@article{Bolotova:283708,
      recid = {283708},
      author = {Bolotova, Yuliya V.},
      title = {Price-Fixing in the United States Broiler and Pork  Industries},
      address = {2019-02},
      number = {2173-2019-437},
      pages = {23},
      year = {2019},
      abstract = {During the recent decade a group of large meat processors  in the U.S. broiler and pork industries implemented a  series of production control practices at various stages of  the broiler and pork supply chains. The meat processors  used these practices to mitigate agricultural supply  volatility and increases in agricultural input prices (i.e.  feed prices), which led to the over-supply problem  adversely affecting their profitability. Direct and  indirect buyers of broilers and pork filed antitrust  lawsuits alleging that by implementing these production  control practices (i.e. production cuts), the meat  processors engaged in unlawful conspiracies with the  purpose of fixing, increasing and stabilizing prices of  broilers and pork paid by various participants in the  broiler and pork supply chains. The research presented in  the paper applies a traditional theoretical framework  explaining the seller market power to understand the  economics of the conduct and performance of the U.S.  broiler and pork industries in light of the alleged  price-fixing conspiracies. It also provides a basic  empirical evidence on the market and price behavior during  the period of alleged price-fixing conspiracies (i.e. the  implementation of production cuts) and the period preceding  the implementation of production cuts.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/283708},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.283708},
}