@article{Brockhaus:246914,
      recid = {246914},
      author = {Brockhaus, Jan and Kalkuhl, Matthias},
      title = {Grain emergency reserve cooperation – A theoretical  analysis of benefits from a common emergency reserve},
      address = {2016-09},
      number = {310-2016-5421},
      pages = {26},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {This paper presents a two country model with private  stockholders and producers featuring
rational expectations  which is used to evaluate emergency reserve, private  storage and
trade related policies to stabilize grain  prices. Contrary to existing works, this paper
looks at  extreme events besides price volatility, both representing  political concerns.
Findings illustrate the benefits from  trade and that private storage, even if subsidized,
hardly  manages to avoid extreme price spikes although it is very  efficient in reducing price
volatility. In contrast, a  (common) public emergency reserve allows compensating  large
supply shortages at a reasonable level of fiscal  costs while leaving the lower quantiles of
the price  distribution largely unaffected. A private storage subsidy  significantly impacts
trade whereas a reserve hardly does.  Policy makers looking for stabilization mechanisms
may  consider either option or a combination thereof. Free trade  is beneficial if stocking
policies match while otherwise a  free-rider problem is created.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/246914},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.246914},
}