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OCT 8 1976

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE. 1776 - 1976

by

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Staff Paper 76-25

Montana State University, Bozeman

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Two hundred years ago when Adam Smith described the way in which the invisible hand of the market place would organize society's output, he had no intention of implying that this invisible hand was to be unconstrained. Quite to the contrary, Smith recognized that the rules of the game under which buyers and sellers operated were crucial to the outcome. To put it another way, the structure of property rights has always played and will continue to play an important role in determining the way in which resources are organized for production and the agricultural sector is no exception.

The history of agriculture contains many chapters on the methods of organization which range from communal to private and the debate continues as to which system is "best." Recently it has been argued that even the neolithic revolution which witnessed the switch from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture found its roots in the rules of the game which governed production. In the words of Douglass North and Robert Thomas,

The solution to the common property dilemma in which pre-historic man found himself was the development of exclusive communal property rights. While animals and plants remained abundant relative to the demands of the human population, there was no incentive to incur the costs of establishing property rights over them. It is only during this transitional phase of increasing scarcity that it became worthwhile for man to incur the costs necessary to develop and enforce property rights that would limit the rate at which the resources were exploited. (North and Thomas, 1975, p. 26.)

Often the concept of private property rights is taken for granted in this country, but it should be recognized that the same evolutionary process to which Professors North and Thomas attribute the "first economic revolution" is responsible for the organizational structure we now have. Colonists landing on the shores of the New World found it necessary to adapt the rules which they had known in their mother country. The founding fathers were faced with the problem of determining the proper federal land policy, while those who ventured into the western frontiers found it necessary to adjust those rules to their needs. And when those frontiers closed, the farmers were faced with further adjustment to a more urban world. The rules of the game governing economic organization have varied over time and space in the United States and will undoubtedly continue to do so.

Our purpose here is to explain the evolutionary process which has tempered the structure of property rights in the agricultural sector and discuss how these rules have affected resource allocation. To understand this process we must first understand what is meant by property rights and what factors determine how these rights change. Within this context six periods in American agricultural history will be briefly examined: the adjustment to new conditions in Colonial America; the formation of a national land policy; westward expansion; the closing of the frontier; the new role of government; and the recent environmental movement. An understanding of the factors influencing major changes in the institutional framework should provide insight into what lies ahead.

The Evolutionary Process

The rules of the game which establish who has access to and use of both physical and human resources and the outputs therefrom are perhaps the most important determinants of the game's outcome. By assigning responsibility, private property rights force the self-interest maximizing individual to consider the costs and benefits of his decisions. In other words the structure of property rights will determine how individuals or groups use resources, what goods or bads they produce, and who bears the costs and reaps the benefits of actions.¹ When exclusivity and transferability are insured through private property rights, resources will move to their highest valued alternative subject to the constraint of positive transaction costs. Decision makers guided by the invisible hand and private property rights will promote efficiency and raise society's output to its highest feasible level. When exclusivity and transferability are lacking certain costs and benefits will be externalized and inefficient allocation will result.

From the above discussion it appears that efficiency is a simple matter of establishing private property rights, but this simplistic solution begs the question of how such rules are established. The rules of the game will evolve through a process of interaction in which rule makers will assess the perceived benefits and costs of alternative rules and act in favor or against the alternatives according to their assessment. By determining the extent to which an individual has access to and use of resources, the adopted rules of the game will influence society's as well as the individual's wealth position.

We have postulated elsewhere that "establishing and protecting

property rights is very much a productive activity toward which resources can be devoted. But, like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits and costs to investors of allocating resources to these endeavors." (Anderson and Hill, 1975, p. 165.) Efforts to change the rules of the game can be thought of as inputs into the production of an institutional structure. The demand for such inputs is determined by the value of the desired rule change as perceived by the decision maker and the likelihood that the proposed activities will achieve the desired change. It should be emphasized that the individual will be motivated by his perception of private benefits and costs which may differ from those of society. In the case of establishing private rights, for example, the action may have public good aspects which will result in an under-investment in such activity from society's perspective. On the other hand, if desired rule changes merely transfer rights from one owner to another, net private benefits may exceed net social benefits and too many resources will be devoted to these efforts. Nonetheless, an equilibrium level of effort to change the rules of the game will be established by the equilization of marginal benefits as described above and the marginal costs of activities, the latter being a function of the opportunity costs of resources involved.

To illustrate the use of this model consider the example of recent efforts by various groups of Indians to re-obtain title to their ancestral lands. Three factors fit into the explanation of this activity. First the value of the lands has been rising over time and is likely to continue to do so. Secondly, a higher education level amongst the Indians has

better equipped them to attempt the changes within the legal system. And finally, recent court decisions in favor of the Indian cause have significantly increased the probability of their success. These factors would suggest an increase in the marginal benefits of rule change activity which should induce the observed efforts. Let us now apply these simple concepts to the evolution of property rights in American agriculture.

Property Rights in Agriculture

In the course of American history there have been many changes in the structure of property rights as they pertain to the agricultural sector. At the same time the inhabitants of this nation have been faced with many different combinations of factor endowments and different precedents within the legal system which help explain the evolution of the existing property rights system and the impact the system has had upon output. The application of the above analysis to six periods in American history will shed light on the evolution of this system.

Adaptation in the Colonies²

Since the early colonists came mostly from England, it is hardly surprising that the property rights system which has evolved in the United States bears a great deal of similarity to that of the mother country. After centuries of evolution, seventeenth-century English law was increasingly recognizing the private rights of citizens especially with respect to land. (North and Thomas, 1973.) Hence, "the institutions which the English settler brought with him provided a hospitable back-

ground for growth." (North, p. 48.) But because actual conditions in the colonies differed from expectations, adaptation of the rules began almost immediately.

In both the Chesapeake Bay area and New England, initial settlements attempted some form of communal property. The Virginia charter, for example, required that all "fruits of their labours" as well as "all such other goods and commodities which shall be brought out of England" be put into one store and divided equally. But the results of such systems spelled disaster for the colonists.

Its [common property's] strangeness, the fact that it was so contrary to the agricultural tradition they knew, was discomfiting. There were drones who idled while others labored, and in a land where every hand was needed to survive, there were women who would allege weakness and inability to avoid weeding and hoeing. There was a very human tendency to work less for the common good than one would work for one's own good. (Rutman, p. 6.)

To remedy the problem in Virginia each man was given a small garden plot from which he was to provide his own food. This dispersement of land from the London Company marked the first form of private ownership in the colonies. In New England where each family was granted an acre of land and the livestock were divided amongst the colonists at an early date, "the end of communal agriculture was a boon to the settlement." (Rutman, p. 12.)

And with time the system of private ownership in the colonies became better defined and enforced. Where good farm land was scarce, this evolution was more rapid. The New England geography, for example, combined with the commercial aspects of the economy meant that settlement was more likely to be concentrated. The potential for conflict over property rights raised the benefits from definition and enforcement

which in turn produced a system for surveying and recording land ownership. Farther south in the Chesapeake region, however, this concern with the land system was much less intense. Since land was more homogeneous and of good quality, transportation was available to most tide water land via rivers, and economies of scale were few, congestion and hence the potential for conflict were reduced. We should not be surprised, therefore, that well defined and enforced property rights in land did not evolve as rapidly in that region.

When the colonies declared their independence of the mother country in 1776, colonial farmers had established the right to alienate and inherit land, rights which were crucial to efficient agriculture. To be sure there were some regulations of land use and the government had retained the rights of eminent domain, police power, and taxation. Nonetheless, by the time of the Revolution the landowner had basically acquired the right to use his land as he saw fit with few restrictions and controls by government.

Of course the property rights structure that existed in 1776 was more than just the result of economic forces. The colonists inherited a strong philosophical ideology which adhered to the concept of natural law. Under this ideology individuals were vested with certain rights and it was the function of the state to codify and enforce these rights. Included in this package of vested rights was the right to private property, a right which the state could neither create nor destroy. The embodiment of these rights in the Constitution with its emphasis on the importance and sanctity of the freedom of contract and the subsequent interpretations of that social contract by the Marshall

Court firmly established the principle of private property in our legal and economic system. Thus from the very beginning of our nation a firm basis was laid for an efficient allocative mechanism in agriculture; a property system that provided strong incentives for increases in production.

Federal Land Policy

The nineteenth century was marked by the movement of agriculture across most of the continent, with large-scale increases in production coming from the settlement of new lands and from technological advance. In both of these, however, the ability of the farmer to capture all or most all of any output increases was crucial to the rising output that occurred. The property rights system internalized the benefits (and costs) of most decisions and thus led to efficient resource use. A major influence in determining what property rights structure would prevail was the land policy of the federal government. Although by 1776 a set of institutions had developed which provided for private property in most of the settled land, formal property rights were not established over much of what is now the United States. That meant that the new nation was faced with some crucial decisions about what form those rights would take.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the government at both the state and national level moved rapidly towards a policy of establishing private rights in land. Such action was spurred by a basic attitude that the energy of the unpopulated continent should be released and that this release could be best accomplished by the private

actions of the citizenry. The impact of this land policy was felt most in the agricultural sector which dominated our early economy.

To be sure the transfer of the public domain to private ownership entailed numerous costs, but those costs were made considerably less by two important developments early in the nation's history. In 1785 the Continental Congress passed the Rectangular Survey Act that made establishment and enforcement of property rights much easier. Secondly, between 1781 and 1802 the various states ceded their claims to western lands to the federal government, again significantly lowering adjudication costs in establishing rights.

Initially the federal government saw itself simply as a wholesaler of land and disposed of large blocks of undeveloped territory to interested individuals and companies. Although the term "speculator" is often applied to these land purchasers in a pejorative sense, this policy did establish private rights very rapidly and quickly allowed the market to allocate land to its highest valued use. Because of a general disapprobation of "land speculator profits," the federal government gradually moved from being a wholesaler of land to being more of a retailer.

The growing concern for equity in land policy culminated in the Homestead Act of 1862 which, although it put severe restrictions on efficiency in land holdings, particularly in the arid west, did embody community sentiment about appropriately sized land holdings. Although there were significant social costs to the Homestead Act and its various modifications, it did allow for the establishment of private property rights, albeit at a higher cost than previously. But perhaps of even

greater significance than the Homestead Acts in federal land policy was a general movement away from establishment of individual rights to a policy of maintenance of group (governmental) rights in land. The twentieth century saw the government at both the state and federal levels move to more firmly establish its rights in the land that it held, which contrasts sharply with the nineteenth century which can be characterized as a period of rapid establishment of individual rights.

Westward Expansion³

The Easterner, with his background of forest and farm, could not always understand the man of the cattle kingdom. One went on foot, the other went on horseback; one carried his law in books, the other carried it strapped round his waist. One represented tradition, the other represented innovation; one responded to convention, the other responded to necessity and evolved his own conventions. Yet the man of the timber and the town made the law for the man of the plain; the plainsman, finding this law unsuited to his needs, broke it and was called lawless. (Webb, p. 206.)

By the time the first settlers were beginning to enter the American West, a system of defining and enforcing property rights in the productive agricultural inputs had evolved in the East. Surveys of the many small farms established the boundaries of each productive unit; positive identification by natural markings combined with rail fences made from the available wood supplies provided for definition and enforcement of rights in livestock; and riparian rights determined access to and use of water in the streams. Just as the colonists of the New World imported a set of rules inherited from the mother country, the "colonists" of the American West borrowed from their eastern heritage. By the same analogy the western colonists were forced to adapt their rules to fit the resource endowments they found in the new country.

Initial land endowments relative to population in the American West made the returns to the establishment of private property rights quite low. "There was room enough for all, and when a cattleman rode up some likely valley or across some well-grazed divide and found cattle thereon, he looked elsewhere for range." (Osgood, p. 182.) Squatter sovereignty was sufficient for settling land ownership questions during the early periods of settlements, but increased population density changed the level of property rights activity. Such activity ranged from the description of "accustomed range" in local newspaper advertisements, to the filing of legal documents of ownership, to the fencing of the open range with barbed wire in the 1870's. Between 1860 and 1900 changing land values and changing costs caused individuals and groups to devote more resources to definition and enforcement activity in order to capture potential rents to land. These efforts included not only control of land held privately but also control of grazing on the public domain. The result of these activities was a successive movement toward exclusive ownership of land on the Great Plains.

Property rights in cattle followed much the same evolutionary process. The most efficient size of operation on the Plains was vastly larger than that in the East and the lack of fencing materials prior to the introduction of barbed wire made fencing out of the question. Hence western ranchers were forced to turn to alternative methods of defining and enforcing property rights. In the absence of ownership conflicts, the return to establishing and enforcing property rights in cattle was low, but "the questions arising over the ownership of cattle and the rights of grazing, difficulties that have bothered the pastoral industry

from the beginning of time, were intensified as the number and value of the herds increased." (Osgood, p. 114.) With this came the increased use of branding and efforts to establish brand registration laws as means of defining and enforcing private ownership rights over livestock. Again the western agriculturalist was forced to adapt the institutional framework to fit his needs.

And finally in the case of water rights, the unique endowments of the Great Plains led the frontiersmen to invent and adopt an ownership system unique to their region. The initial adoption of the riparian system made sense for two reasons: (1) the precedent in Eastern law made the rules easy to implement in a legal system founded in the East; and (2) the initial abundance of land adjacent to water made the riparian system adequate for the allocation of that resource. However, again as the settlement pressure increased, the returns to activities aimed at changing the rules of the game also increased. Spurred by such activity, a system of water law evolved which:

1. Granted to the first appropriator an exclusive right to the water and to later appropriators rights conditioned upon the prior rights of those who have gone before;
2. Permitted the diversion of water from the stream so that it could be used on nonriparian lands;
3. Forced the appropriator of water to forfeit his right if the water was not used and;
4. Allowed for the transfer and exchange of rights in water between individuals.

That this system is strongest in the areas where water is most scarce, is combined with the riparian system in the states bordering the most arid portion of the Great Plains, and is not used to any significant extent in the more humid East suggests that benefits and costs do significantly influence the property rights system.

The Closing of the Frontier

Although much of the agricultural history of the United States can be described as a continuing process of defining and enforcing private rights in inputs, other concerns did come into play during the last half of the nineteenth century. Well defined and enforced rights do minimize externalities and promote efficiency, but individuals will attempt to change the rules for reasons other than efficiency. The decision maker may use his resources in an effort to affect the transfer of existing property rights from another owner to himself. Such efforts were very much a part of farm organization activities during this period.

It was also recognized that the cost of establishing private rights in some areas was too costly and other solutions resulted. The grants of public lands to railroads can be viewed as a means of allowing those railroads to capture a greater portion of the social rate of return on their investment than otherwise would have been possible. Likewise, the passing of the Morrill Act in 1862 was occasioned by the belief that the advancement of agricultural knowledge was not being carried out rapidly enough by the private sector. Although it took several decades for agricultural research to bear much fruit, Griliches' estimates of the social rate of return to a single innovation, hybrid corn, indicates that there are significant externalities in such research.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the closing of the great American frontier changed the attitudes and opportunities of farmers. Cheap land, considered by some as a "safety valve" for many of our economic and social problems was mostly spoken for either by private individuals or by government agencies. Agriculture had

expanded into the frontier regions of the country where in many cases the soil was fertile and new technology readily adaptable. The results of this expansion were manifested in several ways. First, agricultural output increased at an unprecedented rate. Between 1869 and 1914, wheat output increased by 309 percent, corn by 322 percent, oats by 375 percent, cotton by 644 percent, and cattle by 250 percent. Total farm output increased "about 200 percent during this period, while the nation's population increased about 150 percent." (Higgs, p. 80.) Secondly, as output was increasing, prices at the wholesale level were falling.

The productivity improvements themselves, inasmuch as they meant expansions of output, meant lower farm prices and, in view of the price inelasticity of demand for farm products, would have meant lower total gross farm incomes if demand had not grown simultaneously. The competitive nature of the industry insured that improvement was rather readily passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.

. . . . But, in fact, the demand for farm products, even with large accessions of export demand, did not grow as fast as total demand in the American economy . . . (Davis, et. al., pp. 403-04.)

Hence, absolute farm prices were declining as were absolute and relative incomes. (Higgs, p. 100.) And finally, the closing of the frontier and the continued expansion of the demand for land meant that land values in many areas appreciated rapidly. While these increases most certainly augmented the income of land owners in the form of capital gains, they also appeared as higher input prices which were real opportunity costs to all. Coupled with the above problems was the market instability experienced by agriculture's entry into wider trade areas, and the concern for concentration of economic power in the hands of a few.

During this period numerous agrarian protest movements entered the political arena in an effort to influence the perceived low and fluc-

tuating farm incomes, the high non-farm prices thought to be caused by monopoly power, and the wide margins between farm and market prices. "Farmers' faith in untrammelled individualism was modified by demands that 'something be done' by government or by voluntary association to stabilize farm incomes and to improve and maintain the relative standing of the family farmers in the economy." (Davis, et al, p. 410.) Groups such as the Grangers, the Farmers' Alliances, and Populists rose to the challenge of obtaining for the farmers their "fair share." While such efforts were nothing new to the American economy, the magnitude of these efforts marked a major turning point. As we have illustrated above, the agricultural sector played a major role in the evolution of private property rights in inputs such as land. The major concerns during the late nineteenth century, however, might be characterized as questions of property rights in outputs. The claims of "too low" agricultural prices, "too low" farm incomes, and "too high" freight rates can be interpreted as claims that farmers desired property rights in a larger share of the total market value of their output. The agrarian protest movements of this era can be viewed as efforts to muster resources to define and enforce these rights. Note, however, that acquiring these rights necessitated a transfer from other owners.

With the perceived concentration of power in some input markets such as railroad transportation and grain storage, the farmers saw increased benefits from group action which could be used to countervail these monopoly elements. The declining prices received at the farm also added impetus to the protest movements by giving the protestors more to gain if they were successful in their efforts. On the cost side of the ledger, falling farm incomes reduced the opportunity costs of

resources devoted to changing the rules of the game. Rather than spending extra hours in the field, it may have been much more productive to attend Grange meetings in the hope of increasing the return on crops produced. Moreover, during this era the effectiveness of group organization increased. The idea that power could only be resisted by power became commonplace in American attitudes as individuals joined their fellows to use the law to further their economic, social, or civic interests.

Nothing New--The Early Twentieth Century

During the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century, farmers made great strides toward the organization of their efforts to increase farm income through collective action. To be sure, this was not the first time members of the agricultural sector had engaged in such efforts; for example, farmers were involved in the formulation of the country's tariff policy during the early years of nationhood. But we have argued that their primary focus up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century was with the definition and enforcement of property rights, especially in land. Even though by the end of the century the organization effort was at a low ebb, there is little question that farmers had made their mark and that they would continue to do so.

They had demonstrated that organized farmers could exert a significant influence on national policies. Much had been learned about tactics in the attainment of given ends, and the dangers of direct political affiliation with specific parties. (Benedict, p. 114.)

Because of this success of the agrarian movement, we would predict that efforts at organization would be more productive and that more

collective efforts might occur. In the context of the theory presented herein, with the groundwork laid the marginal benefits from activity designed to define and enforce property rights in higher incomes should have increased. However, the other side of the coin, marginal costs, reduced the amount of such activity during the first fifteen years of the new century. Good years for the farmer made his time in the field more valuable and thereby increased the costs of devoting resources to collective action. Between 1900 and 1915 farm prices continued an upward march which left them over 50 percent higher by the end of the period. Rising incomes which accompanied the rising prices earned the era the designation of "the golden age of agriculture." These good times reduced the relative net return from collective action and hence the amount of such activity.

The impetus for a revival of organized political activity came from the deterioration of the "golden age." By the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century, homesteading had slacked off and was no longer providing for agricultural expansion. The advent of World War I and the policies of the government during that conflict kept farm prices and incomes up until 1920. Expanding overseas demand accounted for a part of this prosperity. But when wartime credits to allied countries were discontinued in 1919, this demand fell off and economic conditions in the agricultural sector began to change. This combined with the signing of the Armistice caused a sharp decline in farm prices in 1920 and an even sharper decline in 1921. With the decreasing demand along with an inelastic supply, wheat prices fell by one half and corn by one third. "Thus, by the spring of 1921, American agriculture found itself in a more unfavorable position than it had experienced at any time in the memory of men then living, or

possibly at any time since the nation's beginning." (Benedict, p. 172.)

The stage was set for another surge of activity which would attempt to secure higher farm incomes through the coercive power of government.

The major focus of the activity was not much different than that which had existed twenty-five years earlier. The farmer's share of national income was below what was considered to be "fair"; prices dictated by the markets were "too low" relative to farmer's expectations. In other words, in the eyes of the farmer, a portion of the true social value of his product was not accruing to the rightful owner; somewhere in the market system, property rights had been attenuated and the government was called upon to correct the situation by redefining and enforcing those property rights. This is not to say that the market had necessarily broken down due to the existence of concentration of power or externalities but that farmers perceived that such a situation existed.

The success of the "new farm movement" was insured by the advent of the Great Depression. To the U.S. farmers of the third and fourth decades of the current century, the costs of devoting resources to the establishment of "new property rights" were low since the markets for their products were yielding poor returns. In addition to these cost considerations was the fact that the Progressive Era had shown the potential effectiveness of organizing to influence the rules of the game. The potential for higher incomes, coupled with the expectation that they could be obtained if the organization was strong, raised the benefits from institutional change activity. Resources employed by the various groups were aimed at increasing the incomes of members by giving them the right to control output in their sector; by giving them the right to receive parity

prices; and by giving them the right to have a say in the establishment of prices charged by input suppliers such as railroads and grain elevators.

The success of their efforts is evident in the farm policy of the federal government which has emerged during this century. Bills such as the cooperative marketing bill of 1922 which exempted coops from anti-trust legislation, the McNary-Haugen bills which would have enabled government purchases of surplus commodities in 1924, and the New Deal price-support programs are all examples of the success of organizations such as the Farm Bureau. "By the end of the 1930's the agricultural price-support program, the basic program desired by the farmer, had become institutionalized into the American political structure, and has continued so in one form or another since that time." (Davis and North, p. 100.)

The Environmental Movement

While a majority of the property rights activity of farmers in this century have been of the type described above, recent years have seen a return to the concern for property rights in inputs such as land and water. The conservation movement which began late in the nineteenth century was revived during the Great Depression, and revived again during the past two decades and might be seen as an effort by various groups to define and enforce property rights in resources which have no such governing rules. In the case of air, for example, the increasing scarcity of clear air has induced many to secure behavioral rules governing the use of that scarce resource. Land and water use have come under similar scrutiny and since these resources are valuable inputs to

the farmer, he has been forced to engage in the battle for rights.

Land use planning, described by some as the "taking issue," is an excellent example of the current issue. As land in general and open space in particular has become more scarce, the rate of return on defining and enforcing property rights in such resources has increased. The response of individuals to this return has resulted in a proliferation of rules and regulations governing land use, many of which transfer rights the farmer considered to be his exclusively to other groups or individuals without compensation to the farmer. The ability of the farmer to alter the course of a stream provides a case in point. While this is not a right guaranteed by law in most cases, it is one which the farmer thought he owned. Legislation designed to regulate stream use has altered these thoughts.

Efforts to alter the rights to resource use have raised the benefits to farmers from better defining the rights which they considered secure. In many cases existing organizations have turned their efforts to this cause while in others entirely new organizations have been formed.

Summary

From colonial times through the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the main focus of agrarian property rights activity was on defining and enforcing property rights in inputs and this focus was instrumental in directing the course of private property rights, especially in land. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century until the present, the primary concern of the farmer has been with the establishment of private property rights in a larger share of the national income and again these efforts were influential in setting

the direction of federal policy. And now with the rise of water and land use planning the agricultural sector is again concerning itself with the definition and enforcement of rights in inputs.

Farmers are not the only productive group in our society which affect the type and distribution of property rights, but it is clear that they have had a voice. Their commitment to private property manifested itself in the large scale output increases which the nation has experienced. On the other hand, their more recent concerns for equity have helped force open the door for increased transfer activity accompanied by government regulation. It is clear from our history that the rules of the game or property rights significantly influence productivity and that such rules are endogenous to the system. Hence, on this bicentennial year it is important that we ask to what extent the present system of property rights encourages efficiency and to what extent it promotes transfers not only in the agricultural sector but in the economy as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

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1. For a more lengthy discussion of how rules evolved and how they influence activity see Anderson and Hill, in press.
2. We wish to thank one of our students, Randy Rucker, for his valuable research assistance on this section.
3. This section is condensed from Anderson and Hill, 1975.

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