@article{Clark:274727,
      recid = {274727},
      author = {Clark, Robert and Coviello, Decio and Gauthier,  Jean-Francois and Shneyerov, Art},
      title = {Evidence from an investigation into collusion and  corruption in Quebec},
      address = {2018-02},
      number = {2110-2018-4537},
      series = {Working Paper No. 1401},
      pages = {72},
      year = {2018},
      abstract = {We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and  corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in  public procurement auctions. Our focus is on Montreal’s  asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid  rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding and  bribes to bureaucrats, and where, in 2009, a police  investigation was launched. We collect procurement data and  use a difference-in-difference approach to compare outcomes  before and after the investigation in Montreal and in  Quebec City, where there have been no allegations of  collusion or corruption. We find that entry and  participation increased, and that the price of procurement  decreased. We then decompose the price decrease to quantify  the importance of two aspects of cartel organization,  coordination and entry deterrence, for collusive pricing.  We find that the latter explains only a small part of the  decrease.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/274727},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.274727},
}