

The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library

#### This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.

Help ensure our sustainability.

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search
<a href="http://ageconsearch.umn.edu">http://ageconsearch.umn.edu</a>
aesearch@umn.edu

Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.

# Identifying Potential Information Effects Associated with the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage (SSB) Taxes

#### Sunjin Ahn<sup>1</sup> and Jayson L. Lusk<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ph.D. Student Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University
 <sup>2</sup>Regents Professor Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University
 sj.ahn@okstate.edu, jayson.lusk@okstate.edu

Selected Poster prepared for presentation at the 2017 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting,

Chicago, Illinois, July 30 - Aug 1

Copyright 2017 by [Sunjin Ahn, Jayson L. Lusk]. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided this copyright notice appears on all such copies.



# Identifying Potential Information Effects Associated with the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage (SSB) Taxes

#### Sunjin Ahn<sup>1</sup> and Jayson L. Lusk<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ph.D. Student, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University <sup>2</sup> Regents Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University

#### Introduction

- Most studies about the impacts of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes have used demand estimates to make *ex ante* projections about the projected effects of SSB taxes.
- These previous literatures suggest SSB taxes may have non-pecuniary effects that either dampen or enhance demand for SSB. However, prior research has not always been well suited to identify such effects (and the potential heterogeneity in the effects).

## Objectives


- The objective of this study is to determine how consumers beverage choices are affected by a SSB tax where people either know or do not know the cause of the price increase.
- To accomplish the objective, we conduct series of choice experiments (CEs) with consumers before and after a tax and with and without information in a way that a difference-in-difference effect can be estimated.

## Survey Design

- We utilize a simple "branded" CE, where consumers choose between six beverage options (soda, diet soda, water, sparkling water, flavored sparkling water) and a "None" option.
- A main effects orthogonal design was used so that prices were uncorrelated with type of beverage.
   The design required each respond to answer 8 choice questions in a given treatment.

## Survey Design and Data

- The survey was completed by 403 individuals, 202 of whom were allocated to the no information treatment, and 201 of whom were allocated to the information treatment.
- To identify the pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects of SSB taxes, we used a 2x2 partial within-subject, partial between-subject design.
- Thus, survey participants answered a CE with pre-tax price levels first, and then the respondents were asked again the same questions with the post-tax price levels (within subject design).



## Analysis

- The advantage of our approach is that it provides a straightforward way to calculate a difference-in-difference estimate of the nonpecuniary effect of the tax.
- We can first approach this in a simple way that does not require econometric models or any of the assumptions that come along with them.
- Let  $S_{pre-tax,noinfo}^{soda}$  represent the share of choices in which soda was chosen across the 8 CE questions and the 202 participants allocated to the no information treatment prior to the tax being implemented.
- Likewise, let  $S_{post-tax,noinfo}^{soda}$ , represent the share of choices in which soda was chosen across the 8 CE questions and the 202 participants allocated to the no information treatment after to the tax was imposed.

### Analysis

- The effect of the tax on soda in the no information treatment is thus  $\Delta S_{noinfo}^{soda} = S_{post-tax,noinfo}^{soda} S_{pre-tax,noinfo}^{soda}$ .
- One can analogously determine the effects of the tax on soda among the 201 individuals assigned to the information treatment:  $\Delta S_{info}^{soda} = S_{post-tax,info}^{soda} S_{pre-tax,info}^{soda}$ .
- Thus, the effect of information is given by the difference-in-difference:  $\Delta S_{info}^{soda} \Delta S_{noinfo}^{soda}$ .

#### Results and Conclusion

- The share of choices that went to soda decreases by 5.5% with information, and the probability of choosing soda option without tax information decreased by 6.9%.
- The difference in effectiveness of the SSB tax between the with/without information treatment groups is 1.5%. Thus, the group *without* tax information reduced soda consumption by more than those with information, indicating a reactance effect on average.
- The results seem to provide little support for the notion that respondents perceived the tax as information about the (un)healthiness of soda or about what they "should" be consuming.
- However, it should be noted that tax information also caused an increase in the percent of "none" choices, where people refrained from buying any beverage, essentially avoiding the category altogether.