@article{Kemp:249518,
      recid = {249518},
      author = {Kemp, Luke},
      title = {A climate treaty without the US Congress: Using executive  powers to overcome the ‘Ratification Straitjacket’},
      address = {2015-11},
      number = {450-2016-34071},
      pages = {26},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {The issue of US ratification of international  environmental treaties is a recurring obstacle for  environmental multilateralism, including the climate  regime. Despite the perceived importance of the role of the  US to the success of any future international climate  agreement, there has been little direct coverage in terms  of how an effective agreement can specifically address US  legal participation. This paper explores potential ways of  allowing for US legal participation in an effective climate  treaty. Possible routes forward include the use of domestic  legislation such as section 115 (S115) of the Clean Air Act  (CAA), and the use of sole-executive agreements, instead of  Senate ratification. Legal participation from the US  through sole-executive agreements is possible if the  international architecture is designed to allow for their  use. Architectural elements such as varying legality and  participation across an agreement (variable geometry) could  allow for the use of sole-executive agreements. Two broader  models for a 2015 agreement with legal participation  through sole-executive agreements are constructed based  upon these options: a modified pledge and review system and  a form of variable geometry composed of number of opt-out,  voting based protocols on specific issues accompanied with  bilateral agreements on mitigation commitments with other  major emitters through the use of S115 and sole-executive  agreements under the Montreal Protocol and Chicago  Convention (Critical Mass Governance). While there is no  single solution, Critical Mass Governance appears to  provide the optimum combination of tools to effectively  allow for US legal participation whilst ensuring an  effective treaty.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/249518},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.249518},
}