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Abstract
It is now twenty years since the first commercial production of GM crops.
Domestic regulatory regimes for agricultural biotechnology and GM foods
differ considerably across the globe. As a result, international trade and other
forms of exchange are considerably inhibited, leading to reduced returns for
those investing in the technology and, hence, less investment in R&D for
agricultural biotechnology. The latter means that biotechnology cannot fully
contribute to meeting the food security challenges of the next four decades.
Part of the problem is that no international regulatory regime for trade in the
products of biotechnology that enjoys widespread support has been
forthcoming. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the WTO was
concluded prior to the commercialization of agricultural biotechnology and
was not re-opened for negotiation in the Doha Round – which, of course, has
not been concluded. In the absence of WTO engagement on the issue an
alternative international institutional arrangement has been developed but does
not have the support of the countries that represent the major developers and
adopters of agricultural biotechnology – the Biosafety Protocol. In the absence
of discernable progress in the Doha Round, countries have turned to
preferential trade agreements to garner the benefits of trade liberalization. The
question this article examines is whether preferential trade agreements can
break the logjam on trade in the products of agricultural biotechnology. Three
preferential trade agreements are examined: the recent EU-Canada agreement;
the TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans Pacific
Partnership. The conclusion reached is that these agreements, in and of
themselves, cannot provide the solution, but they may be able to set the stage
for progress in developing harmonized standards. For there to be success stemming from this process, however, there needs to be institutional
innovation. If there is success, it will not be quick in coming.