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# CUDARE Working Papers 

# Vertical relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data 

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# Vertical Relationships Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data* 

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#### Abstract

In this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared. Demand estimates are used to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed. The purpose is to identify which set of margins is compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost, and to select the model most consistent with the data among non-nested competing models. The models considered are: (1) a simple linear pricing model; (2) a vertically integrated model; and (3) a variety of alternative (strategic) supply scenarios that allow for collusion, non-linear pricing and strategic behavior with respect to private label products. Using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the United States the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain. This is consistent with non-linear pricing by the manufacturers, or high bargaining power of the retailers.


JEL Classifications: L13, L81, C12, C33. Keywords: Vertical relationships, multiple manufacturers and retailers, non-nested tests, yogurt local market.

[^0]
## 1. Introduction

This paper provides a framework for learning about vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers when faced with limited data. The conceptual framework developed here provides a basis for determining which stylized vertical contract best fits the data for a particular market. Wholesale price data are typically unavailable, and retailers' and manufacturers' marginal costs are difficult to measure separately. Given the data limitations faced by researchers now, and for the foreseeable future, examination of the testable implications of different models of vertical contracting, which map from product and cost characteristics to retail price, provides a useful basis for model comparison. The research plan of this paper is as follows: First, I estimate demand and use the estimates to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models without observing wholesale prices. I then compare estimated price cost margins with the price-cost margins estimated using components of marginal costs to assess the fit of these different vertical models and identify the best among the competing non-nested models. I focus empirically on the yogurt market in a large Midwestern city.

There are many reasons to care about analyzing vertical relationships (for a survey of theoretical work, see Katz, 1989). First, vertical relationships determine the vertical profit and the size of total producer surplus to be divided among firms along a distribution chain, and are thus of policy relevance for surplus calculations in counterfactuals (see Brenkers and Verboven, 2002 and Manuszak, 2001). Second, vertical relationships may promote efficiency in the vertical channel. This efficiency is a result of the departure from a simple uniform pricing scheme that leads to double marginalization. Double marginalization arises when the only contractual instrument used is the wholesale price. As a consequence, the sum of profits for the manufacturer and retailer may be less than the profits had they coordinated in their decisions. Third, vertical relationships may impair competition through their horizontal effects on the upstream manufacturer and downstream retail markets by increasing the possibility of oligopolistic coordination (increasing market power), or by excluding rivals (and hence, diminishing product variety and choices). Finally, the vertical structure in a particular market can significantly affect downstream prices (as in Hastings, 2004) and price dynamics (see, for example, Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi, 2003), and condition the assessment of merger activities in upstream and downstream markets.

Vertical relationships are especially difficult to examine empirically due to infra-marginal components, transaction costs, and imperfect information issues. ${ }^{1}$ The present paper sidesteps these

[^1]issues by focusing on the case in which relationships try to address the traditional problem of double marginalization. In this context, the paper provides a first step towards the structural estimation of vertical relationships. Limited data availability is another serious problem faced by empirical researchers analyzing vertical relationships. I demonstrate how one can draw inferences about vertical relationships, even with these data limitations.

The researcher typically does not have access to the prices retailers pay to manufacturers but in many industries the researcher can get data on retailers' and manufacturers' input prices. Suppose a researcher observes a time series of retail price-quantity pairs which she believes to be marketequilibrium outcomes of demand and supply conditions. The general identification problem is to infer the consumers' and firms' decision rules, from the decisions observable as price-quantity pairs. Without additional information, various combinations of demand and supply models may appear to produce the same price-quantity pairs over time. The econometric problem is, thus, a standard simultaneous-equation model in which a demand and a supply pricing equation, both derived from behavioral assumptions, must be specified and estimated. The demand equation relates quantity purchased to price, product characteristics, and unobserved demand determinants. The supply equation relates prices to a markup and to observed and unobserved cost determinants. Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006) derive conditions for which data on an industry's retail prices, quantities, and input prices over time are sufficient to identify the vertical model of manufacturers' and retailers' oligopoly-pricing behavior. Assuming exclusion restrictions such that demand is identified and additive separability in costs across products for the retailer and the manufacturer, nonlinearities in the demand model enable researchers to identify the supply side vertical models. In Bertrand Nash pricing model with differentiated products even for linear demand models, as long as single product manufacturers do not work exclusively with single product retailers, Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2006) show identification of retail and manufacturer models of pricing behavior.

Several recent papers examine retailer and manufacturer vertical relationships in different industries (see e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) in the automobile market; Corts (2001) in the U.S. motion picture industry; Mortimer (2002) for video rentals; and Asker (2004) and Hellerstein (2004) for beer). More closely related to this paper, Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song (2002) estimate the impact of the introduction of a private label by one retailer on the relative market power of the retailer and the manufacturers, and Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2000) measure the share of profits to retailers and manufacturers. Two key features distinguish this paper from the previous two papers; they use data on wholesale prices reported by the retailer and they use a conduct parameter approach, that measures deviations from Bertrand pricing behavior, in their analysis. Finally, Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) evaluate the degree of manufacturer competition and the retailer
and manufacturers interactions in the ketchup market in a certain city, and Sudhir (2001) studies competition among manufacturers under alternative assumptions of vertical interactions with one retailer. The current paper innovates in that it allows for multiple retailers when analyzing the vertical interactions between manufacturers and retailers.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the yogurt market and the patterns of the data used to separate the different stylized vertical relationships. The data are described in section 3 and, in section 4, I present the plausible economic and econometric models. In section 5 the method of estimation and inference is presented, and in section 6 the empirical results and corresponding robustness tests are evaluated. Conclusions and extensions of this research are presented in section 7, and suggestions are provided as to how the proposed methodology can be adapted to different settings.

## 2. The Experimental Setting - The Yogurt Market

To analyze vertical relationships I focus on the yogurt market in a Midwestern metropolitan area. Yogurt is one of the largest dairy categories in retail, and the "yogurt consumer" is an important consumer type for retailers. ${ }^{2}$ Yogurt is produced by a few leading national yogurt manufacturers; Dannon and General Mills together account for almost 62 percent of the total U.S. yogurt sales. Therefore, it is interesting to confront stylized supply models of upstream price collusion with the data. Private label brands from retail stores are in third place with 15 percent of the market. One supply model I look at considers the strategic importance that private labels seem to have in the yogurt market. Kraft ranks forth in terms of U.S. sales, and all other manufacturers have individual shares of less than 2 percent (Frozen Food Digest, October 1995: 38). One of the most important characteristics of the yogurt market is that yogurt sales are mostly driven by new product introductions (Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, 1999; Draganska and Jain, 2005). Product variety, together with successful advertising to influence consumers' evaluations of different products, can result in positive price-cost margins for the manufacturers. This is reflected in the estimates for the price-cost margins in the non-collusive supply scenarios considered here. At the retail level there is a small number of large retailers (or retail chains) competing directly with each other and who jointly have 75 percent of total sales to final consumers in the whole metropolitan area. All other retailers not considered had individual shares less than 5 percent in 1992. Given

[^2]retail concentration in this market, I shall consider a model of retail collusion.
Given the demand for yogurt, I consider, under different models, how retail prices change as a result of changes in an input price, and I pick which model appears to best describe the data. Correlation between retail and wholesale price variation and input prices is necessary for identification of the demand model. Yogurt exhibits retail price patterns potentially correlated with input price changes. Yogurt has to be consumed within twenty-eight days of production, so its shelf life is short. In principle, when marginal cost changes significantly, there exists the possibility for manufacturers to adjust wholesale prices accordingly.

## 3. Data

Building on a theoretical framework relating to vertical relationships, this analysis is based on a weekly data set on retail prices, advertising, aggregate market shares and product characteristics for 43 products produced by five manufacturers. The number of products is equal to 43 for all weeks except for the weeks during which retailer 2 closed due to remodeling and when the number of products in the sample is 25 . The price, advertising and market share data come from an Information Resources Inc. (IRI) scanner dataset that covers the purchases in three retail stores in a Midwestern urban area during 104 weeks (see also Bell and Lattin, 1998). Summary statistics for prices, advertising, quantity sold and shares are presented in Table 1. The combined shares for the products analyzed are on average 34 percent. Quantity sold is defined as servings sold, where one serving corresponds to a 6 -ounce yogurt cup. Price and servings sold series for the 43 products in the sample listed in Table 2 were obtained by aggregation. ${ }^{3}$ Market shares are defined by converting quantity sold to servings sold and then dividing by the total potential servings in the market. The potential market, in terms of servings, is assumed to be half of a serving per capita a week. Hence the potential market in terms of servings is equal to half of the resident population in the two zip code areas.

Dannon ranks first in terms of local market shares of its products with an average of 17 percent. General Mills is second in terms of local market share with 9 percent. Private labels are third with 4 percent, and Kraft comes last among the products analyzed with 3 percent. Three retail stores are considered in the data, where store 1 is a smaller store than stores 2 and 3 . The last two retail

[^3]stores belong to two retail chains, while store 1 is unique in the whole metropolitan area. The retail stores in the data are located less than two miles from one another. In fact, retailers 2 and 3 are located across from each other at a street intersection. Some smaller grocery stores are located within the two zip code areas considered, but the closest large retail store is located in a different zip code area. Combined market shares for the 10 products sold by retailer 1 are on average 2 percent. Store 2 sells 18 products with a combined market share of 20 percent. Store 3 has average combined shares of its 15 products of approximately 14 percent.

For the empirical analysis and inference the above IRI dataset is complemented with data on product characteristics and consumer demographics. The product characteristics data were collected by inspection of the label reads and for those products currently unavailable in any supermarket because they were discontinued, from manufacturers' descriptions. A sample from the joint income and age distribution of the two zip code resident population was obtained from the 1990 Census. Data on costs, obtained from various sources, are described in Table 3. The first group of cost price series relates more closely to manufacturer costs: price of milk, plastic and other components of yogurt, wages, and (industrial) energy prices for the state in which the manufacturing plants are located. There is considerable time variation for most of the manufacturer input price data series. These data are supplemented with additional data that enter retail cost: real estate indices and commercial energy prices for the state in which the retailers are located, chain size, as well as the number of employees in the chains, and gasoline prices that enter transportation costs.

## 4. Analytical Framework

The economic-econometric model appropriate for this study is a standard discrete choice demand formulation (see, e.g., McFadden 1984, Berry, 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995 and Nevo, 2001) and different alternative models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers. The price-cost margins for the retailers and manufacturers are expressed for each supply scenario solely as functions of demand substitution patterns. Due to dataset limitations, I do not have wholesale prices or separate data on wholesale and retail costs. This section derives expressions for the total sum of retail and manufacturer price-cost margins as functions of demand substitution patterns for the alternative supply models specified.

### 4.1. Demand Side

Assume the consumer chooses in each period ${ }^{4} t$ among $N_{t}$ different products ${ }^{5}$ sold by several retailers. Using the typical notation for discrete choice models of demand, the indirect latent utility of consumer $i$ from buying product $j$ during week $t$ is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{i j t}=d_{j}+d_{t}+x_{j t} \beta_{i}-\alpha_{i} p_{j t}+\xi_{j t}+\epsilon_{i j t} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $d_{j}$ represents product (brand-store) fixed effects capturing time invariant product characteristics, $d_{t}$ are quarterly dummies capturing quarterly unobserved determinants of demand, $x_{j t}$ are the observed product characteristics, $p_{j t}$ is the price of product $j, \xi_{j t}$ identifies the mean across consumers of unobserved (by the econometrician) changes in product characteristics ${ }^{6}$, and $\epsilon_{i j t}$ represents the distribution of consumer preferences about this mean. The random coefficients $\beta_{i}$ are unknown consumer taste parameters for the different product characteristics, and the term $\alpha_{i}$ represents the marginal disutility of price. These taste parameters are allowed to vary across consumers according to

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left[\alpha_{i}, \beta_{i}\right]^{\prime}=[\alpha, \beta]^{\prime}+\Gamma D_{i}+\Upsilon v_{i} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the variable $D_{i}$ represents observed consumer characteristics such as demographics, while unobserved consumer characteristics are contained in by $v_{i} .{ }^{7}$ The parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are the mean of the random coefficients described above. The matrix of non-linear demand parameters $\Gamma$ captures the observed heterogeneity, deviations from the mean in the population of the taste parameters and marginal utility of price due to demographic characteristics $D_{i}$. The matrix $\Upsilon$ captures the unobservable heterogeneity due to random shocks $v_{i}$.

In the econometric model, unobserved random consumer characteristics $v_{i}$ are assumed to be normally distributed, and the observed consumer characteristics $D_{i}$ have an empirical distribution

[^4]$\hat{F}(D)$ from the demographic data. Additionally, an outside good is included in the model, allowing for the possibility of consumer $i$ not buying one of the $N_{t}$ marketed goods. Its price is not set in response to the prices of the other $N_{t}$ products. In the outside good I include yogurt sold by smaller retail stores, or grocery stores not considered in the analysis, as well as yogurt of small manufacturers sold in the three retail stores studied. The mean utility of the outside good, $\delta_{0 t}$, is normalized to be constant over time and equal to zero. ${ }^{8}$ The measure $M$ of the market size is assumed to be proportional to the population in the contiguous zip code areas where the stores are located. The observed market share of product $j$ is given by $s_{j}=q_{j} / M$, where $q_{j}$ are the units sold. ${ }^{9}$

I make the usual assumption that consumers purchase one unit of that product among all the possible products available at a certain time $t$ that maximizes their indirect utility. ${ }^{10}$ Then the market share of product $j$ during week $t$ is given by the probability that good $j$ is chosen, that is,

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{j t}=\int_{\left[\left(D_{i}, v_{i}, \epsilon_{i t}\right) \mid U_{i j t} \geq U_{i h t} \forall h=0, \ldots N_{t}\right]} d F(\epsilon) d F(v) d F(D) . \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

If both $D$ and $v$ are fixed and consumer heterogeneity enters only through the random shock where $\epsilon_{i j t}$ is distributed i.i.d. with an extreme value type I density, then (3) becomes the Multinomial Logit model. Assuming that $\epsilon_{i j t}$ is distributed i.i.d. extreme value and allowing for consumer heterogeneity to affect the taste parameters for the different product characteristics, this corresponds to the full random coefficients model, or mixed Logit model. ${ }^{11}$

### 4.2. Supply Side

I focus on the case where relationships try to address the traditional problem of double marginalization resulting from the simple linear pricing model. Several plausible stylized vertical relationships are described next, inspired by the potential market structure in the empirical application. In par-

[^5]ticular, I examine scenarios incorporating the role of non-linear pricing, private labels and collusion in the design of vertical relationships. In three of the models, either the retailers or the manufacturers are allowed to use non-linear pricing relationships. In several models, the retailers are assumed to behave as if they were vertically integrated with respect to the private labels. In two sets of models, collusion at the manufacturer level, or at the retailer level, is examined. Finally, I consider the model of vertically integrated pricing which maximizes joint profits and, therefore, is the efficient outcome from the retailer's and manufacturer's points of view. The implied price-cost margins correspond to those of a vertically integrated monopolist. In what follows, each supply model is solved as a function of demand side parameters to obtain an expression for both the retailer's and the manufacturer's implied price-cost margins. ${ }^{12}$

### 4.2.1. Scenario 1: Simple Linear Pricing Model

In this model manufacturers set their prices first and retailers follow. The margins that result from this behavior correspond to the pure double marginalization price-cost margins with linear pricing in oligopoly markets at the manufacturer and retail level.

Let there be $N_{r}$ Nash-Bertrand multi product-oligopolist retailers competing in the retail market and suppose there are $N_{w}$ Nash-Bertrand multi product-oligopolist manufacturers competing in the wholesale market. To solve this vertical model, one starts by looking at the retailer's problem. Each retailer $r$ 's profit function in week $t$ is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{r t}=\sum_{j \epsilon S_{r t}}\left[p_{j t}-p_{j t}^{w}-c_{j t}^{r}\right] s_{j t}(p), \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $S_{r t}$ is the set of products sold by retailer $r$ during week $t, p_{j t}^{w}$ is the wholesale price he pays for product $j, c_{j}^{r}$ is the retailer's marginal cost of product $j$, and $s_{j t}(p)$ is the share of product $j$. The first order conditions, assuming a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium in prices, are

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{j t}+\sum_{m \epsilon S_{r t}}\left[p_{m t}-p_{m t}^{w}-c_{m t}^{r}\right] \frac{\partial s_{m t}}{\partial p_{j t}}=0 \text { for all } j \epsilon S_{r t}, \text { for } r=1, \cdots, N_{r}, \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $N_{t}$ is the number of products in the market.
Define $T_{r}$ as the retailer's ownership matrix with the general element $T_{r}(i, j)$ equal to one when both products $i$ and $j$ are sold by the same retailer and zero otherwise. Let $\Delta_{r t}$ be the retailer's

[^6]response matrix, containing the first derivatives of all the shares with respect to all retail prices, with element $(i, j)=\frac{\partial s_{j t}}{\partial p_{i t}}$. Stacking up the first order conditions given by (5) for all $N_{t}$ products and rearranging terms, we obtain the following vector expression for the retailers' implied price-cost margins, as a function of only the demand side for each week $t$,
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}-p_{t}^{w}-c_{t}^{r}=-\left(T_{r} * \Delta_{r t}\right)^{-1} s_{t}(p), \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

where $T_{r} * \Delta_{r t}$ is the element by element multiplication of the two matrices. If the equilibrium is unique, equation (6) implicitly defines the retail prices as a function of wholesale prices.

Each manufacturer maximizes profit by choosing the wholesale prices $p^{w}$, knowing that the retailers behave according to (6). Note that this model allows for different wholesale prices to be chosen for the same "physical product" sold to different retailers. ${ }^{13}$ The manufacturer's profit function is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{w t}=\sum_{j \epsilon S_{w t}}\left[p_{j t}^{w}-c_{j t}^{w}\right] s_{j t}\left(p\left(p^{w}\right)\right) \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $S_{w t}$ is the set of products sold by manufacturer $w$ during week $t$, and $c_{j t}^{w}$ is the marginal cost of the manufacturer that produces product $j$. The first-order conditions are, assuming again a pure strategy Nash-Equilibrium in the wholesale prices,

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{j t}+\sum_{m \epsilon S_{w t}}\left[p_{m t}^{w}-c_{m t}^{w}\right] \frac{\partial s_{m t}}{\partial p_{j t}^{w}}=0 \text { for all } j \epsilon S_{w t} \text {, for } w=1, \cdots, N_{w} \text {. } \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $T_{w}$ be a matrix of ownership for the manufacturers, analogously defined as the matrix $T_{r}$ above. In particular, element $(j, m)$ of $T_{w}$ is equal to one if the manufacturer sells both products $j$ and $m$, and is otherwise equal to zero. Let $\Delta_{w t}$ be the manufacturer's response matrix, with element $(j, m)=\frac{\partial s_{m t}}{\partial p_{j t}^{u}}$, containing the derivatives of the market shares of all products with respect to all wholesale prices. In other words, this matrix contains the cross-price elasticities of derived demand and the effects of cost pass-through. This matrix becomes very complicated with multiple products and multiple retailers and manufacturers. To obtain $\Delta_{w t}$, first note that $\Delta_{w t}=\Delta_{p t}^{\prime} \Delta_{r t}$, where $\Delta_{p t}$ is a matrix of derivatives of all the retail prices with respect to all the wholesale prices. So all that is needed is to find expressions for, and compute, $\Delta_{p t} .{ }^{14}$ Dropping time subscripts to

[^7]simplify notation, to get the expression for $\Delta_{p}$, let us start by totally differentiating for a given $j$ equation (5) with respect to all prices $\left(d p_{k}, k=1, \cdots, N\right)$ and a wholesale price $p_{f}^{w}$, with variation $d p_{f}^{w}:$
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{k=1}^{N}[\underbrace{\left.\frac{\partial s_{j}}{\partial p_{k}}+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left(T_{r}(i, j) \frac{\partial^{2} s_{i}}{\partial p_{j} \partial p_{k}}\left(p_{i}-p_{i}^{w}-c_{i}^{r}\right)\right)+T_{r}(k, j) \frac{\partial s_{k}}{\partial p_{j}}\right]}_{g(j, k)} d p_{k}-\underbrace{T_{r}(f, j) \frac{\partial s_{f}}{\partial p_{j}}}_{h(j, f)} d p_{f}^{w}=0 \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

Putting all $j=1, \ldots N$ products together, let $G$ be the matrix with general element $g(j, k)$ and let $H_{f}$ be the $N$ dimensional vector with general element $h(j, f)$. Then $G d p-H_{f} d p_{f}^{w}=0$. Solving for the derivatives of all prices with respect to the wholesale price $f$, the $f$-th column of $\Delta_{p}$ is obtained:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{d p}{d p_{f}^{w}}=G^{-1} H_{f} \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Stacking all $N$ columns together, $\Delta_{p}=G^{-1} H$, which has the derivatives of all prices with respect to all wholesale prices. ${ }^{15}$ The general element of $\Delta_{p}$ is $(i, j)=\frac{\partial p_{j}}{\partial p_{i}^{w}}$.

Collecting terms and solving for the manufacturers' implied price-cost margins yields

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}^{w}-c_{t}^{w}=-\left(T_{w} * \Delta_{w t}\right)^{-1} s_{t}(p) \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Finally, the sum of the implied price-cost margins for the retailers and the manufacturers is obtained by adding up (6) and (11). For the remaining models, I assume that costs do not vary over the different vertical models.

### 4.2.2. Scenario 2: The Hybrid Model

Each retailer behaves as a vertically integrated firm with respect to its own private label products and plays the vertical Nash-Bertrand game in other products (i.e., national brands). This scenario's implied price-cost margins relate to portions of price-cost margins from scenario 1 (for a simple model, please refer to the web-page supplement). In particular, the retail margins will be the same as those in scenario 1, given by equation (6). However, the wholesale margins change. When
vertical supply models could potentially generate the same observed prices.
${ }^{15}$ Matrix $G$ is derived from totally differentiating the first order conditions of retail profit maximization. The second order conditions are that $G$ be negative semi-definite, and $G$ is invertible if negative definite, which is the typical case, especially if there is enough product differentiation, and or a large outside good in the market (see also Vives, 1999).
vertically integrating into the upstream market, retailers affect the price-cost margins of national brand manufacturers. By vertically integrating, retailers eliminate wholesale margins of private labeled products, and the final retail price of the private label falls. Demand for the products sold by the manufacturers of national brands decreases and, consequently, the national brand manufacturers must adjust their wholesale prices. At the manufacturer level in this particular market, the wholesale margins for private label products are zero and thus not optimized over. The implied manufacturers' price-cost margins for the national brands are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}^{w}-c_{t}^{r}-c_{t}^{w}=-\left(T_{w}^{*} * \Delta_{w t}^{*}\right)^{-1} s_{t}^{*}(p) \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

where excluding the rows and columns that correspond to private label products, $T_{w}^{*}$ is the national brand manufacturers' ownership matrix, $\Delta_{w t}^{*}$ is defined like $\Delta_{w t}$, and $s_{t}^{*}(p)$ are the shares of the national brands.

### 4.2.3. Scenario 3: Non-Linear Pricing Models

In the classical, nonlinear optimal (two-part tariff) pricing model, with one manufacturer and one retailer case, the manufacturer sets wholesale price equal to marginal cost and lets the retailer be the residual claimant. The manufacturer is then able to extract part, or the full "monopoly" (or vertically integrated firm's) surplus, in the form of a fixed fee that the retailer must pay. Two-part tariffs are seen as optimal contracts whenever there is downstream market power in the retail market and fairly general market assumptions hold. ${ }^{16}$ It is no longer true that the optimal two-part tariff, in the context of multiple retailers, yields marginal cost pricing by the manufacturers (Mathewson and Winter, 1984 and Schmalensee, 1981). However, two-part tariffs are still optimal in the context of multiple manufacturers and a single retailer (Shaffer and O'Brien, 1997 and Tirole, 1988, page 180).

Given the above set-up, two sub-cases are next considered to test the validity of non-linear pricing solutions to the double marginalization problem and retail and manufacturer price cost margins for the sub-cases. ${ }^{17}$ I assume first that wholesale price is equal to wholesale costs, and in the second sub-case that the retail mark-up is zero and retail price is equal to wholesale price plus

[^8]any remaining retail costs. ${ }^{18}$
Sub Case 3.1: Suppose, in a first scenario, that manufacturers choose to leave retailers as residual claimants, by eliminating the wholesale margin. Therefore, it follows that total vertical profits may also increase compared to the double marginalization scenario. Retailers now maximize their profits given that wholesale prices are equal to marginal costs, and the manufacturers' implied price-cost margins are zero for all products. The implied price-cost margins for the retailers are given by equation (6) and subject to $p_{t}^{w}=c_{t}^{w}$. That is,
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}-c_{t}^{r}-c_{t}^{w}=-\left(T_{r} * \Delta_{r t}\right)^{-1} s_{t}(p) \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

This means that the retailer gets the profits corresponding to the downstream, vertically integrated structure for each of the $j$ products. Manufacturers recover these profits with the fees $F$.

Sub-Case 3.2: Finally suppose there are zero retail margins and manufacturer pricing decisions in the equilibrium. There exists an equilibrium where retailers can get all the profits and retail prices are chosen to maximize the profits corresponding to the downstream vertically integrated structure for each of the $j$ products. This is achieved by choosing the retail price-cost margins as zero for all products; the retailers add only retail costs to the wholesale prices, i.e. $p_{j t}=p_{j t}^{w}+c_{j t}^{r} \forall j$. The manufacturers' implied price-cost margins are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}-c_{t}^{r}-c_{t}^{w}=-\left(T_{w} * \Delta_{r t}\right)^{-1} s_{t}(p) . \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Finally, retailers set franchise fees $F$ to extract the manufacturers' profits. It is worth noting that the implied price-cost margins in equation (14) are different from those implied by equation (13) because the retail ownership $T_{r}$ differs from the manufacturer ownership $T_{w}$. Thus, manufacturers and retailers are maximizing their profits over a different set of products. In Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001), the (manufacturer) implied price-cost margins computed are given by expressions similar to (14) and the retailers' decisions are not modeled.

### 4.2.4. Scenario 4: Manufacturer-Level Collusion Model

In scenario 4, manufacturers choose wholesale prices to maximize the sum of manufacturers' profits. Because manufacturers are assumed to be colluding, it is as if one single upstream firm owned the full

[^9]set of products. Thus, the manufacturers' ownership matrix $T_{w}$ is a matrix full of ones, henceforth called $T_{1}$. Manufacturers' price-cost margins are given by equation (11), subject to $T_{w}=T_{1}$. Assuming retailers set their retail prices, given the wholesale prices, the implied price-cost margins of the retailers are given by (6).

### 4.2.5. Scenario 5: Retail Level Collusion Model

Assuming collusion at the retail level corresponds to the assumption $T_{r}=T_{1}$. Retail price-cost margins are given by (6) subject to $T_{r}=T_{1}$, while manufacturer price-cost margins are given by (11).

### 4.2.6. Scenario 6: Monopolist Model

This last scenario examines the question of whether the industry is jointly profit maximizing. Wholesale margins are zero. Furthermore, $T_{r}=T_{w}=T_{1}$. Consequently, the implied price-cost margins of the fully vertically and horizontally integrated structure are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{t}-c_{t}^{r}-c_{t}^{w}=-\left(T_{1} * \Delta_{r t}\right)^{-1} s_{t}(p) . \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

## 5. Estimation and Inference

With the data sample discussed in section 3, I estimate demand and use the estimates to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models. Because wholesale prices are unobservable, I compare estimated price cost margins with the price-cost margins estimated using components of marginal costs to assess the fit of these different vertical models and select the non-nested models that are most compatible with the data. Besides the technical simplicity, a two-step procedure also provides an elegant way to compare different supply models without having to re-estimate the demand system (see also Goldberg and Verboven, 2001 and Brenkers and Verboven, 2002). The estimation of a firm's (implied) price-cost margins, without observing actual costs, follows Bresnahan (1989).

### 5.1. Demand Estimation

When estimating demand, the goal is to derive parameter estimates that produce product market shares close to the observed ones. This procedure is non-linear in the demand parameters, and prices
enter as endogenous variables. The key step is to construct a demand side equation that is linear in the parameters associated with the endogenous variables so that instrumental variables estimation, GMM, can be directly applied. This follows from equating the estimated product market shares ${ }^{19}$ to the observed shares and solving for the mean utility across all consumers, defined as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\delta_{j t}(\Gamma, \Upsilon)=d_{j}+x_{j t} \beta-\alpha p_{j t}+\xi_{j t} \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

For the Logit model, the mean utility $\delta_{j t}$ can be recovered analytically, following Berry's (1994) inversion technique, by $\log \left(s_{j t}\right)-\log \left(s_{0 t}\right)=\delta_{j t}$. However, in the full model, solving for the mean utility has to be done numerically (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). Finally, once this inversion has been made, one obtains equation (17) which is linear in the parameter associated with price. Let $\theta$ be the demand side parameters to be estimated, where in the Logit case $\theta=\theta_{L}=$ $(\alpha, \beta, d)$ and, in the full model, $\theta=\left(\theta_{L}, \Gamma, \Upsilon\right)$, where $\Gamma$ and $\Upsilon$ are the non-linear parameters. For the Logit case, $\theta_{L}$ is obtained directly from estimating (17) by feasible 2 SLS. ${ }^{20}$ In the full random coefficients model, $\theta$ is obtained by feasible Method of Simulated Moments following Nevo's (2000) estimation algorithm, where equation (17) enters in one of the steps. ${ }^{21}$ I start by using a simplex search and then a gradient method (providing an analytical gradient) with different starting values of the non-linear parameters to find a minimum of the simulated GMM objective function.

### 5.2. Instruments and Identification of Demand

The remainder of the paper relies heavily on having consistently estimated demand parameters or, alternatively, demand substitution patterns. What is the exogenous variation that identifies these substitution patterns? There are basically two sources of identification in the data. One

[^10]source is the relative price variation over time. In this paper, the experiment asks consumers to choose between different products over time, where a product is perceived as a bundle of attributes (among which are prices). Since prices are not randomly assigned, I use manufacturer and retail level input price changes over time that are significant and exogenous to unobserved changes in product characteristics to instrument for prices. These cost instruments separate cross-brand variation in prices, as well as cross-store/brand variation in prices due to exogenous factors from endogenous variation in prices from unobserved product characteristics changes. Using retail level input price data, the same argument applies to the identification of elasticities for the same product sold at different retailers. The fact that consumer choice sets changed due to renovation in one store provides an additional and fortunate source of identification.

Instrumental variables in the estimation of demand are required because when retailers consider all product characteristics when setting retail prices, not only the ones that are observed. That is, retailers consider both observed characteristics, $x_{j t}$, and unobserved characteristics, $\xi_{j t}$. Retailers also account for any changes in their products' characteristics and valuations. A product fixed effect is included to capture observed and unobserved product characteristics/valuations that are constant over time. Quarterly dummies capture quarterly unobserved determinants of demand. The econometric error that remains in $\xi_{j t}$ will therefore only include the (not-seasonal) changes in unobserved product characteristics, such as unobserved promotions and changes in shelf display and/or changes in unobserved consumer preferences. This implies that the prices in (17) are correlated with changes in unobserved product characteristics affecting demand. Hence, to obtain a precise estimate of the price coefficients, instruments are used. I use, as instruments for prices, direct components of marginal cost, namely manufacturer input prices, interacted with product-specific fixed effects. The price decision takes into account exogenous cost-side variables, such as input prices. It is reasonable to assume that the prices of inputs are uncorrelated with changes in unobserved product characteristics, $\xi_{j t}$. For example, changes in shelf display are most likely not correlated with manufacturer input prices such as the prices of plastic, milk and sugar. The intuition for interacting input prices with product dummies is to allow each input to enter the production function of each product differently: some yogurts are more sugary, fruit yogurts use more fruit, and so on. Since the exact content is not observed, it is estimated this way. Using these instruments for prices is a new approach and, given the good first-stage fit, it appears to generate robust results. ${ }^{22}$ Thus,

[^11]these cost data multiplied by product fixed effects are instruments for endogenous retail prices. To examine the effects of the two alternative instrumental variables specifications, two sets of instruments are considered when estimating demand. In the first specification, I interact 43 product dummies (where product is defined as brand-store) with the input prices, allowing marginal cost of a given yogurt brand sold at two different retailers to vary. In the alternative specification, I assume that the manufacturer marginal cost of the same brand sold at two different retailers is the same. This results in 21 brand dummies interacted with the manufacturer-input prices. There exists one additional reason why these instruments (input prices multiplied by product fixed effects) are valid. The residual in the demand equation contains only the part that is not explained by "store-brand" level fixed effects. Had I not included brand dummies in the demand estimation, the instruments would have been be correlated with constant unobserved product characteristics. I have included seasonal dummies to control for unobserved seasonal variation in consumer preferences. Their inclusion implies that some of the seasonal input price are less problematic as instruments. Retail level input prices (retail size measured by the number of stores and number of employees in the chain, and real estate indices on retail average price per square foot, and retail average rent per square foot) are also used as instruments. It is reasonable to assume that the changes in unobserved product characteristics $\xi_{j t}$, such as changes in shelf display, are most likely not correlated with retail input prices, such as the rental price of square foot and the price of electricity.

### 5.3. Inference

After having estimated the demand model as a first step, I investigate the validity of the supply models as a second step. I follow two approaches: one more formal, non-nested hypothesis testing approach, and another more informal specification testing procedure.

### 5.3.1. Informal Model Specification Check

The idea is to estimate, given demand estimates $\theta$, a supply equation that is derived from the firms' profit maximizing decisions and is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
p=f(C \gamma)+S I P C M_{r}(\theta) \lambda_{r}+S I P C M_{w}(\theta) \lambda_{w}+u^{s} \tag{18}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $C$ is a matrix of cost side variables such as input prices, $\gamma$ is a vector of coefficients associated with cost-side variables, $S I P C M_{r}(\theta)$ and $S I P C M_{w}(\theta)$ are the retail and manufacturer price-cost margins, respectively, implied by the different scenarios, and $\lambda_{r}$ and $\lambda_{w}$ are parameters associated
with the implied margins. Alternative cost specifications are estimated. First, it is assumed that $f(C \gamma)=C \gamma$, then that $f(C \gamma)=\ln (C \gamma)$, and finally that $f(C \gamma)=e^{C \gamma}$. For each model, the specification test evaluates the null hypothesis that all the coefficients in $\lambda_{r}$ and $\lambda_{w}$ are not significantly different from one. I also consider an even more informal and intuitive check for the supply models, which examines whether implied marginal costs are negative for some models.

### 5.3.2. Formal Ranking of Supply Models

This paper follows a menu approach (as in Bresnahan, 1987 and Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong, 1992). I present different models of vertical relationships, and the objective is to determine which model fits the data best. Because most of the models cannot be nested in another proposed model, pair-wise, non-nested testing procedures proposed by Smith (1992) are applied here. The basic idea builds on the previously described informal testing procedure; if a certain model is true, then all parameters associated with the price-cost margins variables in equation (18) are not different from one. I now subtract the implied price-margins from the retail price and recover marginal costs for the vertical supply model in question. Let $y$ be the difference in retail price and price-cost margins. Then, for each pair-wise comparison, there are two competing regression models, $M_{g}$ and $M_{h}$ defined, respectively, as $M_{g}: y_{g}=f(c \beta)+u_{g}$, and $M_{h}: y_{h}=f(c \gamma)+u_{h}$. In the model, $c$ is a matrix of input prices, and $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are parameters to be estimated by GMM. To compare each pair of models, the Cox-type statistic is constructed by examining the difference of the estimated GMM criterion functions for model $M_{h}$ and for the alternative model $M_{g}$. Normalized, standardized and compared to a standard normal critical value, a large positive statistic in this one-sided goodness of fit test leads to the rejection of the null model $M_{h}$ against $M_{g}$. The intuition behind the non-nested pair-wise comparisons is to see how the price-cost margins of alternative models explain the residual (unobserved determinants of price) of the null model. This residual is obtained by subtracting the computed price-cost margins and estimated marginal costs from retail prices under the null model being considered.

## 6. Empirical Results

### 6.1. Demand Estimation

I use the Logit model for demand as a basis for comparing and choosing between different instrumental variable specifications, illustrating the need to instrument for prices when estimating demand, and accessing the sensitivity of the demand estimates with respect to the market size definition.

Understanding the drawback of having poor substitution patterns (see McFadden (1984) and Nevo (2000)), I then estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model of demand for differentiated products.

### 6.1.1. First Stage

In the first instrumental variable (IV) specification, prices are instrumented by manufacturer input prices multiplied by 43 product dummy variables and retail level input prices. In the second IV specification, prices are instrumented by retail level input prices and by manufacturer input prices interacted with 21 product dummies. This second specification corresponds to assuming that manufacturer marginal cost for the same product sold at different retailers is equal. Choosing between the two different instrumental variables specifications, I test and cannot reject the assumption that the coefficients associated with the same input for the same "physical" product are equal to each other, as in Specification 2. The "First Stage" part of Table 4 reveals that the first stage R-squared and F-Statistic of the IV specifications are high, and the F-test for zero coefficients associated with manufacturer instruments is rejected. The F-test for testing that the coefficients associated with retail level additional instruments are zero is also rejected at any significance level. This suggests that manufacturer instruments, and also the additional retail level instruments, are valid. In general, estimates of first-stage coefficients are significant (for example, for plastic, sugar and milk). Coefficients for the wages in U.S. states in which plants of the different products are located are significant as are the retail level instruments' coefficients. Considering the use of instrument for prices, the Hausman (1978) test for exogeneity suggests that there is a gain from using instrumental variables versus ordinary least squares when estimating demand.

### 6.1.2. Logit Demand

Table 4 presents the results from regressing the mean utility $\delta_{j}$, which for the Logit case is given by $\ln \left(s_{j t}\right)-\ln \left(s_{0 t}\right)$, on prices and quarterly and product dummy variables in equation (17). The second column displays the estimate of ordinary least squares for the mean price coefficient $\alpha$, and columns three and four contain estimates of $\alpha$ for the two different instrumental variables (IV) specifications, using manufacturer and retail level input prices as instruments for the prices. The last columns 5 through 7 of Table 4 present results when advertising is included as an additional right hand side variable. The coefficient of advertising is not significant and the effects from including advertising on the price and product characteristic coefficients are insignificant, both statistically and economically. To access the sensitivity of the demand estimates with respect to the definition of
market size, please refer to the bottom of Table 4. As the servings per capita increase, the estimate of the mean marginal utility of price decreases for all specifications.

### 6.1.3. Random Coefficients Demand

Results from estimating equation (17) are presented in columns 3 through 7 of Table 5. Consumer heterogeneity is investigated by allowing the coefficients on price, store dummy variables and product characteristics to vary across consumers as a function of their income, age and other unobserved consumer characteristics, following McFadden and Train (2000). All the demographic variables that interact with prices and product characteristics are expressed as deviations from the mean. Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the random coefficient specification, that allows log of income and the age to influence the price coefficient, are presented in column 3. Column 4 allows for the $\log$ of income to affect the price coefficient non-linearly by including a quadratic term. Columns 5 through 7 present estimates for additional demand specifications as robustness checks. Interpreting the estimates in columns 3 and 4, the mean price coefficients are different from the Logit estimate for the mean of the marginal disutility of price. Age and income do not significantly affect the mean price sensitivity. However, unobservable characteristics in the population seem to affect it significantly. The last line of Table 5 presents the percentage of estimated individual price coefficients that have the wrong and positive sign. For the specification in column 3, this happens but very rarely (less than 0.2 percent) and we use this specification henceforth. The results presented in column 4 reduced the percentage of positive predicted coefficients $\alpha_{i}=\alpha+\Gamma D_{i}+\Upsilon v_{i}$ to zero. In this case, as in Nevo (2001), the zero percentage of estimated positive $\alpha$ 's is due mainly to the inclusion of the interaction of price with income and income squared.

The coefficients associated with the store dummies are interpreted relative to the smaller store. Unobservable characteristics in the population do not seem to explain why people choose stores two and three over store one. In fact, the positive and significant coefficient associated to the interaction between the store two dummy and age of the population suggests that older people significantly prefer store two over store one. One other possibility is that older people live closer to store two than store one since this model does not control for store distance. The preferences for larger store two decreases and for store three rises with an increase in income. Perhaps this is due to the location of a higher income population around store one. For the average consumer, calories have a negative marginal utility, and calcium content has a positive marginal utility. The estimates for the interactions of demographics with the constant term (that captures consumers' valuation for the outside option) suggest that unobserved characteristics in the population explain significantly
and positively how likely or unlikely a consumer is to buy other yogurt not included in the sample.

### 6.2. Elasticities

For the estimated Logit model own and cross elasticities, see columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 . The elasticities vary by brand, where the mean of the distribution of own-price elasticities is -5.91 with a standard deviation of 0.02 . Cross-price elasticities are, on average, 0.019 with a standard deviation of 0.02 . One limitation of the Logit demand specification is the implied cross-price elasticity pattern. That is, products with similar market shares and prices have similar cross-price elasticities.

In the full model, the elasticities-related limitations described above disappear. On the one hand, own price elasticities are no longer uniquely driven by functional form specifications. In particular, the marginal utility of price $\alpha$ will now vary by product, in the sense that it is obtained as the average of all the price sensitivities $\alpha_{i j}$ for all the consumers $i$ of that particular product $j$. On the other hand, cross-price substitution patterns are richer. The mean of own price elasticities is now -5.64 with a standard deviation of 0.03 . For all products, the standard deviation is fairly large relative to the mean, and the Logit restrictions seem less reasonable. Mean cross-price elasticities vary significantly by product, ranging, on average, from 0.001 to 0.134 . Due to the large dimension of the matrix of cross-price elasticities, detailed information on estimated cross-price elasticities for the 43 products in the sample is not presented. However, overall, the results seem reasonable and intuitive: Products seem to be less sensitive to changes in prices of products in other stores than changes in prices in the same store. This is true when breaking up by manufacturer (top of the table), or across manufacturer and breaking up by store (bottom of the table).

### 6.3. Estimated Price-Cost Margins

Summary statistics for the price-cost margin estimates with a random coefficient demand model are provided in Table 7. In each line are the price-cost margins for the different models. For the models that estimate both retail and wholesale margins, total vertical margin is reported. When retailers determine prices (scenario 3, case 1), the median price-cost margins estimated are slightly higher than the price-cost margins that result when manufacturers set prices (scenario 3, case 2). For the random coefficient specification, only for the non-linear pricing models 3.1 and 3.2 all estimated mark-ups are significantly smaller than 100 percent. For all other models there are some products, during some weeks, that exhibit estimated price-cost margins greater than 100 percent, which implies negative marginal cost estimates. For the Logit specifications, the simple linear pricing model (model 1), the hybrid model (model 2), and the collusion models (models 4 and 5),
also exhibit mark-ups greater than 100 percent. Whether this problem is going to be statistically significant is addressed next.

### 6.4. Model Comparison

### 6.4.1. Informal Specification Check

The next step is to subtract estimated price cost margins from observed retail prices to recover the total marginal costs implied by each vertical supply model. Summary statistics of recovered marginal costs for all supply models are presented in Table 8. As the informal test for the estimated models, note that only the two non-linear pricing models (models 3) and the efficient pricing model (model 6) imply less than 0.1 percent negative recovered costs. Model 3.2 has slightly higher cost estimates than model 3.1. This is an interesting fact that reinforces the identification strategy among these two non-linear pricing sub-cases, namely, that the difference in recovered marginal costs estimates and price-cost markup estimates can be attributed to different ownership structures. ${ }^{23}$ Results of informal validity testing for each supply model are the result from estimating a regression of prices on price cost margins and costs, and testing for the hypothesis that the coefficients associated with the price-cost margins are equal to one. The null hypotheses imply that, given the assumptions for demand, the price-cost margins estimated under the scenario in question are consistent with the price-cost margins obtained from supply-side estimates. ${ }^{24}$ The price-cost margins implied by the model with vertically integrated private labels and the retail and collusion models seem the least consistent with the data for random coefficients and logit specifications. In terms of rejection of individual firm parameters, the other models' ranking varies from random coefficients and logit specifications. Looking at more efficient contracting solutions, with just one margin, between manufacturers and retailers the test for unit coefficient is less rejected. As a preliminary conclusion, there seems to be mixed informal evidence on the contracting solution followed, but the least likely is the double marginalization model with integrated private labels (hybrid model) and models involving both retail and manufacturer non zero margins, which are on average rejected over seventy percent of the time along the testing above for several demand specifications.

Finally, table 9 presents the estimates of projecting the estimate of total recovered retailer and

[^12]manufacturer marginal costs on retail and manufacturer input prices and retail and manufacturer dummies. In particular, Table 9 presents the parameter estimates for the simple uniform pricing model with vertically integrated private labels (model 2), and for the zero wholesale and NashBertrand retail pricing model (sub-case 3.1). A linear cost specification and a non-linear cost specification are estimated, and the goodness of fit of each specification is assessed for a product chosen at random, due to space limitations. First, the $R^{2}=0.50$ is fairly high. Overall, the parameters are reasonable, the coefficient on wage is significant and positive. The coefficients on retail level transportation input prices and retail wages also look reasonable for some states; in general, increases in gasoline price and wages are associated with an increase in marginal costs.

### 6.4.2. Ranking of Supply Models

Formally ranking the models, Table 10 presents the p-values for the test statistics for pair-wise comparisons of all models. In each row is the (null) model being tested and in each column is the alternative being used to test it. If the alternative model is performing well, then the null model is rejected by a large and significant test statistic. In an element $(i, j)$ of this table the p-value is reported for the null model in row $i$ being true when confronted with the specified alternative model in column $j$. In the bottom of Table 10 I present the same non-nested comparisons for a supply specification discussed below in the additional robustness checks. From the pair-wise comparisons I conclude that the models assuming zero wholesale margin (model 3.1 and model 6), in which retailers have pricing decisions, provide the most reasonable fit given the other specified alternatives and this is reinforced below. Model 3.1 escapes rejection against all alternatives confronted for this supply side specification, since all the elements in the row corresponding to model 3.1 have p-values larger than 5 percent, and outperforms other models at 5 percent significance since the p-values in the elements of the column labeled 3.1 are less than 5 percent: this happens for the linear pricing model (model 1) and for the zero retail pricing model (3.2). The two margins models are rejected by other models, such as the linear pricing model (model 1), the hybrid model (model 2), and the retail collusion model (model 5). Rejection of the collusion models may be explained by the difficulties associated with both price coordination in the vertically non-integrated case and penalties to sustain collusion (see e.g, Nocke and White, 2004). The "second place" model appears to be the monopolist model (model 6) since it is not rejected by any of the specified alternatives and rejects model 3.1, but only at at ten percent significance level. From the top of the table non-nested comparisons, I may conclude that models 3.1 and 6 both reject other models and are in turn not rejected by any of the other specified alternative models. They have in common that wholesale margins are zero but differ in the retail pricing behavior being Bertrand-Nash or Collusive.

This result is consistent with several scenarios that include non-linear pricing by manufacturers via quantity discounts, or two-part tariff contracts. In the optimal non-linear pricing contract, the manufacturer sets the marginal wholesale price close to the manufacturer's marginal cost and leaves retailers as residual claimants, such that the retailers have the correct incentives when setting the retail prices (especially with non-contractible retail efforts as in Rey and Vergé (2004)). The manufacturer extracts revenue from retailers via a fixed fee or by selling the non-marginal units at higher wholesale prices. ${ }^{25}$ The existence of quantity discounts is common practice in this industry. Anecdotal evidence suggests that retail supermarkets do not often pay fixed fees to their manufacturers and, if they do, these fees are not close to the retail profits. Instead, there seem to be substantial fees paid by the manufacturers to the retailers (the so-called slotting allowances). The non-existent, or small fixed fees, could be explained by the fact that there are multiple manufacturers in this market with whom the retailers can bargain more aggressively for a lower fixed fee by threatening to buy from another manufacturer. This result is also consistent with the high bargaining power of retailers that are able to force wholesale prices down to marginal cost. In fact, in the last few decades, retailers may have acquired greater bargaining power relative to manufacturers (Progressive Grocer, April 1992), suggesting a possible departure from the simple linear pricing model in the industry. Industry participants and researchers have pointed out that private labels now compete directly with national brands (Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998), and provide a new bargaining tool for retailers when negotiating with manufacturers. ${ }^{26}$ Another reason is the increase in concentration at the retail level; retailers have market power with which they can bargain more aggressively with manufacturers. ${ }^{27}$ One indication of retailer market power is the increase in competition for shelf space, implying that manufacturers have to pay retailers slotting allowances (e.g., Chu, 1992 and Shaffer, 1991) to get their products displayed. Ultimately, however, without information on fixed fees, the above theoretical and anecdotal predictions cannot be tested, and one cannot formally identify which interpretation of the results applies.

The results have implications for pricing decision-makers in a particular industry. In the related literature (for example Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995 and Nevo, 2001), traditionally, the retailers' pricing decisions have been assumed away. For the market I study, this model is outper-

[^13]${ }^{27}$ For example, see New York Times, November 13, 1998, page C1.
formed by the alternative model where retailers have pricing decisions. Estimating the price-cost margins under the assumption that manufacturers are setting the prices and retailers are neutral pass-through intermediaries, when in fact retailers are deciding prices, could lead to bias and affect the conclusions when accessing market power or merger activities in a certain industry. Indeed, the bias is expected to be more serious when retailers sell more sets of products and the sets of products that manufacturers sell do not coincide. Since retailers may not be neutral pass-through intermediaries, when analyzing price dynamics in the economy as a whole, retail behavior and retail market conditions should also be considered in addition to manufacturer behavior.

### 6.5. Additional Robustness Checks

In terms of robustness of the demand assumptions for the Logit demand specification, the ranking of the two best models is invariant. Additional demand specifications departing from the base models of specifications in columns 3 and 4 are presented in columns 5 through 7 of Table 5 . Column 5 presents the NLLS estimates of the full model (without instrumenting for price). The demand coefficients change considerably. Column 6 presents the estimates from the specification that sets the unobserved shocks $v_{i}$ to zero for all the product characteristics. Comparing columns 4 and 6 , the estimates are in general unchanged. This suggests that unobservable heterogeneity may not be important for the results of interest, but heterogeneity might still be important for some aspect of demand. Column 7 is equal to 4 but adds advertising. The coefficient for advertising is statistically insignificant and, comparing column 4 with column 7 , there is not a significant effect on the estimates. Finally, the ranking of the supply models is robust to small variations in weekly per capita consumption assumption and the introduction of demand seasonality. I further considered alternative scenarios, modeling retailers to be vertically integrated with respect to their private labels and estimating in that context retail collusion, as well as wholesale collusion models.

The price-cost margins estimated for all specifications described above assume that manufacturers set a wholesale price for each store. Some stores are part of chains, and it may be that manufacturers behave differently towards these stores (stores two and three) than towards the non-chain store (store one). As a robustness test, I estimate the profit maximization of the manufacturers by weighting the profit portion from selling to a certain retailer $k$ by the size of store $k$ 's retail chain (measured by the numbers of employees in the chain and by the number of stores in the chain)..$^{28}$ The non-nested model comparisons and estimated price cost margins and recovered costs are very similar when weighted by stores or employees. Noting that chain size did somewhat

[^14]affect the magnitude of price cost margin and cost estimates, the weighting did not significantly change the conclusions from the above model comparisons relative to the unweighted specification. Looking at the bottom of Table 10, on the one hand model 3.1 is rejecting significantly all models except the hybrid model, with reported p-values less that 5 percent significance, but on the other hand model 3.1 is not rejected by any of the specified alternatives, except the monopolist model 6 (note however that model 3.1 also rejects model 6 at 5 percent significance level). The insight from this alternative supply model specification could be interpreted as providing evidence that wholesale margins are zero and that retail pricing may lie between Bertrand-Nash (as in model 3.1) and collusive retail pricing (model 6).

## 7. Conclusions and Extensions

This paper presents a method to analyze vertical relationships. Alternative models of competing manufacturers' and retailers' decision-making are used to determine whether contracting in the supermarket industry follows the double marginalization pricing model or whether more efficient contracting solutions are in place. This paper extends the literature in analyzing vertical relationships as it considers multiple retailers and does not require observed data on wholesale prices. Given demand estimates, the approach is to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers implied by alternative vertical contracting models and to contrast these with price-cost margins obtained from direct estimates of cost. With the more efficient relationships I considered, the double marginalization externality imposed by retailers disappears. Consequently, the sum of retailers' and manufacturers' profits may increase. ${ }^{29}$

For the market I study, the results rule out double marginalization. In particular, they suggest that, on the margin, manufacturers are pricing at marginal cost and that retail prices are the unconstrained profit maximizing prices. Why should we care about the efficiency gain from solving the vertical coordination problem associated with double marginalization? For the market studied here, if we start with double marginalization, the magnitude of the deadweight loss associated with the simple linear pricing model compared with the most compatible model of no wholesale mark-ups and Nash-Bertrand retail pricing is roughly twelve thousand and six hundred dollars a week, which represents two percent of the sum of the three retailers' revenues. Assuming that retailers behave collusively and there are no wholesale margins results in a simulated change in welfare amounting to twelve thousand and four hundred dollars a week. Extrapolating to a United-States, yearly basis

[^15](given that national yogurt-retail revenues are about two billion dollars), then the deadweight loss is approximately forty six million dollars, a considerably large number.

An extension of this paper is to consider models of vertical relationships under the presence of non-linear pricing, following the modeling approach proposed by Rey and Vergé (2004) and first implemented empirically by Bonnet, Dubois and Simioni (2004) who explicitly and empirically estimate models of retail and manufacturer competition under non-linear pricing for the market of bottled water in France. The idea there is to let retailers and manufacturers play the following "market break-down" game: (1) Manufacturers simultaneously propose non-linear contracts, specifying a franchise fee $F_{j}$ and a wholesale price $p_{j}^{w}$ to each $j$ retailer (and, if retail price maintenance is allowed, a retail price $p_{j}$ ); (2) Then retailers accept or reject the contracts offered, which are public information; (3) If all contracts are accepted, then retailers simultaneously choose retail prices. Otherwise, if one of the contracts is rejected, no product is sold and firms earn zero profits. The estimates under this non-linear pricing model, when confronted with the alternative models specified in this paper, do not change the non-nested comparisons for the yogurt market analyzed here.

Building on these results, future research will consider the fact that looking at just one category may be restrictive since manufacturers, retailers and consumers make their pricing and purchase decisions in the context of multiple categories. ${ }^{30}$ Given that consumers purchase a basket of goods during a shopping trip, a multiple category demand may be a more realistic framework to consider. In terms of pricing decisions, the fact that a manufacturer may sell products in different product categories affects not only its pricing strategy, but may also improve its bargaining flexibility with the retailers. In addition, retailers use strategic category pricing to drive consumers into the store and increase sales. ${ }^{31}$

Finally, to motivate future empirical research on vertical relationships, I identify two questions for which the methodology proposed in this paper can be applied. First, given the estimates of demand and a model of pre- and post-vertical merger supply behavior, one can predict whether a potential vertical merger affects horizontal competition in the upstream and downstream markets involved. ${ }^{32}$ The second relates to pass-through effects of foreign trade policy. Given the estimates

[^16]of demand in a certain country for a particular good from a vertical trading supply model across different countries, one can analyze the effect of a tariff increase or exchange rate depreciation on domestic or foreign margins. Trade policy makers are particularly interested in whether foreign margins or domestic margins absorb most of the effects of a particular trade policy. That, in turn, is determined by the vertical relationships between domestic and foreign upstream or downstream firms. ${ }^{33}$

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| Description | Mean | Median | Std.Dev. | Max | Min | Brand <br> Variation | Week <br> Variation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Prices (cents per serving) | 49 | 48 | 9.2 | 72 | 24 | $68.3 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ |
| Advertising (=1 if featured) | 0.03 | 0 | 0.15 | 1 | 0 | $10.8 \%$ | $5.3 \%$ |
| Servings sold (1 serving=6 ounces) | 246 | 132 | 393.3 | 9538 | 1 | $43.6 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ |
| Share of product within market (\%) | 0.8 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 32 | 0.03 | $43.6 \%$ | $4.1 \%$ |
| Combined Shares of products (\%) | 34 | 37 | 12.7 | 75 | 12 |  |  |
| Combined Shares by Manufacturer (\%) | Mean | Median | Std.Dev. | Max | Min |  |  |
| Dannon | 16.8 | 16.4 | 7.6 | 50.0 | 4.7 |  |  |
| General Mills | 8.8 | 9.0 | 3.6 | 31.1 | 4 |  |  |
| Private Label of Retailer 2 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 38.5 | 0.6 |  |  |
| Kraft | 3.4 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 13.6 | 1.1 |  |  |
| Private Label of Retailer 3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 3.7 | 0.6 |  |  |
| Combined Shares by Retailer (\%) | Mean | Median | Std.Dev. | Max | Min |  |  |
| Retailer 1 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 9.2 | 1 |  |  |
| Retailer 2 | 19.8 | 20.5 | 9.2 | 57.6 | 1.2 |  |  |
| Retailer 3 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 3.4 | 24.3 | 6.7 |  |  |

Table 1: Prices, Feature, Servings Sold and Market Shares of Products in Sample: Summary Statistics. Source IRI.

| Manufacture | Retailer | Product Name | Price |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Mean | Std |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Light Vanilla Yogurt | 47.62 | 3.48 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Light Vanilla Yogurt | 42.06 | 3.07 |
| Dannon | 1 | Dannon Lowfat Plain Yogurt | 52.56 | 3.97 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Lowfat Plain Yogurt | 48.19 | 4.75 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Lowfat Plain Yogurt | 46.90 | 2.48 |
| Dannon | 1 | Dannon Light Fruit Yogurt | 57.87 | 5.01 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Light Fruit Yogurt | 54.69 | 5.09 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Light Fruit Yogurt | 47.08 | 2.33 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Nonfat Plain Yogurt | 48.69 | 4.54 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Nonfat Plain Yogurt | 46.56 | 2.58 |
| Dannon | 1 | Dannon Classic Flavor Fruit Yogurt | 52.50 | 5.53 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Classic Flavor Fruit Yogurt | 53.68 | 7.55 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Classic Flavor Fruit Yogurt | 46.96 | 3.29 |
| Dannon | 1 | Dannon Classic Flavor Vanilla Yogurt | 53.31 | 3.27 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Classic Flavor Vanilla Yogurt | 48.82 | 4.68 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Classic Flavor Vanilla Yogurt | 46.38 | 3.04 |
| Dannon | 1 | Dannon Fruit on the Bottom Yogurt | 51.12 | 6.48 |
| Dannon | 2 | Dannon Fruit on the Bottom Yogurt | 53.18 | 6.47 |
| Dannon | 3 | Dannon Fruit on the Bottom Yogurt | 47.31 | 2.41 |
| Store 2 | 2 | Private Label 2 Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 52.17 | 7.43 |
| Store 2 | 2 | Private Label 2 Lowfat Plain Yogurt | 30.76 | 2.00 |
| Store 2 | 2 | Private Label 2 Lowfat Vanilla Yogurt | 30.13 | 0.87 |
| Store 2 | 2 | Private Label 2 Nonfat Fruit Yogurt | 54.63 | 7.29 |
| Store 2 | 2 | Private Label 2 Nonfat Plain Yogurt | 54.82 | 7.35 |
| Store 3 | 3 | Private Label 3 Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 35.83 | 1.01 |
| Store 3 | 3 | Private Label 3 Lowfat Plain Yogurt | 30.52 | 2.07 |
| Kraft | 1 | Breyer Light Fruit Yogurt | 38.94 | 4.73 |
| Kraft | 1 | Light N'Lively Nonfat Fruit Yogurt | 48.40 | 4.52 |
| Kraft | 2 | Light N'Lively Nonfat Fruit Yogurt | 46.93 | 4.71 |
| Kraft | 3 | Light N'Lively Nonfat Fruit Yogurt | 46.44 | 3.24 |
| Kraft | 1 | Light N'Lively Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 49.38 | 4.28 |
| Kraft | 2 | Light N'Lively Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 46.67 | 5.04 |
| Kraft | 3 | Light N'Lively Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 45.23 | 4.26 |
| General Mills | 2 | Yoplait Custard Style Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 60.69 | 5.86 |
| General Mills | 3 | Yoplait Custard Style Lowfat Fruit Yogurt | 57.52 | 4.77 |
| General Mills | 2 | Yoplait Custard Style Lowfat Vanilla Yogurt | 63.54 | 6.58 |
| General Mills | 3 | Yoplait Custard Style Lowfat Vanilla Yogurt | 57.06 | 5.48 |
| General Mills | , | Yoplait Fruit Yogurt | 57.69 | 9.47 |
| General Mills | 2 | Yoplait Fruit Yogurt | 58.67 | 4.73 |
| General Mills | 3 | Yoplait Fruit Yogurt | 52.62 | 4.67 |
| General Mills | 1 | Yoplait Light Fruit Yogurt | 52.10 | 10.65 |
| General Mills | 2 | Yoplait Light Fruit Yogurt | 56.21 | 5.61 |
| General Mills | 3 | Yoplait Light Fruit Yogurt | 49.15 | 4.10 |

Table 2: Information about the Products in Sample-Prices.
Price in cents per serving. One serving is equivalent to 6 ounces of yogurt. Source: IRI.

| Description | Mean | Median | Std | Max | Min |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Input Prices |  |  |  |  |  |
| Citric Acid (\$/Lb) | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.84 | 3 | 1.23 |
| Plastic (cents/Lb) | 32.6 | 33 | 3.26 | 3.8 | 27 |
| Sugar (cents/Lb) | 9 | 8.6 | 1.14 | 14.4 | 8.2 |
| Non-fat Grade A milk (\$/Lb) | 1 | 1.1 | 0.08 | 1.2 | 0.86 |
| Whey Protein (\$/Lb) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.09 | 0.6 | 0.31 |
| Corn (\$/Bushel) | 2.3 | 2.3 | 0.16 | 2.5 | 1.98 |
| Strawberryb(\$/CWT) | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.29 | 1.4 | 0.35 |
| Wages \& Energy \& Gasoline Prices by State/Plant Location |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plant for Dannon Yogurts: Minster OH. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wages Ohio (weekly earnings/number hours a week - \$/hour) | 11.2 | 11 | 0.56 | 12.6 | 10.4 |
| Energy Prices OH (avg. revenue by kilowatt industrial) | 4.17 | 4.16 | 0.08 | 4.36 | 4.01 |
| Gasoline Prices OH (cents/gallon No.2 Dist.) | 87.53 | 86.5 | 8.26 | 101.5 | 72.7 |
| Plant for Breyers, Light N'Lively (Kraft): Moleena, IL; |  |  |  |  |  |
| Plant for Private Label of Store 3 and |  |  |  |  |  |
| Location of the three retailers. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wages Illinois (weekly earnings/number hours a week - \$/hour) | 12.1 | 12.1 | 0.3 | 12.8 | 11.5 |
| Energy Prices IL (avg. revenue by kilowatt industrial) | 5.42 | 5.31 | 0.45 | 6.28 | 4.69 |
| Gasoline Prices IL (cents/ gallon No.2 Dist.) | 84.97 | 84.4 | 7.37 | 98.8 | 72.9 |
| Plant for Yoplait Yogurts: Kalamazoo, MI. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wages Michigan (weekly earnings/number hours a week - \$/hour) | 12 | 11.8 | 0.61 | 14.4 | 10.9 |
| Energy Prices MI (avg. revenue by kilowatt industrial) | 5.89 | 5.92 | 0.14 | 6.09 | 5.55 |
| Gasoline Prices MI (cents/ gallon No.2 Dist.) | 94.04 | 92.5 | 8.01 | 106.4 | 82 |
| Plant for Private Label of Store 2: Clackamas, OR. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wages Oregon (weekly earnings/number hours a week - \$/hour) | 12.9 | 13 | 0.37 | 13.8 | 12.1 |
| Energy Prices OR (avg. revenue by kilowatt industrial) | 3.11 | 3.09 | 0.18 | 3.48 | 2.80 |
| Gasoline Prices OR (cents/ gallon No.2 Dist.) | 98.24 | 98.8 | 7.86 | 109.1 | 86.3 |
| Interest Rate (Federal Funds Effective Rate - \%) | 4 | 3.7 | 1 | 6.3 | 2.9 |
| Interest Rate (Commercial Paper 3 months - \%) | 4.1 | 3.9 | 0.96 | 6.2 | 3.1 |
| Retail Size |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number stores in chain (retailer 2) | 86 | 86 | 0.5 | 87 | 85 |
| Number Employees in chain (retailer 2) | 17,407 | 17,500 | 0.2 | 17,597 | 17,112 |
| Number Stores in chain (retailer 3) | 186 | 184 | 5.91 | 198 | 182 |
| Number Employees in chain (retailer 3) | 30,077 | 30,102 | 0.21 | 30,364 | 29,887 |
| Real Estate Indices \& Commercial Energy Prices IL |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail avg. price (\$ per sqr. foot) | 111.07 | 109.22 | 4.35 | 121.39 | 107.74 |
| Retail average rents (\$ per sqr. ft.) | 13.27 | 13.09 | 0.32 | 13.9 | 13.05 |
| Retail Rent Cap (\%) | 8.79 | 8.8 | 0.11 | 8.9 | 8.5 |
| Energy Prices IL (avg. revenue by kilowatt commercial) | 7.95 | 7.64 | 0.71 | 9.13 | 6.82 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 3: Cost Data.
Sources: Citric Acid (Chemical Week); Plastic (Chemical Marketing Reporter); Sugar (Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange); Non-fat Grade A milk, Whey protein (Cheese Market News, U.S. Dep. Agriculture); Corn, Strawberry (National Agriculture Statistics Service, U.S. Dep. Agriculture); Wages (CPS Annual Earning File - NBER 50); Energy (Revenue by kilowatt usage, Energy Information Administration, From EIA-826, Table 53); Gasoline (Petroleum Marketing Monthly, Table 18); Interest Rates (Federal Reserve). Number of employees and chain size (Human Resource Departments); Real Estate (National Real Estate Index, CB Richard Ellis Survey of Offered Rents).

| Column | No Advertising |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 4 \\ & \text { sing } \end{aligned}$ | With Advertising |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | OLS | IV1 | IV2 | OLS | IV1 | IV2 |
| Price(*) | $\begin{gathered} -5.06 \\ (0.32) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-5.53 \\ & (0.45) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -5.93 \\ (0.47) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -5.10 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ | $-5.57$ | $-5.73$ |
| Feature |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} (0.34) \\ 0.33 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} (0.44) \\ 0.32 \\ (0.22 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} (0.49) \\ 0.27 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\frac{\text { Measures of Fit }}{R^{2}}$ | 0.73 |  |  | 0.73 |  |  |
| Price Exogeneity Test |  | 5.17 | 6.38 |  | 4.16 | 4.64 |
| 95\% critical value |  | (3.84) | (3.84) |  | (3.84) | (3.84) |
| $\frac{\text { First Stage - Price }}{R^{2}}$ |  | 0.85 | 0.82 |  | 0.87 | 0.83 |
| F-Statistic (p value) |  | 12.95(0.00) | 16.24(0.00) |  | 14.49(0.00) | 17.98(0.00) |
| F : cost coefficients $=0$ |  | 2.52(0.00) | 2.65 (0.00) |  | 2.61(0.00) | 2.69(0.00) |
| F : manuf. cost coeff. $=0$ |  | 1.60(0.00) | 1.36 (0.00) |  | 1.59(0.00) | 1.40 (0.00) |
| F : retail cost coeff. $=0$ |  | 1.60(0.00) | $2.24(0.00)$ |  | 1.73(0.00) | $2.26(0.00)$ |
| Serving-capita-week | Est | mated Price | Coefficient - S | sitiv | y to Market | definition |
|  |  | IV1 | IV2 |  | IV1 | IV2 |
| 0.25 |  | -6.36 | -6.29 |  | -6.18 | -6.05 |
|  |  | (0.54) | (0.57) |  | (0.58) | (0.61) |
| 0.75 |  | -5.46 | -5.86 |  | -5.13 | -5.66 |
|  |  | (0.46) | (0.47) |  | (0.49) | (0.50) |
| 1 |  | -5.43 | $-5.82$ |  | -5.10 | $-5.62$ |
|  |  | (0.45) | (0.47) |  | (0.48) | (0.49) |

Table 4: Results from Logit Demand.
Dependent variable in all columns is $\ln \left(s_{j t}\right)-\ln \left(s_{0 t}\right)$. Market definition: Half a serving per capita per week on the top part of the table. Sensitivity to market definition on the bottom part. Regressions include brand dummy variables and quarterly dummies. 4310 observations. Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Instrumental Variables (IV1) for prices in this column are all input prices multiplied by 43 product dummy variables, assuming that marginal cost differs for the same product sold at different retailers (Specification 1). Instrumental Variables (IV2) for prices in this column have two sets: (i) manufacturer input prices multiplied by 21 product dummy variables, assuming that manufacturer marginal cost for the same product sold at different retailers is constant; (ii) retail input prices interacted with product dummy variables (Specification 2). IV $\left(^{* *}\right.$ ): Specification that also instruments for advertising is in this last column. Source: My calculations.

| column | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2 \\ & \text { Variable } \end{aligned}$ | 3 <br> GMM <br> Est. (s.e) | $\begin{gathered} 4 \\ \text { GMM -Inc }{ }^{2} \\ \text { Est. (s.e) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 5 NLLS Est. (s.e) | $\begin{gathered} 6 \\ v_{i}=0 \\ \text { Est. (s.e) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 7 \\ \text { GMM -Inc }{ }^{2} \\ \text { Est. (s.e) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mean | Constant | -8.25(4.71) | -7.97(4.81) | -5.92(2.52) | -5.73(5.12) | -8.11(4.83) |
|  | Price | -0.79(0.25) | $-0.39(0.25)$ | -1.02(0.24) | -4.33 (0.25) | 0.64(0.21) |
|  | Advertising |  |  |  |  | 0.37(0.20) |
|  | Store 2 | -0.35(0.04) | 2.08(0.04) | -0.12(0.03) | 3.12(0.03) | 2.33(0.03) |
|  | Store 3 | -1.02(0.04) | 1.11(0.04) | -0.66 (0.03) | 2.29(0.03) | 0.84(0.03) |
|  | Calories | 0.06(0.01) | $-0.26(0.01)$ | -0.26 (0.00) | $-0.27(0.00)$ | -0.19(0.01) |
|  | Calcium | $2.06(0.13)$ | $3.54(0.13)$ | 3.77 (0.12) | 4.33(0.13) | 2.84(0.13) |
| Std dev | Constant | 0.25(0.08) | 0.25(0.08) | 0.1(0.05) |  | 0.25(0.08) |
|  | Price | 0.92(0.18) | 0.92(0.18) | 0.57(0.13) |  | 0.92(0.18) |
|  | Store 2 | 0.07(0.13) | 0.06(0.14) | 0.03(0.07) |  | 0.05(0.14) |
|  | Store 3 | $0.15(0.15)$ | 0.15(0.15) | 0.12(0.05) |  | 0.15(0.15) |
|  | Calories | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) |  | 0.00(0.00) |
|  | Calcium | 0.28(0.11) | 0.28(0.11) | 0.19(0.05) |  | 0.28(0.10) |
| Interact | Constant | 0.01(0.53) | -0.01(0.56) | -0.18(0.31) | 0.00(0.59) | $-0.00(0.55)$ |
| With | Price | 1.40 (0.84) | 0.87(0.65) | $-0.17(0.51)$ | 0.84(0.65) | 0.86(0.65) |
| Income | Store 2 | -1.56(0.40) | $-1.36(0.48)$ | -0.11(0.09) | $-1.37(0.52)$ | -1.36(0.48) |
|  | Store 3 | -0.43(0.31) | 1.43(0.50) | 0.14(0.10) | -0.67(0.53) | $-0.39(0.48)$ |
|  | Calories | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) |
|  | Calcium | 0.42(0.16) | 0.33(0.16) | 0.08(0.07) | 0.31(0.14) | 0.32(0.16) |
| Inter. Inc. ${ }^{2}$ | Price |  | -0.61(0.14) | 0.05(0.05) | $0.16(0.10)$ | 0.08(0.11) |
| Interact | Constant | 0.52(1.40) | 0.57(1.41) | 0.22(0.72) | 0.16(1.54) | 0.56(1.40) |
| With | Price | -2.55(2.11) | -2.68(2.11) | -1.68(1.18) | $-1.61(2.38)$ | $-2.68(2.12)$ |
| Age | Store 2 | 1.04(0.55) | 1.11(0.55) | 0.56(0.23) | $0.87(0.56)$ | 1.11(0.54) |
|  | Store 3 | 0.55(0.59) | 0.55(0.56) | 0.51(0.21) | 0.50(0.58) | 0.55(0.57) |
|  | Calories | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) | 0.00(0.00) |
|  | Calcium | 0.25(0.41) | 0.25(0.42) | 0.42(0.18) | 0.07(0.45) | 0.25(0.41) |
| First Stage |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| R2 |  | 0.82 | 0.82 |  | 0.82 | 0.83 |
| F- statistic |  | $16.24 * *$ | 16.24 ** |  | $16.24 * *$ | $17.98 * *$ |
| GMM/NLLS |  | 1063.8 | 1063.0 | 2020.9 | 1115.8 | 1058.2 |
| R2 min.dist |  | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.87 |
| Price coef $>0$ |  | 0.2\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0.3\% |

Table 5: Results from Random Coefficient Model of Demand.
Estimates (Est.) and Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent simulation corrected standard errors are in parenthesis (s.e) for different specifications in each column. Column 3 presents the GMM estimates, column 4 the GMM estimates but including an interaction of price coefficient with Income Squared (Inter. Inc.2), column 5 has the Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS: not instrumenting for price) for the same specification and column 6 presents the GMM estimates with $v_{i}=0$. Column 7 is the same specification as column 4 but includes advertising. Source: My calculations.

|  | Logit Demand |  |  | Random Coefficients Demand |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Summary | Own Price | Cross-Price | Own Price |  | Cross-Price |  | Same Store |
| Statistics For | Elasticity | Elasticity | Elasticity | Mean | Std | yes | no |
| Kraft | -5.918 | 0.014 | -5.702 | 0.018 | 0.020 | 0.032 | 0.011 |
| Dannon | -5.908 | 0.024 | -5.489 | 0.031 | 0.041 | 0.043 | 0.019 |
| PL 2 | -5.911 | 0.020 | -6.738 | 0.031 | 0.038 | 0.030 | 0.013 |
| PL 3 | -5.912 | 0.019 | -5.568 | 0.021 | 0.018 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
| Yoplait | -5.908 | 0.024 | -5.657 | 0.032 | 0.036 | 0.046 | 0.011 |
| Store 1 | -5.926 | 0.006 | -4.669 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.006 |
| Store 2 | -5.904 | 0.027 | -6.663 | 0.043 | 0.046 | 0.062 | 0.026 |
| Store 3 | -5.906 | 0.025 | -5.265 | 0.027 | 0.025 | 0.033 | 0.020 |
| Average All | -5.910 | 0.021 | -5.640 | 0.019 | 0.037 | 0.039 | 0.015 |

Table 6: Mean Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticities.
Own and cross elasticities of Logit demand specification, own, mean and standard deviations of the crossprice elasticities under a random coefficients demand specification. Last two columns present mean crossprice elasticities for products in the same store (yes - column) and across different stores (no - column).

| Wholesale (W), Retail (R) and Total (T) Price Cost Margins (PCM) | Median | Std | Min | Max |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Given Random Coefficient Demand |  |  |  |  |
| Model 1: Simple Linear Pricing: T- PCM | $43.8 \%$ | $25.4 \%$ | $25.5 \%$ | $136.5 \%$ |
| Model 2: Hybrid Model: T- PCM | $41.6 \%$ | $28.6 \%$ | $15.8 \%$ | $136.7 \%$ |
| Model 3.1: Zero Wholesale Margin: R- PCM | $21.1 \%$ | $9.0 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ | $50.0 \%$ |
| Model 3.2: Zero Retail Margin: W- PCM | $20.6 \%$ | $4.7 \%$ | $12.8 \%$ | $45.8 \%$ |
| Model 4: Wholesale Collusion: T- PCM | $72.8 \%$ | $22.4 \%$ | $38.8 \%$ | $253.0 \%$ |
| Model 5: Retail Collusion: T- PCM | $69.9 \%$ | $25.8 \%$ | $23.4 \%$ | $263.2 \%$ |
| Model 6: Monopolist: T- PCM | $40.6 \%$ | $11.5 \%$ | $21.8 \%$ | $103.7 \%$ |

Table 7: Price-Cost Margins (PCM) by Scenario.
$\mathrm{PCM}=(p-c) / p$ where $p$ is price and $c$ is marginal cost. Std: Standard deviation. Source: My calculations.

|  | Recovered Retail and Wholesale Costs |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mean | Std | Min | Max | Percent $<0$ |
| Model 1: Simple Linear Pricing: | 0.2730 | 0.1552 | -0.1532 | 0.5364 | $1.35 \%$ |
| Model 2: Hybrid Model: | 0.2757 | 0.1681 | -0.1541 | 0.5364 | $1.45 \%$ |
| Model 3.1: Zero Wholesale Margin: | 0.3796 | 0.0907 | 0.1201 | 0.6298 | $0 \%$ |
| Model 3.2: Zero Retail Margin: | 0.3815 | 0.0895 | 0.1302 | 0.6279 | $0 \%$ |
| Model 4: Wholesale Collusion: | 0.1352 | 0.1114 | -0.4590 | 0.4409 | $13.12 \%$ |
| Model 5: Retail Collusion: | 0.1530 | 0.1329 | -0.4895 | 0.5053 | $12.6 \%$ |
| Model 6: Monopolist: | 0.2953 | 0.0951 | -0.0089 | 0.5628 | $0.08 \%$ |

Table 8: Sample Statistics of Recovered Costs and Informal Testing.
Recovered Costs $=p-e p c m$ where $p$ is retail price and epcm are the estimated margins. Std:Standard deviation. Last column has the percentage of cases with recovered estimated costs being negative. Source: My calculations.

|  | For Model 2 |  |  |  | For Model 3.1 |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dependent Variable = | Obs | R-sq | F | Obs | R-sq | F |  |
| Price - Estimated Margins | 104 | 0.482 | 3.43 | 104 | 0.546 | 4.43 |  |
|  | Coef. | Std.Err | t | Coef. | Std.Err |  |  |
| Citric acid | -0.003 | 0.035 | -0.090 | 0.002 | 0.023 | 0.090 |  |
| Plastic | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.960 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 1.280 |  |
| Sugar | -0.004 | 0.008 | -0.470 | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.100 |  |
| Milk | -0.485 | 0.246 | -1.970 | -0.330 | 0.158 | -2.090 |  |
| Strawberry | -0.005 | 0.094 | -0.060 | 0.005 | 0.060 | 0.080 |  |
| Wages IL | 0.045 | 0.040 | 1.120 | 0.034 | 0.026 | 1.330 |  |
| Wages MI | 0.044 | 0.027 | 1.620 | 0.031 | 0.017 | 1.770 |  |
| Interest rate | -0.019 | 0.054 | -0.350 | -0.008 | 0.035 | -0.240 |  |
| Retail square-foot-price IL | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.890 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 1.050 |  |
| Retail rental IL | 0.053 | 0.239 | 0.220 | 0.016 | 0.153 | 0.100 |  |
| Gasoline IL | -0.006 | 0.008 | -0.770 | -0.005 | 0.005 | -1.060 |  |
| Gasoline OH | 0.005 | 0.003 | 1.570 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 1.230 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) IL | 0.056 | 0.107 | 0.520 | 0.007 | 0.068 | 0.110 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) MI | 0.005 | 0.138 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.089 | 0.340 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) OR | -0.161 | 0.184 | -0.880 | -0.138 | 0.118 | -1.160 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) OH | -0.389 | 0.214 | -1.820 | -0.305 | 0.137 | -2.220 |  |
| Dependent Variable = | Obs | $\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{sq}$ | F | Obs | $\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{sq}$ | F |  |
| Expon (Price - Estimated Margins) | 104 | 0.512 | 3.86 | 104 | 0.562 | 4.72 |  |
|  | Coef. | Std.Err | t | Coef. | Std.Err | t |  |
| Citric acid | -0.001 | 0.030 | -0.030 | 0.003 | 0.026 | 0.130 |  |
| Plastic | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.970 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 1.260 |  |
| Sugar | -0.003 | 0.007 | -0.370 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.140 |  |
| Milk | -0.372 | 0.211 | -1.760 | -0.346 | 0.184 | -1.880 |  |
| Strawberry | -0.001 | 0.080 | -0.010 | 0.008 | 0.070 | 0.120 |  |
| Wages IL | 0.042 | 0.034 | 1.240 | 0.043 | 0.030 | 1.440 |  |
| Wages MI | 0.038 | 0.023 | 1.640 | 0.036 | 0.020 | 1.780 |  |
| Interest rate | -0.014 | 0.047 | -0.300 | -0.009 | 0.041 | -0.230 |  |
| Retail square-foot-price IL | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.890 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 1.030 |  |
| Retail rental IL | 0.040 | 0.205 | 0.200 | 0.018 | 0.179 | 0.100 |  |
| Gasoline IL | -0.004 | 0.007 | -0.620 | -0.006 | 0.006 | -0.950 |  |
| Gasoline OH | 0.004 | 0.003 | 1.580 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 1.250 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) IL | 0.043 | 0.091 | 0.470 | 0.007 | 0.080 | 0.090 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) MI | -0.006 | 0.118 | -0.050 | 0.024 | 0.103 | 0.230 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) OR | -0.160 | 0.158 | -1.010 | -0.175 | 0.138 | -1.270 |  |
| Electricity (industrial) OH | -0.341 | 0.183 | -1.860 | -0.361 | 0.160 | -2.260 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 9: Estimated Cost Parameters
This Table presents a sample of the estimated cost parameters. Given the size of the full matrix of coefficients from regressing seemingly unrelated regressions for the different supply models and for alternative cost specifications, I present the results for one of the products' regressions for Model 2 (Single Uniform Pricing and Vertically integrated Private Label) in columns 2-4, Model 3.1 (Preferred Model), columns 5-7. On the top, for linear cost specification, on the bottom for logarithmic cost specification. Std.Err.: Standard Error. Source: My calculations.

|  | Alternative Models |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $H_{0}$ Model | 1 | 2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1: Simple Linear Pricing | - | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.24 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| 2: Hybrid | 0.00 | - | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| 3.1: Zero Wholesale Margin | 0.41 | 0.29 | - | 0.05 | 0.50 | 0.39 | 0.07 |
| 3.2: Zero Retail Margin | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.05 | - | 0.50 | 0.39 | 0.17 |
| 4: Wholesale Collusion | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.50 | - | 0.48 | 0.50 |
| 5: Retail Collusion | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.22 | - | 0.50 |
| 6: Monopolist | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.17 | 0.31 | 0.48 | 0.34 | - |
| Chain Size Weighted | Alternative Models |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $H_{0}$ Model | 1 | 2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1: Simple Linear Pricing | - | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 2: Hybrid | 0.17 | - | 0.15 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.14 |
| 3.1: Zero Wholesale Margin | 0.08 | 0.15 | - | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.00 |
| 3.2: Zero Retail Margin | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.00 | - | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| 4: Wholesale Collusion | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.09 | - | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| 5: Retail Collusion | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.02 | - | 0.00 |
| 6: Monopolist | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.14 | - |

Table 10: P-values for Pair-wise Non-Nested Comparisons.
P-values reported from non-nested, Cox-type (Smith, 1992) test statistics of the null model in a row being true against the specified alternative model in a column. Bottom part is a robustness check. It has the same format as above, but the non-nested comparisons are based on estimates for the case when the portion of the manufacturer's profit due to each retailer is weighted by the retailer's chain size. Source: My calculations.


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ There is a growing body of empirical literature on transaction costs and incomplete information, where Mortimer (2002) and Sieg (2000) are two pioneering empirical papers.

[^2]:    2 "(..) Yogurt is aligned with key consumer trends and (...) is an important product to our retailers (...). Its bigger than you think: The Yogurt category is the 4th largest in the dairy case (...)." Source: Why Yogurt? General Mills, http://www.pvg.generalmills.com/yogurt_1.html.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ For a particular retailer, the same "brand/product" sold in different sizes is aggregated as the same product. Also products with the same brand name and with similar product characteristics were aggregated (this aggregates mostly the different fruit yogurts for the same brand. Their price correlation was not significatively different from one). I acknowledge that the variation in the price and quantity data used in estimation may be partially driven by the aggregation method and criteria.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ The demand model is static and consumers choose every week among alternatives. Given that yogurt keeps for twenty eight days and I assume weekly purchase decisions, the consequences of assuming the static demand model in this context are important (as found in Che, Seetharaman and Sudhir, 2003). The substitution patterns from a dynamic model could either be larger or smaller in magnitude than those that ignore dynamics in household brand choices, depending mainly on the estimates of price coefficients. If the price coefficient estimates are smaller in magnitude when accounting for dynamics, the computed price elasticities will also be smaller. I acknowledge that ignoring state dependence is a simplification in this paper and does matter in the test of the supply models as shown in Che et. al., 2003.
    ${ }^{5}$ The same physical product sold at two different retailers is defined as two different products.
    ${ }^{6}$ In particular, $\xi_{j t}$ includes the (not-seasonal) changes in unobserved product characteristics such as unobserved promotions, changes in shelf display and changes in unobserved consumer preferences.
    ${ }^{7}$ In this model consumers are choosing a retailer. The correlation of liking certain goods at a certain retail store is in the random coefficient. The i.i.d. extreme value $\epsilon_{i j t}$ is introduced to smooth the distribution.

[^5]:    ${ }^{8}$ Without making any additional assumptions, it would not be identified. The alternative would be to normalize any one of the $N_{t}$ goods. The utility of the outside good is allowed to vary over time via $\epsilon_{i 0 t}$. Alternatively, one could adopt a different normalization per period by introducing a period specific dummy variable in demand.
    ${ }^{9}$ In this case, $q_{j}$ are the servings sold of yogurt. One serving corresponds to a cup of 6 ounces. Accordingly, $p_{j}$ is the price per serving of product $j$.
    ${ }^{10}$ The studies that explicitly model multiple-discrete choices (e.g., Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Hanemann, 1984; Hausman, Leonard and McFadden, 1995; and Hendel, 1999) need individual level data for estimation. Since this paper uses only market-level data, these techniques could not be directly applied here. Failure to account for multiple discreteness has been shown to matter significantly for cross-product substitution patterns and less for aggregate demand predictions, as shown in Dubé (2004) for the soft-drinks industry.
    ${ }^{11}$ This is a very general model. As shown in McFadden and Train (2000), any discrete choice model derived from random utility maximization can be approximated, with any degree of accuracy, to a Mixed Logit.

[^6]:    ${ }^{12}$ The (Logit and random coefficients) expressions of the price-cost margins in a simplified model with only two retailers, two wholesalers and two products are available at the journal web-page and also at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~villas/homepage.html.

[^7]:    ${ }^{13}$ This assumes that manufacturers set a wholesale price for each store. Some retail stores are part of chains (not modeled here), and manufacturers may behave differently towards chain and non-chain stores. Given the existence of these two types of retail stores, a simple robustness check is performed and presented in the results section by weighting the manufacturer profit from selling to a certain retailer by the size of the retail chain.
    ${ }^{14}$ The possibility of multiple equilibria may be an issue here, in the context of a manufacturer pricing its different products sold at different retailers. Different combinations of products offered at different retailers and different

[^8]:    ${ }^{16}$ Two-part tariff has been shown to be optimal in the simple double marginalization model where retailers follow manufacturers in a price setting game with certain demand (Tirole, 1988, page 176), uncertain demand (Rey and Tirole, 1986), or under asymmetric information (Tirole, 1988, page 177). However, in the presence of uncertainty, two-part tariffs have poor properties in terms of risk sharing.
    ${ }^{17}$ Note that rejection of the sub-case(s) of non-linear pricing does not imply rejection of non-linear pricing.

[^9]:    ${ }^{18}$ For a more detailed and complete discussion on how these two extreme cases can be derived among other equilibria in non-linear pricing see Rey and Vergé (2004) and a recent paper by Bonnet, Dubois and Simioni (2004), who explicitly and empirically estimate models of retail and manufacturer competition under non-linear pricing for the market of bottled water in France.

[^10]:    ${ }^{19}$ For the random coefficient model the product market share in equation (3) is approximated by the Logit smoothed, accept-reject simulator given by

    $$
    \begin{equation*}
    s_{j t}=\frac{1}{R} \sum_{i=1}^{R} \frac{e^{\delta_{j t}+\left[x_{j t}, p_{j t}\right]\left(\Gamma D_{i}+\Upsilon v_{i}\right)}}{1+\sum_{k=1}^{N_{t}} e^{\delta_{k t}+\left[x_{k t}, p_{k t}\right]\left(\Gamma D_{i}+\Upsilon v_{i}\right)}}, \tag{16}
    \end{equation*}
    $$

    where $R$ are the random draws from the distribution of $v$ and $D$. This simulator is continuously differentiable in the data and in the parameters to be estimated, so gradient-based methods are applied to estimate $\Gamma$ and $\Upsilon$.
    ${ }^{20}$ This is optimal in the presence of homoscedastic errors. The 2SLS estimators are unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, even in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, one needs to obtain an appropriate Newey-West (1987) estimate of the 2SLS estimators' variance covariance matrix.
    ${ }^{21}$ The aim is to concentrate the Simulated "GMM" (SGMM) objective function, so that it will only be a function of the non-linear parameters. By expressing the optimal vector of linear parameters as a function of the non-linear parameters, and then substituting back into the SGMM objective function, it can be optimized with respect to the non-linear parameters alone.

[^11]:    ${ }^{22}$ One problem remains with the above instrumentation method: I cannot control for the case when manufacturer input prices vary and manufacturers may change the set of products proposed for sale to retailers (and input prices would be correlated with changes in unobserved product characteristics). I acknowledge the assumption that $T_{r}$ and $T_{w}$ are exogenous as a limitation. The instrumentation approach is used in subsequent papers with a good first stage (e.g., in Chintagunta, Bonfer and Song (2002), Draganska and Mazzeo (2003) and Hellerstein (2004)).

[^12]:    ${ }^{23}$ See Villas-Boas and Hellerstein (2005) for the role of multi-product manufacturers and retailers without exclusive dealerships, identification of manufacturer and retail price-markup behavior, and the role of differentiated products and demand non-linearities for identification of retail and manufacturer pricing behavior.
    ${ }^{24}$ The purpose and interpretation of the supply parameters $\lambda$ are different from the Conduct Parameter (CP) Models where, for some values of the estimate of the CP, inferences (subject to Corts' (1999) cautions) are drawn about market power in a certain industry.

[^13]:    ${ }^{25}$ One of the retail stores (the one that is not a chain) confirmed anecdotally that the manufacturers present them with step-wise quantity discounting for some of their shipments. That is, the first units are shipped at a certain price and additional units are shipped at lower prices.
    ${ }^{26}$ Retailers are able to sell private label products at a potentially lower wholesale price. Furthermore, the products carry their store brand and are displayed next to the national brands. At a 1995 convention, Douglas Ivester, then-president and CEO of Coca Cola, called private labels "parasites" and said they were responsible for "eroding category profits."

[^14]:    ${ }^{28}$ I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

[^15]:    ${ }^{29}$ In certain cases, profits may decrease and the manufacturers may not choose the vertically integrated solution, e.g. as in Mc Guire and Staelin (1983), and Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989).

[^16]:    ${ }^{30}$ For the retailers analyzed, yogurt sales represent on average only 2 percent of total retail sales in contrast to the two largest dollar sales categories: soft drinks 17 percent and cereal 12 percent.
    ${ }^{31}$ In terms of the econometrics, it would be useful to consider semi-parametric estimation and inference procedures that are possibly more robust for the problem at hand. In this context, information theoretic formulations appear to offer interesting possibilities (Judge et. al. 2004).
    ${ }^{32}$ See Manuszak (2001) for an analysis on how upstream (horizontal) mergers affect market power in the retail gasoline markets.

[^17]:    ${ }^{33}$ See also Hellerstein (2004) and Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2006). For example, if import prices do not rise as much as the dollar depreciation (i.e. the pass-through effect is less than one), then foreign profit margins are being diminished (see, for example, Feenstra, 1989).

