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China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States								
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China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States

How the chickens came home to roost




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
Edwin Vermulst VVGB Advocaten

What is Chicken?... and how do you price it?!

Google "chicken parts"... what do you see?



What's missing in this picture?



Paws!

Chicken Paws?

- Not a product desired by US/EU consumers
 - o Sold as residual product; used in animal feed, fertilizer, hot dogs!
 - o <u>Historically</u>, low value product
- Light bulb moment!
 - o Consumers in other countries (most notably, China) like chicken paws
 - o Paws now far more valuable than other by-products (gizzards, gristle, bones, beaks, etc.)
- Trade benefits both US producers and Chinese consumers

Maybe not...

- China initiates an antidumping/countervailing duty against U.S. chicken parts
- Investigation initiated on 27 September 2009
- Final Determinations
 - o AD: 26 September 2010 (margins 50.3%-105.4%)
 - o CVD: 30 August 2010 (margins 4.0%-30.3%)

WTO Appeal

- US requested WTO consultations on 20 Sept 2011
- WTO Panel
 - o final report issued on 25 June 2013
 - o report adopted by the DSB on 25 Sept 2013
 - US requested WTO Compliance Proceeding on 2 June 2016
- Report due by end of 2017

Dumping Allegation

Price based

- o Export Price < Home Price
- o Certainly not in this case

Cost based

o Export price <average total costs

Most Interesting Issue – Joint Production

- Key complication: joint products
 - o Chickens can only be produced "whole"
 - Costs accrue to whole bird

 How to determine the costs to produce a chicken breast? Thigh? Paws?

Cost of a chicken

Observe: TC, Cpre-split, Cpost-split

$$TC = C_{\text{pre-split}} + C_{\text{post-split}},$$

- But, the cost of individual parts must be calculated
 - o Approach: Calculate cost shares

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\alphabreast , \alphathigh , \alphawing , \alphaleg , \alphapaw , \alphaoffal
```

• How to calculate the shares (α_i) ?

Cost Allocation

Value-based

o US producers' historical method

$$\alpha_i = \frac{P_i}{P_{\text{whole}}},$$

Weight-based

- o MOFCOM's approach
- o Each part has same value (per kg)

$$\alpha_i = \frac{WT_i}{WT_{\text{whole}}},$$

- China applied the same shares to pre-split and post-split
 - Clearly not correct

ADA Article 2.2.1.1

- Costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, <u>provided that</u>
 - 1) such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) of the exporting country and
 - 2) <u>reasonably reflect</u> the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration
- Authorities shall consider all available evidence on the <u>proper allocation of costs</u>, including that which is made available by the exporter or producer in the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been <u>historically utilized by the</u> <u>exporter or producer</u>

US Producers' Method

Prices used are domestic (US) prices

- Paws assigned very low value
 - o Some producers value paws as by-product: gizzards, beaks, bones, etc.
 - o General issue: US preferences makes US price for paws very low
- Value-based allocation implies a very low cost of production for paws

Value-Based

(paws valued according to relative sales value)

	Export price per KG	US market price per KG	Share	Pre-split meat costs	Post-split costs	Total COP	COP + SG&A + profit	Dumping Margin
Breast	\$4.90	\$4.75	64.19%	\$3.31	\$1.02	\$4.33	\$4.67	No
Thigh	\$2.00	\$1.50	20.27%	\$1.04	\$0.30	\$1.34	\$1.45	No
Wings	\$1.50	\$1.00	13.51%	\$0.70	\$0.20	\$0.90	\$0.97	No
Paw	\$0.90	\$0.10	1.35%	\$0.07	\$0.02	\$0.09	\$0.10	No
Offal		\$0.05	0.68%	\$0.03	\$0.01	\$0.04	\$0.05	No
TOTAL	\$9.30	\$7.40	100%	\$5.15	\$1.55	\$6.70	\$7.24	

MOFCOM

- Rejects value-based method
- Instead: Weight-based approach
 - Similar to the <u>USDOC's</u> history of rejecting value-based accounting
 - "We recognize that a value-based cost allocation can be problematic in an anti-dumping context. The most obvious problem is the potential circularity of the analysis, whereby prices are used to determine the product-specific costs which in turn are either compared to those same product-specific prices or are used to determine prices (i.e., through the sales-below-cost test and constructed value)" (US - Softwood Lumber V)
 - the key question is whether the cost allocation accurately reflects the "price to be paid for the act of production." [EC Salmon (Norway)]

Weight-Based – I

	Export price per KG	Weight	Share	Pre-split meat costs	Post-split costs	Total COP	COP + SG&A + profit	Dumping Margin
Breast	\$4.90	1.000	20%	\$1.03	\$1.02	\$2.05	\$2.21	No
Thigh	\$2.00	1.000	20%	\$1.03	\$0.30	\$1.33	\$1.44	No
Wings	\$1.50	1.000	20%	\$1.03	\$0.20	\$1.23	\$1.33	No
Paw	\$0.90	1.000	20%	\$1.03	\$0.02	\$1.05	\$1.13	25.56%
Offal		1.000	20%	\$1.03	\$0.01	\$1.04	\$1.12	No

$$\frac{\$1.13-\$0.90}{\$0.90} = 0.2556 = 25.56\%$$
 dumping margin

Shares allocate pre-split costs only

Weight-Based – II

	Export price per KG	Weight	Share	Pre-split meat costs	Post-split costs	Total COP	COP + SG&A + profit	Dumping Margin
Breast	\$4.90	1.00	20%	\$1.03	\$0.31	\$1.34	\$1.45	No
Thigh	\$2.00	1.00	20%	\$1.03	\$0.31	\$1.34	\$1.45	No
Wings	\$1.50	1.00	20%	\$1.03	\$0.31	\$1.34	\$1.45	No
Paw	\$0.90	1.00	20%	\$1.03	\$0.31	\$1.34	\$1.45	61.11%
Offal		1.00	20%	\$1.03	\$0.31	\$1.34	\$1.45	No

$$\frac{\$1.45-\$0.90}{\$0.90} = 0.6111 = 61.11\%$$
 dumping margin

Shares allocate pre-split and post-split costs

Which Method is Correct?


- Panel: neither method in principle inherently unreasonable
- Article 2.2 reference to 'cost of production in the country of origin'
- Deference must be given to the producers' historical approach as long as this approach reasonably reflects the costs
 - o Questionable whether all aspects of US producers' method "reasonable"

Tit-for-tat

- - o US imposed duties on truck tires from China on 17 September 2009
 - o China initiated this investigation on 27 September 2009
- Tariff on tires ill-fated policy
 - o Ineffective (trade diversion):
 - "The tariffs did ultimately lead to a 30% reduction in made in China tire imports from 2009 to 2011, but that didn't mean 30% more tires were produced in the U.S. It just meant that 30% more tires were imported from Canada; 110% more from South Korea; 44% more from Japan; 152% more from Indonesia; 154% more from Thailand; 117% more from Mexico and 285% more from low volume provider Taiwan." (Rapoza, 2012)
 - o Tires tariff appears to have provoked this dispute
 - Costly for US chicken producers

Cost #1:

Exports - US Chicken Products to China



Cost #2: Triggers AD case by Mexico against US

