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Convergence Theory and Conditional Convergence in Countries of Sub Saharan Africa from 1990-2015

W. Huffman¹; N. Huffman²

1: Iowa State University, Economics, United States of America, 2: Iowa State University, , United States of America

Corresponding author email: whuffman@iastate.edu

Abstract:

This paper examines the hypothesis of conditional convergence in income per person for Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries over the most recent twenty-five year period, 1990-2015. The income data are in 2011 PPP\$ from the Penn-World Table 9.0 (2017). This is the first study to use them in a study of convergence of per capita income in SSA. New conditioning variables are identified and included in the econometric model of growth. This is important because it might suggest where organizations (e.g., the World Bank or aid agencies) should invest to yield the most economic growth. The main results are for the largest 35 SSA countries, and they include: average per capita income in 2011 PPP\$ grew at 1.1 percent over the period of 1990-2014; and conditional convergence is occurring, i.e., countries lagging behind in 1990 grew faster over the subsequent 25 years. Countries with a larger share of the labor force in agriculture in 1990 grew slower, as do countries in central Africa. Former British colonies tend to grow faster. External support for new agricultural technology or increased nutrition and food availability that increases agricultural productivity would reduce the share of labor in agriculture and increase future growth performance.

Acknowledgment: Authors are Economics Student, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, and C.F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor of Agriculture and Life Sciences and Professor of Economics, Iowa State University. We thank Arun Kandanchatha for helpful comments. We thank the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station for financial support.

JEL Codes: I31, Q18

#1101



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Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis of conditional convergence in income per person for Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries over the most recent twenty-five year period, 1990-2015. The income data are in 2011 PPP\$ from the Penn-World Table 9.0 (2017). This is the first study to use them in a study of convergence of per capita income in SSA. New conditioning variables are identified and included in the econometric model of growth. This is important because it might suggest where organizations (e.g., the World Bank or aid agencies) should invest to yield the most economic growth. The main results are for the largest 35 SSA countries, and they include: average per capita income in 2011 PPP\$ grew at 1.1 percent over the period of 1990-2014; and conditional convergence is occurring, i.e., countries lagging behind in 1990 grew faster over the subsequent 25 years. Countries with a larger share of the labor force in agriculture in 1990 grew slower, as do countries in central Africa. Former British colonies tend to grow faster. External support for new agricultural technology or increased nutrition and food availability that increases agricultural productivity would reduce the share of labor in agriculture and increase future growth performance.

Introduction

Understanding wealth and income of countries and why some countries have the potential to grow at much faster rates is an important issue in economic growth and development literature. Convergence theory is a subset of this literature, and it is concerned with whether poorer countries grow at faster rates than wealthier countries, causing countries to converge in per capita income over time. More specifically, conditional convergence implies that countries converge within their income group (or within some other conditioning variable), for example, poorer developed countries over time converge with the wealthier developed countries.

However, among poor countries there is some doubt as to whether there is conditional convergence. For example, Durlauf (2004) reports that Sub Saharan African countries experienced negative growth in GDP per capita over a substantial period of time, e.g., 40 years or roughly for the period 1960-2000. In countries that experience negative growth over long periods of time, how could they converge to countries with positive growth rates? Hence, further research on conditional convergence in Sub Saharan African countries is an interesting piece of research. It has important implications about where countries, world agencies, and donor agencies should invest in the future.

The objective of this paper is to examine the hypothesis of conditional convergence in income per person for Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries over the most recent twenty-five year period, 1990-2015. This study uses new data on per capita income and income growth that recently became available in purchasing-power-parity 2011 dollars (PPP\$), that better adjusts for prices of untraded services than official exchange rate adjusted data (Groningen Growth and Development Center 2017). It also considers new conditioning variables measured at the start of the study period. These variables include colonial affiliation, political stability, corruption level,

regional location, the population growth rate, share of the labor force in agricultural, extent of child labor, literacy rate, life expectancy, and percent of population with access to safe water.

Consistent with the national (or regional) growth convergence literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Durlauf 2004), the per capita income growth model is a reduced-form and not a structural model.

This paper finds from new data on GDP per person that average per capita income in SSA was growing at 1.1 percent over the period of 1990-2014. It finds that countries lagging behind in 1990 grew faster and some conditioning variables were important, for example the share of labor in agriculture, and UK affiliation. Thus, the paper provides evidence for conditional convergence in SSA and the importance of certain conditioning variables. This information is important as organizations such as The World Bank and foreign aid agencies of developed countries could invest in new agricultural technologies or nutrition and food availability (Fukase and Martin, 2017) programs that would increase agricultural productivity and reduce the share of the labor force in agriculture, which promises to increase the rate of future economic growth.

The second section of this paper examines literature that motivates the questions asked in this paper. The third section considers the materials and methods. The fourth section presents the regression results. The next section presents a general discussion, and the final section contains the conclusion.

Selective Literature Review

Lant Pritchett (1997) reported that over the period 1870-1990 advanced countries experienced convergence but there is neither large amount nor good data on long run growth rates of developing countries, so his goal of this paper was to determine whether this was true for

developing countries as well. He reported lower growth rates for less developed countries in comparison to developed, so that per capita incomes diverged. Pritchett found that there was generally no acceleration of growth absolutely to a new higher steady state or even conditionally in developing countries. In addition, for the period 1960-1990 using the Penn World table, he found a deceleration of growth rates in 81 of the 103 developing countries. This is surprising because if these countries are going to experience per capita income convergence with the developed countries, they must be experiencing positive (and rapid) growth. On the other hand, short periods of explosive growth were reported for some Eastern Asian countries but some African countries experienced economic growth disasters. Overall, Pritchett found that developed countries converged and that low-income countries were diverging from the developed countries.

Durlauf (2004) looks at the historic divergence in living standards. In the 1700s all countries were poor, in the 18th and 19th century growth rates in Western Europe increased. The global inequality seems to stem from a few Western economies growing while the majority of countries did not, though there are a few important exceptions, such as a few developing countries growing at really fast rates including parts of Eastern Asia. He states that growth in per capita income seems to be correlated with growth in GDP per worker, except in countries that had low labor participation rates at the beginning of the period. When looking at a table of GDP per worker, relative to the US for 1960 and 2000, major Western European countries had similar growth rates as the US (i.e., the UK), or faster growth rates (i.e., France, Italy). Now rich countries were significantly poorer than the US 60 years ago, such as Japan and Korea, drastically improved, while countries such as Argentina performed badly. Looking at the median and mean there was a slight increase suggesting a slight convergence. He also reported that many

countries in Sub Saharan Africa experienced negative growth rates over the 40-year time period. However, new and updated income data have become available in the Penn World Table version 9.0 making it possible to measure per capita income as GDP per person in purchasing-power-parity (PPP\$) 2011 U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2016). PPP\$ data better account for the low price of nontraded services in developing countries. None of the other papers on convergence consider per capita income growth in real PPP units or for the period 1990-2014.

Our paper is similar to Pritchett's work in the aspect that it tests for whether developing countries experience convergence, but we use a formal econometric model and income data from a newly updated Penn World table. In our formal model, it is also possible to examine the effects of various conditioning variables. SSA was largely bypassed by the green revolution (Pingali, 2012) and the gene revolution (Bazuin et al., 2011) and contains several of the poorest countries of the world. Hence, it is a region that needs further analysis, and we focus on the performance of countries in SSA rather than the general category of developing countries.

Materials and Methods

The Data

The study chooses 35 countries in SSA for empirical analysis (see Table 1 for list of countries). This is a very large share of all of the countries in this region but excludes very small countries with less than 1.5 million people in 1990 and for which data are not available. The income and population data are taken from The Penn World Tables version 9.0, which became available in 2017 (see Femstra et al., 2015, for details). They are the most updated version, which is significant because it has not yet been used for convergence analysis in Africa. New stunting data were also obtained directly by contacting the World Health Organization in

¹ Dervis (2012) discusses prospects of more rapid income convergence between the rich and poor countries of the world since 1990, but SSA seems to be largely insulated from the fundamental trends that he emphasizes.

Geneva, Switzerland on stunting in children less than 5 years of age in 1990 for the countries of SSA.

Table 1 displays the per capita real GDP in 2011 PPP's for 1990 and 2014 that will be later used in the empirical analysis. It also includes a comparison to GDP in 1990 and 2014 in

Table 1. Per capita real GDP per person in real dollars for Sub Saharan African countries: 1990 and 2014

Countries	PPP per_cap_1990	PPP per_cap_2014	Real* per_cap_1990	Real* per_cap_2014	Avg ann growth in PPP	Avg ann growth rea terms*
Benin	1202	1922	1461	8533	0.020	0.074
Burkina Faso	912	1565	780	1461	0.023	0.026
Burundi	798	772	632	806	-0.001	0.01
Cameroon	2370	2698	2561	2705	0.005	0.002
Central African Republic	1079	594	977	570	-0.025	-0.022
Chad	1411	2013	949	1963	0.015	0.030
Côte d'Ivoire	2311	3352	2961	2982	0.015	0.000
Ethiopia	866	1323	658	1467	0.018	0.033
Ghana	1903	3570	1846	3728	0.026	0.029
Kenya	2061	2769	2455	2914	0.012	0.007
Madagascar	1012	1237	1633	1352	0.008	-0.008
Malawi	958	949	847	1137	0.000	0.012
Mali	733	1434	1040	1497	0.028	0.015
Niger	846	852	827	886	0.000	0.003
Nigeria	845	5501	2949	5537	0.078	0.026
Sierra Leone	1590	1419	1968	2048	-0.005	0.002
South Africa	8366	12128	9671	12154	0.015	0.010
Sudan	1588	3781	2046	3585	0.036	0.023
Tanzania	1118	2213	1352	2439	0.028	0.025
Uganda	808	1839	833	1923	0.034	0.035
Zambia	1343	3726	2240	3516	0.043	0.019
Zimbabwe	4262	1869	1417	1688	-0.034	0.007

^{*}Real rates are using an exchange rate conversion

exchange rate dollars. It is interesting that per capita GDP in 1990 ranges from \$798 in Burundi to \$8,366 for South Africa, and for 2014, the range is from \$594 in the South African Republic to \$12,128 for South Africa. For the great bulk of the countries there is growth in GDP per capita in 2011 PPP's, but for five of the thirty-five countries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Niger and Zimbabwe) per capita income declines over this period and for the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe, per capita income is roughly 50% lower in 2014 than in 1990. However, only 15% of the countries were experiencing negative growth, which is much lower

than reported by Durlauf using earlier data. An alternative measure of real GDP per person is in real exchange rate dollars. The majority of the countries have a higher beginning per capita GDP using real exchange rate dollars. When comparing the average annual growth in PPP terms and real terms, growth rates were generally similar except for Benin and Nigeria.

The Model

Consistent with the economic growth literature, the growth convergence equation is:

(1)
$$\left(\frac{1}{T}\right) \ln \left(\frac{y_{it+T}}{y_{it}}\right) = B_1 + B_2 \ln y_{it} + \sum_{j=3}^{J} B_j X_{ij} + \mu_i$$

where i refers to the particular countries in the study. In particular, for convergence in per capita income, growth rates across countries conditionally depends on β_2 being negative. This says that the countries lagging behind in t must grow faster over the next T years than the leading countries.

If β_1 is positive and β_2 is negative and significant, and the other $\beta_j s$ are not significant, unconditional convergence occurs. This means none of the conditioning variables are significant. However, this would be unexpected.

The specific empirical specification of the growth equation for the study is as follows:

$$(2) \qquad (\frac{1}{24}) \left[\ln{(y_{2014})} - \ln{(y_{1990})}\right] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \ln{(y_{1990})} + \beta_3 \text{aglabor_1990} + \beta_4 UK + \beta_5 we stafrica \\ + \beta_6 central africa + \beta_7 \text{life_exp_90} + \beta_8 \text{per_water_90} + \beta_9 \text{lit_90} + \beta_{10} \text{child_lab_90} + \beta_{11} \text{corr_90} + \beta_{12} \text{pop_growth} + \beta_{13} \text{ocean} + \beta_{14} \text{pol_stab} + \beta_{15} \text{stunt} + \mu$$

where y_{2014} and y_{1990} are per capita real income in 2014 and 1990. This is a reduced form model of aggregate economic growth of nations in the spirit of Barro and Sali-a-Martin (1992) and Durlauf (2004), and it is not a structural model of economic growth.

As noted above, for per capita income convergence, β_2 must be negative. An increase in log per capita in 1990 should be associated with a lower rate of economic growth of per capita income over 1990-2014. This is a condition needed for lagging countries in 1990 to catch up by 2014. Thus, in the long run, these countries will converge. Hence, if β_2 is negative, there will be evidence for conditional convergence.

We have a short list of key conditioning variables and a sizeable list of other possible conditioning variables. We first discuss the key conditioning variables that are available in the beginning of the study period. A higher percent of people in agriculture is expected to have a negative effect on the future average rate of growth because it signals low labor productivity in agriculture. This is likely to slow the rate of future growth (Huffman and Orazem 2007).

Many believe that the UK did a better job investing in a new legal system, property rights and infrastructure including education in countries it colonized than other countries, e.g., France, Netherlands. They most likely also adopted the English as a language, which is important for understanding much of the advances published in scientific journals. For these reasons, a country that was a UK colony is expected to grow more rapidly (Heldring and Robinsons, 2012).

West, Central, and East Africa have different natural resources, including that Central African countries tend to have less rainfall than West or Eastern Africa. This impacts the production potential of crops (and pastureland). Many of these countries really struggle to get enough food and water to grow crops to feed their people and famines sometimes occur. With a low and variable water and food supply, these countries are likely to be less productive and grow more slowly. East Africa is the default category.

Other possible conditioning variables at the beginning of the study period include life expectancy at birth, polluted drinking water, stunting of children, and low literacy. A longer life

expectancy at birth is important for creating an opportunity to live and work longer, and a longer life generally increases benefits from investing in human capital. If people are expecting to live longer, there is a larger benefit of learning while young and going to school (Huffman and Orazem 2007). This increases incentive for households, individuals, and society to invest more in education, on-the-job training, and health. When more human capital is available, labor productivity, and more generally economic growth are expected to be higher. However, increasing life expectancy may also lead to population growth, which in turn could decrease income per capita. Work by Cervillate (2006) found that in pre-transitional countries, increase in life expectancy increased population growth rate enough to lower per capita income. While in post-transitioning countries, increase in life expectancy led to an acceleration in human capital and an increase in per capita income. Other things equal, higher population growth would have negative effects on per capita income growth due to diluting factors of production (Cervillate, 2006).

Polluted drinking water is a major carrier of diseases leading to other health problems which lower labor productivity (Fogel, 1994). Eighty-eight percent of disease in developing countries comes from unsafe drinking water (Prüss-Üstün, 2008). If unsafe water causes health problems, children would be less likely to attend school and might generally have low energy for work, which would lead to low labor productivity and income growth of a country. Hence, countries with access to safe drinking water are expected to grow faster.

Stunting, which reflects long term food deprivation, has permanent effects likely compromising organ systems of children and making them unusually short in adult stature (Fogel, 1994). Hence, stunted adults are likely to have low labor productivity. Therefore,

countries that have a higher rate of stunting are expected to have lower rates of economic growth.²

Since education is hard to measure and SSA countries have low levels of completed schooling, literacy rate is an alternative measure of education and will be used here. People who are literate are better able to acquire and process information for their home and job which will make them more productive and lead to higher economic growth (Schultz, 1977). They are also able to do more advanced work and find jobs in a larger amount of areas. Thus, countries that have higher literacy rates are expected to grow faster. However, if there is a high rate of child labor (children 7-14 years of age working regularly), these children will not be in school and it will have long-term effects on their labor productivity. Hence, countries with a higher rate of child labor are expected to grow less rapidly.

If a country has less corruption and the people have higher trust in government, they may feel secure in making human capital and other investments that would promote future economic growth. In addition, the economy is more likely to be viewed as fair, encouraging people to work harder, opposed to situations where people get ahead using bribes rather than hard work. Hence, countries with higher rates of corruption are expected to grow more slowly.

If a country is on the ocean, they have more opportunities for sea ports and shipping, which gives them easier access to international trade. They are better able to import and export more goods, which could increase economic activity for the country, including creating more jobs. Hence, countries on the ocean are expected to grow faster.

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² Stunting of children is also an indicator of just how nutritionally impoverished the general population of a country is likely to be and might cause per capita income in 1990 to be lower than otherwise.

Table 2 reports short definitions of each variable in the empirical growth model, and summary statistics— sample mean (for 35 countries) values and standard deviation for these variables. Of particular interest is that the average annual rate of growth of per capita real income over the 24 years period in 2011 PPP's is 1.1 percent. This is the mean for the dependent variable in our growth model. The average annual growth rate of the population over the 24 year period is 3.2 percent. In 1990, the beginning of the study, the mean share of the labor force working in agriculture is 69%; the mean life expectancy at birth is 62 years; and the mean literacy rate is 47%. Forty three percent of children 10-14 years of age were working in the labor force, and forty-three percent of the countries were colonized by the British. Sixty-seven percent of the countries are on the sea coast.

Table 2. Short Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Variables (N=35)

Name	Symbol	Mean/Sd	Description			
Annual Growth	ann_growth	.011/.032	Average annual growth rate of per capita income over 1990-2014.			
Log of per capita income 1990	log_per_c_90	3.245/.347	Log of per capita income 1990.			
Population Growth	pop_growth	.027/.012	Average growth of population from 1988-1990.			
Ocean Agricultural Labor	ocean aglabor_1990	.6/.497 68.971/19.679	1 if country is located on ocean. 0 if no. Share of the labor force 15 years and older working in agriculture.			
Political Stability	pol_stab	(-0.662)/1.021	Political stability and absence of violence.			
West Africa	west_africa	.371/.490	1 if country is located in West Africa. 0 if no.			
Central Africa	central_africa	.171/ .382	1 if country is located in Central Africa. 0 if no.			
Life Expectancy 1990	life_exp_1990	51.742/ 7.289	Life expectancy at birth.			
% of population with access to safe water	per_wat_1990	51.228/ 19.339	Share of households with access to safe drinking water.			
Literacy Rate 1990	lit_1990	46.914/ 20.043	Percent of population that is literate.			
Child labor 1990	child_lab_1990	31.374/ 13.462	Share of children 10-14 in labor force.			
UK	UK	.428/ .502	1 if country has colonial affiliation with UK. 0 if no.			
Corruption 1990	corr_1990	(537)/.751	Control of corruption.			

The β_j s in equation (2) are to be estimated using a single cross-section of 35 countries with the dependent variable being the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in 2011

PPP\$s. The explanatory variables are the 1990, or beginning year, value of per capita income and a variety of conditioning variables. With assumption that the $\mu_i s$ are uncorrelated, equation (2), a reduced-form growth model, can be estimated by Stata OLS. We will compare the signs of these estimated coefficients with the expected signs, and then perform tests of the null hypothesis that each of them is equal to zero versus the alternative that they are not zero at the 5% significance level. ³ Estimated coefficients that are not significantly different from zero will be considered for exclusion from later estimates of the empirical growth model.

The Regression Results

Estimates of equation (2) are reported in table 3. In regression R1, the estimated coefficient for log per capita income in 1990 is negative, as required for conditional convergence, and significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. The estimated coefficient of 0.05 implies that a 10% increase in per capita income in 1990 would be associated with a 0.5 percentage point decline in the average rate of growth of per capita income over 1990-2014. This is large enough to be economically meaningful. The estimated coefficients for the share of the labor force being in agriculture and for a country having colonial British ties are as expected. The size of the estimated coefficient for the share of the labor force being in agriculture is economically small, i.e., a 10 percentage point increase in the labor force in agriculture reduces average growth of per capita income by 0.09%, but significantly different from zero. If a country was a UK colony, the average annual rate of growth of per capita income would be 1.1 percentage points higher. This result is statistically significant at the 30 percent level. The R² for this equation is 0.19.

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 $^{^3}$ Under the assumption that $\mu_{i}s$ are normally distributed, the test statistic will be the "t."

Table 3: Estimates of the Per Capita Income Growth Equations for Countries in Sub Saharan Africa, 1990-2014 (absolute value of t values are in parenthesis)

	Average Rate of Growth of Per Capita Income (gy)					log_per_cap	<u>gy</u>
Variables	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7
plog			-0.0818	-0.0726			
			[2.43]	[2.15]			
log_per_cap	-0.0504	-0.0414			0.02		-0.2084
	*[2.20]	[1.67]			[0.44]		[2.18]
aglabor_1990	-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0013	-0.0012	-0.0016		-0.001
	[2.32]	[2.04]	[2.61]	[2.47]	[2.09]		[1.06]
UK	0.0116	0.0023	0.018	0.0077	0.00114		0.0578
	[1.06]	[0.18]	[1.59]	[0.59]	[0.06]		[1.21]
west_africa		-0.0065		-0.0043	-0.0253		-0.0302
		[0.05]		[0.35]	[1.04]		[0.94]
central_africa		-0.0249		-0.0273	-0.0562		-0.0291
		[1.44]		[1.65]	[1.77]		[0.86]
life_exp_90					-0.0029		0.0048
					[1.51]		[1.34]
per_water_90					-0.0002	0.0031	0.0003
					[0.36]	[1.35]	[0.40]
lit_90					-0.0005		-0.0013
					[0.80]		[1.41]
child_lab_90					0.0009	-0.0085	-0.0018
	-				[0.94]	[2.79]	[1.21]
corr_90					-0.0189	0.0556	0.0044
					[1.41]	[0.92]	[0.25]
pop_growth					-0.1574		-1.6022
					[0.26]		[1.17]
ocean					0.006		-0.0183
					[0.44]		[0.80]
pol_stab					0.0081	0.0181	0.0177
					[0.98]	[0.42]	[1.19]
stunt					-0.0004	-0.0163	
					[0.30]	[3.29]	
_cons	0.2356	0.2108	0.3588	0.3341	0.2456	4.0722	0.7174
	[2.43]	[2.03]	[2.60]	[2.42]	[1.26]	[14.2]	[2.73]
R ²	0.1945	0.248	0.2179	.2891	0.4034	0.7190	0.7545
N	35	35	35	35	35	35	22

R3 and R4 are estimated by instrumental variables using the information in R6, where *child_lab_90* and *stunting* are instruments. They do not have statistically significant coefficients in the growth equation R5 * absolute value of t values

In regressions R2, we have added dummy conditioning variables for a country being in West or Central Africa (relative to West Africa). The estimated coefficients for both of these

dummy variables are negative, suggesting that the average rates of growth of per capita income over 1990-2014 is 2.5 percentage points lower in Central than East Africa. This coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 15 percent level. However, average per capita income growth in West Africa is not different from East Africa for any plausible significance level. The estimated coefficient for the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is unaffected by adding these dummy variables. But the inclusion of these two dummy variables reduces the size of the estimated coefficient for log per capita income in 1990 by about 29 percent and reduces the statistical significance of this coefficient implying that log per capita income in 1990 is correlated with these regional dummy variables. However, adding these two variables boosts the R² a little. Aglabor is statistically significant with the same coefficient as in regression 1.

Next we consider some supplemental results. In Regression R5, we now include the set of other conditioning variables. There are nine of them. All of these variables have the expected signs except for life expectancy at birth, the literacy rate of adults, child labor, and access to safe water. However, the estimated coefficients of variables in this equation have generally small t-values (suggesting that these variables are highly correlated), and the estimated coefficient of log per capita income in 1990 has switched sign and is now positive. The main purpose of this equation is to show that the other conditioning variables are individually not significant in explaining the future economic growth rates nor can the hypothesis be rejected that the estimated coefficients of these nine variables are jointly equal to zero.⁴

It is possible that log per capita income in 1990 is endogeneous (or contains measurement error), and that instrumenting $ln(y_{1990})$ in equation (2) would be interesting. In regression R6, we

⁴ The sample value of the F-statistic for this test is 0.567, and the critical value with 9 and 20 degrees of freedom at the 5% significance level is 2.39.

now regress $\ln(y_{1990})$ on five variables—percent of households with access to safe water, share of children 10-14 working, extent of corruption of the government, political stability, and share of children under five that are stunted.⁵ These variables are included for the expected immediacy of their impact on per capita income in 1990. However, we place the most emphasis on the child labor and stunting variables. We argue that the extent of stunting of children under five at the start of the period (1990) is a good proxy for just how nutritionally impoverished children but also the population in general are. This would reduce labor productivity. The results in R6 show that a country with a higher stunting of children and/or more child labor have lower per capita income in 1990, which implies these countries start farther behind 1990. In addition, these two variables have estimated coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.⁶

We now re-estimate R1 and R2 by replacing the actual value of ln y in 1990 with its predicted value (*plog*) from R6, and report these estimates in R3 and R4. We see that the t-values of all of the variables are (marginally) larger for R3 (than R1) and R4 (than R2). In addition, the estimated coefficient for plog is now 80% larger in R3 and R4 than R1 and R2. This is a large increase, and implies a much higher rate of per capita income convergence.

Finally, we fit the model to data for 22 high growth countries and report the results in R7. Some of the regressors in this equation are stronger than for regression R1-R4. For example, the estimated coefficient for log per capita income in 1990 is much larger, -0.208 (vs -0.041 in R4) and is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. It implies that a 10 percent increase in per capita income increases average per capita income growth by 20 percentage points. This

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⁵ We chose to run instrumental variable estimation as it is a much more general estimation procedure than two stage least squares (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2016).

⁶ The R² for R6 is 0.719, and the sample F value for the null hypothesis that this equation has no explanatory power is 14.8. The tabled value of the F for 5 and 29 degrees of freedom at the 5% significance level is 2.55.

implies a much higher rate of convergence in per capita income for this subset of countries than the other results. The R^2 is .72, which is large but the degrees of freedom is small.

Discussion

We now undertake more discussion of the empirical results. Some overall findings are as follows: a larger share of the labor force in 1990 engaged in agricultural labor reduces future economic growth. This was the strongest variable throughout all regressions, surprisingly. The results support the idea that when a country has a larger share of its labor force in agriculture, agriculture is not very productive. If the productivity of agriculture could be increased significantly, it might be possible for some of the agricultural labor to transition to the non-agricultural sector in a way that would increase the rate of future economic growth (Huffman and Orazem 2007).

We consistently find that if a country had a UK colonial affiliation, it has a higher rate of economic growth. This suggests that countries have at least a small advantage for future economic growth if they speak more English, or that the systems the UK put in place increased productivity. However, the statistical significance of this coefficient is never smaller than 12 percent. Results from R2 and R4 show that Central African countries grew more slowing than other countries in SSA. This area is generally drier so there is more frequently a problem with water and food availability, which creates barriers to economic growth.

It is surprising that access to safe water did not affect the economic growth rate. We do not have an explanation for this since water is key to health, which in turn is key to productivity. Also puzzling, the literacy rate had a negative, rather than positive, coefficient in the growth regressions. This could possibly be because the level of technology that SSA countries are using

is very simple and jobs don't require much education, so literacy doesn't matter much for growth. However, these estimated coefficients have small t-values.

In addition, child labor, corruption, and political stability were also insignificant in explaining economic growth. SSA countries seem to be at a stage of development where increasing education does not increase future economic growth. With SSA having a share of their population working in agriculture, they may not have access to current information about likely problems with local corruption. This could explain why it does not affect future economic growth there.

Conclusion

This paper's goal was test to for effects of conditioning variables such as education, health and demographics at the starting date on the future rate of economic growth. It also listed predicted correlations between the conditioning variables and impact on economic growth. The main hypothesis was that an increase in log of per capita in 1990 would lower the average rate of growth over 1990-2014. A one percent increase in log of per capita in 1990 leads to a 0.2 percent decrease in economic growth indicating catch up conditional on some other factors which appear to the grow equation.

We find that convergence in income growth in SSA is most likely conditioned by the share of the labor force in agriculture, a country being in Central Africa (rather than in the East or West), and having a colonial affiliation with the UK. A large number of other conditioning variables consistently did not matter for explaining future economic growth. These included the population growth, child labor, corruption, location on the ocean, higher political stability, higher life expectancy, percent of population with access to safe water, and the literacy rate.

When we created an instrument for per capita income in 1990, we discovered that countries that had higher rates of stunting and a larger share of children working had lower per capita income in 1990, causing them to be farther behind economically at the start. With instrument per capita income in 1990, the rate of convergence in per capita income increased by 80%, which is large. We also found that the rate of convergence in per capita income was higher for a set of rapidly growing subset of 22 SSA countries. More research is needed on these countries.

This paper is significant because it is the first time anyone has used income data in 2011 PPP\$ for a study of growth rate convergence in SSA countries over 1990-2014, and also the first to examine the impact of a broad set of conditioning variables on future economic growth rates. Additionally this is brand new data and the first study to apply them to growth convergence in SSA.

If investments (by the World Bank or aid agencies) could be made in new agricultural technology, new seeds, and plants or improved nutrition or food distribution, the productivity of agriculture could be increased such that some labor could move to the non-agricultural sector.

This would have prospects for increasing future economic growth rates.

The methodology in this paper could also be applied to the larger set of African countries, or even to a broader set of low-income or developing countries.

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