@article{Rubinstein:275557,
      recid = {275557},
      author = {Rubinstein, Ariel and Wolinsky, Asher},
      title = {A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games},
      address = {1992-02},
      number = {2123-2018-4920},
      series = {Working Paper No. 4-92},
      pages = {10},
      year = {1992},
      abstract = {The comment demonstrates several examples of extensive  games for which the set of subgame perfect equilibrium  payoff vectors of its repeated game with discounting is  very different than that of the corresponding repeated  reduced normal form game even when the discount factor is  close to 1. Nevertheless, it is true that with a  "dimensionality" condition (ala Fudenberg and Maskin  (1986), or, Abreu and Dutta (1991) all feasible and  strictly individually rational payoff vectors are subgame  perfect equilibrium payoff vectors where the discount rate  approaches the unity.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275557},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275557},
}