@article{Page:269362,
      recid = {269362},
      author = {Page, Frank H., Jr. and Monteiro, Paulo K.},
      title = {Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing},
      address = {2002-06-06},
      number = {2068-2018-1322},
      pages = {51},
      year = {2002},
      abstract = {We make three contributions to the theory of contracting  under asymmetric information. First, we establish a  competitive analog to the revelation principle which we  call the implementation principle. This principle provides  a complete characterization of all incentive compatible,  indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract  catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in  competitive contracting situations, …rms in choosing their  contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss  of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a  competitive taxation principle. This principle, a re…nement  of the implementation principle, provides a complete  characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing  schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us  to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules  to a strategically equivalent game played over  product-price catalogs. Third, applying the notion of payo¤  security (Reny (1999)) and the competitive taxation  principle, we demonstrate the existence of a Nash  equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear  pricing game. Moreover, we identify a large class of  competitive nonlinear pricing games whose mixed extensions  satisfy payo¤ security. This paper extends earlier work by  the first author (see Page (1992, 1999)).},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269362},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.269362},
}