@article{Bacchiega:244955,
      recid = {244955},
      author = {Bacchiega, Emanuele and Bonroy, Olivier and Petrakis,  Emmanuel},
      title = {Contract contingency in vertically related markets},
      address = {2016},
      number = {717-2016-48692},
      series = {149th EAAE Seminar ‘Structural change in agri-food chains:  new relations between farm sector, food industry and retail  sector’, Rennes, France, October 27-28, 2016},
      pages = {34},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream  monopolist producing an essential input that may sell to  two vertically differentiated downstream firms. The  upstream supplier can offer an exclusive contract to one of  the firms or non-exclusive contracts to both firms. Each of  the latter can be made contingent or not on the breakdown  of the negotiations between the upstream supplier and the  rival downstream firm. The distribution of bargaining power  during the contract terms negotiations is the main driving  force of the monopolist's choices. A powerful supplier  always opts for an exclusive contract. By contrast, a  weaker supplier offers non-exclusive contracts and makes  each of them contingent or non-contingent such as to  guarantee the most favorable outside option in its  negotiations. Our main results hold under an horizontally  differentiated downstream market too.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/244955},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.244955},
}