of around 15 technical executives derived from agriculture, animal resources, environment, trade, finances, transport, etc. has been created, but it was spearheaded by the previous Minister of Agriculture. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been consulted

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<sup>15</sup> One respondent reports: “unfortunately, conjunctural aspects are predominant [in the CNSA]; structural aspects are weaker. The reason why structural aspects are present but less visible, is that we are a Sahelian country subject to recurrent shocks (...) everything has been organised around the Early Warning System, around the issue of natural hazard (...) there is no framework for a structural approach of FNS”.

<sup>16</sup>Emergency actors seem to have a more heterogeneous profile, in geography or law for instance.

during the national validation workshop. Among them, the National Federation of Producer Organisation has been particularly active in promoting production issues in the PNSAN<sup>17</sup>. By contrast, the social movement against the high cost of living (i.e. *Coalition contre la vie chère*) has not been really involved in the process. NGOs were also consulted but those working specifically on nutrition were less numerous<sup>18</sup>.

As a result, the content of the PNSAN – though globally considered satisfactory – reflects the predominance of agricultural actors in the policy-making process. Despite its multisectoral opening, the drafting process remains agriculture-driven and the PNSAN is an agricultural document for a number of interviewees<sup>19</sup>. All FNS dimensions are presented, but the section on food availability is much more developed, with production data presented for all agricultural products than sections on other dimensions. Some interviewees regret the absence of FNS analyses, lessons learned from the SNSA, and underlined the lack of prioritization and forecasts on future FNS challenges<sup>20</sup>.

With respect to training, it has also been raised in **Kenya** that this could be an obstacle to a comprehensive approach of FNS from agricultural actors. One interviewee in the Home Economics section within the ministry of agriculture, states that: “The Ministry of Agriculture, it is mainly agronomists, men who do not know the reality of food and nutrition insecurity in households” (ACF, 2013a).

### **5.3. Importance of high-level commitment and policy entrepreneurs**

High-level commitments and leadership, as well as the role played by some individual actors can be highlighted as important factors in the evolution of FNS policies. These factors seem also important for the success of FNS policies.

In **Ethiopia**, the political willingness at senior government level – combined with donors’ flexibility and willingness to revise their fragmented response to chronic food security – is considered as determining in the success of the PSNP (Furtado and Hobson, 2011; Berhanu, 2011). The government demonstrated its commitment in forging stronger links between emergency response, longer-term development, and setting up the National Food Security Council and other institutional frameworks. Here, high-level commitments and the new set-up of institutions go together. In a context where the history of the country was marked by a number of tragic famines, the government has taken the FNS issue seriously. This high-level political commitment is also reflected in the establishment of MoU and ToR with donors, and the close work of the MoARD with the PM. In addition, donors were flexible to pull and coordinate their resources and technical knowhow from one unified management unit administered and managed by government structures.

In **Kenya**, an individual actor – a former female Member of Parliament, and scientist and professor of food and nutrition – has played an undeniable role in finalising the national policy on food and nutrition security. This actor has been appointed to chair the working

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<sup>17</sup> One representative of the producer federation notes: “We pushed to put production issues at the heart. We even succeeded to inscribe the need of providing producers with ploughs, equipment and improvement of living conditions in general”.

<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, several nutrition NGOs claim the name of PNSAN (on FNS and not only food security) is one outcome of their advocacy.

<sup>19</sup> One interviewee states that: “The document is led by agriculture, which is not surprising to see as it’s an agricultural document. The MoAFS tends to only describe production or even exportation results, but not food insecurity. Food insecurity is not part of its concern! We didn’t succeed to include one chapter on food security”.

<sup>20</sup> One representative of development partners reported that: “the policy doesn’t look at the future, this is a conjunctural approach”.

group in-charge of drafting the policy. She was able to use her political and technical experiences to facilitate the intersectoral dialogue and process of policy formulation.

In the case of **Benin**, the progress observed in intersectoral initiatives on food and nutrition security can be largely attributed to the will of a single official from the Ministry of Agriculture. This actor was one of the first officials from the Ministry of Agriculture to be trained in nutrition and is recognised as having an extensive knowledge of FNS issues. He has also been well-integrated in donors' networks and able to mobilise technical and political resources. This official has actively contributed to the development of the Food and Nutrition Council (CAN), and to the integration of nutrition into the National Growth Strategy to Reduce Poverty. He has represented Benin at SUN meetings and has increased the visibility of the CAN within the SUN movement at the global level.

These examples show how high-level political willingness and how individual actors are the key in mobilising all relevant stakeholders in the intersectoral process, and in facilitating debates and changes in FNS visions. By bestowing policy entrepreneurs with credibility and legitimacy, technical resources (e.g. nutrition skills and knowledge) appear to be the crucial resources in these processes, as much as political and institutional resources.

## 6. The role of development partners

Development partners strongly contribute to FNS policies, both in their definition as they work closely with the government and in their implementation through significant funding. This contribution takes many forms (participation in policy-making, institutional framework, technical assistance, advocacy, co-management of food security stocks, etc.) and varies according to national governance contexts. The analysis of some policy decisions shows the complexity of relations between aid and national actors. This Section tries to analyse the role of development partners in the FNS policy design. To what extent development partners contribute to the shift in FNS policies introduced by the PSNP in Ethiopia? To what extent development partners play a role in the form of continuity of FNS policies in Burkina Faso?

### 6.1. Participation in FNS policy-making

As **Ethiopia** is one of the largest regular recipients of food and non-food aid (in financial terms), the engagement of donors in the national food and nutrition programs is certainly significant. In fact, most of Ethiopia's FNS policies are supported by a range of donors, whose strategy is derived largely from the country strategy, which in turn is developed with their participation in the policy-making process<sup>21</sup>. At the same time, the strong government ownership and leadership is frequently reported as a key feature of policy-making process in Ethiopia (Furtado and Hobson, 2011).

Regarding the PSNP, the development partners (mainly donors in the Ethiopian context<sup>22</sup>) played a key role in its definition through changes they have brought through their vision of FNS and the design of their interventions. Prior to the formal launch of multi-annual cash-based transfers programs, some aid actors, such as the German Technical Agency (GTZ), the Netherlands Embassy, and Save the Children (UK), have already moved towards this direction (World Bank, 2004b; cited by Walker D.J. and Wandschneider T., 2005).

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<sup>21</sup>This should not imply that some donors do not have their own strategy or focus or priority areas, which might not be align fully with the government FNS strategy. Different donors might also participate differently in the development of FNS policies, strategies or programs in the country. Senior USAID officers, for instance, claim that it is only USAID that offers technical support in defining components in policy design.

<sup>22</sup> There are a few international NGOs in Ethiopia since the 2005 election.

The PSNP was developed partly based on field experience of some donors<sup>23</sup>, as the government intended to scale-up their approach through the cash-based transfers. The PSNP emerged from the New Coalition for Food Security (NCFS) in which Ethiopia's major donors, such as the World Bank, USAID, DFID and EU, played significant roles (World Bank, 2011). In general, from its outset, PSNP is considered as a joint program of Ethiopia's government and its development partners.

In addition, institutional coordination between government and donors is at the heart of the PSNP. Donors work with the government through their Donors Assistance Group (DAG) and form various joint committees (see Figure 9). The PSNP institutional setup builds therefore coordination among government levels in political, technical and operational arenas, as well as with donors of the program. The PSNP could also be mentioned as a program that creates a new kind of cooperation and partnership between the government and donors.

The process of transfer responsibilities for disaster risk management from an independent agency (DPPC) into the MoARD (see Figure 11) is another example where donors play a significant role. The integration of the Disaster Risk Management Agency (DRM) into the MoARD has been brought as a result of World Bank's Business Process Reengineering Support to Ethiopia. This support was designed to restructure government institutions to enhance accountability, action-oriented structures and efficiency (IEH, 2012). This restructuring acknowledges the relationship between improvements in agriculture and disasters as well as the need to link consumption objectives with the protection and creation of assets (Loma-Ossorio E., and Lahoz C., 2012).

In **Burkina Faso**, the form of governance is different from Ethiopia and the affirmation of a strong government ownership seems less prominent, leaving *a priori* more room for development partners in FNS governance<sup>24</sup>. According to some interviewees, the PNSAN has been elaborated at the request of donors who recall that one performance indicator of the Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development Strategy was to draft a PNSAN in replacement of the SNSA. Development partners<sup>25</sup> have been associated to the PNSAN drafting process, some of them being very active and directly involved in the Writing Committee (e.g. WFP, FAO, EU, etc.). Nevertheless, some national actors reported that the process was primarily nationally-driven and donors were consulted as NGOs or CSOs.

Development partners are also fully part of the CNSA since they are statutory members of the Technical Committee, which is a structure of dialogue and reflection on food security issues. Some partners involved in emergency interventions, such as the WFP and ECHO, are reported to be particularly active within the CNSA. These donors (as the EU Delegation and FAO) contributed to the revival of the CNSA in 2010/11 and played a key role in drafting the first Response Plan. The weight of these actors in the CNSA functioning certainly contributes to explain the focus on vulnerability monitoring and prevention of food crises in the debate.

Furthermore, donors' financial contribution is essential in the funding of FNS interventions and hence this makes them major influencing actors in the FNS policy-making processes. The limited state funding (compared to development partners' one) was already raised as a

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<sup>23</sup>They include the Canadian International Development Agency, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, European Commission, Irish Aid, Swedish International Development Agency, US Agency for International Development, UK Department for International Development, DANIDA and World Bank (WFP, 2012).

<sup>24</sup> One development partner reported that: "the policy [PNSAN] is coming from the outside (...) Burkinabè are familiar with development partners (...) policy processes are largely externally driven (...) developing countries do not decide, this is the World Bank. Today the World Bank's agenda is on cash transfers".

<sup>25</sup> Here, development partners refer to donors as well as international NGOs that are quite numerous to operate in the country.

weakness of the specific scheme related to cereal policy (Burkina Faso, 2003). The implementation programme established in 2008 (PNSA) for the SNSA was funded up to 90% by the development partners (CSAO-CILSS, 2008).

MAFAP (2013) also underlines the strong reliance of agriculture on external funding during the period 2006-2010. The share of external funding accounted for an average 71% of total expenditures for the food and agriculture sector. Regarding social safety nets, the role of the World Bank in the agenda-setting and the funding of this type of intervention is another example of the key role of donors. According to FAO (2014b) “most of the existing social safety nets programmes are donor-driven and, therefore, susceptible to be discontinued when donors’ priorities shift”.

However, the current debate on targeting and the national list of vulnerable people in Burkina Faso shows that the game of actors is much more complex than the simplistic view of development partners dictating the FNS agenda and policies. A number of aid actors advocate for a long time the development of cash transfers and raise the challenge of targeting the beneficiaries of cash transfers. Taking short all these actors, the former PM made a statement on social measures (i.e. safety nets, high intensity labour force public works, etc.) and decided that a national list of vulnerable people should be built by June 2014. In this example, it seems that the PM’s willingness to (re)affirm the national leadership on social policies strongly contributes to the agenda setting of cash transfers<sup>26</sup>.

## 6.2. Challenges of donors coordination

Development partners have made huge efforts to better coordinate, in particular through a number of working groups addressing different FNS issues. This observation regarding donors can be made for almost all developing countries as this is in line with international commitments on aid effectiveness<sup>27</sup>. One can imagine that if development partners have too much divergent views the coordination process can be very long and difficult, and it can obstruct having better policies. However, in Ethiopia and Burkina, joint working groups seems to help in narrowing the divergent views in terms of policies, strategies and priorities among different donors as well as in aligning their resources and technical capacity with the government. Efforts of coordination have then undoubtedly improved aid efficiency on the ground, but intersectoral coordination remains a major challenge. Within large aid actors in particular, FNS issues are often addressed by different departments or services (i.e. rural, social, nutrition, etc.) for effectiveness reasons but this internal organisation without (or with weak) intersectoral mechanism tends to result in fragmentation of FNS interventions. Given the weight of large aid actors on FNS policy design, this fragmentation might contribute to the difficulties of intersectoral collaboration at national policy level.

In **Ethiopia**, donors’ willingness, flexibility and cooperation in pooling financial and technical/knowledge resources and management role have been reported as important to help to minimise wastage while strengthening national capacity in managing and refining interventions continuously.

In **Burkina Faso**, the lack of coordination among development partners has been raised by a number of interviewees: each donor has its vision, preferences, agenda, projects, financial proceedings, etc. For example, the two main divides in the vision of the FNS that have been highlighted (see section 5.2.1) are reflected among development partners: agricultural-

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<sup>26</sup> One representative of donors mentioned that: “the idea of a national list of vulnerable people comes from the government”.

<sup>27</sup> See for example Mattee and Ngetti (2009) or Edriss (2010) on policy coherence of agricultural aid delivery in Tanzania and Malawi, and the work of IDDRI in a forthcoming document for FoodSecure.

oriented versus social or nutrition-oriented visions; short-term (focusing on specific zones, periods, households) versus long-term visions. In addition, the tendency to multiply working groups on agriculture, food security, nutrition issues, which mirror the national FNS institutional framework, creates fragmentation and overlap. One EU-funded program has been identified by some interviewees as a good example of innovative program that aims to bridge short-term and long-term responses. As part of the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework, the LRRD-REPI 2010 program funded by the European Union Delegation (EUD) in Burkina Faso was set up following the emergency response to the flooding of July 2010 funded by DG ECHO in the same year. The main objective was to improve the resilience of people affected by the floods by ensuring that the EUD interventions can take over from the ECHO interventions when they come to an end<sup>28</sup>.

## 7. The policy content of trade policies

Trade policies are particularly important for food security as they strongly impact food prices. At the same time, they represent a highly controversial domain. Controversies relate especially to price distortions resulting from agricultural subsidies<sup>29</sup> and different policy options on key issues, such as the “food price dilemma” between interests of producers and consumers<sup>30</sup>, or trade-offs between export-oriented agriculture and domestically-oriented agriculture. Schematically, trade policy options are reflected in free trade policy or support to local production through border protection (tariffs and non-tariff measures) and domestic supports to producers. As recalled by Huchet-Bourdon and Laroche-Dupraz (2014), the effects of such trade policy options on the economic welfare of producers and consumers are well known: a protective policy (i.e. high agricultural tariffs) has positive effects on domestic supply (the same with coupled domestic support), but negative impacts on domestic consumers; an open market (i.e. low or zero tariffs) is positive for urban consumers, but could discourage domestic producers from developing their investment and supply.

Trade policies are translated into various instruments, such as tariffs, safeguards, quotas, market interventions, price risk insurance, commodity exchanges, futures and other hedge instruments, export restrictions, various forms of food reserves, and trade and export promotion (Häberli, 2013). For simplification reasons, this Section is focused on two main instruments of trade policies: border measures and subsidies.

### 7.1. Liberal trade policy while ad hoc state interventions in Ethiopia

**Ethiopia** has experimented with a whole spectrum of agricultural pricing policies ranging from parastatal-centric control through production quota and trade control during the Derge regime, to a dual pricing approach during the period 1992-99 to total liberalization (except security reserve and safety nets) with ad hoc interventions since 1999 (Rashid, 2007).

Ethiopia’s government current trade policy in relation to food security could be categorized into three groups: (i) food especially wheat price stabilization through import and improve

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<sup>28</sup> See more information for example on the URD website: <http://www.urd.org>.

<sup>29</sup> EU and US agricultural subsidies have been particularly criticized for their distorting impacts on international prices and local production in African countries. Indeed, global prices were not true indicators of efficiency and imports from the global market created unfair competition with local production. However, subsidies have been substantially reduced these last years as a result of the WTO disciplines and, above all, import competition on local production comes now not only from the EU and the USA but more and more from emerging countries (for instance Brazil).

<sup>30</sup> The challenge of trade policies is to balance the interests of net food buyers and net food sellers (FAO, 2013).

trade effectiveness (e.g. ECX); (ii) ad hoc pricing policy; and (iii) ad hoc intervention in food export markets.

Regarding food price stabilization, there are widely held beliefs, albeit with little evidence, that “middlemen” are to be blamed for both the ever increasing food prices and for the fact that farm gate prices remain below world market levels. As a consequence, price stabilization measures through governmental cereal/wheat supplies to millers and bakers enjoy high general support (Lawrence, 2003). This intervention through cereals/wheat importation has been growing especially since 2006 (see



Figure 14. Cereals Import Quantity (tonnes)

Figure 15. Cereals Export Quantity (tonnes)

). Despite its positive impact in enhancing food security especially for the poor, this intervention might affect producers’ incentives. However, there is no information available on intervention criteria, triggers, and quantities, which makes it difficult to assess the impact of the intervention on the incentives of producers (Rashid, 2007; Häberli, 2013).

Figure 14. Cereals Import Quantity (tonnes)

Figure 15. Cereals Export Quantity (tonnes)



Source: Computed-based on FAO’s data base.

The new Commodity Exchange (ECX) is the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. It had been hailed as a big step forward in the fight for transparency and against market power abuse by the “middlemen”. Now farmers can bring their crops to one of the 17 warehouses established by the ECX in the growing regions, agree with managers on the quality grading and give their minimum offering price, which they can modify after each trading day and for one month (after which there is a penalty). Today ECX handles over 60% of Ethiopian coffee (different schemes, some export directly, or through coops, with a primary market around the warehouse through local traders). Trading is by ‘open cry’ and the farmer can see all the paid prices on his cell phone.

Yet there is no price risk hedging. At this point in time and to the disappointment of a number of people who had hoped for more, only contracts for three export crops are traded on this spot market: coffee, sesame, and white beans (Häberli, 2013). This focus on non-food export crops reflect the export-oriented strategy adopted by Ethiopia in its agricultural policy (Agricultural Growth Programme). Despite enhancing the transparency in trade of these crops via ECX, there are no much studies that ascertain the actual benefit accrued to smallholders. Similarly, today’s experience and lessons from ECX trading on these few crops is not

translated into expansion of this modern trading activity into major food crops like teff, wheat and maize, which are extensively produced and traded in the country.

The launch of production insurance for small farmers about a decade ago could also be considered as an intervention that potentially help enhancing food security. Production insurance operates inter alia by Nyala Insurance Company, in-cooperation with WFP, Oxfam America, and others. It started in 2006 with 120 farmers/ 261ha for wheat, teff, and haricot beans; in 2008 there were 827 farmers/ 778ha with additional farmers and surfaces insured by 2010. Farmers unable to pay the insurance premium can obtain an insurance license through “work for insurance” at a “work for food” project operated by Oxfam or USAID (e.g. for environmental protection, forest, or compost). After an initial trial and error period with more specific risks insured, its operation has become much simpler with compensation now triggered by a weather-based index (Häberli, 2013).

Reinsurance for this scheme is guaranteed by the Switzerland-based reinsurance company (Swiss Re). It is too early to consider the scheme as a commercial success with a demonstrable impact on farmers’ income stabilisation. However, it should be recognised that the scheme covers certain production risks only and in particular, does not help farmers to gauge and hedge commercial risks, such as price fluctuations, or longer-term investment risks. This incidentally is just one of the problems accelerating the “land rush” of foreign-based investors benefitting from such insurance (and legal protection). Initial yield-based insurance schemes have also other difficulties to address, especially communication and organisational mistakes that presently limit their usefulness (evaluation report by Terefe Degefa for Nyala Insurance in May 2010). In addition, crop insurance may not work for risk-averse farmers according to Getaw Tadesse from IFPRI, though it is easier to handle than livestock insurance which has a much longer production cycle (Häberli, 2013).

Finally, it has to be noted that three or four years ago when food inflation exceeded 40%, the government intervened in the market directly through price cap and banned export food grains. The government seems to continue implementing these policies, but on ad hoc bases. Key food items such as wheat, food oil or sugar are imported and distributed by the government to keep prices affordable for consumers and keep inflation low.

## **7.2. Trade policies marked by agricultural taxation in Burkina Faso**

In **Burkina Faso** as in many other African countries, the taxation of agriculture—especially export crops— has been demonstrated by several authors (Krueger et al., 1988, Berg report, 1981, Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas, 1999 cited by Laroche-Dupraz and Postolle, 2011). Agricultural trade policies have radically changed since the independence periods where governments intervened at various stages of agricultural value chains (input subsidies, fixed producer prices, public storage to stabilise consumer prices, etc.). Structural adjustment programs implied a shift from highly protected import-substitution industrialisation and an emphasis on food self-sufficiency towards focus on export crops and trade-based food security (FAO, 2013). However, according to MAFAP trade policies continue to negatively affect producers. Between 2005 and 2010, producers received price below those that they would have received in the absence of current agricultural policies, except for some products such as rice, cotton and sorghum (MAFAP, 2013).

Tariffs decreased with structural adjustment reforms in the 1990 and have again been reduced with the introduction of the relatively low WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET) in



2000<sup>31</sup>. Hence, the need for stronger protection of local producers has long been claimed by producer organisations, especially at the regional level by the Network of Farmers' and Producers' Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA)<sup>32</sup>.

In 2007/08, the border measures decided by the government of Burkina Faso to manage food price spikes tend to increasing disincentives for farmers (MAFAP, 2013). Import duties and taxes were temporarily suspended on basic food commodities such as rice, salt, milk and food preparations for children, but they were restored before the end of the year. With respect to non-tariff measures, "the government banned cereals exports for six months to ensure domestic market supply. Moreover, since 2007/08, exports of staple crops such as sorghum and maize have been restricted with the intention to keep these commodities in the country to avoid acute famine. These restrictions take the form of red tape at borders" (FAO, 2014).

Only recently tariffs in Burkina Faso have experienced a reversal in their evolution with the endorsement by ECOWAS Member States of the ECOWAS CET in 2013. After long negotiations and strong advocacy from some stakeholders (e.g. Nigeria and ROPPA) – a fifth tariff band (of 35%) has been added to the WAEMU CET and safeguard measures adopted to address price volatility when extended to the ECOWAS zone<sup>33</sup>.

The domestic support measures' evolution is also marked by market-oriented policy reforms with state's withdrawal from agricultural service provision, marketing and finance (FAO, 2013). Expenditure in support of agriculture has moved away from direct payments to farmers towards more general support (e.g. training or agricultural research) (MAFAP, 2013). Input subsidies are an important item of public expenditures but concentrated on a few agricultural products such as cotton. While the 2007/08 border measures were not in favour of producers, the food crisis pushed the government to support staple crop production by distributing improved seeds and subsidizing half the cost of fertilizers (FAO 2014).

The fact that agriculture has been historically taxed – rather than subsidized – in African countries such as Burkina Faso is generally explained by the persistence of an "urban bias". Because the majority of voters are urban consumers and that rural people have little political voice, governments are prone to avoid any producer support measures that could have negative impact on urban consumers (Laroche-Dupraz and Postolle, 2011). Urban riots such as those experienced by Burkina Faso when prices of food (and other basic commodities) rose in 2007/08, well illustrate the strong political sensitivity of urban food insecurity<sup>34</sup>.

Nevertheless, as recalled by Laroche-Dupraz and Postolle (2011) agricultural taxation has gradually decreased over the last two decades. In addition, the 2007/08 crisis has also marked a shift in the orientation of trade policies by highlighting the costs of a strong reliance on the international market for food security. Ambitious agricultural production targets supported by significant input subsidies programs have been set to improve self-sufficiency. While trade policies are usually preferably used to support consumers than public expenditures, these latter have increased between 2006 and 2010 through food aid, school feeding programmes,

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<sup>31</sup>National taxes such as VAT being *de facto* only imposed on imported products were nevertheless equivalent to border protection measures.

<sup>32</sup>The arguments were the need for ensuring a favourable environment to local producers so that they are encouraged to invest on their farms and then production costs could be reduced to the benefit of consumers.

<sup>33</sup> ECOWAS Member States turned back to the 2006 decision of extending the WAEMU CET (at this time, four tariff bands with a maximum tariff of 20%) to the ECOWAS zone. Agricultural products falling under the fifth band are mainly meats, fresh and processed horticultural products, processed cocoa products and key vegetable oils. Safeguard measures comprise a temporary surtax on imports to protect local production from large world price declines or import surges, and a cut in tariffs in case of price hikes or falls in imports (FAO, 2013).

<sup>34</sup> "Starvation in the countryside does not trigger political instability" and there is clearly "an urban consumers *versus* small farmers approach" in African countries (Laroche-Dupraz and Postolle, 2011).

vouchers and cash transfers. At the regional level, it has to be noted that the ECOWAS/ CAADEP agricultural policy recognises both the need of higher protection for food sovereignty purpose and the need to protect vulnerable people from adverse effect of price volatility through social safety nets and a regional food security reserve (FAO, 2013).

## **8. Conclusions**

Despite the wide recognition of the multidimensionality of FNS and of the need to mobilize all the concerned sectors (agriculture, health, social affairs, trade, etc., short-term and long-term responses), FNS policies barely reflect a comprehensive and well-balanced approach. In Ethiopia the introduction of the PNSP seems to succeed in making the bridge between short-term and long-term interventions and bringing a social perspective to FNS. In Burkina Faso, the current resilience agenda has also the ambition to build this bridge. However, FNS policies and institutional frameworks remain predominantly agricultural production-oriented and most often focused on monitoring the agricultural season in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and also Kenya and Benin.

This paper tries to understand this form of disconnection between the holistic concept of FNS which asks for inter-sectoral FNS policies and the reality of FNS policies which are mainly sector-specific. The original framework used for the analysis is based on both the cognitive policy analysis where actors' representations play a determining role in policy changes and the neo-institutionalism where the weight of institutions explains policy inertia. Between 10 and 20 semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted, especially to understand how they perceive the FNS challenges and what should be the solutions. The analytical framework proves to be particularly powerful to respond to our research questions.

Historically, decision makers have understood FNS in terms of food production only. Since only a few years, awareness on nutrition for example has emerged very high on the political agenda. This initial framing of FNS challenges around food availability and the prevention and management of food crises continues to weight on FNS actors' visions. This illustration of path dependency is strongly rooted in actors' training (the vast majority of them have their background in agriculture) and the bias of national food security information systems towards production indicators (despite their significant enlargement to other FNS indicators).

Alternative visions of FNS, focusing more on social and nutrition perspectives of FNS, are gaining importance but this tends to lead to parallel agenda and institutional frameworks. For example, both in food security and nutrition, intersectoral bodies are created in order to convoke all the relevant sectors. This situation creates some confusion and overlap between FNS institutions and, in fact, these intersectoral bodies are facing difficulties in properly addressing the multiple dimensions of FNS.

Paradoxically, trade policies have usually been unfavourable to producers through agricultural taxation, low tariffs and ad hoc state interventions to keep domestic prices accessible to consumers. Generally governments want to keep the prices low because of pressures from urban vocal consumers. It should be ensured, however, that efforts to lower consumer food prices are aligned with opportunities to sustain livelihoods and growth in farming. Farmers should be given enough incentives. The decrease of agricultural taxation over the last decades and the ambitious programs to support agricultural production in view of improving food self-sufficiency since the 2007/08 food crisis can be considered as a reduction of this paradox. Such reform has effectively been going hand in hand with an upscaling of social protection measures for consumers that are vulnerable to shocks in the market.

Shaping and implementing comprehensive and well-balanced FNS policies does not prejudice any form of intersectoral collaboration and institutional architecture. Questions such as what is the most appropriate institutional anchorage for FNS issues (under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Prime Minister or the Presidency), or whether food security and nutrition institutions should be merged into a single intersectoral body, are very context-specific. Successful national experiences of FNS institutional framework can barely be transferred or replicated in other countries. It's up to each country, given its political and social history and specificities, to design its own institutional mechanism which would enable to move from the agricultural bias of FNS policies towards more multidimensional policies.

The weight of initial FNS framings (agricultural-oriented), the routine practices and functioning of FNS organisations, as well as the interests of the historical (agricultural) actors in FNS and power relations with other actors, suggest some inertia in FNS policies. Effective multidimensional FNS policies would certainly take some time to be implemented as they question these historical trends, sectoral logics and interests built over time.

High-level commitments and leadership and/ or the existence of policy entrepreneurs are important factors contributing to initiate FNS policy changes. In Ethiopia, the high-level political willingness to move away from annual humanitarian appeal is part of the explanation of the FNS policies' shift towards addressing chronic food insecurity. Donors have made huge efforts to coordinate and align with the government's position, in line with aid effectiveness principles. However, this experience has to be understood in the specific context of the Ethiopian governance. Various forms of political commitments are possible and further research would be necessary to explore the relation between some forms of governance and leadership and the evolution of FNS policies.

Development partners (donors, NGOs, etc.) are nevertheless important actors in FNS policy-making processes in all the studied countries. Hence, changes in their vision of FNS, their functioning and their interventions may significantly contribute to FNS policy changes. In particular, a better coordination between the different services or units in charge of FNS in the internal organisation of large aid actors, such as the European Commission, is a major challenge. In terms of recommendations for the EU policies in aid and development, examples of EU programs aiming at better linking emergency and development responses already exist (e.g. projects where the delegation could take over from ECHO support when it comes to an end). Ensuring a strong articulation of supports in agriculture, social transfers and nutrition appears now to be a key effort for more multidimensional FNS policies.

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## **Annex 2. List of organisations interviewed in Ethiopia**

29 persons were carefully selected from multilateral and bilateral aid and development agencies because of their participation or role in Ethiopia's FNS programs and strategies. The following institutions were approached for the survey: USAID, DFID, EU, World Bank, UNDP, WFP, FAO, AU/CAADP, AfDP, Bilateral development cooperation in the embassies of Germany, France), NGOs from Save the Children and ACF/Action against Hunger, and two key government ministries (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development). Three selected individuals expected to have good knowledge of Ethiopia's FNS were also contacted.

Ten persons responded to the opinion survey, from the following organisations:

- World Bank Country office in Ethiopia
- WFP - World Food Programme
- FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- EU - Delegation of the European Commission to Ethiopia
- WHO - World Health Organization
- USAID-Ethiopia
- DFID-Ethiopia
- CCRDA
- SC- Save the Children
- World Vision

### **Annex 3. List of organisations interviewed in Burkina Faso**

Around 20 persons have been interviewed in Burkina Faso, coming from the following organisations:

- MoAFS - Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/ General Secretariat
- MoAFS - Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/ Permanent Secretariat for Coordination of Sectoral Agricultural Policies
- MoAFS - Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/ Direction of Prospective and Operational Planification
- CNSA – National Council on Food Security (Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire)/ Executive Secretariat
- WFP – World Food Program
- AFD – French Development Agency
- FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- World Bank
- EU – Delegation of European Commission in Burkina Faso
- Humanitarian Office of European Commission
- French Embassy
- FEWSNET
- Confédération Paysanne du Faso (Producer Organisation)
- Gret (NGO)
- Action Contre la Faim (NGO)

## The FOODSECURE project in a nutshell

Title	FOODSECURE – Exploring the future of global food and nutrition security
Funding scheme	7th framework program, theme Socioeconomic sciences and the humanities
Type of project	Large-scale collaborative research project
Project Coordinator	Hans van Meijl (LEI Wageningen UR)
Scientific Coordinator	Joachim von Braun (ZEF, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn)
Duration	2012 - 2017 (60 months)

**Short description**

In the future, excessively high food prices may frequently reoccur, with severe impact on the poor and vulnerable. Given the long lead time of the social and technological solutions for a more stable food system, a long-term policy framework on global food and nutrition security is urgently needed.

The general objective of the FOODSECURE project is to design effective and sustainable strategies for assessing and addressing the challenges of food and nutrition security.

FOODSECURE provides a set of analytical instruments to experiment, analyse, and coordinate the effects of short and long term policies related to achieving food security.

FOODSECURE impact lies in the knowledge base to support EU policy makers and other stakeholders in the design of consistent, coherent, long-term policy strategies for improving food and nutrition security.

EU Contribution	€8 million
Research team	19 partners from 13 countries

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