@article{Szalay:269750,
      recid = {269750},
      author = {Szalay, Dezso},
      title = {Contracts with Endogenous Information},
      address = {2006-12-14},
      number = {2068-2018-1574},
      pages = {46},
      year = {2006},
      abstract = {I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a  principal agent problem allowing for general technologies  of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy local  versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance  and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function  conditions, a Örst-order approach is justiÖed. Under the  same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports  are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the  agentís informational rents more risky, are used to  increase incentives for information acquisition,  insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for  information gathering. The value of information to the  agent is always positive. The value of information to the  principal is ambiguous.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269750},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.269750},
}