@article{Gabszewicz:232221,
      recid = {232221},
      author = {Gabszewicz, Jean J. and Marini, Marco A. and Tarola,  Ornella},
      title = {Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Cannibalization or  Proliferation?},
      address = {2016-03-01},
      number = {843-2016-55939},
      series = {ET},
      pages = {22},
      month = {Mar},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus  proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly  under the assumption that some firms collude and control  both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding  prices, likewise a multiproduct  firm. We analyse whether  pruning emerges and, if so, a fighting brand is marketed.  We find that it is always more profitable for colluding  firms to adopt a pricing strategy such that some variants  are withdrawn from the market. Under pruning, these firms  commercialize a fighting brand only when facing competitors  in a low-end market. The same findings do not hold when  firms are horizontally differentiated along a circle.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/232221},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.232221},
}