@article{Rubio:232181,
      recid = {232181},
      author = {Rubio, Santiago J.},
      title = {Sharing R&D Investments in Breakthrough Technologies  to Control Climate Change},
      address = {2016-02-29},
      number = {839-2016-55896},
      series = {MITP},
      pages = {48},
      month = {Feb},
      year = {2016},
      abstract = {This paper examines international cooperation on  technological development as an alternative to  international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In  order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage  technology agreement formation game is solved. First,  countries decide whether or not to sign up to the  agreement. Then, in the second stage, the signatories  (playing together) and the non-signatories (playing  individually) select their investment in R&D. In this  stage, it is assumed that the signatories not only  coordinate their levels of R&D investment but also pool  their R&D efforts to fully internalize the spillovers of  their investment in innovation. Finally, in the third  stage, each country decides non-cooperatively upon its  level of energy production. Emissions depend on the  decisions made regarding investment and production. If a  country decides to develop a breakthrough technology in the  second stage, its emissions will be zero in the third  stage. For linear environmental damages and quadratic  investment costs, the grand coalition is stable if marginal  damages are large enough to justify the development of a  breakthrough technology that eliminates emissions  completely, and if technology spillovers are not very  important.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/232181},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.232181},
}