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Mergers and Acquisitions by U.S. Farmer Cooperatives: An Empirical Study of Capital Capacity, Spatial Competition, and Strategic Orientation

NCERA-210 St. Paul, MN 11/01/2017

Jasper Grashuis

Postdoctoral Fellow

135C Mumford Hall

Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics

University of Missouri-Columbia

grashuisj@missouri.edu

Matt Elliott

Assistant Professor


D6 DePuy Military Hall

Department of Economics

South Dakota State University

matthew.elliott@sdstate.edu

Introduction



Introduction

- 4,259 Exits from 1979–2014 (Eversull, 2014)
- 1,181 Exits from 2000–2013 (Eversull, 2014)
 - 48% merged, converted, acquired
- 2,106 in 2014 to 2,047 in 2015 (-2.8%) (USDA, 2017)
- Examples of recent M&As
 - South Dakota Wheat Growers and North Central Farmers Elevator (SD)
 - Central Valley Ag and Farmway (KS)
 - Cedar Country Cooperative, Lakeland Cooperative, and United Ag Cooperative (WI)

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON M&AS

- Hudson and Herndon (2002)
 - 74 observations (cross-section of U.S. cooperatives)
- Richards and Manfredo (2003)
 - 1,308 observations, 19 years (panel of U.S. cooperatives)
- Melia-Marti and Martinez-Garcia (2015)
 - 147 observations (cross-section of Spanish cooperatives)

MAIN FINDINGS

- Hudson and Herndon (2002)
 - negative relationship of cash patronage obligations (-0.005) to the probability of engaging in future strategic transactions
- Richards and Manfredo (2003)
 - negative impact of the current ratio (-0.431) and the debt ratio (-1.306) on the
 likelihood of merger activity
- Melia-Marti and Martinez-Garcia (2015)
 - probability of acting as the target (as opposed to the bidder) increased in the quick ratio (8.3%) and decreased in ROA (-8.4%)

RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the financial, competitive, and strategic characteristics of U.S. farmer cooperatives which engaged in mergers and acquisitions from 2014 to 2016?

HYPOTHESES

- Capital Capacity
 - Current Ratio
 - Debt Ratio
 - ROA
- Spatial Competition
 - Market Share
 - Distance
- Strategic Orientation
 - Brand or Product Differentiation

- (+) (Richards and Manfredo, 2003)
- (-) (Richards and Manfredo, 2003)
- (-) (Melia-Marti and Martinez-Garcia, 2015)

- (-) Huyghebaert and Luypaert (2010)
- (+) Weterings and Marsili (2015)

(-) Desyllas and Hughes (2009)

DATA

Variable	Description	Mean	Median Source					
Y (M&A Activity and Frequency)								
Activity	1 if the cooperative completed one or more M&As in the 2014-2016 period	0.07	0.00 Various					
Frequency	number of completed M&As in the 2014-2016 period	0.09	0.00 Various					
X_{l} (Capital Capacity)								
Sales (\$M)	total sales	244.85	49.69 USDA					
ROA	net income / total assets	0.20	0.06 USDA					
Current Ratio	current assets / current liabilities	1.79	1.42 USDA					
Debt Ratio	total liabilities / total assets	0.51	0.50 USDA					

DATA

Variable	Description	Mean	Median	Source		
X ₂ (Spatial Com	epetition)					
Market Share	business volume / business volume of all cooperatives in the same commodity sector	0.06	0.00	USDA		
Distance	geodesic distance to the nearest cooperative in the same commodity sector	45.89	21.82			
X_3 (Strategic Orientation)						
Product Differentiation	number of live trademarks owned at the end of 2014	1.77	0.00	USPTO		
z (Control Variables)						
Census Region	New England; Middle Atlantic; South Atlantic; West South Central; East South Central; West North Central; East North Central; Mountain; Pacific		١	U.S. Census		

METHODOLOGY

- Probit
- Negative Binomial
- Bayesian Additive Regression Trees

EMPIRICAL MODEL – PROBIT

$$pr(y_i = 1|x_i) = f(\beta'x_i) \tag{1}$$

$$pr(y_i = 1|x_i) = \alpha + \theta_1 x_1 + \theta_2 x_2 + \theta_3 x_3 + \varphi z_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

- y = M&A Activity (binary variable)
- x_1 = Capital Capacity
- x_2 = Spatial Competition
- $-x_3 = Strategic Orientation$
- -z = Control Variables (U.S. Census regions)

EMPIRICAL MODEL – NEGATIVE BINOMIAL

$$pr(Y_{ij} = y_{ij} | x_{ij}) = \frac{e^{-\lambda_{ij}u_{ij}}(\lambda_{ij}u_{ij})^{y_{ij}}}{y_{ij}!}, y_{ij} = 0, 1, 2, ...$$
 (1)

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \alpha + \vartheta_1 x_1 + \vartheta_2 x_2 + \vartheta_3 x_3 + \varphi z_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

- y = M&A Activity (count variable)
- x_1 = Capital Capacity
- $x_2 = Spatial Competition$
- $-x_3 = Strategic Orientation$
- -z = Control Variables (U.S. Census regions)

RESULTS – PROBIT

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
In Sales	0.070*** (0.009)	0.067*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.008)
ROA	-0.183* (0.097)	-0.211** (0.098)	-0.190* (0.103)
Current Ratio	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Debt Ratio	-0.147*** (0.050)	-0.144*** (0.049)	-0.147*** (0.049)
Local Share	-0.130*** (0.044)		
Regional Share		-0.226*** (0.073)	
Distance			0.099** (0.041)
ln Trademark Ownership	-0.021** (0.011)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.025** (0.010)
N	983	983	983
Wald Chi2	600.84	857.87	418.42
Prob > Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
McFadden R ²	0.20	0.20	0.20
% Correctly Classified	92.47%	92.68%	92,68%

RESULTS – NEGATIVE BINOMIAL

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
In Sales	4.33*** (0.760)	4.733*** (0.797)	3.895*** (0.557)
ROA	0.045 (0.089)	0.044 (0.086)	0.037 (0.077)
Current Ratio	0.896 (0.132)	0.943 (0.089)	0.910 (0.119)
Debt Ratio	0.033*** (0.037)	0.063** (0.068)	0.042*** (0.045)
Local Share	0.399 (0.287)		
Regional Share		0.026*** (0.031)	
Distance			2.827 (2.207)
In Trademark Ownership	0.614*** (0.110)	0.702** (0.118)	0.620*** (0.108)
N	983	983	983
Wald Chi2	6433.100	4219.857	2817.810
Prob > Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
McFadden R ²	0.25	0.26	0.25
Cragg-Uhler R ²	0.29	0.30	14 0.29




Scrape Yellowpages.com

- 30 mile trade areas
 - Establishments

Examine competition


Trade area, MNC Competition, and Merger activity



Alternative method: Decision Tree Mode

Let $M = \{\mu_1, \mu_2, ..., \mu_b\}$ denote the set of bottom node μ 's.

Let $g(x; \theta)$, $\theta = (T, M)$ be a regression tree function that assigns a μ value to x.



A single tree model:

$$y = g(x; \theta) + E.$$

Bayesian Additive Regression Trees: BART


- Some Distinguishing Feastures of BART:
- BART is NOT Bayesian model averaging of single tree model. Unlike Boosting and Random Forests, BART updates a set of *m*
- trees over and over, stochastic search.
- Choose m large for flexible estimation and prediction.

Choose m smaller for variable

selection

fewer trees forces the x 's to compete for entry.

Non-Linearity and Interaction Effects



propose a more complex tree





propose a simpler tree

BART Variable Importance

With out previous merger activity

With previous merger activity







BART Partial Dependence Plots

Gross Business Volume

Multi-National Competition







BART Partial Dependence Plots

Membership


Current Ratio






Interaction Effects

Without Previous Mergers



BART Prediction Accuracy

Without Previous Mergers



BART correctly, predicted 17 more in sample mergers while reducing 5 false predictions compared to the probit

Conclusions

- Recent Merger activity is mostly explained by size
- allocated equity, central region, and strategy are important
- Machine learning techniques can enhance merger prediction accuracy, particularly when there is not a strong signal
- BART can provide machine learning prediction accuracy with statistical inferences-- comparable to probit and logit models.