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### Hub Premiums In An Era of Low-Cost Carrier Competition And Financial Distress

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### Contents

- Hub Premiums Previous Research
- Hub Premiums in the Light of Recent Industry Trends
- Empirical Analysis & Preliminary Results



# In a number of studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers have repeatedly proven the existence of hub premiums

 Selected Examples
 Previous Findings of Hub Premiums Research

 Estimated Hub Premiums

 GAO (1989, 1993):

 - "fares for travel originating at <u>concentrated airports</u> vs. fares for trips originating at <u>unconcentrated airports</u>" (1989)

 - "fares for trips originating in Charlotte, a <u>concentrated airport</u> vs.

 + 70%

#### Borenstein (1989):

- "carrier with an <u>airport enplanement share</u> of 50% vs. direct competitors with only 10% of the traffic at the endpoints"
- "TWA yield/mile for flights to/from St. Louis vs. similar flights that did not originate or terminate in St. Louis"
- Dresner and Windle (1992): "hub premiums, as an effect of <u>airport concentration</u>"

fares at unconcentrated control airports" (1993)




+12%

+81%

+ 1-2%

### Hub premiums may be decomposed into market concentration and market power effects



# Throughout the 1990s, however, LCCs have increased their market shares and induced substantial fare decreases

18.6% 15.8%

15.1%

10.6%

9.0%

7.6%

5.8%

3.3%

2.2% 1.9%

1.7%

1.1%

0.7%

0.7%

0.7%

5.2%

2003

American

Northwest

Continental

Southwest

US Airways

Alaska

AirTran

Comair

Frontier

Others

Spirit

ATA JetBlue

America West

United

Delta

1993					
United	21.2%				
American	20.4%				
Delta	17.4%				
Northwest	12.2%				
Continental	8.9%				
USAir	7.4%				
TWA	4.8%				
Southwest	3.5%				
America West	2.4%				
Alaska	1.2%				
Midwest Express	0.2%				
Comair	0.1%				
Atlantic	0.1%				
Aloha	0.1%				
Horizon	0.1%				
Others	0.2%				


Market Shares of Low-Cost Carriers<sup>1)</sup>

Comments
Various studies have empirically analyzed the direct and indirect effect of low-cost carriers on fares:
<ul> <li>Morrison (2001): Direct effect of Southwest Airlines:</li> <li>\$ -3.4 billion</li> <li>Effect of actual, adjacent and potential competition:</li> <li>\$ -9.5 billion</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996): Direct effect of Southwest Airlines: -53% yield reductions</li> <li>Effect on adjacent route markets: -8% to -45% yield reductions</li> </ul>


(1) Standard & Poor's (2003), based on revenue passenger miles, data from U.S. Department of Transportation




### While low-cost carriers have thrived, established airlines have been experiencing major financial distress




Industry Net Profit/Loss & Major Chapter 11 Filings








### Given these industry trends, it is questionable to what extent carriers are still able to capitalize on market concentration and market power



### Our analysis is based on a price estimation equation suggesting direct and interaction effects of LCC competition and financial distress

**Price Estimation Equation** 



# The base model consists of 25 variables and is estimated using data from the U.S. top 1000 domestic route markets in 1992, 1997, and 2002

Key Variables and Data

Key Variables	•	<ul> <li>Hub premium variables</li> <li>Route HHI</li> <li>Maximum Airport HHI</li> <li>Maximum Airport Market Share</li> <li>Route Market Share</li> <li>Low-Cost Carrier variables</li> <li>LCC dummy variable</li> <li>"LCC competitors for non-LCC carrier" dummy variable</li> <li>"LCC competitors for LCC carrier" dummy variable</li> <li>"Adjacent route markets with LCC presence" dummy variable</li> <li>Financial distress variables</li> <li>Difference of a carrier's and its route competitors' Z scores</li> <li>"Chapter 11 filing" dummy variable (used to model interaction effects only)</li> </ul>
		Quarterly data for 1992, 1997, and 2002
Data		34,541 usable observations (out of a total 35,114 observations; one aggregated observation per carrier per route per quarter)
	•	Data sources: DOT DB 1A (10% ticket sample of all U.S. domestic passenger traffic) – top 1000 routes, DOT Form 41 Traffic, Form 41 Financial Data, (schedules B1, P12), Table T-1; ATA ; Bureau of Labor Statistics



### In the preliminary regression analysis the hub premium, LCC and financial distress variables have the expected signs and are significant


_						
	Excerpt Variable	Coefficient <sup>1)</sup>	P> t		Comments	
	Constant	-6.90	0.00			
	Distance	0.40	0.00		The dependent variable is "Fare"	
	SlotRoute	0.11	0.00		(all fares deflated to Q1 1992)	
	TouristRoute	-0.15	0.00		The coefficients for all four buch	
Market		0.04	0.00		<ul> <li>The coefficients for all four hub</li> </ul>	
concentration	MaxAirportHHI	0.09	0.00	Hub premium	premium driver variables are positive and significant supporting	
Market	MaxAirportShare	0.07	0.00	variables	the contention that market	
power	RouteShare	0.05	0.00	J	concentration and market power	
	Coupons	-0.17	0.00	Ι	increase fares	
	AirlinePass	-0.09	0.00			
	Loadfactor	-0.04	0.08		The coefficients for the LCC	
	AirlineCost	0.03	0.01	LCC variables	variables are all negative and significant as expected	
	LCC	-0.37	0.00			
	LCCCompForNonLCCs	-0.19	0.00		The "ZCeereDiff" verieble is	
	LCCCompForLCCs	-0.03	0.00		The "ZScoreDiff" variable is positive and significant indicating that airlines that are financially healthier than their route competitors tend to charge higher fares	
	AltRouteLCC1M	-0.02	0.00			
	ZScoreDiff	0.02	0.00	Financial distress variable		
	IndustryCost	1.77	0.00	valiable		
	1997	-0.30	0.00			
	2002	-0.64	0.00			
	Number of observations	34541 Ad	dj. R-squar	red 0.7162	(1) based on log-linear specification of the model	

tend to charge higher ear specification of the model Robert H. Smith SCHOOL OF BU

Leaders for the Digital Economy

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
## The empirical results show that both market power and market concentration lead to significant fare increases



Leaders for the Digital Economy

## Hub premiums appear to vary over time – possibly as a function of the industry's financial health

**Hub Premiums Over Time** 



## Some preliminary tests also indicate that the presence of low-cost carriers has indeed reduced hub premiums

On average, hub **Major Carriers** Low-Cost Carriers premiums earned by Route HHI 0.076 Route HHI 0.037 low-cost carriers are Airport HHI 0.069 Airport HHI 0.026 93% lower than major Airport Share 0.112 Airport Share -0.031 carriers' hub premiums (when there is no direct **Route Share** 0.057 Route Share 0.019 LCC competition) Hub Premium: \$36.20 Hub Premium: \$2.70 On average, the major **No LCC competition** LCC competition carriers' hub premiums Route HHI 0.076 Route HHI 0.025 are 18% lower when Airport HHI 0.069 Airport HHI 0.099 there is low-cost carrier Airport Share Airport Share 0.112 0.121 competition than when there is no LCC **Route Share** 0.057 Route Share 0.048 competition Hub Premium: \$36.20 Hub Premium: \$29.50


**Hub Premiums And Low-Cost Carriers** 

Note: all coefficients significant at the less than 1% level; avg. hub premiums were obtained by changing power/concentration levels from 25<sup>th</sup> percentile to 75<sup>th</sup> percentile with all other variables held constant at their mean parameter values



### In summary, LCCs and financial distress seem to have lowered hub premiums – further analyses will investigate these effects more closely

**Summary and Outlook** 



- reconfirm the existence of hub premiums (i.e. price markups related to market concentration) and market power)
- demonstrate a decline of fares and variability of hub premiums between 1992 and 2002
- are an indication of the moderating effect of LCCs and financial distress on hub premiums

#### Our next steps include:

- a closer examination of the impact of LCCs and financial distress on hub premiums, most importantly an analysis of the hypothesized interaction effects
- a more detailed analysis of the changes of the regression results over time

#### We expect to find that:

- hub premiums are less of an issue today than they were in the earlier stages of hub premiums research and, therefore, do not warrant regulatory intervention
- hub premiums are likely to further decrease in the future as LCCs expand their operations and financial distress continues to reshape the industry

