@article{Hammond:269717,
      recid = {269717},
      author = {Hammond, Peter},
      title = {Designing a Strategy-Proof Spot Market Mechanism with Many  Traders: Twenty-Two Steps to Walrasian Equilibrium},
      address = {2016-01-01},
      number = {2068-2018-1541},
      series = {WERP 1108},
      pages = {66},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {To prove their Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem,  Arrow and Debreu (1954) devised an abstract economy that  Shapley and Shubik (1977) cricitized as a market game  because, especially with untrustworthy traders, it fails to  determine a credible outcome away from equilibrium. All  this earlier work also postulated a Walrasian auctioneer  with complete information about traders’ preferences and  endowments. To ensure credible outcomes, even in  disequilibrium, warehousing is introduced into a  multi-stage market game. To achieve Walrasian outcomes in a  large economy with incomplete information, even about  traders’ endowments, a strategy-proof demand revelation  mechanism is considered, and then extended to include  warehousing.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269717},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.269717},
}