@article{Bellemare:22132,
      recid = {22132},
      author = {Bellemare, Marc F. and Barrett, Christopher B.},
      title = {AN ASSET-RISK MODEL OF REVERSE TENANCY},
      address = {2003},
      number = {376-2016-20544},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {22},
      year = {2003},
      abstract = {Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to  richer tenants on shares, is a common phenomenon. Yet, it  does not fit existing theoretical models of sharecropping  and has never before been modeled in the development  microeconomics literature. We explain reverse tenancy  contracts using an asset risk model that incorporates moral  hazard. When choosing the terms of an agrarian contract,  the landlord considers the impact of her choice on the  probability that she will retain future rights to the  rented land. Thus, this model captures the effect of tenure  insecurity and property rights on agrarian contracts. The  main testable implication of the theoretical model is that,  as property rights become more secure, reverse tenancy  tends to disappear.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22132},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.22132},
}