000235650 001__ 235650
000235650 005__ 20180123004232.0
000235650 037__ $$a333-2016-14715
000235650 041__ $$aen_US
000235650 084__ $$aF53
000235650 084__ $$aF51
000235650 084__ $$aQ25
000235650 084__ $$aR41
000235650 260__ $$c2016
000235650 269__ $$a2016
000235650 270__ $$mS.M.Eskander@lse.ac.uk$$pEskander,   Shaikh
000235650 270__ $$mTJanus@uwyo.edu$$pJanus,   Thorsten
000235650 270__ $$mEBarbier@uwyo.edu$$pBarbier,   Edward
000235650 300__ $$a16
000235650 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000235650 520__ $$aWe develop a game-theoretic framework of negotiation over sharing of trans-boundary resources between neighboring countries. The downstream country offers a non-water “leverage” good in exchange for water access and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the upstream country. The downstream country can further invest in water provision before the negotiations. We compare three types of outcomes: the first-best outcomes where an “ex-ante social planner” choses both the water investment and the water and leverage goods exchanged in the negotiations; the outcome when an “ex-post social planner” only enters at the negotiation stage; and the outcome of bilateral negotiations. We argue that all three cases can be empirically realistic; show that the outcome with the ex-post social planner can distort the downstream country’s investment incentive; and that the bilateral negotiation outcome can lead to water investment either below or above the efficient/ex-ante planner’s preferred choice.
000235650 542__ $$fLicense granted by Shaikh Eskander (smsu_isku@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-24T16:32:36Z (GMT):

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000235650 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000235650 650__ $$aPolitical Economy
000235650 650__ $$aResource /Energy Economics and Policy
000235650 650__ $$aRisk and Uncertainty
000235650 6531_ $$aTrans-boundary water sharing
000235650 6531_ $$aissue-linkage
000235650 6531_ $$anegotiation.
000235650 700__ $$aEskander, Shaikh
000235650 700__ $$aJanus, Thorsten
000235650 700__ $$aBarbier, Edward
000235650 773__ $$d2016
000235650 8564_ $$s499224$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/235650/files/Linking%20the%20Unlinked.pdf
000235650 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/235650
000235650 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:235650$$pGLOBAL_SET
000235650 912__ $$nSubmitted by Shaikh Eskander (smsu_isku@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-24T16:36:06Z
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  Previous issue date: 2016
000235650 982__ $$gAgricultural and Applied Economics Association>2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts
000235650 980__ $$a333