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New Economics of Entrepreneurship, Innovation & Institutions: Considerations for Australian Agriculture

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
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New Economics of Entrepreneurship, Innovation & Institutions

Considerations for Australian Agriculture



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Basic argument

Social welfare/market failure definition of the innovation problem

Old economics of agriculture

- Textbook perfcomp, price taking, ...
- No role for entrepreneurship & innovation
- Govt role to drive up ag. prices, or subsidize ag. costs

Creative destruction/
Market process definition
of innovation problem



Economics of opportunity discovery

- -- Entrepreneurship & innovation as collective action problems
- -- information about opportunities as the public good

Old economics of innovation

- market failure in producing new knowledge
 - innovation-push model of public science & technology
- Innovation problem: fixed costs under competition (P=MC<AC)
 - E.g. chemicals, consumer electronics, CSIRO
- Implication: social welfare max requires government intervention
 - i.e. IP, R&D subsidy, demand support, public science,

Presumption 1: **governments can fix market failures**

Presumption 2: this applies to agriculture too

New economics of innovation

- the role of entrepreneurial discovery
 - market information, not new technology
- private governance institutions to solve the innovation problem
 - innovation commons

New Institutional Economics
Evolutionary/Schumpeterian economics
Public choice economics
Austrian economics/Economics of Knowledge
Economics of the commons
Complexity economics

Innovation problem: rules to coordinate knowledge for discovery of value

Path from new technology to emergence of new industry

- 3D printing, bitcoin/blockchain, new sports, PC/software
- early wine industry in Australia

Implication:

- a new technology is not a new industry;
- new industry emergence requires governance
 - i.e. cooperation & rules, that become industry groups/associations

Presumption 1: **governments can fix market failures**

Presumption 2: this applies to agriculture too

Problem with Presumption 1 above:

- knowledge problem,
- rent-seeking/govt. failure,
- no recognition of the entrepreneurial problem

Presumption 2: this applies to agriculture too

a new research program – agricultural innovation economics

 Study the institutional conditions that resolve collective action problems associated with distributed knowledge in the very early stages of new agricultural industries

 theory: this institutional mechanism is the origin of comparative advantage in agricultural clusters

Agricultural economic policy in Australia: history and consequences

- Agrarian socialist
- Globalised free-trading
- Govt. support for political-economy reasons
- Govt. support for industry-level public goods with externalities (rural R&D corps)
 - have been disappointing, just as economic theory predicts
 - (1) public choice theory (capture, rent-seeking)
 - (2) new science is not new entrepreneurship

Problems with ag. econ. of innovation

All about **market failure** in ag. science / or marketing. Resolved with government. But ...

- (I) Where are the entrepreneurs?
- (II) Where is the information/knowledge?
- (III) Where are the institutions?

KEYWORDS

entrepreneurship, knowledge, coordination, institutions, governance, evolution

entrepreneurial discovery problems

NOT

investment misallocation problems

collective action problems

NOT

market failure problems

governance solutions

NOT

government solutions

Schumpeter Hayek & Ostrom

NOT

Samuelson,
Arrow &
Romer

Opportunity discovery – entrepreneurs & the growth of knowledge

- Agents of change.
- Knowledge needs creating and processing.
- Opportunities need to be revealed.
- Market process theory.
- Evolutionary growth of knowledge.

Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik (2003) 'Economic Development as Self Discovery' *Journal of Development Economics*, 72(2): 603-33.

Discovery of comparative advantage – a local public goods problem

- Discovery of information about local comparative advantage/ costs, opportunities, etc
- Entrepreneurial information as a local public good

Chile

Bangladesh

Pakistan

Columbia

India

Taiwan

salmon farming

hats

bed sheets

cut flowers

software

semiconductors


Discover your niche

- Kimberley (Ord River)
- Barossa valley
- King island
- Northern rivers

- sandalwood oil
- shiraz
- camembert
- creative industries

Barriers to entrepreneurial action

- Finance
- Resources, infrastructure
- Legal & regulatory
- Competence & capability
- Uncertainty about costs & benefits



Entrepreneurs discover these costs & opportunities revealing the regions strengths & weaknesses

Innovation Commons – efficient governance & innovation institutions

 Institution for collective action in pooling innovation resources (Potts et al 2015)

- Hypothesis: all new industries/niches begin within an innovation commons
 - Entrepreneurial and distributed market knowledge far more important to early stage innovation than scientific technical knowledge

Innovation commons in Australian Agriculture

 Very early Australian wine industry in the Hunter Valley

- Collective pooling of experiments
- Information

McIntyre J, Mitchell R, Boyle B, Ryan S (2013) 'We used to get and give a lot of help: Networking, cooperation and knowledge flow in the Hunter Valley wine cluster' *Australian Economic History Review*, 53(3): 247-67.

The life cycle of an Industry Association

- Hypothesis: industry associations originate from a collapsed innovation commons
 - An industry association emerges as a switch in function from coordinating discovery and common pool resource access, to coordinating industrial *niche construction*

I – A New Research Program?

 Ag economics needs to move from old innovation economics to new innovation economics

 New = Schumpeterian + Hayek?Ostrom/Rodrik

II – A New Policy Framework?

• from *government* to *governance* solutions

 focus on institutional structures from which new industries/opportunities emerge

- We don't presume to know what the exact opportunities are. That's the problem to solve.
 - Information is the public good, not (just) infrastructure