@article{Fershtman:275612,
      recid = {275612},
      author = {Fershtman, Chaim and de Zeeuw, Aart},
      title = {Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly},
      address = {1995-12},
      number = {2123-2018-4975},
      series = {Working Paper No. 45-95},
      pages = {44},
      year = {1995},
      abstract = {The paper considers an oligopolistic industry in which  pollution is a by-product of production. Firms are assumed  to have emission permits that restrict the amount that they  pollute. These permits are assumed to be tradeable and the  paper discusses a structure in which the same set of firms  operates both in the product market as well as in the  pollution permits market. The paper demonstrates that in  such a structure allowing trade in emission permits is not  necessarily beneficial. In particular it may lead to the  choice of inferior production and abatement technologies,  it may lead to a market equilibrium with lower output rates  and higher prices and it may result in a shift of  production from a low cost to a high cost firm.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275612},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275612},
}