@article{Buisseret:270438,
      recid = {270438},
      author = {Buisseret, Peter},
      title = {A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SEPARATION OF ELECTORAL ORIGIN},
      address = {2013-08},
      number = {2068-2018-2020},
      series = {WERP 1021},
      pages = {55},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {In democratic politics, voters delegate competing  policy-making responsibilities to multiple elected agents:  one agent is frequently tasked with initiating policies  (the proposer ) whilst the other is charged with  scrutinizing and either passing or rejecting these policies  (the veto player ). A fundamental distinction lies in  whether both offices are subject to direct and separate  election, or whether the voter instead may directly elect  only one office. Why should the voter benefit from a  relatively coarse electoral instrument? When politicians’  abilities are private information, actions taken by one  agent provide information about both agents’ types. A  system in which their electoral fates are institutionally  fused reduces the incentives of the veto player to build  reputation through the specious rejection of the proposer’s  policy initiatives. This can improve the voter’s welfare,  relative to a system in which the survival of the veto  player is institutionally separated from that of the  proposer.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/270438},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.270438},
}