000260372 001__ 260372
000260372 005__ 20180123011139.0
000260372 022__ $$a1496-5208
000260372 037__ $$a1753-2017-1202
000260372 041__ $$aeng
000260372 245__ $$aThe Law of Subsidies in Air Transport Services
000260372 260__ $$c2017
000260372 269__ $$a2017-07-01
000260372 336__ $$aJournal Article
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000260372 546__ $$aEnglish
000260372 6531_ $$aThe debate on subsidies in air transport has been closely associated with State aid that is allegedly calculated to enable carriers – in particular carriers such as Emirates, Etihad and Qatar – to distort markets and engage in anticompetitive conduct. Some carriers in competition with these three carriers have alleged that the two carriers of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are unfairly depriving the carriers of the West of their “market share” by moving into the American and the European markets with undue and unfair advantages granted to them by their States. A lobby group representing the three major airlines that brought the complaint against the Gulf carriers – American Airlines, Delta and United Airlines – has said that the three carriers of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have received $42 billion in subsidies and other benefits. The claim further alleges that, over the past decade, the three Middle East carriers have spent more than $100 billion on acquiring bloated fleets of modern wide-body aircraft. The request of the three American carriers was that the “open skies” agreements between the United States and the United Arab Emirates and between the United States and Qatar be “renegotiated” and modified, as the alleged subsidies had distorted international trade. This article discusses the legal regime pertaining to subsidies in air transport against the backdrop of this debate and evaluates the positions of the key players, including the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Trade Organization and the airlines concerned.
000260372 700__ $$aAbeyratne, Ruwantissa
000260372 773__ $$jVolume 18$$kNumber 1$$o49$$q31$$tEstey Journal of International Law and Trade Policy
000260372 8560_ $$fwilliam.kerr@usask.ca
000260372 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:260372$$pGLOBAL_SET
000260372 980__ $$a1753