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## The Dynamic Migration Game:

### A Structural Econometric Model and Application to Rural Mexico

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# The Dynamic Migration Game: A Structural Econometric Model and Application to Rural Mexico\*

Ruben Irvin Rojas Valdes,<sup>†</sup> C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell,<sup>‡</sup> and J. Edward Taylor<sup>§</sup>

## Abstract

The migration decisions of households in a village can be thought of as a dynamic game in which each household optimally decides how to allocate its members across distinct activities, taking into account dynamic considerations about the future and strategic considerations about what neighbors in the village are doing. We develop and estimate a structural econometric model of this dynamic migration game. The structural econometric model enables us to examine how natural factors, economic factors, institutions, government policies, and strategic interactions affect the migration decisions of households in rural Mexico. We use this model to simulate the effects of counterfactual policy scenarios, including those regarding wages, schooling, crime rates at the border, precipitation, and government policy, on migration decisions and welfare.

**JEL Codes:** O15, O54

**Keywords:** migration, Mexico, strategic interactions, dynamic behavior, dynamic game, structural econometric model

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# 1 Introduction

According to estimates from the World Bank (2010a), around 3 percent of the world population lived in a country different from the one in which they were born. The US is the country with the highest immigrant population in the world, with more than 46 million people who were foreign born (United Nations, 2013), of which about 11 million are from Mexico (World Bank, 2010b). These trends are considerably changing demographic portraits, reshaping patterns of consumption, and altering the cultures of both sending and receiving countries (Rojas Valdes, Lin Lawell and Taylor, 2017).

Given the economic significance of migration and its relevance for policy (Rojas Valdes, Lin Lawell and Taylor, 2017), it is important to understand the factors that cause people to migrate. We add to the literature on the determinants of migration by incorporating two important features of migration decisions: strategic interactions and dynamic behavior.

Migration decisions are dynamic because these decisions can be viewed as forms of investment that are made under uncertainty. Migration decisions are at least partially irreversible, there is leeway over the timing of these decisions, and the payoffs from these decisions are uncertain; as a consequence, there may be an option value to waiting before making these decisions that makes these decisions dynamic rather than static (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Migration decisions are also dynamic because households consider the future when making these decisions, basing them not only on the current state of economic factors, but also on the prospects of economic opportunities in other areas and the potential streams of net benefits (or payoffs) from migrating.

In addition to being dynamic, migration decisions are also strategic. We define 'strategic interactions' as arising whenever the migration decisions of other households in the village affect a household's payoffs from migration and therefore its decisions to have a member migrate. There are several reasons why a household's migration decisions may depend on the migration decisions of its neighbors, including migration networks, information externalities, relative deprivation, risk sharing, and competition effects, (Rojas Valdes, Lin Lawell and

Taylor, 2017). Our structural model is general enough to capture multiple possible sources of strategic interactions, and enables us to analyze their net effect.<sup>1</sup>

Owing to strategic interactions and dynamic behavior, the migration decisions of households in a village can be thought of as a dynamic game in which each household optimally decides how to allocate its members across distinct activities, taking into account dynamic considerations about the future and strategic considerations about what neighbors in the village are doing. We develop and estimate a structural econometric model of this dynamic migration game.

There are several advantages to using a dynamic structural econometric model. First, a dynamic structural model explicitly models the dynamics of migration decisions. Second, a dynamic structural model incorporates continuation values that explicitly model how expectations about future affect current decisions. Third, a structural econometric model of a dynamic game enables us to estimate structural parameters of the underlying dynamic game with direct economic interpretations. These structural parameters include parameters that measure the effects of state variables on household payoffs (utility) and the net effect of the strategic interactions. These parameters account for the continuation value. Fourth, the parameter estimates can be used to calculate welfare. Fifth, the parameter estimates can be used to simulate the effects of counterfactual scenarios on decisions and welfare.

Our structural econometric model of the dynamic migration game enables us to examine how natural factors, economic factors, institutions, government policies, and strategic interactions affect the migration decisions of households in rural Mexico. We use this model to simulate the effects of counterfactual policy scenarios, including those regarding wages, schooling, crime rates at the border, precipitation, and government policy, on migration decisions and welfare.

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<sup>1</sup>We choose to use the term 'strategic interactions' instead of 'peer effects' for two main reasons. First, the term 'peer' often connotes an individual; in contrast, the decision-makers we examine are households rather than individuals. Second, a possible source of strategic interactions we allow for in our analysis is a competition effect, which is an effect that is potentially more accurately described as a 'strategic interaction' rather than a 'peer effect'. Nevertheless, our concept of 'strategic interactions' is very similar to that of 'peer effects'.

The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the importance of migration in rural Mexico. Section 3 reviews the related literature on migration and structural econometric models. Section 4 presents our model of the dynamic migration game. Section 5 describes the econometric estimation. Section 6 describes the data. Section 7 presents the results of the structural econometric model. Section 8 presents the results of our counterfactual simulations. Section 9 concludes.

## 2 Background

The economic importance of migration from Mexico to the US is twofold. Since the mid-1980s, migration to the US has represented an employment opportunity for Mexicans during a period of economic instability and increasing inequality in Mexico. In addition, it has represented an important source of income via remittances, especially for rural households (Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda, 2007).<sup>2</sup> Remittances from the US to Mexico amount to 22.8 billion dollars per year, according to estimates from the World Bank (2012). According to recent calculations, an average of 2,115 dollars in remittances is sent by each of the nearly 11 million Mexicans living in the US, which represents up to 2 percent of the Mexican GDP (D’Vera et al., 2013). Some authors estimate that 13 percent of household total income and 16 percent of per capita income in Mexico come from migrant remittances (Taylor et al., 2008).<sup>3</sup>

With a border 3200 kilometers long, the largest migration flow between two countries, and a wage differential for low-skilled workers between the US and Mexico of 5 to 1 (Cornelius and Salehya, 2007), the US-Mexico migration relationship also imposes challenges to policy-makers of both countries. Beginning in 2000, Mexico moved away from its previous so-called ‘no policy policy’, and tried instead to pursue a more active policy to influence the US to

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<sup>2</sup>Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2007) find that 3 percent of urban households and up to 10 percent of rural households in Mexico receive remittances.

<sup>3</sup>Castelhanao et al. (2016) find that migrant remittances are not associated with increases in rural investment in agricultural production in Mexico, however.

agree to a workers program and to increase the number of visas issued for Mexicans, although its efforts got frustrated after the 9/11 attacks in September 2001. More recently, other domestic policies have included the programs Paisano and Tres Por Uno, which facilitate the temporary return during holidays of Mexicans legally living in the US and which match the contributions of migrant clubs for the construction of facilities with social impact in Mexican communities, respectively. On the US side, several reforms have been attempted to both open a path for legalization while increasing the expenditure to discourage illegal immigration, both of which affect mostly Mexicans. The most recent, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, gives access to work permits to individuals who entered the country before they were 16 years of age.

## **3 Literature Review**

### **3.1 Determinants of Migration**

The first strand of literature upon which our paper builds is the literature on determinants of migration. The new economics of labor migration posits the household as the relevant unit of analysis. Using the household as the relevant unit of analysis addresses several observed features of migration that are ignored by individualistic models, including the enormous flows of remittances and the existence of extended families which extend beyond national borders. Most applications of the new economics of labor migration assume that the preferences of the household can be represented by an aggregate utility function and that income is pooled and specified by the household budget constraint.

For example, Stark and Bloom (1985) assume that individuals with different preferences and income not only seek to maximize their utility but also act collectively to minimize risks and loosen constraints imposed by imperfections in credit, insurance, and labor markets. This kind of model assumes that there is an informal contract among members of a family in which members work as financial intermediaries in the form of migrants. The household

acts collectively to pay the cost of migration by some of its members, and in turn migrants provide credit and liquidity (in form of remittances), and insurance (when the income of migrants is not correlated with the income generating activities of the household). In this setting, altruism is not a precondition for remittances and cooperation, but it reinforces the implicit contract among household members (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Garlick, Leibbrandt and Levinsohn (2016) provide a framework with which to analyze the economic impact of migration when individuals migrate and households pool income.

In the new economics of labor migration, individual characteristics and human capital variables are also very important because they influence not only the characteristics of the migrants but also the impacts that migration has on the productive activities of the remaining household. Migrants are not homogeneous nor are they a random sample from the population in the host country. Instead, individuals might be selected according to their characteristics and how these characteristics fit in the host country. Positive selection occurs when migrants have (expected) earnings above the mean in both the host and the source economy and negative selection when they would have expected income below the average in both locations. Borjas (1987) presents a variation of the Roy (1951) model which shows that, assuming constant costs, positive selection happens when the variance of the income in the host country is smaller than the variance in the source country, since then it would be as if the source country taxed highly skilled workers and insured less skilled workers. The opposite happens with negative selection.

The importance of migrant characteristics have been analyzed empirically with mixed results. Human capital theory à la Sjaastad (1962) suggests that migrants are younger than those who stay because younger migrants would capture the returns from migration over a longer time horizon. The role of education depends on the characteristics of the host and the source economy. Education is positively related to rural-urban migration but has a negative effect on international migration (Taylor, 1987). The reason is that education is not equally rewarded across different host economies. For example, agricultural work in



the United States requires only low-skilled labor, so education has a negative effect on the selection of migrants for this type of work.

Changes in labor demand in the United States has modified the role of migrant characteristics in determining who migrates. Migrants from rural Mexico, once mainly poorly educated men, more recently have included female, married, and better educated individuals relative to the average rural Mexican population (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Borjas (2008) finds evidence that supports the negative selection of Puerto Rico emigrants to the United States, which is consistent with Borjas' (1987) model of negative selection of workers when the source economy has low mean wages and high inequality. On the other hand, Feliciano (2001), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), Cuecuecha (2005), and Rubalcaba et al. (2008) find that the selection of Mexican migrants occurs from the middle of the wage or education distribution. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) show that migrants from regions with communities of moderate size in the United States are selected from the middle of the wealth distribution, while migrants from regions with bigger communities in the United States come from the bottom of the wealth distribution.

The financial costs of migration can be considerable relative to the income of the poorest households in Mexico.<sup>4</sup> Migration costs reflect in part the efforts of the host country to impede migration, which might explain why migration flows continue over time and why we do not observe enormous flows of migrants (Hanson, 2010). Migration costs for illegal crossing from Mexico to the United States are estimated to be 2,750 to 3,000 dollars (Mexican Migration Program, 2014). Estimates reported in Hanson (2010) suggest that the cost of the "coyote" increased by 37 percent between 1996-1998 and 2002-2004, mainly due to the increase of border enforcement due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Nevertheless, Gathmann (2008) estimates that even when the border enforcement expenditure for the Mexico-United

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<sup>4</sup>Data from the National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Policy in Mexico (CONEVAL) show that the average income of the poorest 20 per cent of rural Mexican households was only 456 dollars a year in 2012.

States border almost quadrupled between 1986 and 2004, the increase in expenditure produced an increase the cost of the coyote of only 17 percent, with almost zero effect on coyote demand.

Migration decisions may also be affected by weather and climate. Jessoe, Manning and Taylor (forthcoming) evaluate the effects of annual fluctuations in weather on employment in rural Mexico to gain insight into the potential labor market implications of climate change, and find that extreme heat increases migration domestically from rural to urban areas and internationally to the U.S. Maystadt, Mueller and Sebastian (2016) investigate the impact of weather-driven internal migration on labor markets in Nepal. Mason (2016) analyzes climate change and migration using a dynamic model, and shows that the long run carbon stock, and the entire time path of production (and hence emissions), is smaller in the presence of migration.

We build on our analysis in Rojas Valdes, Lin Lawell and Taylor (2017), in which we analyze strategic interactions, or 'neighborhood effects', in migration decisions using reduced-form models. Using instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of neighbors' decisions, we empirically examine whether strategic interactions in migration decisions actually take place in rural Mexico, whether the interactions depend on the size of the village, and whether there are nonlinearities in the strategic interactions. Our results show that there is a significant and positive own-migration strategic effect. In our base case specification, an increase of 0.1 in the fraction of neighbors with migration to the US increases a household's probability of migration to the US by around 5.9 percentage points, while an increase of 0.1 in the fraction of neighbors with migration to other states within Mexico increases a household's probability of migration to other states within Mexico by around 6.3 percentage points. We also find that strategic interactions vary nonlinearly with village size.

## 3.2 Structural econometric models

In addition to the literature on migration, our paper also builds on previous literature using structural econometric models.

There is a burgeoning literature using structural models in development economics. Shenoy (2016) estimates the cost of migration and migration-related supply elasticity in Thailand using structural model of location choice. He finds that the costs of migration are 0.3 to 1.1 times as high as average annual earnings. He also finds that migration contributes 8.6 percentage points to local labor supply elasticity. We build on Shenoy’s (2016) work by explicitly modeling the dynamic and strategic components of international migration.

To explain the large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the trade-off between consumption smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income gains from migration. We build on Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2016) work by explicitly modeling the dynamics of international migration, by allowing for multiple channels of strategic interactions in addition to networks, and by applying our model to migration from rural Mexico.

The seminal work of Rust (1987) is the cornerstone of dynamic structural econometric models. Rust (1987) develops an econometric method for estimating single-agent dynamic discrete choice models. Hotz and Miller (1993) propose a two-stage algorithm.

Structural econometric models of dynamic behavior have been applied to model bus engine replacement (Rust, 1987), nuclear power plant shutdown decisions (Rothwell and Rust, 1997), water management (Timmins, 2002), air conditioner purchase behavior (Rapson, 2014), wind turbine shutdowns and upgrades (Lin Lawell, 2017), agricultural disease management (Carroll et al., 2017c), supply chain externalities (Carroll et al., 2017b), agricultural productivity (Carroll et al., 2017a), pesticide spraying decisions (Sambucci, Lin Lawell and Lybbert, 2017), and decisions regarding labor supply, job search, and occupational choices (see Keane, Todd and Wolpin, 2011).

Morten (2016) develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of risk sharing with limited commitment frictions and endogenous temporary migration to understand the joint determination of migration and risk sharing in rural India. We build on Morten’s (2016) work by allowing for multiple channels of strategic interactions in addition to risk sharing, and by applying our model to migration from rural Mexico.

As many migrations are temporary (Dustmann and Gorlach, 2016), Kennan and Walker (2011) estimate a dynamic structural econometric model of optimal sequences of migration decisions in order to analyze the effects of expected income on individual migration decisions. They apply the model to interstate migration decisions within the United State. The model is estimated using panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on white males with a high-school education. Their results suggest that the link between income and migration decisions is driven both by geographic differences in mean wages and by a tendency to move in search of a better locational match when the income realization in the current location is unfavorable.

While most of the dynamic structural econometric models in development economics model single-agent dynamic decision-making (see e.g., Todd and Wolpin, 2010; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012; Mahajan and Tarozzi, 2011), we model a dynamic game between decision-makers, and thus allow for both dynamic and strategic decision-making.

Structural econometric models of dynamic games include a model developed by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), which has been applied to the multi-stage investment timing game in offshore petroleum production (Lin, 2013), to ethanol investment decisions (Thome and Lin Lawell, 2017), and to the decision to wear and use glasses (Ma, Lin Lawell and Rozelle, 2017); and a model developed by Bajari et al. (2015) and applied to ethanol investment (Yi and Lin Lawell 2017a; Yi and Lin Lawell, 2017b).

The structural econometric model of a dynamic game we use is based on a model developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), which has been applied to the cement industry (Ryan, 2012; Fowle, Reguant and Ryan, 2016), to the production decisions of ethanol pro-

ducers (Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome, 2017), and to the world petroleum industry (Kheiravar et al., 2017).

Lin (2013) develops and estimates a structural model of the multi-stage investment timing game in offshore petroleum production. When individual petroleum-producing firms make their exploration and development investment timing decisions, positive information externalities and negative extraction externalities may lead them to interact strategically with their neighbors. If they do occur, strategic interactions in petroleum production would lead to a loss in both firm profit and government royalty revenue. The possibility of strategic interactions thus poses a concern to policy-makers and affects the optimal government policy. Lin (2013) examines whether these inefficient strategic interactions take place on U.S. federal lands in the Gulf of Mexico. In particular, she analyzes whether a firm's production decisions and profits depend on the decisions of firms owning neighboring tracts of land. The empirical approach is to estimate a structural econometric model of the firms' multi-stage investment timing game.

Ryan (2012) uses a dynamic game model to estimate the cost structure of the cement industry, which allows him to estimate the effects of changes in the regulatory environment coming from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. A typical cost-benefit analysis focuses only on the costs that existing firms would have to pay to comply with a new regulation. In contrast to such a static analysis, a dynamic games model allows him to evaluate the entry decisions of new players, which is determined mainly by the sunk costs. Ryan (2012) finds that the Clean Air Act Amendments increased the sunk costs of entry, which negatively affected potential entrants and partially benefited incumbents because of lower ex post competition. Fowlie, Reguant and Ryan (2016) extend this work to analyze market-based emissions regulation and industry dynamics.

Huang and Smith (2014) model the dynamics of a common-pool fisheries exploitation in North Carolina. They model daily fishing decisions as a dynamic game to quantify the inefficiency resulting from the common-pool resource exploitation. The common-pool ex-

exploitation produces two types of externalities: stock externalities (because the amount of harvest of each fisherman reduces the stock available for the rest of the fishermen and because they also alter the timing of fishing in a given season) and congestion externalities. They show that the usually proposed individually transferable quota only partially solves the inefficiency because it does not affect the timing of the exploitation within a season. They simulate a new theoretical daily limited entry policy and show that it yields to an outcome closer to the efficient allocation.

Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2017) use a dynamic game model grounded on the theoretical models of Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) to analyze the effect of government subsidies and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) on the US ethanol industry. Analyses that ignore the dynamic implications of these policies, including their effects on incumbent ethanol firms' investment, production, and exit decisions and on potential entrants' entry behavior, may generate incomplete estimates of the impact of the policies and misleading predictions of the future evolution of the fuel ethanol industry. Yi, Lin Lawell and Thome (2017) construct a dynamic model to recover the entire cost structure of the industry including the distributions of fixed entry costs and of exit scrap values. They use the estimated parameters to evaluate three different types of subsidy: a volumetric production subsidy, an investment subsidy, and an entry subsidy, each with and without the RFS. Results show that the RFS is a critically important policy for supporting the sustainability of corn ethanol production, and that investment subsidies and entry subsidies are more effective than production subsidies.

## 4 Dynamic Migration Game

The players  $i = 1, \dots, N$  in our dynamic migration game are households within a village. Each year  $t = 1, \dots, \infty$ , each household  $i$  chooses an action from a discrete finite set  $a_{it} \in A_i$ , and all households choose their time- $t$  actions  $a_{it}$  simultaneously, such that  $\mathbf{a}_t = (a_{1t}, \dots, a_{Nt}) \in A$

summarizes the actions played at  $t$ . In our model, the actions are whether to engage in migration to the US, and whether to engage in migration within Mexico.

The decisions of each household  $i$  in year  $t$  depend on the vector of state variables  $\mathbf{s}_t \in S \subset \mathbb{R}^L$  at time  $t$ . State variables include natural factors, economic factors, and government policy.

The decisions of each household  $i$  in year  $t$  also depend on private information shocks to household  $i$ . Each period  $t$ , each household  $i$  receives an idiosyncratic shock  $\varepsilon_{it} \in E_i$  independent of other players' private shock with distribution  $G_i(\cdot|\mathbf{s}_t)$  such that the collection of idiosyncratic shocks is  $\varepsilon_t = (\varepsilon_{1t}, \dots, \varepsilon_{Nt})$ . The private information shocks may represent, for example, shocks to household costs, health, and/or income.

The per-period payoff to each household  $i$  depends on the actions played by household  $i$ , the actions played by other households (denoted  $-i$ ), the state variables  $\mathbf{s}_t$ , and household  $i$ 's private shock  $\varepsilon_{it}$ .

We account for the important factors in a household's utility maximization decision by including in the payoff function state variables that affect income from migrating; state variables that affect alternative sources of income; state variables that affect costs of migration; state variables that affect household utility; state variables that affect liquidity and other constraints; and state variables that affect the outside option to not engaging in migration. The per-period payoff function therefore includes terms that are functions of actions, strategic variables, demographic characteristics of the household, natural factors, economic factors, and government policy. Our specification of the per-period payoff function is agnostic about the actual functional form of the utility function, the actual nature of the constraints, and the actual mechanism by which, for example, local wages affect household utility, and thus is general enough to capture the reduced-form implications of a number of models of general equilibrium behavior of individuals within the household, households in the village, and the village economy.

We assume that the payoff function and the distribution of the shocks are indexed by

a finite parameter vector  $\theta$ , so that the payoff function is given by  $\pi_i(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i; \theta)$  and the distribution of the private shock has density  $G_i(\varepsilon_i | \mathbf{s}; \theta)$ .

Our action variables include migrating to the US and migrating within Mexico. For the actions of neighbors, we include the fraction of neighbors with migration to the US and the fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico.

For state variables, we include the number of indigenous schools in the municipality, the number of males in the household, the household head age, a dummy variable for whether the first born of the household was a male, the household head schooling, the maximum level of schooling of any member of the household, the lag of the fraction of household members that worked in the US, the lag of the fraction of household members that worked in other state within Mexico, the average crime rate in border crossing municipalities that are within a radius of 1,000 kilometers from the village, and the average number of apprehensions in the border crossing municipalities that are within a radius of 1,000 kilometers from the village. We also include the squared terms of these state variables, and the interaction of each state variable, including the strategic variables, with the household's own action.

The payoff function is the per-period payoff for each household. It is specific to each household since it includes household-specific state variables. We assume that the parameters  $\theta$  are common to all households, but the values of the action variables and the state variables vary by household, as does the error term, so for each household the payoff is different.<sup>5</sup>

In our model, we do not assume the actions are mutually exclusive, so it is possible for household to engage in multiple actions at the same time. Households make decisions as to maximize the expected present discounted value of their entire stream of per-period payoffs, so in each period, they face different trade-offs between the benefits and costs they can generate by migrating to a given location (US or within Mexico) versus those benefits and costs of migrating to a different location or not migrating at all. To see these tradeoffs from

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<sup>5</sup>We do not aggregate all households into a single utility function (although we do aggregate all members of the household into the households utility function), nor is the payoff function for an “average” household only. Instead, the payoff function is the per-period payoff specific to each household.



migration, we would compare the value function evaluated at different values of migration decisions. The tradeoffs depend on the parameters, the action variables, the state variables, and the shock.

At each time  $t$ , each household  $i$  makes its migration decisions in order to maximize the expected present discounted value of the entire stream its expected per-period payoffs, without knowing what the future realizations of its idiosyncratic shocks and the state vector will be, and without knowing what other households will decide to do at time  $t$ . Household  $i$ 's dynamic optimization problem of household  $i$  is given by:

$$\max_{\{a_{it}\}} E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_i(\mathbf{a}_t, \mathbf{s}_t, \varepsilon_{it}; \theta) | \mathbf{s}_t \right].$$

A Markov state-space strategy for player  $i$  is a function  $\sigma_i : S \times E_i \rightarrow A_i$  that maps combinations of state-shocks into actions such that  $\sigma : S \times E_1 \times \dots \times E_N \rightarrow A$  is the profile of strategies, and where  $E_i \subset \mathbb{R}^M$  is the support of  $G_i$ . For a realization of the state vector  $\mathbf{s}$ , the expected payoff of player  $i$  from playing strategy  $\sigma_i$  is:

$$V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma; \theta) = E_{\varepsilon} \left[ \pi_i(\sigma(\mathbf{s}, \varepsilon), \mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i; \theta) + \beta \int V_i(\mathbf{s}'; \sigma; \theta) dP(\mathbf{s}' | \sigma(\mathbf{s}, \varepsilon), \mathbf{s}) | \mathbf{s} \right].$$

In a Markov Nash Perfect Equilibrium, the expected present discounted value that each household  $i$  receives from playing its equilibrium strategy  $\sigma_i$  is at least as high as the expected present discounted value it could receive from playing any other alternative strategy  $\sigma'_i$ :

$$V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma; \theta) \geq V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma'_i, \sigma_{-i}; \theta).$$

The parameters  $\theta$  to be estimated are the coefficients on the terms in the per-period

payoff function, which include terms that are functions of action variables, strategic variables, demographic characteristics of the household, natural factors, economic factors, and government policies.

## 5 Econometric Estimation

Finding a single equilibrium is computationally costly even for problems with a simple structure. In more complex problems – as in the case of the dynamic game of migration, where many agents and decisions are involved – the computational burden is even more important, particularly if there may be multiple equilibria. Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) propose a method for recovering the dynamic parameters of the payoff function without having to compute any single equilibrium. Their estimation builds on the algorithm of Hotz and Miller (1993) but allows for continuous and discrete choice variables, so their approach is more general and can be implemented in a broader array of research questions.

In a first stage, one estimates the parameters of the policy function, that is, one estimates the empirical relationship between the observed actions and the state variables. Without imposing any structure, this step simply characterizes what firms do mechanically as a function of the state vector; these are reduced-form regressions correlating actions to states. This step also avoids the need for the econometrician to both compute the set of all possible equilibria and to specify how agents decide on which equilibrium will be played, as the policy functions are estimated from the equilibrium that is actually played in the data (Ryan, 2012). In this stage one also recovers the distribution of the state variables, which describes how these state variables evolve over time.

Forward simulation is used to estimate the value functions. The procedure consists of simulating many paths of play for each individual given distinct draws of the idiosyncratic shocks, and then averaging over the paths of play to get an estimate of the expected value function. Our methodological innovation is that we address the endogeneity of neighbors’

decisions using a fixed point calculation.

The second stage consists of estimating the parameters of the payoff function that are consistent with the observed behavior. This is done by appealing to the assumption of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, so each observed decision is every agent’s best response to the actions of the rest of the players. The estimation of the parameters in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) is based on a minimum distance estimator, minimizing profitable deviations from the optimal strategy.

The crucial mathematical assumption to be able to estimate the parameters in the payoff function is that the same equilibrium is played in every market, so in case of the existence of multiple equilibria, the same equilibrium is chosen always. We present further details of the estimation procedure below.

## 5.1 Policy functions

The policy functions relate the state variables relevant for the decision of migration to the actions played by each household, which in our model is the decision to engage in migration to the US and the decision to engage in migration within Mexico. The actions  $a_i$  of each agent  $i$  are assumed to be functions of a set of state variables and private information:

$$a_i = \sigma_i(\mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i; \sigma_{-i}). \tag{1}$$

For the policy function, we regress household  $i$ ’s decision  $y_{ikt}$  to engage in migration on the fraction  $s_{ikt}$  of the households in the same village household  $i$ , excluding  $i$ , that engage in migration of type  $k$ . Thus, the econometric model is:

$$y_{ikt} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_{sk} s_{ikt} + x'_{it} \beta_x + \mu_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ikt}, \tag{2}$$

where the vector  $x_{it}$  includes covariates at the household, village, municipality, state, and

national level as well as border crossing variables;  $\mu_i$  is a village fixed effect; and  $t$  is a time trend.

The regressors at the household level in  $x_{it}$  include the number of males in the household, the age of the household head; the schooling of the household head; the maximum level of schooling achieved by any of the household members; the average level of schooling, measured as the number of years of education that have been completed, of household members 15 years old and above; a dummy if the household's first born was a male; the area of land owned by the household that is irrigated for agricultural purposes, interacted with village precipitation; the lagged fraction of household members working in the US; and the lagged fraction of household members working within Mexico.

The regressors at the municipality level in  $x_{it}$  include the number of schools in the basic system, the number of schools in the indigenous system, the number of cars, and the number of buses. The state-level variables in  $x_{it}$  include employment by sector. The national variables in  $x_{it}$  are aggregate variables that represent the broad state of the institutional and economic environment relevant for migration, including the average hourly wage, and wage by sector. The border crossing variables in  $x_{it}$  includes variables that measure crime, deaths, and border enforcement at nearby border crossing points.

Since the policy function for each player  $i$  depends on the policy functions for all other players, we address the endogeneity of neighbors actions in the structural model by using a fixed point algorithm in the forward simulation.

## 5.2 Transition densities

We estimate the value of next period's state variables relevant for the migration decision using flexible transition densities. Particularly, we use linear regressions that relate the current level of the state variables to their lags, and the lags of other related state variables.

At the national level, we regress the mean of wages in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors on the the lags of these three same variables. At the state level, we regress

the employment shares in each sector on the lags of the three shares, and on the lags of the mean wages. At the municipality level, we regress the number of basic schools, the number of indigenous schools, and the number of students in the basic system on the lags of these same variables, and the lags of the employment levels in the three sectors. At the village level, we regress the average crime rate, the average number of apprehensions, and the average number of border agents at the border crossing municipalities within 1,000 kilometers on their lags and the lag of the wage at the primary sector.

We also model the following transition densities at the household level: the number of males in the household, the number of males in the family,<sup>6</sup> the household size, a dummy indicator for whether the first born of the household was a male, the lag of the fraction of household members that worked in the US and in other state within Mexico, the household head schooling, the average schooling of the adults in the household, the maximum level of schooling of any household member, household's land slope and quality, and household's irrigated area. We model these transition densities by regressing these variables on their lags. The age of the head of the household evolves deterministically, so next period's age is today's age plus one.

### 5.3 Equilibrium conditions

The value function of player  $i$  is given by:

$$V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma; \theta) = E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_i(\sigma(\mathbf{s}_t, \varepsilon_t), \mathbf{s}_t, \varepsilon_{it}; \theta) | \mathbf{s}_0 = \mathbf{s} \right]$$

which gives the expected payoff over the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks and states.

Bajari, Benkard and Levin show that the computational burden can be reduced if one assumes linearity in the payoff function. Particularly, they show that if  $\pi_i(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i; \theta) =$

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<sup>6</sup>We define a family as the household head, its spouse, and its children.

$\Pi(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i) \cdot \theta$ , then the value function can be written as:

$$V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma; \theta) = E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Pi_i(\sigma(\mathbf{s}_t, \varepsilon_t), \mathbf{s}_t, \varepsilon_{it}) | \mathbf{s}_0 = \mathbf{s} \right] \cdot \theta = \mathbf{W}_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma) \cdot \theta \quad (3)$$

Since  $\mathbf{W}_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma)$  does not depend on  $\theta$ , the forward looking simulation can be used to estimate each  $\mathbf{W}_i$  once, and then obtain  $V_i$  for any value of  $\theta$ . Bajari, Benkard and Levin argue that this assumption is valid in models of entry and exits with fixed costs.

## 5.4 Forward simulation

We use forward simulation to calculate the expected PDV of the entire stream of per-period payoffs by simulating  $S = 100$  different paths of play of  $T = 30$  periods length each using  $D = 3$  different initial observed vectors of state variables. Our algorithm for the forward simulation for each initial observed vectors of state variables is as follows:

- Step 0: Starting at  $t = 0$  with initial state variables.
- Step 1: Evaluate the policy functions using this period's state variables to determine this period's actions. Our methodological innovation is that we address the endogeneity of neighbors' decisions using a fixed point calculation, as described below.
- Step 2: Calculate this period's payoffs as a function of this period's state variables and actions.
- Step 3: Evaluate the transition densities using this period's state variables and action variables to determine next period's state variables.
- Repeat Steps 1-3 using next period's state variables.

We sum the discounted payoffs over the  $T$  periods and average over the  $S$  simulations to obtain the expected PDV of entire stream of payoffs

## 5.5 Fixed point algorithm

Our methodological innovation is that we address the endogeneity of neighbors' decisions using a fixed point calculation, as follows:

- Step 1: Estimate policy functions, based on the reduced-form analysis in equation (2).
- Step 2: Use the observed  $s_{ikt}$  in the data as the initial guess for the expected fraction of neighbors with migration.
- Step 3: Predict the actions using the policy function for the current guess.
- Step 4: Estimate the corresponding  $s_{ikt}$  for the predicted actions, which becomes the new guess.
- Repeat Steps 3 and 4 until the difference between the guess and the predicted fraction of neighbors with migration is below a certain threshold.

We estimate the parameter  $\theta$  by imposing the restriction that the observed equilibrium is a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium condition  $V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}; \theta) \geq V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma'_i, \sigma'_{-i}; \theta)$  yields a set of inequalities that are consistent with the assumed behavior. The goal of the estimation procedure is to find the value of  $\theta$  that makes all the inequalities to hold at the same time. In practice, we will use an estimator that minimizes profitable deviations from the optimal strategy. Bajari, Benkard and Levin prove the asymptotic properties of this kind of estimator, which turns out to be consistent and asymptotically normal.

## 5.6 The optimization problem

Since we assume that the per period payoff function is linear in the parameters, we know we can write the value function of player  $i$  as in equation (3). We use forward looking simulation to compute  $\mathbf{W}_i$ , which is the present value of the discounted stream of expected

payoffs. We estimate this expectation by simulating  $S$  different paths of play of  $T$  periods length each, using  $D$  different initial observed datasets. We add the discounted payoffs over the  $T$  periods, and then average over the  $S$  simulations to obtain the entries of  $\mathbf{W}_i$ .

The average of the discounted sum of payoffs over many simulated paths of play is  $\hat{V}_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma; \theta)$ . Furthermore  $\hat{V}_i(\mathbf{s}; \hat{\sigma}; \theta)$  is an estimate of the payoff function that results from playing the optimal strategy  $\hat{\sigma}_i$ , the best response to other players' actions  $\hat{\sigma}_{-i}$ . Given our assumption of Markov perfect equilibria, the observed data is the best response of each agent to the observed states and expectations of the future. In order to estimate  $\theta$  we compute alternative value functions  $\hat{V}_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma'; \theta)$  that result from perturbations to the policy function. We compute the corresponding actions that agents would have taken and simulate a whole set of  $S$  stories of length  $T$ , with  $D$  initial data sets. A deviation is profitable if the value of the discounted stream of payoffs under the perturbed policy is greater than under the optimal policy. We choose  $\theta$  such that it minimizes the average profitable deviations.

An advantage of our structural model is that the estimated parameters have direct economic interpretation. Thus, it is possible to calculate the welfare associated with the observed and simulated data. We calculate the average welfare per household and the average welfare per household-year using the observed data and also using the simulated data.

Another advantage of our structural model is that we can use the estimated parameters to simulate the effects of counterfactual scenarios on decisions and on welfare. Counterfactual scenarios we simulate include those regarding changes in schools, schooling, crime rates at the border, wages, employment, precipitation, and government policy.

## 6 Data

We use data from the National Survey of Rural Households in Mexico (ENHRUM) in its three rounds (2002, 2007, and 2010<sup>7</sup>). The survey is a nationally representative sample of Mexican

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<sup>7</sup>The sample of 2010 is smaller than the sample of the two previous rounds because it was impossible to access some villages during that round due to violence and budget constraints.



rural households across 80 villages and includes information on the household characteristics such as productive assets and production decisions. It also includes retrospective employment information: individuals report their job history back to 1980. With this information, we construct an annual household-level panel data set that runs from 1990 to 2010<sup>8</sup> and that includes household composition variables such as household size, household head age, and number of males in the household. For each individual, we have information on whether they are working in the same village, in some other state within Mexico (internal migration), or in the United States.

The survey also includes information about the plots of land owned by each household, including slope (flat, inclined, or very inclined), quality (good, regular, or bad), irrigation status, and land area.<sup>9</sup> We reconstruct the information on land slope and land quality for the complete panel using the date at which each plot was acquired. Since a plot's slope and quality are unlikely to change over time (unless investments were taken to considerably change the characteristics of the plots, which we do not observe very often in the data), we interact the plot variables with a measure of precipitation at the village level (Jessee, Manning and Taylor, forthcoming) so the characteristics vary across households and along time. Rain data covers the period 1990 to 2007.

We use information from the National Statistics Institute (INEGI) to control for the urbanization and education infrastructure at the municipality level, including the number of basic schools and the number of indigenous schools. We also include the number of registered cars and buses. These data cover the period 1990 to 2010.

We also include aggregate variables that represent the broad state of the institutional and economic environment relevant for migration. We use data from the INEGI on the fraction of the labor force employed in each of the three productive sectors (primary, secondary,

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<sup>8</sup>Since retrospective data from 1980 to 1989 included only some randomly selected individuals in each village who reported their work history, we begin our panel data set in 1990.

<sup>9</sup>We use information on plots of land which are owned by the household because our data set does not include comparable information on plots of land that are rented or borrowed.

and tertiary<sup>10</sup>) at the state level, from 1995 to 2010. We use INEGI’s National Survey of Employment and the methodology used in Campos-Vazquez, Hincapie and Rojas-Valdes (2012) to calculate the hourly wage at the national level from 1990 to 2010 in each of the three productive sectors and the average wage across all three sectors.

We use two sets of border crossing variables that measure the costs of migration. On the Mexican side, we use INEGI’s data on crime to compute the homicide rate per 10,000 inhabitants at each of the 37 the Mexican border municipalities. On the United States’ side, we use data from the Border Patrol that include the number of border patrol agents, apprehensions, and deaths of migrants at each of nine border sectors,<sup>11</sup> and match each border sector to its corresponding Mexican municipality.

We interact these border crossing variables (which are time-variant, but the same for all villages at a given point in time) with measures of distance from the villages to the border (which are time-invariant for each village, but vary for each village-border location pair).

We use a map from the International Boundary and Water Commission (2013) to obtain the location of the 26 crossing-points from Mexico to the United States. Using the Google Distance Matrix API, we obtain the shortest driving route from each of the 80 villages in the sample to each of the 26 crossing-points, and match the corresponding municipality at which these crossing-points are located. This procedure allows us to categorize the border municipalities into those less than 1,000 kilometers from the village; and those between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers from the village.

By interacting the distances to the border crossing points with the border crossing variables, we obtain the mean of each border crossing variable at each of the three closest crossing points, and the mean of each border crossing variable within the municipalities that are in each of the two distance categories defined above. We also compute the mean of each border

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<sup>10</sup>The primary sector includes agriculture, livestock, forestry, hunting, and fisheries. The secondary sector includes the extraction industry and electricity, manufacturing, and construction. The tertiary sector includes commerce, restaurants and hotels, transportation, communication and storage, professional services, financial services, corporate services, social services, and government and international organizations.

<sup>11</sup>A “border sector” is the term the Border Patrol uses to delineate regions along the border for their administrative purposes.

crossing variable among all the border municipalities.

Figure A.1 in Appendix A presents a map of the villages in our sample (denoted with a filled black circle) and the US-Mexico border crossing points (denoted with a red X).

Table A.1 in Appendix A presents the summary statistics for the variables in our data set. Table A.2 in Appendix A presents the within and between variation for the migration variables. 'Within' variation is the variation in the migration variable across years for a given village. 'Between' variation is the variation in the migration variable across villages for a given year.

## 7 Results

### 7.1 Structural estimation

In Table A.3 in Appendix A, we present the results of the policy functions that relate states to actions. Column (1) presents the state variables that affect the probability of a household of having migration to the US. Column (2) presents the results for a similar analysis but for migration within other states of Mexico. The implications of these results are detailed discussed in Rojas Valdes, Lin Lawell and Taylor (2017). We use the coefficients that are significant at a 10% level in our structural model to predict the actions played given the state variables. To address the endogeneity of neighbors' decisions, we use a fixed point calculation.

In Tables A.4-A.6 in Appendix A, we present the results of the transition densities for the variables at the household, municipality, state, and national levels. These transition densities describe the behavior of state variables over time. We regress the level of each variable on the lag of other relevant state variables. We use the coefficients that are significant at a 10% level to predict the value of next period's state variables, which affect the actions taken of each household in next period as well as the payoff functions.

We present the parameter estimates of our structural model in Table 1. The parameters

we estimate are the coefficients in the per-period payoff function  $\pi_i(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}, \varepsilon_i; \theta)$ .

According to our results, the coefficient in the per-period payoff on household head schooling is significant and positive, which indicates that the higher the household head schooling, the higher the per-period payoff to the household.

The coefficient on household land quality interacted with rain is significant and negative. Since higher values of our index for household land quality denote a lower land quality, the significant negative coefficient on the interaction indicates that the higher quality the household land and the more rain, the higher the per-period payoff to the household.

The significant negative coefficient on household land quality interacted with rain interacted with migration to the US indicates that the higher quality the household land and the more rain, the higher the per-period payoff to having a household member migrate to the US. This result suggests that home agricultural production and migration to the US are complements.

The significant positive coefficient on household land quality interacted with rain interacted with migration within Mexico indicates that the higher quality the household land and the more rain, the lower the per-period payoff on net to having a household member migrate within Mexico. This result suggests that home agricultural production and migration within Mexico are substitutes.

The significant positive coefficient on hourly wage indicates that the higher the hourly wage, the higher the per-period payoff to the household.

The significant positive coefficient on hourly wage interacted with migration to the US indicates that the higher the hourly wage, the higher the per-period payoff to having a household member migrate to the US.

In contrast, the significant negative coefficient on hourly wage interacted with migration within Mexico, which is smaller in magnitude than the significant positive coefficient on hourly wage, indicates that the hourly wage has less of a positive effect on net on the per-period payoff when a household engages in migration within Mexico.

The significant positive coefficients on the variables interacting crime rate with migration to the US indicates that the higher the crime rate in Mexico, the higher the per-period payoff to having a household member migrate to the US. In contrast, the effects of crime rates at the border on the payoff to having a household member migrate within Mexico are mixed.

## 7.2 Comparing structural model with observed data

As seen in Table A.7 in Appendix A, which compares actual welfare with the welfare predicted by our structural econometric model, our structural econometric model does a fairly good job of predicting the actual welfare observed in the data.

Similarly, when comparing the migration observed in the data in Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix A with the analogous migration statistics predicted by our structural econometric model in Tables A.10 and A.11 in Appendix A, our structural econometric model does a fairly good job of predicting the levels and upward trends in migration observed in the data.

## 8 Counterfactual simulations

We use the parameter estimates from our structural econometric model to simulate the effects of counterfactual policy scenarios, including those regarding wages, schooling, crime rates at the border, precipitation, and government policy, on migration decisions and welfare.

For our counterfactual simulations, we simulate the effects of a counterfactual change that takes place in the year 1997 on migration and welfare over the years 1997-2007. We then compare the percentage change in migration and welfare under each counterfactual simulation with those under the base case simulation of no counterfactual change. In particular, for each counterfactual scenario, we compare the average welfare per household-year and the fraction of households with migration under that counterfactual scenario with those under the base case of no change using two-sample t-tests.

The full set of results of all the counterfactual simulations are presented in Appendix B.

## 8.1 Wages

Real wages in Mexico plunged after the 1994 crisis and recovered slowly during the period covered by our data set. We simulate changes in the hourly wage in the primary sector. The primary sector includes agriculture, livestock, forestry, hunting, and fisheries. In our structural econometric model, the hourly wage in the primary sector affects both the policy functions and the transition densities.

In Table 2, we compare the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico under each simulated change in wages in the primary sector with that under the base case of no change in wages using two-sample t-tests. Results show that an increase in wages in the primary sector leads to a statistically significant increase in migration to the US and within Mexico. Similarly, a decrease in wages in the primary sector leads to statistically significant decreases in migration to both the US and within Mexico in all but one of the simulated scenarios (that of a 15% decrease). Moreover, the more dramatic the simulated change, the more dramatic the response of the fraction of households with migration. In addition, in all the cases where changes in migration are statistically significant, the magnitudes of the changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US are much larger than those of the changes in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico. Table 3 shows that, as we expected, a decrease in wages in the primary sector leads to a statistically significant decrease in average welfare per household-year, and that increases in wages in the primary sector lead to statistically significant increases in welfare.

In addition to the pooled results, we also analyze the results by village. In Figure 1 we show the changes by village in the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico under a 10% decrease and a 10% increase in wages in the primary sector. The red dots denote villages that experienced a statistically significant decrease in the fraction of households with migration; the green dots denote villages that experienced a statistically significant increase in the fraction of households with migration; and the black dots denote villages with no statistically significant change. We find that there is some heterogeneity at

the village level in the changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico.

To analyze the determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration, in Table 4 we present results of regressions of the village-level changes in the fraction of households with migration that are significant at a 10% level, under a simulated 10% increase and decrease in wages in the primary sector, on village, municipality, state, and national characteristics. Under a 10% increase in wages in the primary sector, significant changes in migration to the US are positively correlated to the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico; while significant changes in migration within Mexico are positively correlated to the distance to the US border, the number of males in the household, and the household head age; and negatively correlated with the household size. Under a 10% decrease in wages in the primary sector, significant changes in migration to the US are positively correlated to the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico and negatively correlated with the household head schooling.

In Figure 2 we present the changes in average welfare per household-year at the village level under simulated changes of a 10% decrease and a 10% increase in wages in the primary sector. Consistent with the aggregate results, most of the villages experience a decrease in welfare under a 10% decrease in wages in the primary sector while all of the villages experience except for one experience a statistically significant increase in welfare under a 10% increase in wages in the primary sector. In Table 5 we show that changes in welfare under a 10% increase in wages in the primary sector are positively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico and the household head age, while statistically significant changes in welfare under a 10% decrease in welfare are positively correlated with the number of males in the household and the household head age, and negatively correlated with both the initial fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico.

Thus, our simulation regarding wages paid in the primary sector show that migration to US and within Mexico increase with primary sector wage in the pooled results, but there is

some heterogeneity across villages. Average welfare per household-year is increasing in the primary sector wage for almost all villages.

## 8.2 Schooling

Policies to improve the levels of schooling assume that a higher human capital will improve earning opportunities. We simulate the effect of changes in the three schooling variables in our model: the schooling of the household head, the average schooling of the household, and the maximum schooling of the household.

### 8.2.1 Household head schooling

Household head schooling affects both the policy functions and the transition densities. As seen in Table, 6, counterfactual increases in household head schooling have a negative effect on the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico, but the effect is only significant for the very dramatic changes of an increase of 50% for the case of migration to the US and for the increases of 25% and 50% in household head schooling for the case of migration within Mexico. Almost symmetrically, a very dramatic decrease of 50% in the household head schooling leads to a statistically significant increase in migration to the US, whereas every simulated decrease in household head schooling leads to a statistically significant increase in migration within Mexico. Moreover, there appears to be a monotonic relationship between the simulated changes and the fraction of households with migration to both the US and within Mexico: the lower the household head schooling, the higher the migration to the US and within Mexico, with the changes in migration within Mexico being larger in magnitude. Table 7 shows that all the simulated increases in household head schooling lead to statistically significant increases in welfare, whereas most of the simulated decreases in household head schooling lead to statistically significant decreases in welfare.

Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the changes in the fraction of households with migration by village under a 10% increase or decrease in the household head schooling. We see that



the results are heterogeneous by village. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows that the distance to the nearest border crossing point and the household head age increase the change in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico as a result of 10% increase in household head schooling while the household head schooling decreases the change in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico as a result of 10% increase in household head schooling. Under a 10% increase in household head schooling, the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico is negatively correlated with changes in migration to the US. And changes in migration to the US under a 10% decrease in household head schooling are negatively correlated with the number of household members.

In Figure B.2 in Appendix B we show that there is heterogeneity at the village level in the changes in average welfare per household-year. In Table B.2 in Appendix B, we show that statistically significant changes in welfare are positively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico under a 10% decreases in household head schooling.

### **8.2.2 Average household schooling**

Average household schooling affects both the policy functions and the transition densities. For our counterfactual simulations of changes in average household schooling, Table 8 shows that there are statistically significant effects on migration to the US under very dramatic increases or decreases in average schooling. For migration within Mexico, increases of 15%, 25%, and 50% in average schooling have a statistically significant and positive effect on migration within Mexico; and decreases of 15%, 25%, and 50% have a statistically significant and negative effect on migration within Mexico. Table 9 shows that every simulated increase in household average schooling leads to a statistically significant decreases in average welfare per household-year, and every simulated decrease in household average schooling leads to a statistically significant increase in average welfare per household-year.

Figure B.4 in Appendix B shows that the effects of changes in average household schooling

vary by village. As seen in Table B.3 in Appendix B, employment in the secondary sector increases the change in the fraction of households with migration to the US as a result of 10% decrease in average household schooling. Also, under a 10% increase in the household average schooling, changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico are positively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico, respectively, and changes in migration within Mexico are also negatively correlated with the number of household members.

In Figure B.3 in Appendix B, we show the changes in welfare by village. Changes in average welfare per household year are positively correlated with the employment share in the primary and secondary sectors, and with the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico, under a 10% increase in household average schooling, as seen in Table B.4 in Appendix B.

### **8.2.3 Maximum household schooling**

Maximum household schooling affects the transition densities. For our counterfactual simulations of changes in maximum household schooling, and similar to our findings in the simulations of changes in the household average schooling, we show in Table B.5 in Appendix B that dramatic increases in the maximum schooling leads to statistically significant increases in migration within Mexico, while dramatic decreases in the maximum schooling leads to statistically significant decreases in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico. Table B.6 in Appendix B shows that every simulated decrease in household maximum schooling leads to a statistically significant increase in welfare, while only dramatic simulated increases in maximum schooling lead to statistically significant decreases in welfare.

In Figure B.5 in Appendix B, we show that the changes in the fraction of households with migration by village under a simulated 10% increase and decrease in maximum schooling vary by village. As shown in Table B.7 in Appendix B, employment in the primary sector decreases the change in the fraction of households with migration to the US as a result of

10% increase in maximum schooling. Also, employment in the primary sector increases the change in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico as a result of both a 10% increase and a 10% decrease in maximum schooling. The initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico is positively correlated to changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US under a 10% decrease in maximum schooling, whereas the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico is negatively correlated to significant changes in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico under a 10% increase in maximum schooling.

Similar to the aggregate results, in Figure B.6 in Appendix B, we show that most of the villages experience an increase in welfare under a simulated decrease in maximum schooling of 10%, and that there is some heterogeneity under a simulated increase of 10% in maximum schooling. Statistically significant changes in welfare at the village level are positively correlated with the household land quality, as seen in Table B.8 in Appendix B.

#### **8.2.4 Mechanisms**

For schooling, we find that migration to US and within Mexico decrease with household head schooling, while average welfare per household-year increases with household head schooling. In contrast, as household average schooling or household maximum schooling increases, migration to US and within Mexico increase, while average welfare per household-year decreases. As seen in our parameter estimates in Table 1, schooling affects per-period payoffs (and therefore welfare) regardless of the migration decision. The effects of schooling on migration decisions arise through the policy functions in Table A.3 in Appendix A.

### **8.3 Crime**

Crime rates in Mexico experienced a dramatic increase after 2006. An important question then is what is the effect of crime on migration decisions. We simulate changes in the crime rate at the three closest border crossing points from the household villages. Changes in

crime rate affect both the policy functions and the transition densities in our structural econometric model.

Table 10 reports no statistically significant change in migration to the US and within Mexico under any of the simulated scenarios. As seen in Table 11, we find that, except for a dramatic increase of 50% in crime rate at the border, there are no statistically significant changes in the average welfare per household-year under most of the simulated scenarios of changes in the crime rate at the border.

In Figure 3 we show that there is some heterogeneity in the changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico at the village level. As seen in Table 12, under a 10% increase in crime, the significant changes in migration to the US are positive correlated to the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico, whereas changes in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico are negatively correlated with the employment share in the secondary sector, the initial fraction of the households with migration within Mexico, and positively correlated with the household land quality. Under a simulated 10% decrease in crime rate, the number of males in the household is negatively correlated with changes in migration to the US whereas significant changes in migration within Mexico are negatively correlated with the employment share in the secondary sector, but positively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration to the US. While in the aggregate results there are no statistically significant changes in welfare, there is some heterogeneity at the village level in the changes on average welfare per household-year, as can be seen in Figure 4 and the determinants of which are presented in Table 13.

## 8.4 Precipitation

Changes in climatic conditions are important determinants of productivity in agriculture and may have implications for migration. We simulate changes in precipitation, which affects households differently depending on the soil's quality. In our structural econometric model, precipitation has a significant effect on transition densities.

In Table 14 we show that a 10% decrease in precipitation leads to a statistically significant increase in migration to the US. In Table 15 we show that this decrease of 10% in precipitation leads to a statistically significant increase in average welfare per household-year.

The heterogeneity of a 10% increase and decrease in precipitation on the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico by village is presented in Figure B.7 in Appendix B. As shown in Table B.9 in Appendix B, the share of employment in the secondary sector decreases migration within Mexico, while the number of males in the household and the initial fraction of households with migration to the US decreases migration within Mexico, under a 10% increase in precipitation. In Figure B.8 in Appendix B, we show that there is some heterogeneity in the changes in average welfare per household-year under the simulated increases and decreases in precipitation. As shown in Table B.10 in Appendix B, under a simulated decrease of 10% in precipitation, changes in welfare are positively correlated with the distance to the border, the employment in the primary and secondary sectors, and the household head age.

Our finding that decreases in precipitation may increase migration to the US is consistent with the findings of Jessoe, Manning and Taylor (forthcoming) that another adverse weather condition – extreme heat – increases migration within Mexico (from rural to urban areas) and to the US.

## 8.5 Migration policy

Given the significance of migration policy, especially from the US perspective, an important question is what is the effect of policies that affect the migration decisions directly. We simulate two types of policies: a floor on schooling for migration to the US, and a cap on the number of households with migration to the US.

The first migration policy we simulate is a policy that specifies a minimum threshold household average schooling needed in order for a household to be allowed to engage in migration to US. We set the threshold to range from 50% (labeled “-50%”) up to 150%

(labeled “50%”) of the average household schooling observed in the data.

This policy would have direct negative effects on migration to the US, as observed in Table 16. The greater the requirement for minimum schooling for migration to the US, the more dramatic the drop in migration to the US, with all the simulated changes being statistically significant. But this policy would lead to changes in migration within Mexico too: a floor on schooling for migration to the US from a 25% of the average schooling up to a 150% of the average schooling leads to a statistically significant decrease in the fraction of households with migration within Mexico. Table 17 shows that this policy leads to a statistically significant decrease in average welfare per household-year in every simulated minimum threshold of schooling required for migration.

In Figure B.9 in Appendix B, we show that the policy would have a negative effect on the fraction of households with migration to the US and within Mexico almost in every village, but that some of them would not experience a significant change and, for the case of Mexico, even some of them would experience an increase in the fraction of households with migration. In Table B.11 in Appendix B we show that, under a simulated threshold of 110% of the average schooling for migration, significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to the US are positively correlated to the household head schooling at the village level, and inversely correlated to the household size and the initial fraction of households with migration to the US, whereas significant changes in migration within Mexico are positively correlated with the household land quality. Similarly, under a simulated threshold of 90% of the average schooling, the shares of employment in the primary and secondary sectors decrease migration both to the US and within Mexico, and the initial share of households with migration to the US decreases migration to the US. In Figure B.10 in Appendix B we show that most of the villages experience a statistically significant decrease in welfare under the simulated minimum thresholds of schooling for migration. As shown in Table B.12 in Appendix B, the changes in welfare under a threshold of 110% and 90% of average schooling are positively correlated with the household head schooling and the initial fraction of house-

holds with migration to the US, whereas changes in welfare under a simulated threshold of 90% of average schooling are also negatively correlated with the shares of employment in the primary and secondary sectors.

The second migration policy we simulate is a cap on total migration to the US. For this counterfactual policy, we set a cap that denies migration to US to from 50% up to a 90% of the total number of households with migration to the US under the base case simulation. That is, from the total number of households with simulated migration to the US, we randomly restrict the migration decisions of 50, 75, 85, and 90% of those households who migrate under the base case to “do not migrate” in 1997, the first year of the simulation.

In Table 18 we show that the simulated caps have statistically significant negative effects on migration not only to the US but also within Mexico. Moreover, the size of the reduction in the fraction of households with migration to the US is greater than the cap. For example, a cap aimed to restrict migration of 50% of the households leads to a decrease in the fraction of households with migration to the US of 70% for the period of our simulations, due to the spillover effects of the migration decisions. In Table 19 we show that all our simulated caps on migration lead to a statistically significant decrease in welfare.

In Figure B.11 in Appendix B, we present the heterogeneity of the changes in migration under a cap of 90% of migration from base case. Consistent with the aggregate finding, all villages experience a statistically significant decrease in migration to the US whereas there is some heterogeneity in the signs of the changes in migration within Mexico at the village level. Table B.13 in Appendix B shows that under a simulated cap of 90% of households with migration to the US as from base case, significant changes in the fraction of households with migration is positively correlated with the household head schooling and initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico, and negatively correlated with the household size and the initial fraction of households with migration to the US. Under this simulation, significant changes in migration within Mexico are negatively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration within Mexico. Figure B.12 in Appendix B shows that

all the villages experience a statistically significant decrease in welfare under the simulated cap of migration. And as seen in Table B.14 in Appendix B, the significant changes in welfare are positively correlated with the household head schooling, and negatively correlated with the initial fraction of households with migration to the US and the quality of the household land.

Strategic interactions explain why policies that decrease migration to the US also decrease migration within Mexico. Owing to the significant negative other-migration strategic effect in the the policy functions in Table A.3 in Appendix A, decreases in migration to US by neighbors decrease a household's probability to migrate to US.

Dynamic behavior explains why a cap on total migration to the US causes migration to the US to decrease by more than what was required by the policy. Owing to the significant positive effect of lagged migration to the US on the probability of migration to the US in the policy functions in Table A.3 in Appendix A, there is persistence in the decision to engage in migration to the US. Thus, policies that restrict migration to the US are amplified over time.

## 9 Conclusion

In our paper we have shown that dynamic behavior and strategic interactions are important features of migration decisions. The main findings of our paper regard the effects of changes in wages, schooling, and the effects of simulated government policies.

Our simulation regarding wages paid in the primary sector show that migration to US and within Mexico increase with primary sector wage in the pooled results, but there is some heterogeneity across villages. Average welfare per household-year is increasing in the primary sector wage for almost all villages.

For schooling, we find that migration to US and within Mexico decrease with household head schooling, while average welfare per household-year increases with household head



schooling. In contrast, as household average schooling or household maximum schooling increases, migration to US and within Mexico increase, while average welfare per household-year decreases. As seen in our parameter estimates, schooling affects per-period payoffs (and therefore welfare) regardless of the migration decision. The effects of schooling on migration decisions are through the policy functions.

For the crime rate at the border, we find that changes in the crime rate at the border do not have statistically significant effects on migration to US or within Mexico in the pooled results, but there is some heterogeneity across villages. We also find that increases in the crime rate at the border may increase average welfare per household-year.

For precipitation, we find that changes in precipitation have heterogeneous effects on migration across villages. We also find that decreases in precipitation may increase migration to the US and average welfare per household-year in the pooled results.

In terms of counterfactual government migration policy, a minimum threshold household average schooling needed for migration to US decreases migration not only to the US but also within Mexico, and also decreases average welfare per household-year. A cap on total migration to the US decreases migration not only to the US but also within Mexico as well, causes migration to the US to decrease by more than what was required by the policy, and decreases average welfare per household-year.

Strategic interactions explain why policies that decrease migration to the US also decrease migration within Mexico. Owing to the significant negative other-migration strategic effect in the the policy functions, decreases in migration to US by neighbors decrease a household's probability to migrate to US.

Dynamic behavior explains why a cap on total migration to the US causes migration to the US to decrease by more than what was required by the policy. Owing to the significant positive effect of lagged migration to the US on the probability of migration to the US in the policy functions, there is persistence in the decision to engage in migration to the US. Thus, policies that restrict migration to the US are amplified over time.

In future work we hope to build upon our model in several ways. First, our model distinguishes between migration within Mexico and to the US, and we include wages and employment of different sectors in Mexico as factors that may affect household decisions and payoffs. In future work we hope to also distinguish between different jobs/locations within Mexico or within the US.

Strategic interactions among households in a village have an important role in household migration decisions that has previously been neglected in the literature. Dynamic behavior is an important aspect of household migration decision-making as well. As reduced-form models and structural econometric models each have their advantages and disadvantages, it is often a good idea to tackle problems using both approaches.

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Table 1: Parameter estimates

	Estimate	Standard error
<i>Coefficients in the per-period payoff function on:</i>		
Migration to US	-0.000380	0.07848
Migration within Mexico	-0.000580	0.09041
Fraction of neighbors with migration to US	0.000510	0.06887
Fraction of neighbors with migration to US, squared	-0.000300	0.10875
Fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico	0.000880	0.06611
Fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico, squared	-0.000620	0.10882
Number of household members	-0.001190	0.00068 *
Number of household members, squared	0.028990	0.00010 ***
Household head age	-0.448320	0.00000 ***
Household head age, squared	-0.023520	0.00000 ***
First born was a male (dummy)	0.000000	0.21732
Household head schooling (years)	0.002880	0.00035 ***
Household head schooling (years), squared	0.014020	0.00005 ***
Household average schooling (years)	-0.014330	0.00066 ***
Household average schooling (years), squared	0.040190	0.00011 ***
Household land quality interacted with rain (area)	-0.014520	0.00025 ***
Household land quality interacted with rain (area), squared	0.000050	0.00001 ***
Number of basic schools	-0.030090	0.00007 ***
Number of basic schools, squared	-0.000110	0.00000 ***
Hourly wage, primary sector	0.035280	0.00194 ***
Hourly wage, primary sector, squared	0.000400	0.00002 ***
Migration to US interacted with:		
Fraction of neighbors with migration to US	-0.000290	0.12603
Fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico	-0.000470	0.06262
Number of household members	0.001840	0.00482
Household head age	-0.000630	0.00380
First born was a male (dummy)	-0.000010	0.10227
Household head schooling (years)	-0.001160	0.00530
Household average schooling (years)	0.000370	0.00496
Household land quality interacted with rain (area)	-0.009950	0.00016 ***
Number of basic schools	0.062860	0.00022 ***
Hourly wage, primary sector	0.004070	0.00066 ***
Distance to closest border crossing point	0.013130	0.00066 ***
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.039170	0.00299 ***
Crime rate at second closest border crossing point	0.009600	0.00029 ***
Crime rate at third closest border crossing point	0.013340	0.00134 ***
Migration within Mexico interacted with:		
Fraction of neighbors with migration to US	-0.000430	0.06094
Fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico	-0.000440	0.12824
Number of household members	0.002850	0.00493
Household head age	-0.001240	0.00359
First born was a male (dummy)	-0.000010	0.10861
Household head schooling (years)	-0.001330	0.00625
Household average schooling (years)	-0.000040	0.00500
Household land quality interacted with rain (area)	0.023690	0.00018 ***
Number of basic schools	0.122170	0.00026 ***
Hourly wage, primary sector	-0.015870	0.00080 ***
Distance to closest border crossing point	-0.008240	0.00068 ***
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.050480	0.00272 ***
Crime rate at second closest border crossing point	-0.005120	0.00033 ***
Crime rate at third closest border crossing point	0.033550	0.00125 ***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Effects of Changes in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector

Table 2: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in wages in primary sector	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2578 (0.0202)	-13.0448***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2873 (0.0107)	-2.1401***
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2782 (0.0233)	-6.1510***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2897 (0.0109)	-1.3310***
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2854 (0.0212)	-3.7359***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2932 (0.0105)	-0.1458
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2879 (0.0218)	-2.8961***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2908 (0.0093)	-0.9554**
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.309 (0.0222)	4.2385***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2965 (0.0122)	0.9724*
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.312 (0.0213)	5.2374***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2965 (0.0099)	0.9895**
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3216 (0.024)	8.4755***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2982 (0.0105)	1.5634***
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3445 (0.0222)	16.1943***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.303 (0.0118)	3.2078***

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector

Table 3: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in wages in primary sector	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012304 (0.000043)	-0.5188***
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012271 (0.000043)	-0.2481***
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012253 (0.000044)	-0.1025**
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012253 (0.000044)	-0.1005**
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012214 (0.000044)	0.2196***
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.01221 (0.000044)	0.2465***
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012188 (0.000045)	0.4310***
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012144 (0.000046)	0.7931***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01




Figure 1: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in the wages paid in the primary sector.

## Effects of Changes in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector


Table 4: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>		<i>Mexico</i>	
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in wages in primary sector:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0012 (0.0055)	0.0102*** (0.0037)	0.0020 (0.0037)	0.0016 (0.0046)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
Employment in primary sector	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Employment in secondary sector	0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0000 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0005 (0.0005)
Number of males in household	0.0012 (0.0080)	0.0092* (0.0053)	-0.0010 (0.0053)	0.0091 (0.0066)
Household head age	0.0004 (0.0006)	0.0007* (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0005)
Household head schooling	0.0033 (0.0036)	-0.0018 (0.0024)	-0.0049** (0.0024)	0.0003 (0.0030)
Number of household members	-0.0048 (0.0053)	-0.0074** (0.0035)	-0.0016 (0.0035)	-0.0033 (0.0044)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.0180 (0.0151)	0.0102 (0.0101)	0.0032 (0.0101)	-0.0002 (0.0125)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0448* (0.0230)	-0.0031 (0.0153)	0.0184 (0.0154)	-0.0225 (0.0191)
Household average schooling	-0.0017 (0.0039)	-0.0006 (0.0026)	0.0045* (0.0026)	-0.0026 (0.0032)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0005 (0.0056)	0.0038 (0.0038)	-0.0013 (0.0038)	-0.0043 (0.0047)
Constant	-0.0105 (0.0470)	-0.0173 (0.0313)	0.0154 (0.0314)	0.0218 (0.0390)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.8550	0.1480	0.4930	0.2520
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.


Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Effect of a 10% Decrease in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Effect of a 10% Increase in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(b)

Figure 2: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in the wages paid in the primary sector.



## Effects of Changes in the Wages Paid in the Primary Sector

Table 5: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in wages in primary sector:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0003)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0184 (0.0250)	0.0059 (0.0276)
Employment in primary sector	0.0048 (0.0176)	0.0282 (0.0194)
Employment in secondary sector	0.0084 (0.0291)	0.0191 (0.0321)
Number of males in household	0.3362 (0.3906)	0.7454* (0.4310)
Household head age	0.0472* (0.0278)	0.0892*** (0.0307)
Household head schooling	-0.1787 (0.1760)	-0.2499 (0.1942)
Number of household members	-0.3348 (0.2575)	-0.3094 (0.2841)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.4864 (0.7390)	-1.5430* (0.8154)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	2.1125* (1.1273)	-2.1275* (1.2439)
Household average schooling	0.0739 (0.1885)	0.1690 (0.2080)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.1487 (0.2758)	0.4680 (0.3044)
Constant	1.9611 (2.2989)	-7.5317*** (2.5366)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0350	0.0126
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## Effects of Changes in Household Head Schooling

Table 6: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in household head schooling	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3035 (0.0234)	2.3561**	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.3057 (0.0117)	4.1046***
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3005 (0.0199)	1.3519	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.299 (0.0109)	1.8294***
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2995 (0.0241)	1.0152	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2977 (0.0113)	1.3703***
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2991 (0.0221)	0.8899	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2961 (0.01)	0.8421*
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2977 (0.0199)	0.4220	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2919 (0.0105)	-0.5905
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2952 (0.0214)	-0.4283	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.292 (0.0106)	-0.5469
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2918 (0.0216)	-1.5626	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2898 (0.0101)	-1.2964***
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2909 (0.0213)	-1.8835*	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.285 (0.012)	-2.9492***

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Effects of Changes in Household Head Schooling

Table 7: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in household head schooling	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012303 (0.000041)	-0.5072***
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012272 (0.000042)	-0.2561***
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012256 (0.000043)	-0.1263**
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012249 (0.000043)	-0.0699
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012216 (0.000045)	0.2005***
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012208 (0.000045)	0.2632***
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012197 (0.000045)	0.3586***
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012156 (0.000047)	0.6948***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in Household Average Schooling

Table 8: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in household average schooling	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2884 (0.0214)	-2.7344***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.281 (0.0097)	-4.3047***
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2937 (0.0229)	-0.9367	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.286 (0.0104)	-2.6125***
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2946 (0.022)	-0.6459	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2902 (0.0109)	-1.1847**
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2951 (0.0233)	-0.4557	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2929 (0.0105)	-0.2585
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2963 (0.0226)	-0.0611	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2959 (0.0111)	0.7767
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2994 (0.0238)	0.9973	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2981 (0.0115)	1.5283***
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2999 (0.0197)	1.1491	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.3002 (0.0118)	2.221***
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3086 (0.0228)	4.0826***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.3094 (0.0102)	5.3798***

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in Household Average Schooling

Table 9: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in household average schooling	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.0121 (0.000036)	1.1468***
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012173 (0.00004)	0.5547***
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012199 (0.000041)	0.3398***
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012212 (0.000042)	0.2341***
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012264 (0.000045)	-0.1920***
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012264 (0.000047)	-0.1888***
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012291 (0.000048)	-0.4089***
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012323 (0.000053)	-0.6740***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in Crime Rate at the Border

Table 10: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in crime rate	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2967 (0.019)	0.0616	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2916 (0.0111)	-0.6916
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2988 (0.0243)	0.7908	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.293 (0.0108)	-0.2016
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2965 (0.0215)	0.0153	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2937 (0.0099)	0.0074
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2953 (0.022)	-0.3957	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.293 (0.0109)	-0.2282
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2971 (0.0213)	0.1923	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2957 (0.0101)	0.6985
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2972 (0.0221)	0.2371	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2935 (0.0103)	-0.0319
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2969 (0.0215)	0.1307	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2944 (0.0101)	0.2777
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2985 (0.0202)	0.6644	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2958 (0.0107)	0.7538

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in Crime Rate at the Border

Table 11: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in crime rate	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.01224 (0.000044)	0.0051
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012236 (0.000044)	0.0355
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012237 (0.000044)	0.0284
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012239 (0.000044)	0.0092
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012235 (0.000044)	0.0476
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012232 (0.000044)	0.0722
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012233 (0.000044)	0.0644
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012226 (0.000044)	0.1180**

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01




Figure 3: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in crime rate at the border.




## Effects of Changes in Crime Rate at the Border

Table 12: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration


<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in crime rate:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0005 (0.0038)	0.0025 (0.0052)	-0.0001 (0.0021)	0.0008 (0.0046)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0004)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Employment in secondary sector	0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0012** (0.0006)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0010* (0.0005)
Number of males in household	-0.0049 (0.0055)	0.0110 (0.0076)	-0.0058* (0.0030)	0.0111 (0.0067)
Household head age	0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0005)
Household head schooling	0.0004 (0.0025)	0.0010 (0.0034)	-0.0017 (0.0014)	0.0027 (0.0030)
Number of household members	0.0010 (0.0036)	-0.0027 (0.0050)	0.0015 (0.0020)	-0.0053 (0.0044)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-0.0050 (0.0104)	0.0009 (0.0143)	-0.0020 (0.0057)	0.0219* (0.0126)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0286* (0.0158)	-0.0412* (0.0219)	0.0068 (0.0087)	-0.0048 (0.0193)
Household average schooling	-0.0004 (0.0026)	-0.0029 (0.0037)	0.0018 (0.0015)	-0.0033 (0.0032)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0025 (0.0039)	-0.0119** (0.0054)	0.0012 (0.0021)	-0.0063 (0.0047)
Constant	-0.0264 (0.0322)	0.0952** (0.0446)	-0.0100 (0.0178)	0.0747* (0.0393)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.4400	0.1210	0.4930	0.3900
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.

Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



(a)



(b)

Figure 4: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in crime rate at the border.

## Effects of Changes in Crime Rate at the Border

Table 13: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in crime rate:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0063 (0.0329)	-0.0050 (0.0230)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0024 (0.0232)	-0.0039 (0.0162)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0291 (0.0382)	-0.0142 (0.0267)
Number of males in household	0.5125 (0.5132)	-0.0046 (0.3583)
Household head age	-0.0012 (0.0366)	0.0073 (0.0255)
Household head schooling	0.0787 (0.2313)	0.0447 (0.1615)
Number of household members	-0.1508 (0.3383)	0.0368 (0.2362)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.0172 (0.9711)	-0.1842 (0.6780)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	-1.3377 (1.4813)	-1.0705 (1.0342)
Household average schooling	-0.2942 (0.2477)	-0.0912 (0.1729)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.7625** (0.3625)	-0.0564 (0.2531)
Constant	5.1434* (3.0208)	0.6506 (2.1090)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.2450	0.9940
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## Effects of Changes in Precipitation

Table 14: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in precipitation	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2971 (0.0218)	0.1965	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2918 (0.01)	-0.6240
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2984 (0.021)	0.6327	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2931 (0.0093)	-0.1825
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2971 (0.0214)	0.2092	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2956 (0.0095)	0.6697
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.3032 (0.0216)	2.2649**	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2957 (0.0097)	0.7038
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2969 (0.0217)	0.1296	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2933 (0.0096)	-0.1208
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2988 (0.0212)	0.7824	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2944 (0.0096)	0.2697
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.298 (0.0213)	0.5053	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2938 (0.0117)	0.0415
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2991 (0.0202)	0.8951	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.295 (0.0107)	0.4607

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of Changes in Precipitation

Table 15: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in precipitation	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012236 (0.000044)	0.0379
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012232 (0.000044)	0.0664
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012231 (0.000044)	0.0813
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012226 (0.000044)	0.1225**
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012234 (0.000044)	0.0526
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012235 (0.000044)	0.0427
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012236 (0.000044)	0.0391
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012233 (0.000044)	0.0658

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Effects of a Minimum Household Average Schooling Needed for Migration to US

Table 16: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Minimum as % of mean household avg. schooling	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2641 (0.0194)	-10.9106***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2922 (0.0109)	-0.4793
75%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2134 (0.0187)	-28.0327***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.288 (0.0104)	-1.9172***
85%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.1802 (0.0134)	-39.2283***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2844 (0.0084)	-3.1327***
90%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.1669 (0.016)	-43.6896***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2832 (0.0103)	-3.5456***
110%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.1083 (0.0086)	-63.4718***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2815 (0.0096)	-4.1344***
115%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0933 (0.0096)	-68.5201***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2795 (0.0111)	-4.8154***
125%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0681 (0.0072)	-77.0277***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2765 (0.0111)	-5.8426***
150%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0311 (0.0045)	-89.5136***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2727 (0.0094)	-7.1188***

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Effects of a Minimum Household Average Schooling Needed for Migration to US

Table 17: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Minimum as % of mean household avg. schooling	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012242 (0.000044)	-0.0077
75%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012253 (0.000044)	-0.1027**
85%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012271 (0.000043)	-0.2459***
90%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012268 (0.000044)	-0.2266***
110%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012284 (0.000043)	-0.3527***
115%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012291 (0.000043)	-0.4135***
125%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012296 (0.000043)	-0.4566***
150%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012311 (0.000043)	-0.5720***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## Effects of a Cap on Migration to US

Table 18: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Cap as % of base case migration that is denied migration to US	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.088 (0.0066)	-70.3056***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2848 (0.0097)	-2.9907***
75%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0364 (0.0026)	-87.7354***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.283 (0.0099)	-3.6222***
85%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0207 (0.0017)	-93.0082***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.283 (0.0113)	-3.6333***
90%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.0132 (0.001)	-95.5507***	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.283 (0.0105)	-3.6115***

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01



## Effects of a Cap on Migration to US

Table 19: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Cap as % of base case migration that is denied migration to US	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012289 (0.000043)	-0.3913***
75%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012303 (0.000043)	-0.5133***
85%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012305 (0.000043)	-0.5264***
90%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012309 (0.000043)	-0.5549***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

# Appendix A. Supplementary Tables and Figures




Figure A.1: Location of sampled villages in the ENHRUM survey and the border crossing municipalities

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	# Obs
Household migration variables					
Household has a migrant to the US (dummy)	0.17	0.38	0	1	25761
Household has a migrant within Mexico (dummy)	0.2	0.4	0	1	25761
Neighbor migration variables					
Fraction of neighbors with migrants to US	0.17	0.21	0	1	25761
Fraction of neighbors with migrants to Mexico	0.2	0.17	0	0.89	25761
Household characteristics					
Number of household members	5.94	3.15	1	24	25761
Number of family members	5.48	2.83	1	17	25761
Number of children in household	2.17	1.86	0	12	25761
Number of children in family	1.82	1.85	0	11	25761
Number of males in household	2.93	1.84	0	17	25761
Number of males in family	2.74	1.72	0	12	25761
First born is a male (dummy)	0.5	0.5	0	1	25761
Household head age (years)	45.15	16.26	3	100	25725
Household head schooling (years)	4.75	3.84	0	23	25725
Household average schooling (years)	6.21	2.97	0	20.5	25554
Household maximum schooling (years)	8.99	3.84	0	23	25761
Household head is the most educated (dummy)	0.26	0.44	0	1	30313
Irrigated area (hectares)	0.22	3.38	0	426	21257
Household land slope (1 = flat)	3.42	0.81	1	4	23836
Household land quality (1 = good)	3.33	0.92	1	4	23811

Table A.1: (continued)

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	# Obs
Municipality characteristics					
Number of basic schools	284.97	332.44	0	1762	22763
Number of indigenous schools	6.08	12.78	0	72	23313
Number of schools	238.87	301.17	0	1603	13107
Number of classrooms	1399.33	2236.64	0	12707	13322
Number of public libraries	20.09	34.74	0	327	11523
Number of labs	47.84	82.72	0	482	12987
Number of workshops	42.78	69.6	0	424	12987
Number of public libraries	4.92	5.69	0	28	19165
Number of students	42284.31	70057.57	0	372625	22763
Number of vehicles	44556.99	88624.85	0	502836	24220
Number of cars	29396.74	64269.9	0	383512	24220
Number of buses	371.1	841.11	0	5355	24220
Number of trucks	14203.43	23759.15	0	113819	24220
Number of motos	585.72	1685.87	0	18650	24220
State-level variables					
Employment in primary sector (% working population)	20.3	10.37	4.3	52	20635
Employment in secondary sector (% working population)	26.58	6.03	15.1	40.7	20635
Employment in tertiary sector (% working population)	52.78	7.14	31.6	68.1	20635
National variables					
Hourly wage in primary sector	29.48	5.3	21.91	39.45	30313
Hourly wage in secondary sector	31.77	3.4	24.9	35.98	30313
Hourly wage in tertiary sector	37.81	4.21	30.27	43.54	30313
Average hourly wage	35.97	3.34	29.61	41.44	33873
Border crossing variables					
Distance to the closest border crossing point (km)	847.4	474.1	7.0	2178.3	30352

Table A.1: (continued)

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	# Obs
Number of border crossing points					
... < 1000 km	6.3	5.4	0.0	17.0	30352
... 1000-2000 km	12.4	6.0	0.0	26.0	30352
Average crime rate (murders per 10,000 inhabitants)					
... in crossing municipalities < 1000 km	11.5	8.8	1.9	83.7	12166
... in crossing municipalities 1000-2000 km	12.2	7.4	2.9	52.3	16612
... along border municipalities	14.3	2.5	9.9	18.4	17554
... at the closest crossing point	8.7	6.6	0.0	38.2	17554
... at the second closest crossing point	13.8	26.3	0.0	217.4	17554
... at the third closest crossing point	9.6	19.2	0.0	144.2	17554

Table A.2: Within and between variation of migration decisions

		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	# Obs
Household has a migrant to the US (dummy)						
	Overall	0.1746	0.3796	0.0000	1.0000	25,761
	Within		0.2254	-0.7778	1.1269	
	Between		0.3095	0.0000	1.0000	
Household has a migrant within Mexico (dummy)						
	Overall	0.2000	0.4000	0.0000	1.0000	25,761
	Within		0.2477	-0.7523	1.1524	
	Between		0.3197	0.0000	1.0000	

Notes: Within variation is the variation in the migration variable across years for a given village. Between variation is the variation in the migration variable across villages for a given year.

Table A.3: Policy functions

<i>Dependent variable is probability of migration to/within</i>		
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
	(1)	(2)
Fraction of neighbors with migration to US	-0.1479*** (0.0322)	0.0685** (0.0289)
Fraction of neighbors with migration within Mexico	0.0537* (0.0302)	-0.2136*** (0.0369)
Number of household members	0.0052*** (0.0009)	0.0052*** (0.0009)
Household head age (years)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0007*** (0.0002)
First born is male (dummy)	0.0104** (0.0042)	0.0049 (0.0043)
Household head schooling (years)	-0.0016* (0.0009)	-0.0030*** (0.0009)
Household average schooling (years)	0.0024** (0.0011)	0.0044*** (0.0011)
Lag of migration to US	0.8020*** (0.0108)	-0.0048 (0.0061)
Lag of migration within Mexico	0.0137** (0.0058)	0.8269*** (0.0093)
Household land quality interacted with rain (area)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Number of basic schools	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Distance to closest border crossing point (km)	0.0001** (0.0000)	-0.0002** (0.0001)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0005* (0.0003)
Crime rate second closest border crossing point	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
Crime rate third closest border crossing point	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Hourly wage, primary sector	0.0025*** (0.0005)	0.0006 (0.0005)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0013 (0.0012)	0.0011 (0.0012)
Constant	-0.2782*** (0.0616)	0.2369** (0.1031)
Village fixed effects	Y	Y
p-value (Pr>F)	0	0
adjusted R-squared	0.743	0.773
# observations	9486	9486

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Employment is in % working population.

Table A.4: Transition densities coefficients at the household level

	Number of				Dependent variables is:					
	males in household	males in family	Household size	First born is male (dummy)	Household head schooling (years)	Household average schooling (years)	Household maximum schooling (years)	Household's land slope interacted with rain	Household's land quality interacted with rain	Household's irrigated area interacted with rain
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Lag of number of males in household	1.0087*** (0.0036)	-0.0020 (0.0032)	0.0271*** (0.0053)	0.0075*** (0.0016)	0.0003 (0.0033)	-0.0372*** (0.0093)	-0.0238** (0.0104)	4.5062 (19.7362)	3.1666 (19.7635)	-0.8995 (4.1497)
Lag of number of males in family	-0.0146*** (0.0033)	0.9970*** (0.0029)	-0.0347*** (0.0049)	-0.0039*** (0.0015)	-0.0030 (0.0030)	0.0334*** (0.0086)	0.0219** (0.0096)	-21.0162 (18.1221)	-20.2062 (18.1472)	0.2350 (3.8096)
Lag of first born is male (dummy)	0.0143*** (0.0036)	0.0140*** (0.0032)	0.0119** (0.0053)	0.9790*** (0.0016)	-0.0125*** (0.0032)	-0.0169* (0.0092)	-0.0076 (0.0103)	25.6640 (19.4757)	28.5128 (19.5027)	-2.2195 (4.0718)
Lag of household head age (years)	-0.0016*** (0.0001)	-0.0016*** (0.0001)	-0.0031*** (0.0002)	-0.0007*** (0.0001)	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0022*** (0.0004)	-0.7295 (0.7210)	-0.7458 (0.7220)	0.2896* (0.1510)
Lag of household size (members)	0.0022** (0.0010)	0.0000 (0.0009)	1.0021*** (0.0015)	-0.0044*** (0.0005)	-0.0017* (0.0010)	0.0064** (0.0028)	0.0084*** (0.0031)	3.4226 (5.8200)	3.9097 (5.8281)	0.4858 (1.2166)
Lag of household head schooling (years)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	0.0000 (0.0006)	-0.0017 (0.0010)	-0.0007** (0.0003)	0.9995*** (0.0006)	0.0067*** (0.0018)	0.0020 (0.0020)	3.5709 (3.7224)	3.3941 (3.7275)	1.4838* (0.7782)
Lag of household average schooling (years)	-0.0012 (0.0013)	-0.0015 (0.0012)	-0.0007 (0.0020)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0014 (0.0012)	0.9434*** (0.0035)	-0.0335*** (0.0039)	-9.0181 (7.3142)	-8.7666 (7.3243)	-0.8912 (1.5289)
Lag of household maximum schooling (years)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0008)	-0.0017 (0.0013)	0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0007 (0.0008)	0.0371*** (0.0023)	1.0197*** (0.0026)	-0.9318 (4.7920)	-0.8082 (4.7986)	0.3536 (1.0018)
Lag of fraction of households with migration to US	0.0001 (0.0090)	0.0063 (0.0080)	0.0030 (0.0133)	-0.0047 (0.0040)	-0.0030 (0.0083)	0.0091 (0.0236)	-0.0509* (0.0264)	148.7091*** (48.2475)	141.8349*** (48.3143)	15.1994 (10.0782)
Lag of fraction of households with migration within Mexico	-0.0336*** (0.0110)	-0.0217** (0.0097)	-0.0454*** (0.0162)	-0.0096** (0.0048)	-0.0178 (0.0114)	0.0544* (0.0326)	0.0720** (0.0364)	689.5393*** (66.0319)	701.5287*** (66.1234)	23.7046* (13.7949)
Lag of own household migration to US (dummy)	0.0043 (0.0052)	0.0053 (0.0046)	0.0009 (0.0077)	0.0093*** (0.0023)	0.0124*** (0.0046)	-0.0310** (0.0133)	-0.0003 (0.0148)	6.7006 (28.1827)	7.0530 (28.2218)	-9.4844 (5.8896)
Lag of own household migration within Mexico (dummy)	0.0102** (0.0046)	0.0086** (0.0041)	0.0161** (0.0068)	0.0082*** (0.0020)	0.0095** (0.0040)	-0.0241** (0.0115)	-0.0418*** (0.0128)	20.5595 (24.4302)	21.1400 (24.4640)	-3.2179 (5.1016)
Lag of number of basic schools					-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)			
Lag of number of indigenous schools					0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0002)	0.0010*** (0.0002)			
Lag of household land slope interacted with rain					0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.8535*** (0.0397)	-0.1555*** (0.0397)	-0.0036 (0.0085)
Lag of household land quality interacted with rain					-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0270 (0.0395)	0.9817*** (0.0396)	0.0009 (0.0085)
Lag of household's irrigated area interacted with rain					-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0046 (0.0139)	0.0042 (0.0139)	1.0032*** (0.0037)
Constant	0.1221*** (0.0080)	0.1225*** (0.0071)	0.2423*** (0.0118)	0.0653*** (0.0035)	0.0538*** (0.0079)	0.1398*** (0.0226)	0.2563*** (0.0252)	319.0271*** (43.9870)	314.7990*** (44.0480)	-13.8696 (9.1763)
adjusted R-squared	0.9882	0.9898	0.9908	0.9705	0.9993	0.9889	0.9905	0.7588	0.7628	0.9163
# observations	14554	14554	14554	14554	6497	6497	6497	7168	7168	7117

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.





Table A.5: Transition densities coefficients at the village and municipality level

	Dependent variable is:					
	Crime at closest crossing border point (11)	Crime at second crossing border point (a) (12)	Crime at third crossing border point (a) (13)	Number of basic schools (a) (14)	Number of indigenous schools (15)	Number of students in basic system (16)
Lag of number of basic schools				0.5484*** (0.0431)	0.0003 (0.0073)	27.0023*** (3.9734)
Lag of number of indigenous schools				-0.2278 (0.2207)	0.4956*** (0.0372)	-14.9978 (20.3280)
Lag of number of students in basic system				0.0009* (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0941** (0.0413)
Lag of employment in primary sector				1.0530 (1.2750)	0.0180 (0.2160)	-18.8602 (117.4470)
Lag of employment in secondary sector				1.3148 (1.2895)	-0.0555 (0.2188)	-51.5847 (118.7885)
Lag of employment in tertiary sector				0.7357 (1.3240)	-0.0007 (0.2243)	10.5247 (121.9671)
Lag of avg. hourly wage in primary sector (pesos)	-0.5765*** (0.1314)	4.2476*** (0.8395)	0.4092 (0.3101)			
Lag of avg. hourly wage in secondary sector (pesos)	-2.0471*** (0.2333)	0.3548 (1.4910)	0.3891 (0.5507)			
Lag of avg. hourly wage in tertiary sector (pesos)	1.9010*** (0.2633)	-2.6400 (1.6822)	-0.9146 (0.6213)			
Lag of crime at closest border crossing point	0.3543*** (0.0285)	0.9985*** (0.1822)	0.3662*** (0.0673)			
Lag of crime at second closest border crossing point	0.0347*** (0.0050)	0.2047*** (0.0321)	0.0389*** (0.0118)			
Lag of crime at third closest border crossing point	0.0850*** (0.0142)	0.4031*** (0.0909)	0.1935*** (0.0336)			
Constant	17.2215*** (3.1505)	-33.4177* (20.1307)	15.3372** (7.4350)	-35.3086 (126.5089)	8.6043 (21.4457)	19691.8306* (11653.7577)
adjusted R-squared	0.3736	0.1547	0.1001	0.9814	0.9907	0.7589
# observations	960	960	960	743	735	743

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Employment is in % working population. Crime is in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.  
Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table A.6: Transition densities coefficients at the state and national level

	Employment in primary sector (a)	Employment in secondary sector (a)	Employment in tertiary sector (a)	Avg. hourly wage in primary sector (pesos)	Avg. hourly wage in secondary sector (pesos)	Avg. hourly wage in tertiary sector (pesos)
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Lag of employment in primary sector	-0.1632 (0.2584)	0.2706 (0.2075)	0.6664*** (0.2382)			
Lag of employment in secondary sector	-0.4812** (0.2405)	0.7253*** (0.1932)	0.5811*** (0.2217)			
Lag of employment in tertiary sector	-0.4501** (0.2202)	0.1884 (0.1769)	1.0455*** (0.2030)			
Lag of avg. hourly wage in primary sector (pesos)	-0.4508*** (0.1342)	0.2284** (0.1078)	0.3217** (0.1237)	0.9509* (0.5007)	0.8702** (0.2892)	1.0556** (0.3295)
Lag of avg. hourly wage in secondary sector (pesos)	-0.1500 (0.1820)	0.0685 (0.1462)	0.1867 (0.1678)	-0.0404 (0.8731)	0.9658* (0.5043)	0.4484 (0.5745)
Lag of avg. hourly wage in tertiary sector (pesos)	0.2400 (0.2726)	-0.3680* (0.2189)	-0.1159 (0.2513)	0.1823 (1.0005)	-1.0594 (0.5779)	-0.6512 (0.6583)
Constant	57.7381** (23.1182)	1.0251 (18.5670)	-36.6682* (21.3111)	-2.7204 (11.1884)	15.6277** (6.4624)	17.2455** (7.3613)
adjusted R-squared	0.9547	0.9204	0.9101	0.7020	0.7410	0.7777
# observations	154	154	154	12	12	12

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Employment is in % working population.  
Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table A.7: Summary of actual and simulated welfare

	Estimate	Standard error
Actual average welfare per household year	-0.017739	0.14013
Simulated average welfare per household year	-0.012241	0.00004***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10,

\*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A.8: Observed migration

	To US	Within Mexico
Fraction of households with migration	0.1809	0.2113
Fraction of households with migration per village-year		
Mean	0.1787	0.2406
Std. Dev.	0.2327	0.2242

Table A.9: Observed fraction of households with migration by year

Year	Fraction of households with migration to/within:	
	US	Mexico
1997	0.1478	0.1770
1998	0.0942	0.1964
1999	0.1045	0.2091
2000	0.1781	0.2022
2001	0.1661	0.1764
2002	0.1952	0.2321
2003	0.1825	0.2142
2004	0.2030	0.2179
2005	0.2191	0.2285
2006	0.2328	0.2272
2007	0.2634	0.2567

Table A.10: Simulated migration

	Migration to US		Migration within Mexico	
	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.
Fraction of households with migration	0.2965	0.0207	0.2936	0.0102
Fraction of households with migration per village year				
Mean	0.2976	0.0219	0.3310	0.0161
Std. Dev.	0.2329	0.0099	0.2294	0.0121

Table A.11: Simulated migration by year

Year	Fraction of households with migration to/within:			
	US		Mexico	
	Mean	Std.Dev.	Mean	Std.Dev.
1997	0.1974	0.0116	0.2108	0.0132
1998	0.2367	0.0127	0.2448	0.0156
1999	0.2631	0.0164	0.2712	0.0152
2000	0.2845	0.0203	0.2880	0.0163
2001	0.2983	0.0232	0.2985	0.0179
2002	0.3100	0.0255	0.3054	0.0187
2003	0.3196	0.0305	0.3128	0.0162
2004	0.3258	0.0324	0.3166	0.0188
2005	0.3335	0.0353	0.3211	0.0196
2006	0.3405	0.0372	0.3280	0.0198
2007	0.3519	0.0410	0.3327	0.0202




Figure B.1: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household head schooling.

## Appendix B. Counterfactual Simulations

## Effects of Changes in Household Head Schooling

Table B.1: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration


<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in household head schooling:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0007 (0.0035)	0.0082** (0.0035)	0.0006 (0.0030)	0.0014 (0.0027)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0004 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0002)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0000 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)
Number of males in household	-0.0057 (0.0051)	-0.0025 (0.0051)	0.0067 (0.0043)	0.0041 (0.0039)
Household head age	0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0008** (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0003)
Household head schooling	0.0009 (0.0023)	-0.0045* (0.0023)	-0.0030 (0.0020)	-0.0012 (0.0018)
Number of household members	0.0006 (0.0034)	-0.0028 (0.0034)	-0.0060** (0.0029)	-0.0042 (0.0026)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.0158 (0.0097)	-0.0030 (0.0097)	-0.0072 (0.0082)	0.0056 (0.0074)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0398*** (0.0148)	-0.0021 (0.0148)	0.0149 (0.0125)	0.0123 (0.0112)
Household average schooling	-0.0010 (0.0025)	0.0027 (0.0025)	0.0022 (0.0021)	0.0022 (0.0019)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0031 (0.0036)	-0.0003 (0.0036)	-0.0012 (0.0031)	-0.0019 (0.0027)
Constant	-0.0031 (0.0303)	0.0051 (0.0301)	0.0147 (0.0256)	0.0064 (0.0229)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.2510	0.1620	0.2400	0.7200
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.

Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.




Effect of a 10% Decrease in Household Head Schooling on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Effect of a 10% Increase in Household Head Schooling on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(b)

Figure B.2: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household head schooling.


## Effects of Changes in Household Head Schooling

Table B.2: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in household head schooling:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.0140 (0.0353)	-0.0196 (0.0286)
Employment in primary sector	0.0045 (0.0248)	0.0202 (0.0201)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0078 (0.0410)	0.0288 (0.0332)
Number of males in household	0.2115 (0.5501)	0.3310 (0.4455)
Household head age	0.0177 (0.0392)	-0.0073 (0.0317)
Household head schooling	0.3173 (0.2479)	-0.2266 (0.2008)
Number of household members	-0.1582 (0.3626)	-0.2908 (0.2937)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-0.1332 (1.0408)	0.8187 (0.8430)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	-0.4954 (1.5875)	3.5098*** (1.2859)
Household average schooling	0.0407 (0.2655)	-0.2804 (0.2150)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.3484 (0.3885)	0.2945 (0.3146)
Constant	1.3123 (3.2375)	0.9217 (2.6223)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.1620	0.0000
# observations	62	62


Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Effect of a 10% Decrease in Household Average Schooling on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Effect of a 10% Increase in Household Average Schooling on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(b)

Figure B.3: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household average schooling.




Figure B.4: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household average schooling.

## Effects of Changes in Household Average Schooling

Table B.3: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in household average schooling:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0018 (0.0026)	-0.0009 (0.0028)	0.0016 (0.0036)	0.0027 (0.0032)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0003)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Employment in secondary sector	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0003)	0.0008* (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Number of males in household	0.0010 (0.0038)	0.0056 (0.0041)	0.0043 (0.0053)	-0.0034 (0.0046)
Household head age	0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0004)	-0.0000 (0.0003)
Household head schooling	0.0007 (0.0017)	0.0024 (0.0018)	0.0000 (0.0024)	-0.0016 (0.0021)
Number of household members	-0.0030 (0.0025)	-0.0051* (0.0027)	-0.0022 (0.0035)	0.0018 (0.0030)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.0100 (0.0073)	0.0186** (0.0077)	-0.0069 (0.0100)	0.0061 (0.0087)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0226** (0.0111)	0.0186 (0.0117)	0.0093 (0.0153)	-0.0143 (0.0133)
Household average schooling	-0.0001 (0.0019)	-0.0024 (0.0020)	0.0007 (0.0026)	0.0020 (0.0022)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0023 (0.0027)	0.0020 (0.0029)	0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0006 (0.0032)
Constant	-0.0182 (0.0226)	0.0008 (0.0239)	-0.0355 (0.0311)	0.0087 (0.0271)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.6060	0.3660	0.7970	0.8240
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.

Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## Effects of Changes in Household Average Schooling

Table B.4: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in household average schooling:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0004)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0286 (0.0307)	0.0220 (0.0356)
Employment in primary sector	0.0596*** (0.0216)	-0.0329 (0.0250)
Employment in secondary sector	0.0884** (0.0356)	-0.0543 (0.0413)
Number of males in household	0.3521 (0.4786)	0.3513 (0.5552)
Household head age	0.0545 (0.0341)	-0.0201 (0.0395)
Household head schooling	0.2486 (0.2157)	-0.0521 (0.2502)
Number of household members	-0.3469 (0.3155)	0.0326 (0.3660)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.2671 (0.9056)	0.3786 (1.0505)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	2.7680* (1.3814)	-1.7872 (1.6025)
Household average schooling	-0.1846 (0.2310)	0.0792 (0.2680)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.1244 (0.3380)	0.0435 (0.3921)
Constant	-6.8471** (2.8172)	4.0741 (3.2679)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0839	0.6950
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## Effects of Changes in Household Maximum Schooling

Table B.5: Two-sample t-test of the change in the fraction of households with migrants

Simulated change in household max schooling	To US			Within Mexico		
	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2973 (0.0217)	0.2898	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2902 (0.011)	-1.1512**
-25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2941 (0.02)	-0.8024	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2912 (0.01)	-0.8389*
-15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2964 (0.0206)	-0.0306	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2923 (0.0101)	-0.4655
-10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2977 (0.019)	0.4015	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2947 (0.0099)	0.3607
10%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2963 (0.0227)	-0.0474	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2959 (0.0098)	0.7682
15%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2966 (0.0206)	0.0406	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2964 (0.0104)	0.9485*
25%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2964 (0.0209)	-0.0242	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2962 (0.0109)	0.8719*
50%	0.2965 (0.0207)	0.2985 (0.0203)	0.6707	0.2936 (0.0102)	0.2964 (0.0094)	0.9586**

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance codes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Effects of Changes in Household Maximum Schooling

Table B.6: Two-sample t-test of the change in average welfare per household-year

Simulated change in household max schooling	Base case	Simulated	Percentage change from base case
-50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012202 (0.000042)	0.3124***
-25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012226 (0.000043)	0.1183**
-15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012229 (0.000043)	0.0936*
-10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012228 (0.000043)	0.1032**
10%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.01224 (0.000044)	0.0067
15%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012242 (0.000044)	-0.0135
25%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012252 (0.000045)	-0.0946*
50%	-0.012241 (0.000044)	-0.012259 (0.000046)	-0.1526***

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01






Figure B.5: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household maximum schooling.

## Effects of Changes in Household Maximum Schooling


Table B.7: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in household max schooling:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0029	0.0024	-0.0016	0.0036
	(0.0031)	(0.0027)	(0.0026)	(0.0027)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0005**	0.0004**	-0.0002	0.0003*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0005	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0006**
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Number of males in household	-0.0069	0.0046	-0.0050	0.0028
	(0.0045)	(0.0039)	(0.0038)	(0.0039)
Household head age	0.0004	-0.0001	0.0004	0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Household head schooling	0.0011	-0.0033*	0.0004	-0.0000
	(0.0020)	(0.0018)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)
Number of household members	0.0024	-0.0021	0.0000	-0.0027
	(0.0030)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.0069	0.0009	0.0086	0.0033
	(0.0086)	(0.0074)	(0.0072)	(0.0073)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0187	-0.0217*	0.0269**	-0.0051
	(0.0131)	(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0111)
Household average schooling	-0.0012	0.0036*	-0.0010	-0.0003
	(0.0022)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.0004	-0.0010	-0.0001	-0.0005
	(0.0032)	(0.0028)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)
Constant	0.0115	-0.0053	0.0067	-0.0171
	(0.0267)	(0.0232)	(0.0225)	(0.0227)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.2710	0.0609	0.1430	0.6210
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.


Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Effect of a 10% Decrease in Household Maximum Schooling  
on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Effect of a 10% Increase in Household Maximum Schooling  
on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(b)

Figure B.6: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in household maximum schooling.

## Effects of Changes in Household Maximum Schooling

Table B.8: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in household max schooling:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0003)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0097 (0.0207)	-0.0219 (0.0286)
Employment in primary sector	0.0001 (0.0146)	0.0317 (0.0202)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0146 (0.0240)	-0.0131 (0.0333)
Number of males in household	0.0608 (0.3226)	0.1577 (0.4467)
Household head age	-0.0054 (0.0230)	0.0374 (0.0318)
Household head schooling	0.0223 (0.1454)	-0.1200 (0.2013)
Number of household members	-0.0334 (0.2126)	0.1065 (0.2945)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.1105 (0.6103)	0.0888 (0.8452)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	-0.6218 (0.9310)	-1.4331 (1.2893)
Household average schooling	-0.0959 (0.1557)	-0.1469 (0.2156)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.5970** (0.2278)	-0.3226 (0.3155)
Constant	3.6366* (1.8985)	1.4631 (2.6293)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.3340	0.0109
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.




Figure B.7: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in precipitation.


## Effects of Changes in Precipitation

Table B.9: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration


<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Simulated change in precipitation:	10% Increase		10% Decrease	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0000	0.0022	-0.0013	0.0008
	(0.0024)	(0.0045)	(0.0046)	(0.0034)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Employment in primary sector	0.0001	-0.0000	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0001	-0.0009*	0.0003	-0.0000
	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Number of males in household	-0.0040	0.0111*	0.0059	-0.0008
	(0.0034)	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0049)
Household head age	0.0003	-0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Household head schooling	-0.0024	0.0023	0.0030	0.0004
	(0.0016)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0022)
Number of household members	0.0010	-0.0060	-0.0047	-0.0002
	(0.0023)	(0.0043)	(0.0044)	(0.0032)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-0.0108	0.0217*	0.0058	0.0085
	(0.0065)	(0.0124)	(0.0126)	(0.0093)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0008	-0.0078	0.0257	-0.0157
	(0.0099)	(0.0189)	(0.0192)	(0.0142)
Household average schooling	0.0030*	-0.0044	-0.0022	-0.0004
	(0.0017)	(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0024)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0014	-0.0068	-0.0013	0.0012
	(0.0024)	(0.0046)	(0.0047)	(0.0035)
Constant	-0.0215	0.0705*	-0.0032	-0.0073
	(0.0203)	(0.0386)	(0.0391)	(0.0289)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.3010	0.1190	0.9300	0.7150
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.

Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



(a)



(b)

Figure B.8: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a 10% change in precipitation.

## Effects of Changes in Precipitation

Table B.10: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Simulated change in precipitation:	10% Increase	10% Decrease
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0007* (0.0004)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0081 (0.0271)	-0.0152 (0.0377)
Employment in primary sector	0.0028 (0.0190)	0.0504* (0.0265)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0163 (0.0314)	0.0817* (0.0438)
Number of males in household	0.3220 (0.4222)	0.0577 (0.5879)
Household head age	0.0250 (0.0301)	0.0811* (0.0419)
Household head schooling	-0.0462 (0.1902)	0.1166 (0.2649)
Number of household members	-0.1570 (0.2783)	-0.4131 (0.3876)
Fraction of households with migration to US	0.9024 (0.7987)	1.4540 (1.1124)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.4676 (1.2184)	2.2693 (1.6968)
Household average schooling	-0.1425 (0.2037)	-0.2854 (0.2837)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	-0.0554 (0.2981)	0.1127 (0.4152)
Constant	1.0168 (2.4847)	-3.2178 (3.4604)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.5210	0.1450
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.






Figure B.9: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a floor of schooling of 10% above and below the average schooling.

## Effects of a Minimum Household Average Schooling Needed for Migration to US


Table B.11: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>				
	US	Mexico	US	Mexico
Minimum as % of mean household avg. schooling :	110%		90%	
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0060 (0.0234)	0.0095 (0.0064)	0.0039 (0.0270)	0.0059 (0.0041)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0006 (0.0022)	0.0001 (0.0006)	0.0011 (0.0025)	-0.0002 (0.0004)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0025 (0.0015)	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0034* (0.0018)	-0.0005* (0.0003)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0033 (0.0025)	-0.0007 (0.0007)	-0.0058* (0.0029)	-0.0008* (0.0004)
Number of males in household	0.0542 (0.0340)	0.0061 (0.0093)	0.0303 (0.0392)	0.0038 (0.0060)
Household head age	-0.0007 (0.0024)	-0.0008 (0.0007)	-0.0031 (0.0028)	0.0003 (0.0004)
Household head schooling	0.0292* (0.0153)	-0.0010 (0.0042)	0.0219 (0.0177)	0.0004 (0.0027)
Number of household members	-0.0424* (0.0224)	-0.0031 (0.0061)	-0.0229 (0.0258)	-0.0051 (0.0040)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-0.4193*** (0.0642)	-0.0230 (0.0175)	-0.3037*** (0.0741)	-0.0022 (0.0114)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.0297 (0.0980)	-0.0408 (0.0268)	-0.0105 (0.1131)	0.0038 (0.0174)
Household average schooling	0.0009 (0.0164)	0.0032 (0.0045)	0.0023 (0.0189)	-0.0002 (0.0029)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0037 (0.0240)	-0.0179*** (0.0065)	0.0025 (0.0277)	-0.0012 (0.0043)
Constant	-0.0259 (0.1998)	0.1014* (0.0546)	0.1685 (0.2306)	0.0327 (0.0355)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0000	0.1190	0.0000	0.2170
# observations	62	62	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.


Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Effect of a Floor for Migration to US of 90% of Average Schooling  
on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Effect of a Floor for Migration to US of 110% of Average Schooling  
on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(b)

Figure B.10: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a floor of schooling of 10% above and below the average schooling.

Effects of a Minimum Household Average Schooling Needed for Migration to US

Table B.12: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>		
Minimum as % of mean household avg. schooling :	110%	90%
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0426 (0.0795)	0.0199 (0.0848)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0733 (0.0559)	-0.1102* (0.0597)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.1004 (0.0923)	-0.1809* (0.0985)
Number of males in household	1.6459 (1.2400)	1.0590 (1.3226)
Household head age	-0.0034 (0.0883)	-0.0971 (0.0942)
Household head schooling	1.1830** (0.5588)	1.0083* (0.5960)
Number of household members	-0.7789 (0.8174)	-0.4507 (0.8719)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-13.3467*** (2.3461)	-8.8057*** (2.5024)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	-2.0534 (3.5787)	-1.3157 (3.8171)
Household average schooling	-0.1743 (0.5984)	-0.3158 (0.6383)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.1624 (0.8757)	0.4884 (0.9340)
Constant	-2.1404 (7.2982)	4.7190 (7.7843)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0000	0.0000
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.




Figure B.11: Signs of changes in migration by village that are significant at a 10% level under a cap of 90% of base case migration.

## Effects of a Cap on Migration to US


Table B.13: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the fraction of households with migration

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the fraction of households with migration to/within:</i>		
	<i>US</i>	<i>Mexico</i>
Cap as % of base case migration that is denied migration to US:		90%
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	0.0110 (0.0139)	0.0055 (0.0055)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0006 (0.0013)	-0.0001 (0.0005)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0015 (0.0009)	0.0003 (0.0004)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0004 (0.0015)	-0.0003 (0.0006)
Number of males in household	0.0188 (0.0202)	0.0089 (0.0080)
Household head age	0.0005 (0.0014)	0.0003 (0.0006)
Household head schooling	0.0218** (0.0091)	-0.0017 (0.0036)
Number of household members	-0.0228* (0.0133)	-0.0059 (0.0053)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-0.5293*** (0.0382)	-0.0246 (0.0151)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.1350** (0.0583)	-0.0446* (0.0230)
Household average schooling	-0.0159 (0.0098)	0.0014 (0.0039)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	0.0238 (0.0143)	-0.0018 (0.0056)
Constant	-0.2165* (0.1189)	0.0010 (0.0470)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0000	0.2130
# observations	62	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants.

Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Effect of a Cap on Migration to US of 90% of Base Case Migration  
on Average Welfare per Household-Year by Village



(a)

Figure B.12: Signs of changes in average welfare per household-year by village that are significant at a 10% level under a cap of 90% of base case migration.

## Effects of a Cap on Migration to US

Table B.14: Determinants of significant changes at the village level in the average welfare per household-year

<i>Dependent variable is the value of significant changes in the average welfare per household-year:</i>	
Cap as % of base case migration that is denied migration to US:	90%
Distance to closest border crossing point (1000 km)	-0.0004 (0.0007)
Crime rate at closest border crossing point	-0.0891 (0.0635)
Employment in primary sector	-0.0480 (0.0447)
Employment in secondary sector	-0.0308 (0.0738)
Number of males in household	0.3228 (0.9909)
Household head age	0.0276 (0.0706)
Household head schooling	0.8344* (0.4465)
Number of household members	0.0176 (0.6532)
Fraction of households with migration to US	-16.5421*** (1.8749)
Fraction of households with migration within Mexico	0.8716 (2.8599)
Household average schooling	-0.4593 (0.4782)
Household land quality (1=good, 4=very bad)	1.5704** (0.6998)
Constant	-9.5214 (5.8322)
p-value (Pr>F)	0.0000
# observations	62

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Crime rates are in homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Significance codes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.