@article{Chen:273504,
      recid = {273504},
      author = {Chen, Yongmin and Wang, Ruqu},
      title = {Market Design with Correlated Valuations},
      address = {2005-09},
      number = {2110-2018-4153},
      series = {Working Paper No. 1034},
      pages = {26},
      year = {2005},
      abstract = {The effects of information on market design are explored  in a simple setting where firms have private information  about their correlated fixed costs and the government aims  to maximize its expected revenue conditional on achieving  efficient allocations. Government revenues are higher when  the costs are less correlated (or are more of a private  value). The reduced correlation increases the firms’  information rents, but a change in the information  structure also changes the expected market structures with  positive effects on government revenues. If the government  faces the no-deficit constraint, there are situations where  efficient allocations are achieved under asymmetric  information but not under symmetric information.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273504},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.273504},
}