@article{Romero-Aguilar:211825,
      recid = {211825},
      author = {Romero-Aguilar, Randall and Miranda, Mario J. and Glauber,  Joseph W.},
      title = {Sustainability of Regional Food Reserves When Default is  Possible},
      address = {2015},
      number = {1008-2016-80290},
      pages = {16},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {We model a regional grain reserve as a game of two  countries that agree to pool together a
fraction of their  grain to cope with production risk, but that can also  repudiate their obligations
at any moment. The reserve can  be operated as a “credit union” or an “insurance union”.  We
find that although risk sharing is more effective when  production shocks are negatively correlated,
the regional  reserve is more sustainable when the correlation is  positive. We also find
that an “insurance” game can be more  sustainable than a “credit” game.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211825},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.211825},
}