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# Market Concentration and Retail Markups: Evidence from Commissary Data 

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## What is the Issue?

- Food retail has become much more concentrated in the U.S.
- Four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) in the U.S. (USDA-ERS)
- 1992: 16.8\%
- 2013: 36.4\%
- Average MSA-level CR4 as of 2014: 63\%


## Prices and Concentration

- Many studies have found a positive and significant priceconcentration relationship in food retail
- Lamm, 1981; Cotterill, 1986; Connor and Peterson, 1992; Yu and Connoer, 2002; Stiegert and Sharkey, 2007
- Mergers have been found to result in higher food prices
- Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2008; Davis, 2010
- These findings are often attributed to market power in action
- But it is almost impossible to observe wholesale prices and margins


## Obj ectives

- Create a novel dataset of estimated price-cost margins for food retailers and measures of market structure
- Estimate the relationship between market concentration and markups at the UPC level


## If it's not Market Power...

- Cost efficiencies/ economies of scale (Clarke et al., 1984; Azzam, 1997; Wood, 2013)

D "Demsetz Critique," Demsetz, 1973

- Services and quality are related to concentration, leading to higher prices
- Wholesale prices
- Input prices vary systematically with concentration


## Data

- 2009-2011 EmpowerIT Military Commissary data
- Weekly UPC-level prices for all U.S. commissaries
- All national brands
- Promotional activity removed
- Prices set to wholesale $+5 \%$ to cover costs
- 2009-2011 Symphony IRI Store Scanner Data
- UPC-level prices for $>40,000$ supermarkets and supercenters in the U.S.
- Nielsen TDLinx Data
- Store-level data, 2004-2014
- Revenues, ownership structure

Average Markup by Department


Average Markup by IRI Commodity


Average Margins by Product Categery Percentile


## Commissaries and Supermarkets

- USDA-ERS Rural-Urban Continuum county codes
- 1: Metro area with $>1$ million people
- 9: Rural area with $<2,500$ people
- Radius of mergers widened with the Continuum codes
- 1: 5 miles
- 9: 50 miles
- California
- 279 supermarkets, 7 chains (including independents)
- 23 military commissaries
- $\mathrm{N}=8.8$ million


## Market Concentration

- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
- By zip code and year
- Mean $=0.317$, St. Dev. $=0.149$


## Model

( 1 ) Margins $=f(H H I$, Year Effects, Month Effects, Income, Food Assistance, Food Prices, Department Effects)
( ${ }^{\text {(2) }}$ Margins =f(HHI, Year Effects, Month Effects, Income, Food Assistance, Food Prices, Department Effects, Chain Effects)

## Results (1)

| Variable | Parameter <br> Estimate | Standard <br> Error | t Value | Pr $>\|\boldsymbol{t}\|$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Intercept | 95.61922 | 2.23613 | 42.76 | $<0001$ |
| HHI | 5.04977 | 0.08274 | 61.03 | $<0001$ |
| y2009 | -1.06880 | 0.02883 | -37.07 | $<0001$ |
| y2010 | -1.12319 | 0.02878 | -39.03 | $<0001$ |
| jan | 1.80470 | 0.05752 | 31.37 | $<0001$ |
| feb | 0.16261 | 0.05737 | 2.83 | 0.0046 |
| mar | 0.66553 | 0.05744 | 11.59 | $<0001$ |
| apr | -2.50139 | 0.05808 | -43.07 | $<0001$ |
| may | -1.49277 | 0.05769 | -25.88 | $<0001$ |
| jun | -0.65924 | 0.05732 | -11.50 | $<0001$ |
| jul | -0.35361 | 0.05730 | -6.17 | $<0001$ |
| aug | -1.49385 | 0.05719 | -26.12 | $<0001$ |
| sep | -1.10234 | 0.05813 | -18.96 | $<0001$ |
| oct | -0.89915 | 0.05839 | -15.40 | $<0001$ |
| nov | 0.15721 | 0.05797 | 2.71 | 0.0067 |
| income | 0.00023085 | 0.00000172 | 134.14 | $<0001$ |
| PCT_SNAP09 | -4.19796 | 0.29634 | -14.17 | $<0001$ |
| MLK_PRICE10 | -30.98897 | 0.34161 | -90.71 | $<0001$ |
| produce | -3.59145 | 0.10377 | -34.61 | $<0001$ |
| grocery | 5.91454 | 0.03489 | 169.54 | $<0001$ |
| meat | -7.01430 | 0.36150 | -19.40 | $<0001$ |
| chill | 13.58050 | 0.04565 | 297.48 |  |

## Results (2): With Chain Effects

| Variable | Parameter <br> Estimate | Standard <br> Error | t Value | Pr $>\mid$ t $\mid$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Intercept | -4.59500 | 2.33718 | -1.97 | 0.0493 |
| hhifood | -1.47065 | 0.08697 | -16.91 | $<0001$ |
| y2009 | -1.01460 | 0.02834 | -35.80 | $<0001$ |
| y2010 | -1.09704 | 0.02829 | -38.78 | $<0001$ |
| income | 0.00005384 | 0.00000202 | 26.68 | $<0001$ |
| PCT_SNAP09 | 2.70140 | 0.30147 | 8.96 | $<0001$ |
| MLK_PRICE10 | 30.75041 | 0.47585 | 64.62 | $<0001$ |
| produce | -3.61682 | 0.10202 | -35.45 | $<0001$ |
| grocery | 6.00777 | 0.03430 | 175.16 | $<0001$ |
| meat | -7.43519 | 0.35535 | -20.92 | $<0001$ |
| chill | 13.66051 | 0.04488 | 304.39 | $<0001$ |

## Discussion

- Markups share the expected positive relationship with concentration in (1)
- Sign flips in (2)
- In both cases, findings are very robust
- By department and year
- Outliers


## Market Effects vs. Firm Effects

- Markups are higher in more concentrated markets
- Large chains more likely to operate in concentrated markets
- But chains have smaller markups in more concentrated markups
- Recall we are unable to observe other variable costs that contribute to margins
- Transportation, Iabor, overhead, etc.


## Market Effects vs. Firm Effects

- Markets can be highly price competitive with 3-5 firms (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991)
- Results are consistent with cost efficiencies at large chains
- Keeping markups low to remain price competitive and preserving margins via lower operating costs


## Next Steps

- Incorporate VA, GA, NC, SC for more variation and firms
- Incorporate controls
- Ag land value
- Property value
- Energy costs
- Identify concentration impacts separately on retail and wholesale prices
- Examining changes in the product mix across markets


## Thank you!

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