@article{Clark:263797,
      recid = {263797},
      author = {Clark, Jeremy},
      title = {Recognizing Large Donations to Public Goods: An  Experimental Test},
      address = {1999-08-01},
      number = {2008-2017-4915},
      series = {9907},
      pages = {28},
      year = {1999},
      abstract = {Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell  participants only oftheir group's total contribution after  each round. In contrast, private charities sometimes  publicise large contributions or contributors to encourage  others to give or to bring recognition to donors. The  effect of supplying such selective information on  contribution levels is tested here experimentally.  Following a control treatment with standard information, a  second treatment also informs subjects of the maximum  contribution made in their group after each round. In a  third treatment, subjects are further given the opportunity  to make costly rewards to the (unidentified) maximum  contributor. Revealing generous contributions appears to  raise average contributions slightly. Adding the ability to  reward large contributors does not generate further  increases, but raises the variance of contributions.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/263797},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.263797},
}