TY  - RPRT
AB  - Intelligence affects the social outcomes of groups. A systematic study of the link is provided in an experiment where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence, but otherwise similar, play a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Initial cooperation rates are similar, but increase in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while they decline in the groups with lower intelligence. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive and not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups.
AU  - Proto, Eugenio
AU  - Rustichini, Aldo
AU  - Sofianos, Andis
DA  - 2015-12-12
DA  - 2015
DO  - 10.22004/ag.econ.269724
DO  - doi
ID  - 269724
KW  - Financial Economics
KW  - Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
KW  - Cooperation
KW  - Intelligence
L1  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf
L1  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf?subformat=pdfa
L2  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf
L2  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf?subformat=pdfa
L4  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf
L4  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf?subformat=pdfa
LA  - eng
LA  - English
LK  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf
LK  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf?subformat=pdfa
N2  - Intelligence affects the social outcomes of groups. A systematic study of the link is provided in an experiment where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence, but otherwise similar, play a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Initial cooperation rates are similar, but increase in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while they decline in the groups with lower intelligence. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive and not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups.
PY  - 2015-12-12
PY  - 2015
T1  - Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
TI  - Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
UR  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf
UR  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269724/files/twerp_1101proto.pdf?subformat=pdfa
Y1  - 2015-12-12
T2  - WERP 1101
ER  -