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LAND REFORMS LEGISLATION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENT STATES

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The legislative history of land reforms can be broadly divided into three phases. The era of land reforms started with legislation for abolition of intermediaries which was undertaken between 1948 and 1954. During the next phase which started from the year 1953, measures for tenancy reforms were undertaken in different States. The third phase started in 1956 with the legislation for imposition of ceiling on existing holdings.

LEGISLATION FOR INTERMEDIARY TENURES

The intermediary tenure covered about 45 per cent of the total area of the country and generally comprised of *zamindaris*, *jagirs*, and *inams* of various descriptions. The intermediaries were interposed between the cultivators and the State, resulting in separation of ownership from cultivation. At the time of settlement of intermediary tenures, the intermediaries were conferred, in varying degrees, various types of rights which may be classified as under:

(i) Right to collect rent from the cultivators on payment of land revenue to the Government;

(ii) Right of occupancy, *i.e.*, right to the possession and use of land;[1] and

(iii) Right of collection and use of land revenue in part or in full.

The intermediaries enjoyed these rights generally on permanent, heritable and transferable basis. In permanently settled and temporarily settled *zamindari* areas, the subsequent legislative measures passed during the last 100 years resulted in recapturing the right of occupancy by a great majority of principal *raiyats* of *zamindars*. With the exception of permanently settled areas of Madras, the incidence of rent payable by *raiyats* to *zamindars* in other States compared favourably with the incidence of land revenue payable to the Government by *raiyats* in *raiyatwari* areas. Thus, at the time of abolition, the *zamindars* were only rent receivers in the *raiyati* lands and had no other right in land except where such lands were *sir*, *khudkasht*, *nijijot*, lands in *khas*-possession, etc.

The position of *jagir* and *inam* lands was different. In Hyderabad, Saurashtra and in case of some categories of *jagirs* in Bombay, the *jagirdars* did not

1. For holding occupancy right it is not necessary that the land should be under one's personal possession. If the landlord is free to resume land for personal cultivation or to evict one tenant and settle another in his place (though he may never do it in practice), the right of occupancy shall be deemed to be held by him and not by his tenant who may be in actual possession of the land.

have any proprietary right in the soil but were only assignees of land revenue. In other areas the *jagirdars* enjoyed full proprietary rights in land. As compared to *zamindari* areas, the tenancy legislation in *jagir* areas was something unknown right upto 1947. The tenants of the *jagirdars* remained tenants-at-will and paid exorbitant rents. Rajasthan was the first princely State in India to stop arbitrary ejectment of tenants in *jagir* areas in 1949. In *inams* which were sparsely located in the States of Andhra, Bombay, Kerala, Madras, Mysore and former princely States, the *inamdars* enjoyed full proprietary rights in their lands which were either revenue-free or were partially assessed. In most States, even the tenancy legislation in force in *raiyatwari* areas did not apply to the tenants of *inamdars.*

Till now as many as 65 Acts have been passed in different States to abolish the rights of intermediaries. Under the legislation, while no compensation is payable for the levy of full assessment on the lands which were formerly called "alienated," compensation generally equal to the prescribed multiples of annual net rental income is payable for the abolition of the landlords' right to collect rent. The legislation applies to nearly 97 per cent of the former intermediary area and it has also been implemented in 92.4 per cent of the area. The intermediaries whose interests have been abolished number about 25.9 lakhs. The implementation of the legislation has been fairly satisfactory in most of the States and it is an achievement that such a monumental change in the land tenure system of the country has been brought about in such a peaceful and orderly manner. However, here are some of the shortcomings in the measures adopted in various States:

1. There have been large variations in the scope of the legislation. While in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal (with the exception of *Bargadars*) and Delhi all tenants and sub-tenants of intermediaries were brought into direct relationship with the State, there were States like Bombay and Mysore where even principal tenants, in majority of cases, were not brought into relationship with the State and the intermediaries were made *raiyatwari* holders of the entire tenanted land. In Andhra Pradesh, the *inams* of hamlets and *khandrigas* in *zamindari* and *ryotwari* villages and minor *inams* which had the characteristics of an intermediary tenure were not abolished but were converted into *raiyatwari* holdings and their tenants, in majority of cases, were not brought into direct relationship with the State. The tenants of *inamdars* were denied all the rights which previously accrued to them in the matter of payment of maximum rent and security of tenure. In other States only the *principal* tenants holding directly under the intermediaries were brought into direct relationship with the State and the rights of sub-tenants or under-*raiyats* remained unaffected. The rights of these tenants and sub-tenants are now regulated under the tenancy legislation.

It was perhaps a retrograde step that an intermediary tenure instead of being abolished may be simply converted into a *raiyatwari* tenure. This naturally left all the different layers of tenures undisturbed and re-established the authority of ex-intermediary as the highest *raiyatwari* holder with full occupancy rights.

2. In most of the States, the intermediaries became *raiyatwari* holders of their entire private lands or home-farms even when such lands were cultivated through tenants or crop-sharers. In former *jagir* and *inam* areas a provision was even made for allotment of additional land including land held by their tenants to make up the *khudkasht* land upto the prescribed limit. Such limits were as high as 500 acres in Rajasthan and 250 acres in former Vindhya Pradesh. These provisions have only strengthened the rights of intermediaries instead of

reducing or abolishing them. By permitting the landlords to retain or acquire vast areas of land as *khudkasht*, a large number of tenants cultivating these lands were rendered landless.

3. In a number of States the legislation has not resulted in evolving a uniform type of *ryotwari* tenure under the State. In Assam, Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, the tenants or sub-tenants who have come into direct relationship with the State hold their rights under the State on same terms and conditions as were applicable to them under the intermediaries. In these States while occupancy tenants had transferable rights, the non-occupancy tenants or sub-tenants did not enjoy such rights. In these States and also in West Bengal such tenants and sub-tenants continue to pay the same rents to the Government which they were previously paying to the *zamindars* and no reduction in rent has been made as part of scheme of abolition. Thus, even these tenants have not materially benefited from the abolition provisions. In permanently settled areas, the rents payable by *raiyats* represented the customary levels of rent and were not based on any systematic method of assessment. In temporarily settled areas also, the rent rates at which the *raiyats* are paying land revenue to the Government were fixed long back as part of revisional settlement operations and now bear no relationship with the quality or productivity of the land. In some of the States measures to undertake *raiyatwari* settlement have been adopted but progress in this respect is extremely slow except in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Assam and Madras.

LEGISLATION FOR RAIYATWARI TENURE

At the time of *raiyatwari* settlement the *raiyats* were conferred full proprietary rights with right of transfer and lease. This resulted in the creation of a class of non-cultivating owners as well as that of non-owning cultivators on a large scale. In recent years the concept of ownership has undergone a veritable change and the permanent, heritable and transferable rights including the right to lease enjoyed by the tenure holders have been made subject to various types of restrictions provided under the land revenue and tenancy legislation. The ownership right as defined under the *raiyatwari* legislation, has been restricted to right of occupancy, *i.e.*, right to cultivate the land on a permanent and heritable basis and does not cover a right to collect rent or transact the land for business purposes. The ownership of land signifies the positive contribution which an owner can make to agriculture and not the undue benefit that he can derive from it.

Tenancy legislation primarily aimed at regulating tenant-landlord relationship and not at putting an end to it. This was so because, unlike the *zamindars*, the *raiyatwari* holders were full proprietors and were not holders of big estates. At present, there are about 35 tenancy enactments in force in different parts of the country to deal with the following classes of tenants:

(i) Tenants of home-farm lands settled with intermediaries after abolition;

(ii) Sub-tenants or under-*raiyats* in the ex-intermediary areas;

(iii) Tenants holding lands from *raiyats* or landholders in the *raiyatwari* areas; and

(iv) Crop sharers.

There are still large variations in the provisions of tenancy legislation enacted in various States with regard to security of tenure, regulation of rents and right of purchase for tenants. The measures relating to security of tenure restrict the grounds on which a tenant shall be liable to ejectment. The grounds for ejectment are generally the following:

(i) Non-payment of rent;

(ii) Performance of an act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land;

(iii) Sub-letting the land;

(iv) Using the land for purposes other than agriculture, etc., and

(v) Resumption of land for personal cultivation by the landlord.

Ejectment is to take place through an order of the Revenue Court and in the case of first four conditions, the landlord, after getting his tenant ejected, can put another tenant in his place. In the case of last condition the landlord after ejecting his tenant has to cultivate his land personally.

In Andhra, Madras, Mysore and Orissa, apart from the conditions stated above, the tenants are liable to ejectment from their entire area after the expiry of minimum period of lease prescribed under the law. The period of interim protection is extended from year to year and in some cases, for every six months. This creates uncertainty in the minds of tenants. In Bihar, even interim protection has not been given to tenants. It is unfortunate that comprehensive legislation for tenants has still to be brought on the statute book in these States. In Orissa, a tenancy Bill has recently been passed by the State legislature.

The provisions relating to right of resumption also differ from State to State. While there are States like U. P. and Delhi where no resumption was allowed for personal cultivation, there are States like Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Madras and West Bengal where in certain cases legislation permits ejectment of tenants or crop-sharers from the entire area if the landlord wants to exercise the right of resumption.

In a number of States, *e.g.*, Andhra Pradesh (Telangana area) and Rajasthan, a distinction is made between the existing tenants, *i.e.*, tenants existing at the commencement of the tenancy Act and future tenants. The provisions relating to security of tenure and right of purchase, etc., do not apply to tenants admitted after the commencement of the Act. The Plan also does not suggest to confer any rights on future tenants. But it may be equitable to apply tenancy provisions to future tenants in the same manner as the existing tenants as in many cases the Acts came into force about a decade back.

PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Land reform surveys conducted on behalf of the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission and other organizations indicate that while implementation of legislation for abolition of intermediaries has been fairly satisfactory, most of the provisions of tenancy legislation have been more or less

ineffective. Legislation on land reforms may be rendered ineffective because of the following reasons:

(i) The legislation may not go far and may fall short of fulfilling the objective;

(ii) There may be technical defects and contradictions in the legislation itself;

(iii) Legislation may not be properly implemented because of administrative difficulties and inadequacies; and

(iv) The spirit of legislation may go against the underlying social and economic forces.

The legislation for abolition of intermediaries failed in its purpose only where it did not provide to bring the tenants of the intermediaries into direct relationship with the State. But, in the case of tenancy legislation, the progress was checked by all the four types of difficulties stated above. It has been stated above that provisions of tenancy legislation in many States are still far behind the policy laid down by the Planning Commission. For example, the fixation of statutory rent as high as customary rent (*e.g.*, at one-half of the gross produce) may be of limited value to tenants and it may be natural to expect that tenants in these States would not be paying less than the statutory rent.

If we go through the history of tenancy legislation during the past ten years, we find that the legislation has generally been pursued in an unsystematic and un-co-ordinated manner and it has been suffering from a host of technical defects and contradictions. For instance, legislation was passed in Saurashtra to prohibit leasing in future except by persons suffering from a disability. It was further provided that leases made in contravention of the law shall be declared null and void and both the lessee and the lessor shall be liable to fine. This simply resulted in evasion of the provision through collusion between the lessor and the lessee. Had it been provided that in case of unauthorized leases, the lessor shall be penalized and the lessee made owner, perhaps the legislation would have been more effective. In some States (*e.g.*, Bhopal, Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan) where legislation was enacted to give interim protection, no provision was made at the same time to fix maximum rents. Again, rents were fixed or tenants were given a right to purchase ownership without giving adequate protection to tenants against ejectment. Security of tenure without fixation of maximum rents is useless inasmuch as the landlord can enhance the rent to any extent and get the tenant ejected on non-payment of the rent so enhanced. According to an enquiry conducted by Prof. M. B. Desai, about 38 per cent of the evictions of tenants in Gujarat areas during 1952-55 were due to failure by tenants to pay rents. Similarly, it is meaningless to provide for fixation of rent or right of purchase without giving adequate security of tenure. A tenant is likely to be threatened by ejectment move if he tries to invoke rent or purchase provisions. That is why the provisions regarding fixation of rent and right of purchase have been mostly ineffective in many States because no provision was made to give adequate and effective protection to tenants against ejectment. In many States (*e.g.*, Rajasthan, Berar, Punjab, Pepsu and Madhya Bharat), no legal sanctions were provided against the landlord if a tenant was ejected unlawfully or the landlord realized more than the statutory rent. Sometimes, while provision was made for penalty against unlawful ejectment, the law did not provide for the

restoration of the ejected tenant. It is, therefore, not surprising that, as revealed by enquiries, in Hyderabad 57 per cent of protected tenants were evicted from 59 per cent of the area held by them and in Bombay, tenants were ejected from 42 per cent of the area before and during the first four years of the First Five-Year Plan period. The position in other States could be no better if similar surveys had been conducted there also.

Another loop-hole in tenancy legislation has been the loose way in which the term "personal cultivation" was defined in various States. In a number of States, crop-sharing arrangements and absence of effective supervision on the part of the landlord were not regarded as tenancies. The Plan has suggested that land should be deemed to be under the personal cultivation of a landowner if (i) he bears the *entire* risk of cultivation *and* (ii) the land is cultivated under his personal supervision or the supervision of any member of his family. It has two implications. Firstly, by getting his land cultivated through crop-sharers, the landlord shares the risk of cultivation and the land cannot be treated under his personal cultivation even if there is personal supervision on the part of the landlord. In Punjab, cultivation under any arrangement is self-cultivation provided the landlord undertakes personal supervision. Secondly, cultivation of land through servants or hired labourers without personal supervision by the landlord does not tantamount to personal cultivation. However, in some States like Punjab (Pepsu area), U. P. and West Bengal, it is not necessary under the law that cultivation through servants or labourers on wages should be accompanied by personal supervision. Cultivation through labourers is not possible without personal supervision which also includes directing and decision-taking and a landlord who takes the entire risk of cultivation cannot afford to be an 'absentee'. In other words, all cases of cultivation through so-called hired labour without one's personal supervision should in reality be crop-sharing arrangements. Moreover, in States where the law enjoins upon the landowner to supervise the land cultivated by labourers, the term 'supervision' has been left vague and undefined. Because of the defective definition, the lands, ostensibly resumed by the landholders on grounds of personal cultivation, are cultivated through crop-sharing arrangements wherein crop-sharers are treated as labourers or as partners in cultivation. It is only recently that some States have started paying attention to this aspect with a view to making the term more stringent.

It has been stated above that in some States the legislation makes a distinction between the existing tenants and tenants admitted after the commencement of the Act. It has been found that landlords take advantage of this provision by either converting the existing tenants into future tenants or by replacing them with new tenants. Even in the case of existing tenants, in a number of States like Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Punjab, etc., a distinction is made between those who are in possession for a specified period (*e.g.*, six years) and those who are not, in the matter of conferring protected tenancy status, etc. What naturally happens is that landlords try their best to prevent tenants from continuing in possession for the specified period. We remember how a similar mistake in the Bengal Rent Act of 1859 had to be rectified in the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 to provide that a *raiyat* could acquire occupancy right, if he had been in possession for 12 years of *any* land and not necessarily the *same* land. It is unfortunate that no lessons were learnt from the legislation enacted 100 years back. In this connection it may be stated that the Plan suggests that all existing tenants, irrespective of the length of tenancy, should be conferred permanent right.

Both the Khusro and Dandekar Reports which investigated the working of

Hyderabad and Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Acts respectively have pointed out that ejectment of tenants generally takes the form of 'voluntary surrenders'. The history of tenancy legislation of Hyderabad and Bombay where the so-called "voluntary surrenders" took place on such a large scale shows that while comprehensive legislations were being proposed for these States, the existing legislation did not provide for any security of tenure to tenants. The existing legislation freely allowed the landlords to resume land for personal cultivation by ejecting tenants from the entire area. In this connection it may be recalled that the First Five-Year Plan provided that a landlord might resume land upto three family holdings and the idea of leaving a minimum area with the tenant was conceived of during the Second Plan period. The Reports further indicate that in very few cases (2.5 per cent in both Bombay and Hyderabad) the ejectment of tenants took place through courts even though the landlord could easily get his tenants ejected through legal process. It was so because a tenant could be easily persuaded to surrender land when he was made to realize that the law was not on his side. It may be correct to say that a defective tenancy legislation has done more harm to tenants than no legislation at all. A provision has been made in a few States like Mysore, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra to regulate voluntary surrenders on the lines suggested in the Second Plan. It is, however, felt that the most effective safeguard against 'voluntary surrenders' may be through strengthening the tenancy provisions of the legislation.

It was observed by the Committee of Direction of the Rural Credit Survey that all the powerful economic and social elements in rural areas join together to jeopardize the plans or programmes for the uplift and emancipation against exploitation of persons at the lower level. The same has been the case in the field of land reforms. Legislation for abolition of intermediaries was successful in achieving the desired aim of abolition of intermediary tenure mainly because the State itself took over the rights of intermediaries and undertook the responsibility for payment of compensation. On the other hand, the implementation of tenancy legislation was left to be determined by tenant-landlord relationship and the State came into picture only when called upon in the event of a disagreement between the landlord and the tenant. The vested interests had a free play when either the legislation was defective or there were lapse on the part of the administrative machinery, *e.g.*, when the tenant's name or rights were not recorded in the record of rights or when the record of rights was not correct or up-to-date. It is only recently that the trend has shifted in favour of the State stepping in to put an end to vestiges of tenant-landlord relationship either by conferring ownership upon tenants of non-resumable areas by issue of notifications as provided in Bombay, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, etc., or otherwise declaring them tenants of the State as, for instance, provided in Kerala.

It is true that any legislation which goes against the economic and social forces rampant in the country is bound to meet some opposition and evasion however comprehensive it may be. After all, deterioration in the working conditions of tenants is the net result of scarcity of land and the overcrowding in agricultural occupations. Under these circumstances the tenants, especially the newly admitted, may be willing, in the absence of alternative means of subsistence, to cultivate the land of their landlords without taking advantage of any of the tenancy provisions or may be even afraid of getting their names recorded in the record of rights. For sometime past, the Bihar Government has been conducting field enquiries for bringing the records up-to-date, but it is reported that tenants are not generally coming forward to get their names recorded. It may

be that in actual practice the area leased-in has not decreased since the inception of tenancy legislation and it may be much more than what even the records may show. This is, to some extent, borne out by the results of the Rural Credit Follow-Up Survey. It may, however, be conceded that the landowners are chary of leasing out their lands for fear of adverse rights accruing to their tenants. Moreover, by restricting the landowners' right of transfer and mortgage, except where these are made in favour of the Government or co-operatives, the possibility of the cultivators' lands passing into the hands of absentee landlords and non-agriculturists is very much reduced. It is revealed by the Dandekar Report that while the cases of non-cultivating owners selling their lands to cultivators were quite large, the cases of cultivators selling their lands to non-cultivators were very few.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

In India both ownership and operational holdings are characterized by (i) small size of an average holding, and (ii) unequal distribution of land. Thus, the pressure of population on land which works through sub-division of holdings is accentuated by unequal distribution of land. The pressure of population on land has a direct impact in determining the average size of holding of a particular region or State, as indicated in Table I.

TABLE I — PRESSURE OF POPULATION AND AVERAGE SIZE OF HOLDING

District	Rural Population per square mile	Average size of cultivated holding (acres)	District	Rural Population per square mile	Average size of cultivated holding (acres)
Nadia	614	4.0	Mandsaur	124	10.4
Gaya	598	5.3	Broach	199	12.9
Etawah	521	5.0	East Khandesh	220	12.3
Ferozepur	268	23.7	West Godawari	457	6.3
Bikaner	17	37.1	Dharwar	204	13.5
			Coimbatore	419	8.8

Source: Rural Credit Follow-Up Survey 1956-57, Genera' Review Report, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, 1960.

Historically speaking, the pattern of distribution of land is the outcome of tenurial settlements made by the State from early periods and disparity in the social and economic opportunities enjoyed by different sections of population. In India, the distribution of operated area in various size groups tends to closely follow the distribution of area owned as shown in Table II.

The sub-division of ownership holding generally results in the sub-division of an operational holding too. Table II also shows that perhaps as a result of leasing there is slight improvement in the distribution of operational area. If looked at from purely economic point of view, it is a matter of satisfaction that while 70 per cent of the holdings are uneconomic—if we roughly take an operational holding of less than 5 acres as uneconomic—the area involved in uneconomic holdings is only about 15 per cent. Thus bulk of the land is cultivated in fairly sized units. The problem of uneconomic holdings is essen-

TABLE II – DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP AND OPERATED AREA

Sl. No.	Size groups of Holdings (in acres)	Holdings		Area	
		Ownership	Operational	Owned	Operated
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Below 1	47.26	42.08	1.37	1.20
2.	1.00-2.49	13.98	14.07	4.86	4.38
3.	2.50-4.99	13.49	15.28	10.09	10.02
4.	5.00-9.99	12.50	14.19	18.40	18.56
5.	10.00-24.99	9.17	10.36	29.11	29.22
6.	25.00-49.99	2.66	3.12	18.63	19.54
7.	50 and above	0.94	1.10	17.54	17.08
	Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Eighth Round of the N.S.S. — Report on Land Holdings.

tially a human problem—the problem of feeding 70 per cent of the cultivating households who eke out bare subsistence by cultivating tiny plots or also by working elsewhere as agricultural labourers.

While the legislation for abolition of intermediaries did not generally affect the distribution of holdings, the tenancy legislation which provided for the right of resumption by the landlord and right of purchase by tenants might have resulted in reducing the size of operational holdings.

The land reform measures which directly affect the size and distribution of holdings are legislation for ceiling on landholdings, prevention of sub-division and fragmentation and co-operative farming. Legislation for ceiling on existing holdings has been enacted or is in process of enactment in all the States. Actual implementation has, however, not been taken in any State except Jammu and Kashmir, and West Bengal. The provisions of the legislation vary from State to State in the matter of level of ceiling, provisions for disregarding transfers, rate of compensation, exemptions and allotments of surplus lands. Ceiling has been fixed more or less in an arbitrary manner without taking into consideration the extent of surplus area likely to be available for redistribution to landless labourers and uneconomic holders or leaving a viable unit of ownership or cultivation with the owner. In some States legislation applies to the land owned under personal cultivation while in others it applies to tenanted lands as well. While in some States each individual is entitled to retain land up to ceiling limit, in others it applies to the aggregate area held by all the members of a family. In latter case also, some States make allowance for large families, others do not. While legislation for some States provides to disregard transfers made with a view to evade ceiling by giving restrospective effect to the legislation, in others the transfers will be disregarded only after the commencemnt of the ceiling law. There are also some States where there is no provision to disregard transfers made even after the commencement of the Act. No reliable estimates have been prepared about the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling limit which may vest in the Government, but, judged from the trend of the legislation and the extent of malafide transfers and partitions, the surplus land is likely to prove

negligible. However, large scale cases of transfer of land in anticipation of ceiling legislation might have resulted in some redistribution of land except where such transfers were *benami* in nature. Ceiling on future acquisitions must have also operated against further concentration of land.

The existing holdings are not only small, these are under a constant threat of being further sub-divided. Consolidation of holdings does not generally increase the size of a holding but it increased only its operational efficiency, by making it more compact. The legislation for prevention of sub-division and fragmentation, which has been enacted in most of the States, prohibits partition, transfer or leasing of a holding or a plot thereof which results in creation of a holding or a plot below the specified size. Partition and transfer, etc., of holdings or plots which are already below the specified size are also disallowed. However, there are practical difficulties in the enforcement of these provisions, especially those which regulate partitions. The co-sharers generally partition the land informally without having recourse to the court. It is also not easy for courts to decide the cases of partition due to the operation of the Law of Inheritance and the lack of alternative means of livelihood. It is only through co-operative farming that it is possible to increase the size of an operational unit without increasing the size of an ownership unit or to preclude the division of an operational unit when there is division of an ownership unit. However, the progress in this direction has been very slow.

In the absence of comparative data, it may not be incorrect to assume that the above measures have not helped to improve both the size and distribution of cultivated holdings. On the whole, it may be said that while land reforms have largely succeeded in removing functionless intermediaries between the State and the cultivator, it has failed to solve the problem of uneconomic holdings or to correct the structural imbalance between land and labour.

LAND REFORMS IN ITALY

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Ten years have elapsed since passage of the "Sila" and "Extract" Laws enabled the Land Reform Agencies to begin their work in the areas of extensive farming of Italy. Enough time then has passed for a first appraisal of the results of one of the most important Acts of the new Italian democracy.

The first result of the reform is seen in the disappearance of the large extensively farmed properties of the poorest agricultural regions. In their place today one finds both the small peasant farm and the medium-sized farm established with