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Fruit and vegetable marketing orders in the United States, 1937-1987, a review

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Summary

Marketing orders are legally binding fruit and vegetable growers in designated quantities, and qualities of products and support activities such as container standards, advertising. Legislation authorizing such orders during the economic depression in the 1930s has expanded to where now authorized under federal and state management programs and some aspects of such orders are controversial. Evaluation of the actual impact of marketing orders has proved difficult because of the dynamic nature of the market. Agreement on economic criteria for judging the success of such orders based on general observations and studies are presented. During the past 50 years there has been a trend toward relatively greater use of quality control programs.

1. Introduction

Marketing orders are marketing plans developed by growers with the goal of achieving improved and more orderly marketing conditions. They are called "orders" because if a plan is approved by the members and made legally binding on all members by the Secretary of Agriculture (or Director of a marketing order).

Federal marketing orders affect more than 15 percent of the crops grown in the United States and 15 percent of the value of the 33 crops covered was about \$1.5 billion (Comptroller General, 1985). In California, for fruits and vegetables, commodities that have accounted for more than 70 percent of the value of the crops (French, Tamimi and Nuckton, 1978).

In this paper I first describe how marketing orders are established, the types of programs that are established. I then briefly review

orders, the current extent of that surrounds them. Finally past economic impacts and the

2. How marketing orders develop

The legislation which authorizes marketing orders is the result of adverse conditions in agricultural markets during the first quarter of the century, characterized by gluts and shortages, variable and discriminatory trade practices, and conditions plus large outputs of agricultural products during economic crisis for farmers.

Fruit and vegetable grower associations with the object of controlling their markets. However, they are subject to antitrust restrictions, but may be exempted from this problem. Farmers outside of the benefits of controls without

To cope with this problem, the marketing orders were eventually consolidated in the Federal Marketing Act of 1937. This act exempts marketing orders from the antitrust laws, and makes compliance mandatory for all marketing orders. In the same year the state of California was the first to type. State marketing orders for certain commodities (e.g., fruits for which there are federal orders. However, the state may not have that state whereas federal orders are interstate and intrastate. The act provides for times to expand the list of commodities to be permitted.

3. Authorized activities

Marketing orders permit the following activities: volume management, quality regulation, and promotion. The types of programs permitted are listed in Table 1.

4. Establishment and administration

To establish a marketing order, a group of producers in an industry group concerned submit a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture (or to a state if the Secretary of Agriculture is not satisfied with the legislative requirements, a petition may be submitted if two-thirds of the producers agree to the volume of production), the Secretary of Agriculture requires the compliance of all

provisions of the order. Marketing orders u
period of years, but may be renewed.

Compliance with marketing order provision
handler level such as a fruit packing house.
the operation of the program are made by a c
handlers subject to approval by the Secretar
the state director for a state order). Comm
financed by assessments on handlers which an
producers.

5. Use of marketing orders

In the first five years following enactme
Marketing Agreement Act 17 federal marketing
established. In addition, another eight to
California legislation. The use of marketin
suspended or overridden by other controls dur
Following the war, these programs expanded
29 federal marketing orders in effect by 195
1970 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1981).
orders has since stabilized at about 46-48.
in effect in 1985 and their authorized prov
table 2. In addition, about 30 marketing or
under California enabling legislation by the
were established under legislation in nine o
Youde, 1975). About the same number are in

6. Economic issues

The United States Congress granted farmer
monopolistic practices through marketing ord
uncontrolled competitive markets were not w
enhancement through such practices was regar
provided prices were not raised too fast or
profits. A more orderly market process was
the long-run public interest even if it requ
free market conditions. (For further develo
Polopolus et al., 1987.)

Almost from the beginning, marketing ord
controversial. The early critics focused on
their realized benefits and usefulness to fa
especially the problem of controlling quant
production controls, the use of marketing ord
problems for which they were not suited, the
on handlers of the product and differing imp
(Farrell, 1966). Later, consumer groups bec
orders and expressed concerns about their ef
availability. Finally, staff members of fed
Federal Trade Commission, the General Accoun
Office of Management and Budget have expres
monopoloid practices permitted under market
government oversight in administering the or

A major problem in evaluating marketing order programs is the lack of a general agreement on performance criteria. Attempts to evaluate the social desirability of these programs in terms of their economic efficiency as measured by consumer and producer surplus or consumer surplus have been mostly empirical. These studies, which have been mostly empirical, have shown that who gains and who loses depend on a wide range of factors such as the shape of supply and demand functions, the response of programs on supply response, substitution, the degree of risk aversion, and the degree of adjustments. Since many of these factors are difficult to measure, it has not been possible to draw conclusions concerning marketing order efficiency literature. For further evidence see French (1985), French (1981), U.S. Department of Agriculture (1987), Kilmer and Armbruster (1987).

In view of the problems with applying marketing order criteria and the concern by some as to whether a study team appointed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture established a set of more pragmatic criteria for evaluating marketing order performance. The study team argues that a marketing order regulation (a) does not lead to earn persistent above normal profits, (b) does not increase variability and uncertainty, (c) does not place undue burdens on particular classes of growers, (d) does not contribute to chronic surpluses, (e) does not waste resources and (f) does not reduce net benefits. Of course, there should be convincing evidence that a marketing plan contributes to the plan. (Polopolus et al., 1987).

Determining whether particular order programs conform to these evaluation criteria is a difficult task. Only a few empirical studies of marketing order programs (French, 1981, for further review). While the impressions of the economic effects of marketing orders based on these few studies and my general impression are:

Market allocation programs have been successful in almonds, walnuts, filberts, dates and raisins and citrus products. The almond, walnut and date programs have in some years elevated the short-run U.S. price but they have also provided a market for excess supply and have provided outlets for excess supply. The net impact is not fully clear but the short-run impacts on consumers may have been gains to the industry.

The effects of the citrus allocation programs to maintain persistent differences in the price of processed product markets, especially processed lemon products have benefited fresh lemons. A study by Kinney, Green, and others suggests that the public interest would be served by restrictive allocations in the fresh market.

Reserve pools have been used for almonds, raisins, dates, prunes, hops, cranberries and of unusually large crops (see U.S. Department for historical allocations). In some cases were returned to the market in following period reduced; in others, most of the pool was distributed, exported, or in some cases left unharvested.

Consumer groups have been especially vocal in view as wastage of food. Where diversion to abandonment of a portion of a crop becomes possible. California cling peach industry some years ago (King, 1979) such concerns seem valid. However, marketing orders argue that in the occasional greatly exceeds planned quantities, they show the excess on inelastic markets that may yield is also likely that in such years some abandonment without controls.

Critics of reserve pools also question why cannot be achieved by private entrepreneurs who undertake storage operations in anticipation. Marketing order supporters argue this is because are risk averse and they fail to store quantities for welfare. These issues merit further study.

Intraseasonal regulations apply primarily to some vegetables (table 2). Supporters argue that or shipping holidays, markets would be unstable and depressed prices. Indeed, this may well be years ago before such controls were established. Conditions are different today and point out that apples seem to flow smoothly to markets without

Two recent empirical studies provide conflicting concerning the effects of prorate termination. California-Arizona orange prorate by Power, Zuck found only minor differences in the stability in a year when the prorate was suspended compared when prorates were in effect. But a study of Carman and Pick (1987) concluded that "there

that both sales and prices were more stable during prorate was used than during the 1986 year when (p. 18).

Producer allotments have been criticized for restrict entry of new producers into an industry for some years in the U.S. hop industry. The hops was terminated recently and the remaining is minor.

Quality control programs may improve the consumer product and potentially may reduce losses in marketing. Critics argue that grade and size regulations restrict consumers of a full range of choices and that used as a means of regulating quantity marketed

Bockstael (1984) has shown that when quality standards are clearly discernible by consumers upon purchase, quality standards reduces social welfare. If consumers are not able to distinguish quality standards, or not consumers are able to distinguish quality standards at point of purchase. Jesse (1979) and others have shown that wholesalers and retailers may purchase quality standards often are not observable in consumer selection. Consumers can readily observe size differences so quality standards are socially justified only in so far as it is for lower grades and small sizes are priced lower. Quality standards shipped even without controls.

The limited evidence on the use of quality standards suggests that it has not been clearly demonstrated. Illustrate, a study of the quality control of nectarines showed that marketing order rejection of only about four percent of the fruit. The percentage did not vary significantly by size (U.S. Controller General, 1985).

Market support programs appear generally to be in excess of costs. Some aspects such as quality control, exchange and better industry organization are significant. There have been some conflicts of advertising programs where there is a conflict of interest. A firm that spends substantial funds promoting its product appear to be few, if any, adverse effects.

7. Future developments

Many of the marketing orders established by legislation in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized quality control. Commodities affected included apples, asparagus, cantaloupes, lettuce, cling peaches, olive oil, lemons. All of those programs were terminated. They did not solve the problems perceived to exist. Problems that were not foreseen. While the programs continue to exist, primarily under the federal marketing order. The total use of marketing orders has shifted from quality control to emphasis on quality controls and market support.

Criticisms of volume management programs have been continuing. More economic scrutiny by the Secretary of Agriculture has been requested. resolve some of the issues but the pressure to eliminate volume management programs is likely to continue. It perhaps would be a good idea to eliminate of any expansion. Meanwhile, quality control programs seem likely to be maintained and expanded. Many of these programs could be established even if the federal Agricultural Marketing Act were repealed.

There are very few measures of the dollar benefits or costs that have resulted from

It is my opinion that, with perhaps one or two measure these values we would discover that the small--and certainly small relative to the cost involved in federal support programs for dairy field crops. The fruit and vegetable marketing competitive even with marketing order intervention.

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