Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders

In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S. Shapley, and the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Busetto et al. (2008). We argue that these models are all distinct and only the Shapley’s model with a continuum of traders and atoms gives an endogenous explanation of the perfectly and imperfectly competitive behavior of agents in a one-stage setting. For this model, we prove a theorem of existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.


Issue Date:
Sep 09 2008
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269864
Language:
English
Total Pages:
32
JEL Codes:
C72; D51




 Record created 2018-03-23, last modified 2020-10-28

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