@article{Ahamad:235482,
      recid = {235482},
      author = {Ahamad, Mazbahul},
      title = {Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching},
      address = {2016-05-23},
      number = {333-2016-14593},
      series = {P8943},
      pages = {12},
      month = {May},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {We develop a model of two-sided matching problem with  individual-sided envious preferences that originate from an  emulative envy effect in which a more desirable state that  is preferred is owned by the other individual. We assume  envious preferences influence an individual’s decision to  enter into a two-sided network instead of being unassigned.  In this paper, we show that an individual-sided envious  preference leads to a stable matching under a two-sided  market framework. Applying the mechanism of the model to  behavioral contract theory, we show that  individual-proposing envious acceptance leads to stable  farmer-buyer contract matching considering buyer’s time  invariant preference. We further argue that individual’s  envious preference also contributes to herd-type acceptance  that dominates individual’s logical preferences in  participation decision under a less risky environment.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/235482},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.235482},
}