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
Agricultural policy and trade in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the context of WTO rules


Lars Brink


IAMO Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Samarkand Agricultural Institute
Conference "Regional and International Cooperation in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Recent Developments in Agricultural Trade"
2-5 November 2016, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
https://samarkand.iamo.de/about-the-conference/



- Context: CCA and neighbours; WTO system
- Market access in agriculture
- WTO domestic support rules and practice
- WTO participation
- Issues landlocked, trade facilitation, unofficial payments
- Making economic analysis relevant for policy advice







Principles of the WTO trading system

- Trade without discrimination
 - Most-favoured-nation (MFN)
 - » Treating other members equally
 - National treatment
 - » Treating foreign goods and local goods equally
- Freer trade
 - Gradually, through negotiation
 - Rules-based trade
- Predictability
 - Through bindings: legal commitments
 - Through transparency: clear and public rules
- Fair competition, development and economic reform

Agreement on Agriculture: rules Schedule: legally binding commitment levels

Market access

- Bound maximum tariffs
- Tariff rate quotas for some countries and products

Domestic support

- Limit on some, but not all, domestic support
- Diversity of exemptions from limits

Export subsidies


- Entitlements for some countries and products
- Entitlements now being eliminated over time


Accession to the WTO of CCA countries and *Neighbours*


Kyrgyz Republic	Acceded 1998
Georgia	Acceded 2000
Armenia	Acceded 2001
China	Acceded 2001
Russian Federation	Acceded 2012
Tajikistan	Acceded 2013
Kazakhstan	Acceded 2015
Afghanistan	Acceded 2016
Azerbaijan	Negotiations in process
Uzbekistan	Negotiations in process
Iran	Negotiations in process
Turkmenistan	Study and consultation

Context: CCA and neighbours; WTO system


- Market access in agriculture
 - WTO, regional and bilateral trade agreements
- WTO domestic support rules and practice
- WTO participation
- Issues landlocked, trade facilitation, unofficial payments
- Making economic analysis relevant for policy advice








Product group with highest average applied tariff 2014



Product group with highest average applied tariff 2014 % **Sugars &** 50 confectionery Fruit & vegetables **Beverages & tobacco** 45 40 35 30 25 20 **Dairy 15** products 10 5 Russia Iran 0 Kalakhstan Kyreyl Rep. Tajjkistan Izbekistan

Customs Union and EAEU integration

- Many tariff settings at play
 - Applied external tariffs of Customs Union, now of EAEU
 - Bound WTO tariffs: Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyz Rep., Kazakhstan
- Which tariffs are lower or higher than those of EAEU?
 - Renegotiate bound WTO tariffs? Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyz Rep.
 - Kazakhstan WTO accession: may renegotiate tariffs up to EAEU level
 - But usual rules do not apply
- Diverse agricultural trading relations of smaller countries
 - Considerable trade with neighbours other than Russia
 - Expect to continue to increase?



- Context: CCA and neighbours; WTO system
- Market access in agriculture
- WTO domestic support: rules and practice
 - Domestic support: policies not applied at the border
- WTO participation
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Domestic support: <u>exemptions</u> from limits

- Limits on support provided through some policies
 - But many exemptions from limits
 - Support through exempted policies faces no limit
- Exempt from limits if policy meets <u>criteria</u> in Agr. Agreement
 - » Support that distorts only minimally or not at all
 - No reason to limit such support
 - Criteria in Annex 2 of Agreement: green box
 - » Support that often distorts much but is still exempted
 - Investment and input subsidies in developing countries
 - Criteria in Article 6.2 of Agreement
 - » Support that distorts but also limits production in some way
 - Compromise to conclude Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994
 - Criteria in Article 6.5 of Agreement: blue box

Domestic support: limits

- Support that is not exempted is a residual
 - Measure residual through a number of AMSs
 - » Aggregate Measurements of Support
 - One non-product-specific AMS
 - Many product-specific AMSs
- Most countries: each individual AMS has a limit
 - » Limit is X % of product's value of production (VOP) in current year
 - X = 5%, 8.5%, or 10%
 - Actual limit varies from year to year
- Some countries need to sum all the individual AMSs
 - Except any AMS smaller than X% of its VOP
 - Sum is "Current Total AMS"
 - "Bound Total AMS" is limit on "Current Total AMS"
 - Tajikistan, Russia

South Caucasus Central Asia Neighbours	Bound Total AMS	<i>De minimis</i> percentage	Art. 6.2 exemption for investment and input subsidies and diversifying from illicit crops
Armenia	No	5%	No
Azerbaijan	Negotiations	Negotiations	Negotiations
Georgia	No	5%	No
Kazakhstan	No	8.5%	No
Kyrgyz Rep.	No	5%	No
Tajikistan	USD 183 million	10%	Yes
Turkmenistan	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Uzbekistan	Negotiations	Negotiations	Negotiations
Afghanistan	No	10%	Yes
China	No	8.5%	No
Iran	Negotiations	Negotiations	Negotiations
Russia	USD 4.4 billion	5%	No

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Turkmenistan	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
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Turkmenistan Uzbekistan	Unknown Negotiations	Unknown Negotiations	Unknown Negotiations
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Afghanistan	Unknown Negotiations No	Unknown Negotiations 10%	Unknown Negotiations Yes

Table x. Applied support by WTO category (Agreement on Agriculture) and country

	Armenia	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyz Rep.	Tajikistan	Russia	Afghanistan	China
	ARM	GEO	KAZ	KGZ	TJK	RUS	AFG	CHN
	2013	2015	2012	1998	2010	2014	2011	2010
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Services: Research	1	5	1	0	8	1	4	3
Services: Pest & disease, inspection	27	15	6	70	7	8	21	3
Services: Infrastructural	0	43	4	13	11	3	11	17
Payments: Natural disasters	0	3	0	0	0	0	31	9
All other services, exp. & payments	18	34	0	17	9	25	33	49
Green box exempted (sum above)	46	(100)	12	(100)	36	3 6	(100)	81
Article 6.2 exempted	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0
AMS support	54	0	88_	0_	_ 55_	64	0_	19_
Sum domestic support	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Notes: Data from latest available WTO document. AMS support comprises all AMSs, whether de minimis or not.

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Why WTO membership

Pre-condition for engaging with other countries

- Self-interest
 - Rule of law
 - Transition to market economy
 - Domestic reform and modernization
 - Attracting foreign direct investment

- Trade integration in the region
- Trade facilitation
- Right to invoke WTO rules on dispute settlement
- International cooperation: seat at the rule-making table
- Non-membership is risky: easy target for protectionism

Agriculture priorities as WTO member

- Participation in WTO processes
 - Transparency in Committee on Agriculture
 - Notifications
 - Questions
 - Trade Policy Review
 - Negotiations

- Priority on data and analysis in order to ...
 - Ensure and demonstrate compliance with WTO commitments
 - Use WTO commitments as a policy filter

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Landlocked WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement TFA


- "Freedom of transit" already in GATT Article V
 - No unnecessary delays or restrictions
 - Charges and regulations must be reasonable
 - No discriminatory treatment of transit traffic
- "Freedom of transit" in TFA Article 11
 - Clarifies and improves Article V
 - » Expedites the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit
- TFA needs 110 ratifications
 - Has almost 100 ratifications
 - Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran not in WTO
 - » Implications for effectiveness of TFA in and for CCA?

"Unofficial payments" and analysis of trade in agriculture

- Extra payment to a government official to
 - do what he should do anyway
 - not do what he should do
- E.g., mis-recording of flows and values of trade
 - Sparse evidence but many oblique mentions, such as
 - "The share of Central Asia countries in Uzbekistan's exports and imports is most likely larger than official statistics suggest because a large proportion of trade with neighbouring countries goes unrecorded."
- How useful is trade data for analyzing trade and policy?

Rankings:

Trading Across Borders (189) and Corruption Perception Index (168); both normalized to 100



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What makes economic research relevant for policy advice?

- Sample of researchers and policy advisors in agriculture
- Articulated key points for researchers*
 - Understand the policy making context
 - Understand that advice and decisions use input from many sources
 - Timing
 - Do high quality research
 - (Yes, of course)
 - Communicate out
 - Know how to convey to those who are not researchers

Thank you!

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