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#### Transforming Agricultural System under Socioeconomic Change, Climate Change and Ecosystem Change

Hirotaka Matsuda<sup>1)</sup>, Yuka Ogata<sup>2)</sup>, Akira Takagi<sup>3)</sup> and Hisashi Kurokura<sup>4)</sup>

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2) Niigata Prefectural Government Inland Fisheries Experimental Station

3) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; MEXT

4) Graduate School of Agriculture and Life sciences, The University of Tokyo

#### Contributed presentation at the 60th AARES Annual Conference, Canberra, ACT, 2-5 February 2016

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### I. Introduction

#### Definition of Resilience

 Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks (Walker et al (2004)).

#### • Strategy of farmers in developing country

- Combining traditional system with modern system
  - VAC system in Vietnam: Vuon-Ao-Choung (VAC) system, which is gardenpond-livestock pen in the Red River delta and the midlands of northern Vietnam

VAC system in Vietnam




Currently, structure of the combination has been changed in order to respond to introducing market economy.

It is difficult to adopt risks including climate change and loss of economical benefit because of loss of those diversity.

tudy investigates behaviors of farmers who are much vulnerable in developing countries to enhance their resilience to respond to Socio-economic change, Climate change and Ecosystem change.

### **II**. Agriculture in Research Area, Vietnam


#### Research Area



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### **Impact of climate change for Agriculture**


#### salinity intrusion




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### **Impact of climate change for Agriculture**

#### salinity intrusion



#### **Trend of Paddy Yield in Research Area**



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### **Question for capturing risk behaviour**

- Q. If you were to choose a business with different returns, which one of the following would you choose?
  - Game 1. Initial investment cost is: 2000 VND
  - Game 2. Initial investment cost is: 10000 VND

	<u> </u>	101 mvesti			
Business Type	1	2	3	4	5
Fail	100,000	80,000	60,000	40,000	0
Succeed	100,000	240,000	300,000	320,000	6,000,000

Payoff for Investment Game 1 & 2

- Game 3. Initial investment cost is: 20000 VND
- Game 4. Initial investment cost is: 200000 VND

Business Type	1	2	3	4	5
Fail	200,000	160,000	100,000	40,000	0
Succeed	200,000	340,000	500,000	680,000	1,000,000

Payoff for Investment Game 3 & 4

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### **Question for capturing risk behaviour**

- Q. If you were to choose a business with different returns, which one of the following would you 1: Extreme Risk Averter
  - Game 1. Initial investment cost is: 2000 VNI
  - Game 2. Initial investment cost is: 10000 VN

Payoff for Investment Ga

Business Type	1	2	3	with 3. However, variance is
Fail	100,000	80,000	60	larger. 5: Risk neutral or lover
Succeed	100,000	240,000	300	

- Game In case of fail: 80,000 VND is received

- Game 4 In case of success: 240,000VND is received

Payoff for Investment Game 3 & 4

В	usiness Type	1	2	3	4	5
	Fail	200,000	160,000	100,000	40,000	0
58th /	Succeed	200,000	340,000	500,000	680,000	1,000,000

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
2: Severe Risk Averter

3: Moderate Risk Averter

4: Inefficient Risk Averter


Expected payoff of 4 is same

### **Distribution of risk preference of farmers**



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#### **Distribution of risk preference of farmers**



# **III.** Estimation of Risk preference, Animal Feeding and **Production change**

Estimation of Risk Behaviour

$$y_i^* = \beta' X_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ with } \beta'(\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_k)$$

- $y_i^*$ : respondent's propensity to choose a specific alternative in the Game
- $X_i$ : K-vector of known constants, includes all of household i's characteristics

 $\varepsilon_i \sim (0, \sigma^2)$  iid, mean 0 and variance  $\sigma^2$ 

- The ordered probit model is hired to estimate

 $X_{\kappa}$ : Kth independent variable

 For the jth probability, the marginal effects of change in the independent variables:

$$\frac{\partial P_r(y_i = s_j)}{\partial X_K} = \left[ \emptyset \left( \frac{\mu_{j-1} - \beta' X_i}{\sigma} \right) - \emptyset \left( \frac{\mu_j - \beta' X_i}{\sigma} \right) \right] \frac{\beta_K}{\sigma}$$
  
  $\emptyset(\cdot)$ : the normal density function

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#### Estimation of Animal Feeding and Responding to production change

Animal feeding

$$\operatorname{Prob}(y_i = j) = \frac{\exp(\boldsymbol{\beta}'_j \mathbf{x}_i)}{\sum_{k=0}^{J} \exp(\boldsymbol{\beta}'_k \mathbf{x}_i)} \quad \text{for} \quad j = 0, 1, \cdots, J$$

• Responding to production change of rice  $\Delta y = X\beta + \varepsilon$   $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_k) \quad \Delta y = (\Delta y_1, \dots, \Delta y_n)^T$   $X = \begin{pmatrix} x_i \\ \vdots \\ x_n \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & x_{11} & \dots & x_{1k} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & x_{n1} & \dots & x_{nk} \end{pmatrix} \quad \varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n)^T$ 

> $\Delta y$ : reducing amount of rice yield  $X_i$ : K-vector of known constants, includes all of household i's characteristics  $\varepsilon_i \sim (0, \sigma^2)$  iid, mean 0 and variance  $\sigma^2$

#### MCMC for Estimation of responding to production change

$$p(\boldsymbol{y}|\boldsymbol{\beta},\tau) \sim N\left(\boldsymbol{X}\boldsymbol{\beta},\frac{1}{\tau}\boldsymbol{I}\right)$$
  
$$\tau = \frac{1}{\sigma^{2}}, \quad \frac{e}{v} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_{i}^{2}}{v}, \quad \hat{\sigma}^{2} = S = e \quad df: v = n - k$$

- Conjugate prior distribution of parameter  $\beta$  and  $\tau$  $p(\beta|\tau) \sim N(b_0, (1/\tau)B_0)$  $p(\tau | \mathbf{y}) \sim G\left(\frac{v_0}{2}, \frac{v_0 S_0}{2}\right)$
- Posterior distributions follow normal distribution and Gunma distribution, respectively

 $p(\beta|\tau, \mathbf{y}) \sim N(b_1, B_1)$  $p(\tau|\beta, \mathbf{y}) \sim G\left(\frac{v_1}{2}, \frac{v_1S_1}{2}\right)$  $v_1 = v_0 + v, v_1 S_1 = v_0 S_0 + (v - Xb_1)^T (v - X\beta)$  $b_1 = B_1(B_0^{-1}b_0 + \tau X^T y), B_1^{-1} = B_0^{-1} + \tau B$ 

 $- b_0, B_0, v_o, S_0$  can be defined arbitrary.

b0=0, B0=0.001, c0=0.001, S0=0.001, burn in=1000 Fremantle, 2-5 February 2016

#### **IV. Estimation Results : Risk Behaviour**

Variable ID		Game 1	Game 2	Game 3	Game 4
age	Age of respondent	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01 *	-0.01 *
		( -1.57)	(-1.64)	(-1.91)	(-1.71)
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.34 *	0.27	0.30	0.22
		( 1.83 )	( 1.45 )	( 1.61 )	( 1.18 )
edu	year of education	0.10 **	0.06 *	0.07 **	0.06
		( 2.81 )	( 1.80)	( 2.12)	( 1.65 )
native	1 if respondent born in the	0.38 *	0.44 **	0.49 **	0.47 *
	village	( 1.72)	( 1.97)	( 2.13)	( 2.01 )
house_area	Area of household	-0.07	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08 **
		( -1.22)	(-1.54)	(-1.20)	( -1.26 )
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.06 *	0.09 ***	0.05 *	0.07
		( 1.81 )	( 2.74 )	( 1.77)	( 2.37 )
network	Numer of accuitance to ask	-0.12 **	-0.13 **	-0.17 ***	-0.20 ***
	about farming (maximu number is five)	( -2.07 )	(-2.27)	(-2.92)	(-3.36)
variety_animal	variety of animalsiin the	-0.04	-0.11	-0.13	-0.11
	household	( -0.46)	( -1.17)	( -1.37 )	( -1.12)
d_gt	1 if Gio Thien	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.36
		( 1.50)	( 1.55)	( 1.53)	( 1.61 )
$d_gx$	1 if GioXien	0.46 *	0.60 **	0.68 ***	0.77
		( 1.77)	( 2.33)	( 2.57)	( 2.83)
Log likelihood		29.73	30.4	33.4	33.7
Psudo R2		0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
Observation		194	194	194	194

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.

\* significant at 10% level; \*\* significant at 5% level; \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

Variable ID		Game 1	Game 2	Game 3	Game 4
age	Age of respondent	-0.01 ( -1.57 )	-0.01 ( -1.64 )	-0.01 <sup>*</sup> ( -1.91 )	-0.01 <sup>*</sup> ( -1.71 )
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.34 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.83 )	0.27 ( 1.45 )	0.30 ( 1.61 )	0.22 ( 1.18 )
edu	year of education	0.10 <sup>**</sup> ( 2.81)	0.06 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.80 )	0.07 ** ( 2.12 )	0.06 ( 1.65 )
native	1 if respondent born in the village	0.38 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.72 )	0.44 <sup>**</sup> ( 1.97 )	0.49 ** ( 2.13 )	0.47 <sup>*</sup> ( 2.01 )
house_area	Area of household	-0.07 ( -1.22 )	-0.09 ( -1.54 )	-0.07 ( -1.20 )	-0.08 ** ( -1.26 )
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.06 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.81 )	0.09 *** ( 2.74 )	0.05 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.77 )	0.07 ( 2.37 )
network	Numer of accuitance to ask about farming (maximu number is five)	-0.12 ** ( -2.07 )	-0.13 ** ( -2.27 )	-0.17 *** ( -2.92 )	-0.20 ** ( -3.36 )
variety_animal	variety of animalsiin the household	-0.04 ( -0.46 )	-0.11 ( -1.17 )	-0.13 ( -1.37 )	-0.11 ( -1.12 )
d_gt	1 if Gio Thien	0.32 ( 1.50 )	0.33 ( 1.55 )	0.33 ( 1.53 )	0.36 ( 1.61 )
d_gx	1 if GioXien	0.46 <sup>*</sup> ( 1.77)	0.60 <sup>**</sup> ( 2.33 )	0.68 *** ( 2.57 )	0.77 ( 2.83 )
Log likelihood		29.73	30.4	33.4	33.7
Psudo R2		0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
Observation		194	194	194	194

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 10% level; \*\* significant at 5% level; \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

#### **Estimation Results: Animal Feeding**

	Area	Education	Risk	Network
Pig			+	
Chicken				
Duck				
Pig+Chi	Xuan (-)			
Pig+Duc		+		
Pig+Oth				
Chi+Duc	Xuan (-)		-	+
Chi+Oth	Thien (-)	-		
Pig+Chi+Duc	Xuan (-)	-		
Pig+Chi+Duc+ Oth				

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### **Estimation Results: Animal Feeding**


	Area	Education	Risk	Network
Pig			+	
Chicken			• Ri	- la lover choose n
Duck				sk lover choose p
Pig+Chi	Xuan (-)			
Pig+Duc		+		
Pig+Oth				
Chi+Duc	Xuan (-)		-	<b>)</b> +
Chi+Oth	Thien (-)	-	• Ri	
Pig+Chi+Duc	Xuan (-)	-		sk averter choose icken and duck.
Pig+Chi+Duc+ Oth				ienen und duek.

#### **Estimation Results : Production Change (1)**

		Mean	SD	2.5%	25%	50%	75%	97.5%
(Intercept)		-7.070	1.314	-9.638	-7.958	-17.074	-6.189	-4.468
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.051	0.041	-0.030	0.023	0.051	0.079	0.133
Modern Irrigation	1 if modern irrigation system is used	4.589	1.196	2.236	3.786	4.594	5.395	6.923
Semi-Modern Irrigat	ic1 if semi-modern irrigation system is used	4.339	1.189	2.001	3.540	4.343	5.139	6.654
age	Age of respondent	-0.029	0.008	-0.045	-0.035	-0.029	-0.023	-0.013
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.206	0.209	-0.205	0.066	0.206	0.348	0.616
edu	year of education	-0.052	0.040	-0.130	-0.079	-0.052	-0.025	0.027
5 in the Game	Choosing 5 in the Game; Risk neutral or lover	-0.210	0.116	-0.437	-0.289	-0.210	-0.132	0.016
network	Numer of accuitance to ask about farming (maximu number is five)	0.048	0.094	-0.136	-0.015	0.048	0.111	0.231
sigma2		7.906	0.399	7.163	7.632	7.894	8.166	8.725
1 in the Game	Choosing 1 in the Game; Extreme Risk Averter	-0.195	0.114	-0.417	-0.271	-0.195	-0.118	0.027
2 in the Game	Choosing 2 in the Game; Severe Risk Averter	-0.204	0.110	-0.419	-0.278	-0.204	-0.130	0.009
3 or 4 in the Game	Choosing 3 or 4 in the Game; Moderate Risk Averter	-0.219	0.115	-0.443	-0.297	-0.220	-0.142	0.004

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		Mean	SD	2.5%	25%	50%	75%	97.5%
(Intercept)		-7.070	1.314	-9.638	-7.958	-17.074	-6.189	-4.468
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.051	0.041	-0.030	0.023	0.051	0.079	0.133
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age	Age of respondent	-0.029	0.008	-0.045	-0.035	-0.029	-0.023	-0.013
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.206	0.209	-0.205	0.066	0.206	0.348	0.616
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2 in the Game	Choosing 2 in the Game; Severe Risk Averter	-0.204	0.110	-0.419	-0.278	-0.204	-0.130	0.009
3 or 4 in the Game	Choosing 3 or 4 in the Game; Moderate Risk Averter	-0.219	0.115	-0.443	-0.297	-0.220	-0.142	0.004



N = 100000 Bandwidth = 0.02215

Iterations


#### **Estimation Results : Production Change (2)**

		Mean	SD	2.5%	25%	50%	75%
(Intercept)		-2.734	0.671	-4.047	-3.186	-2.733	-2.28
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.057	0.041	-0.023	0.029	0.057	0.085
Traditional Irrigatio	on 1 if traditional irrigation system is used	-4.430	1.189	-6.764	-5.233	-4.426	-3.62
age	Age of respondent	-0.029	0.008	-0.046	-0.035	-0.029	-0.024
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.201	0.210	-0.207	0.061	0.201	0.343
edu	year of education	-0.052	0.040	-0.130	-0.079	-0.051	-0.02
5 in the Game	Choosing 5 in the Game; Risk neutral or lover	-0.194	0.116	-0.421	-0.272	-0.195	-0.110
network	Numer of accuitance to ask about farming (maximu number is five)	0.062	0.093	-0.119	-0.001	0.062	0.12
sigma2		7.913	0.399	7.169	7.638	7.899	8.173
1 in the Game	Choosing 1 in the Game; Extreme Risk Averter	-0.184	0.114	-0.407	-0.260	-0.184	-0.10
2 in the Game	Choosing 2 in the Game; Severe Risk Averter	-0.193	0.110	-0.408	-0.266	-0.193	-0.11
3 or 4 in the Game	Choosing 3 or 4 in the Game; Moderate Risk Averter	-0.206	0.114	-0.430	-0.283	-0.206	-0.12

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		Mean	SD	2.5%	25%	50%	75%
(Intercept)		-2.734	0.671	-4.047	-3.186	-2.733	-2.281
paddy_area	Area of paddy field	0.057	0.041	-0.023	0.029	0.057	0.085
Traditional Irrigatio	on 1 if traditional irrigation system is used	-4.430	1.189	-6.764	-5.233	-4.426	-3.627
age	Age of respondent	-0.029	0.008	-0.046	-0.035	-0.029	-0.024
sex	1 if respondent is female	0.201	0.210	-0.207	0.061	0.201	0.343
edu	year of education	-0.052	0.040	-0.130	-0.079	-0.051	-0.025
5 in the Game	Choosing 5 in the Game; Risk neutral or lover	-0.194	0.116	-0.421	-0.272	-0.195	-0.116
network	Numer of accuitance to ask about farming (maximu number is five)	0.062	0.093	-0.119	-0.001	0.062	0.125
sigma2		7.913	0.399	7.169	7.638	7.899	8.173
1 in the Game	Choosing 1 in the Game; Extreme Risk Averter	-0.184	0.114	-0.407	-0.260	-0.184	-0.107
2 in the Game	Choosing 2 in the Game; Severe Risk Averter	-0.193	0.110	-0.408	-0.266	-0.193	-0.119
3 or 4 in the Game	Choosing 3 or 4 in the Game; Moderate Risk Averter	-0.206	0.114	-0.430	-0.283	-0.206	-0.129



## **V.** Summary

- Rather risk lover prefer to feed large animal, pig, which is more difficult to feed. Rather risk averter prefer to feed smaller animals such as chicken.
- Moderate Risk Averter is able to respond to reducing of paddy yield because of natural disaster.
- Impact of network are not found logically.
- Although, perhaps, person who should be targeted to respond to agricultural production variation can be defined in terms of risk behavior, diffusing those strategy among community is difficult because social network is not so tied in the community.
- Strategies including diffusion process to combine agricultural production, animal feeding and aquaculture have to be established based on empirical results.